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Abstract
In the universal blind quantum computation problem, a client wants to make use of a single
quantum server to evaluate C |0〉 where C is an arbitrary quantum circuit while keeping C secret.
The client’s goal is to use as few resources as possible. This problem, first raised by Broadbent,
Fitzsimons and Kashefi[4], has become fundamental to the study of quantum cryptography, not
only because of its own importance, but also because it provides a testbed for new techniques
that can be later applied to related problems (for example, quantum computation verification).
Known protocols on this problem are mainly either information-theoretically (IT) secure or
based on trapdoor assumptions (public key encryptions).
In this paper we study how the availability of symmetric-key primitives, modeled by a random
oracle, changes the complexity of universal blind quantum computation. We give a new universal
blind quantum computation protocol. Similar to previous works on IT-secure protocols (for
example, BFK[4]), our protocol can be divided into two phases. In the first phase the client
prepares some quantum gadgets with relatively simple quantum gates and sends them to the
server, and in the second phase the client is entirely classical — it does not even need quantum
storage. Crucially, the protocol’s first phase is succinct, that is, its complexity is independent
of the circuit size. Given the security parameter κ, its complexity is only a fixed polynomial of
κ, and can be used to evaluate any circuit (or several circuits) of size up to a subexponential of
κ. In contrast, known schemes either require the client to perform quantum computations that
scale with the size of the circuit [4], or require trapdoor assumptions [17].
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Background
In the universal blind quantum computation problem, a client wants to make use of a single quantum
server to evaluate a quantum circuit C secretly, where C can be arbitrary (up to a subexponential
size). The protocol should at least satisfy the following requirements:
1. (Correctness) When the server is honest, the client holds C |0〉 in the end of the protocol with
probability negligibly close to 1.1
2. (Security) For any adversarial server, which might be unbounded, polynomial, etc, depending
on the setting, it cannot distinguish whether the current protocol is run on input C, or run
on input 0|C|.
∗Boston University, jyz16@bu.edu. Supported by NSF award 1763786.
1A more general form is to consider the evaluation of C |ϕ〉, and in the security requirement both the circuit C
and the input state |ϕ〉 should be hidden. Although this paper considers C as the only input of the protocol, it could
also handle the slightly more general case.
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3. (Efficiency) When the protocol is run honestly, the client and the server should be in poly-
nomial time.
This problem is important for two reasons.
First, the problem itself is very important. The related problems in classical world, like the
delegation of computation, multiparty computation or homomorphic encryption, are all very famous
and fundamental problems and have a very long history. The blind quantum computation problem
is important for the same reasons, and in quantum world there is one more reason to study this
problem: It’s very possible that the quantum computers will mainly be used as a cloud service. So
if a client wants to use the power of a remote quantum server, and simultaneously, wants to keep
its data or circuits secret, a blind quantum computation protocol is needed.
Second, the blind quantum computation problem is the “testbed” for new techniques. Empiri-
cally, once a new technique for the blind quantum computation problem is developed, it may be also
useful in many other problems, including the quantum computation verification, multiparty quan-
tum computation, certifiable randomness, zero knowledge proof for QMA and so on. For example,
the MBQC-based techniques started with the UBQC protocol[4] for blind quantum computation,
and that work becomes the foundation of the UVBQC protocol for quantum computation verifica-
tion [10]; the trapdoor claw-free function techniques started with [17] and led to a series of works
for quantum computation verification[18], certifiable randomness[3], zero-knowledge arguments[23]
and so on.
In classical world, this problem is studied for a long time under the names of two party com-
putation and fully homomorphic encryption. We note that these concepts are not the same, but
they are closely related and aiming at the same goal: to delegate the computation while keep it
(or the data) secure. There are two fundamental constructions in classical world: one is the gar-
bled circuit, or garbled table, raised by Yao[24]; another construction is the “fully homomorphic
encryption”[11], or “FHE”.
1.2 Previous Works and Motivating Questions
Previous protocols for universal blind quantum computation require either the execution of many
quantum gates — proportional to the size of the circuit [4] — but not computational assumptions;
or the existence of “trapdoor” cryptographic primitives, such as the quantum hardness of learning
with errors (LWE [21]) [17]. (See Table 1 for some existing works.) There are also some protocols
that use two separated quantum servers[4] and some protocols that are not universal[5, 25, 16, 20];
in this paper we focus on the universal protocols using a single quantum server.
• One representative of information-theoretically (IT) secure protocols is the BFK’s UBQC
protocol [4]. This protocol is based on the measurement-based quantum computation, and
it contains an offline phase and an online phase. In the offline phase the client sends many
quantum gadgets to the server. These quantum gadgets can be prepared using single-qubit
gates, but the total number of gadgets is linear to the size of the circuit to be evaluated,
which is prohibitive. This protocol becomes the basis of many later works.
• Some earlier representatives of computationally-secure protocols include [8], which is based
on the LWE assumption. Then in [17] a classical fully homomorphic encryption for quantum
circuits was constructed. That protocol is based on the classical FHE and a new technique
based on a primitive called “trapdoor claw-free functions”, and both primitives were con-
structed from the LWE assumption. Later these techniques were applied to many related
problems like the quantum computation verification [18] and certifiable randomness[3].
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One way to classify these assumptions are through the “Impagliazzo’s Five Worlds”[13]. IT-secure
protocols remain secure in all of these worlds, since it does not rely on any computational assump-
tion; and the trapdoor assumptions, FHE, LWE and many “fancy” cryptographic schemes and
protocols are secure only in Cryptomania (a world in which trapdoor primitives exist).
Minicrypt, intuitively, is the world where “symmetric cryptography” (for example, pseudoran-
dom generators) exists but “public key cryptography” (trapdoor functions) is not possible. Our
motivation is to understand what sorts of cryptography are possible in the quantum analogue of
Minicrypt. We work with an abstraction, the QROM, which assumes (1) all parties have oracle
access to a common function which is chosen uniformly at random; (2) the adversary is unbounded,
but can only makes polynomial number of quantum random oracle queries. This setting allows
for symmetric-type primitives (one-way functions, pseudorandom generators, collision-free hash
functions), but excludes “public key primitives”. By the “Random Oracle Methodology”, once we
design a protocol in this setting, we can replace the random oracle by an appropriate hash func-
tion or symmetric key encryption scheme. (We note that although this setting itself is formal, the
instantiation of protocols proved secure in this setting can be subtle: there do exist some construc-
tions that are not possible to be instantiated[6]. However, the usage of the random oracle as an
ideal model of hash functions or symmetric key encryption schemes is wide-spread, and has greatly
helped the design of cryptographic protocols in the past three decades[15].)
Besides the theoretical motivation, the protocols in this setting have the following advantage:
currently there are few choices for post-quantum secure public key encryption schemes[21, 14]. If we
want to instantiate some more specific and stronger primitives, like the FHE, or trapdoor claw-free
functions, currently the only known way is through the lattice-based cryptography (for example,
LWE). On the other hand, there are many choices for symmetric key primitives, and the protocols
can remain to be sound even if lattice-based cryptography is broken.
The design of delegation-style quantum protocols in this setting is not well-understood. As
far as we know, except the works on IT-secure protocols, the only work is [25], which designed a
quantum delegation (blind quantum computation) protocol for a useful but specific circuit family.
Thus we ask the following question:
How does the availability of symmetric-key cryptographic primitives (modeled by a random
oracle) change the complexity of universal blind quantum computation?
Another factor that we will consider is the “client side quantum computation”. Existing works
assume either the client side quantum gates can be linear to the circuit size (during the whole
protocol), or the client is classical; little is known for the setting between them, which is, to allow
the client to run succinct quantum operations, which can depend on the security parameter, but
should be independent of the circuit size. Thus, we can ask the following question:
How can we design a universal blind quantum computation protocol in which the client side
quantum operations are “succinct” (that is, independent of the size of the circuit to be evaluated)?
Thus we want to design a protocol that is more efficient than the IT-secure protocol in terms
of the client side quantum operations (here we do not care about the classical computation and
communication as long as they are polynomial size), and does not use any public key primitives.
None of the existing techniques works for this setting and we need to develop new techniques and
a new protocol.
1.3 Our Results
In this paper we prove the following:
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Client side quantum computation IT-secure IT-secure in QROM LWE
Classical Might be impossible[1] Unknown [17]
Succinct Unknown This paper
Linear [4] [8]
Table 1: Different tradeoff between client side quantum operations and assumptions in quantum
computation delegation problem. “Succinct” means it’s at most a fixed polynomial of the security
parameter; and “Linear” means it’s linear to the size of the circuit to be evaluated.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a universal blind quantum computation protocol (Protocol 18 in Section
12) for circuits of size up to a fixed subexponential function of the security parameter such that
• It contains an offline phase and an online phase. In the offline phase the client prepares and
sends some quantum gadgets to the server, and in the online phase the client is completely
classical.
• The total number of quantum gates to prepare these quantum gadgets is at most a fixed
polynomial of the security parameter, independent to the size of the circuit to be evaluated.
• The classical computation, communication and the server-side quantum computation are
bounded by a fixed polynomial of the security parameter and the size of the circuit to be
evaluated.
• The protocol is secure in the quantum random oracle model against any unbounded malicious
server whose number of queries to the random oracle is bounded by a fixed subexponential
function of the security parameter.
Thus, based on our work, together with previous works[4, 17] we can complete the following
table (Table 1) about the different tradeoffs between client side quantum resources and assumptions.
Our result required the development of a set of new techniques for protocol design and security
proof. Section 1.4 provides a brief technical overview. As discussed before, new techniques in blind
quantum computation often led to protocols for many related problems. We hope the techniques
and protocols developed here will also lead to advances on a range of related problems.
1.4 A Top-down Overview of Our Techniques
1.4.1 Two-step construction via remote gadget preparation
How can the client allow the server to evaluate O(|C|) gates using only succinct quantum compu-
tation? In our protocol, the client will first prepare poly(κ) “gadgets” (poly is a fixed polynomial),
then use classical interactions to allow the server to expand them to O(|C|) gadgets “securely”.
Here the “gadget” is defined to be the states in the form of |y0〉 + |y1〉, where y0, y1 are random
different strings, or “keys”. The client holds the keys, and the server should hold the state.2
This step — the preparation and expansion of gadgets — is called “remote gadget preparation”.
Let’s give the correctness and security definition informally below (for the formal definition, see
Section 4.1):
Definition 1.1 (Correctness of the remote gadget preparation, informal). A protocol is called a
remote gadget preparation protocol of output number L and output length κout if: if the server
2Note that this form of state also appears in some previous papers like [3].
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behaves honestly, it passes the protocol and in the end of the protocol (1)the client gets key set
{y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1} where for any i, y(i)b is a string of length κout, y(i)0 6= y(i)1 ; (2)the server holds the
state ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉).
And we say this protocol has input number N if initially the server holds (or equivalently, the
client prepares and sends) ⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+ |x(i)1 〉) and the client holds all the keys. We use N → L to
denote the honest behavior of a protocol of input number N and output number L.
Note that the protocols in this paper do not require quantum communication in the middle of
the protocol. And the security is defined below, based mainly on the server’s ability to compute
both keys simultanously.
Definition 1.2 (Security definition of the remote gadget preparation, informal). Suppose the out-
put key set is {y(j)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}. For any unbounded malicious server that makes at most subexp(κ)
quantum random oracle queries, for any i, it cannot both make the client accept and output y
(i)
0 ||y(i)1
(|| denotes string concatenation) with non-negligible probability, even if all the {y(j)b }j 6=i,b∈{0,1} to-
gether with the hash tags of {y(i)0 , y(i)1 } are provided to the server just after the last step of the
protocol (or equivalently, given as auxiliary information).
The auxiliary information here is necessary to get rid of potential correlations among keys.
And it may be surprising that the security condition is about unpredictability (as opposed to
simulation). However, it is sufficient for the final indistinguishability-based security of the blind
quantum computation protocol.
As an example, we can see the honest final state ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉) satisfies the security defi-
nition since the server cannot output y
(i)
0 ||y(i)1 from it with high probability, even if {y(j)b }j 6=i,b∈{0,1}
and the hash values of {y(i)0 , y(i)1 } are provided.
Then we will construct our universal blind quantum computation protocol that satisfies Theorem
1.1 (denoted UBQC-GT) as follows:
Outline 1. Design of the UBQC-GT protocol:
1. Remote gadget preparation: (1) the client sends some initial gadgets to the server, whose
size and length are succinct; (2) the client uses classical interactions to allow the server to
expand the number of gadgets securely. The number of output gadgets can be proportional to
the circuit size to be evaluated (|C|).
2. Blind quantum computation execution: using the gadgets output from the previous step, the
client and the server evaluate C using only classical interactions.
The construction of the secure remote gadget preparation protocol (the first step in Outline 1)
is the most difficult step. The second step is relatively easier but still non-trivial.
1.4.2 Remote gadget preparation via weak security
The first step of Outline 1 are achieved as follows: we will define the “weak security” of the remote
gadget preparation. We will first construct a weakly-secure protocol, then “amplify” it to a fully
secure one. Let’s first give an informal introduction to the weak security. (We will revisit this
concept in Section 4.2 and give the formal definition in Definition 4.11.)
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Definition 1.3 (Weak security of remote gadget preparation, informal). We say a remote gadget
preparation protocol is weakly secure with “weak security transform parameter” (p|η,C → η′, C ′)
if a statement in the following form holds:
Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 satisfies: (1)for any adversary with query number less than 2η , for
any input key pair, the norm of guessing both keys in this key pair correctly is at most C| |ϕ〉 | (even
if the adversary is given some auxiliary information — which contains all the other key pairs and
the hash tags of keys in this pair); (2) the state is not too “ill-behaved”. Then for any unbounded
adversary with up to 2κ random oracle queries during the protocol, at least one of the following is
true:
• The client accepts with at most norm p;
• For the output state, for any3 output key pair, any adversary of query number at most 2η′
(note that this is the adversary after the protocol completes, which is different from the
adversary during the protocol), the norm that both the client accepts and the adversary
outputs both keys in this key pair in the end is at most C ′| |ϕ〉 |, even if all the other output
keys and the hash tags of keys in this pair are provided as the auxiliary information.
We simply say “weakly secure” when 1− p, 1− C are at least inverse-polynomial.
Note that we use “norm” instead of “probability” to be compatible with the formal definition.
Intuitively it’s the square root of the probability. Here we simply use a Dirac symbol to describe
the initial state — we can do it by assuming the randomness are all purified by the environment.
And we do not assume the initial state is normalized.
To make the protocol useful, we often need to additionally require the protocol to be “gadget-
increasing” (defined in Definition 4.2), in other words, should generate more gadgets than it con-
sumes. For example, the correctness and security does not rule out the following trivial protocol:
the client prepares ⊗ni=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉) itself, and sends it to the server. Here the number of output
gadgets from this protocol is equal to the number of gadgets the client needs to prepare.
The the overall structure of the construction of the secure remote gadget preparation protocol
(step 1 of Outline 1) is as follows:
Outline 2. Protocol construction for the step 1 of Outline 1:
1. Construct a weakly-secure remote gadget preparation protocol such that it can (asymptotically
multiplicatively) generate more gadgets than it consumes.
2. Using some amplification techniques to amplify it to a secure remote gadget preparation pro-
tocol.
We note that we do not mean our amplification technique works for any weakly-secure protocol.
There are many other factors that we need to consider besides the security: we need to ensure the
post-amplification protocols can indeed generate more gadgets than what it consumes; we want to
keep the client side quantum computation succinct; and we need to ensure the different parameters
are sufficiently good for later constructions and within the scope of our security proof techniques.
Balancing these parameters and properties is tricky; and our work can be seen as the design of a
series of subprotocols with different tradeoffs for these properties, and these subprotocols, when
combined together, can achieve what we want.
3The order of quantifiers is correct here: it’s not “the server can output an index i and the corresponding output
keys”. This seems to be a very weak definition; however, these parameters, if too weak, will affect the result of the
amplification process: the amplification process will not give us a protocol that can increase the number of gadgets.
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In Section 5 there is an index of different subprotocols, and we put an intuitive diagram that
shows the process of construction of different subprotocols. Here let’s give some brief overview on
how these two steps in Outline 2 are achieved. (And we will give a more detailed overview in the
beginning of Section 8 and 9 for these two steps, separately.)
Weakly Secure Protocol Step The main idea in the first step of Outline 2 is a construction
called “robust reversible garbled table”, which is a special reversible garbled table[25] that remains
“secure” (in some sense) even if both keys on some wire are “leaked” together. The “reversible
garbled table” construction in [25] gives us some non-trivial protocol, but simply using this con-
struction does not give a “gadget-increasing” protocol. In our new “robust reversible garbled table”
construction, an additional random permutation is added to further strengthen the security. The
robust reversible garbled table is constructed as follows:
RevGT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : x(1)b1 ||x
(2)
b2
||x(3)b3 ↔ y
(1)
b1
||perm(y(2)b2 ||y
(3)
b3⊕b1b2)) (1)
where perm is a bit-wise permutation. This notation means the reversible garbled table that
encodes the mapping between the left side and the right side of the ↔ symbol, which can be seen
as a reversible garbling of the Toffoli gate, where the right side is bit-wisely permuted under a
hidden permutation. We can see this garbled table allows the server to implement the following
mapping:
(|x(1)0 〉+|x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(2)0 〉+|x(2)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+|x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+|y(1)1 〉)⊗perm((|y(2)0 〉+|y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+|y(3)1 〉))
The observation is, under this garbled table, the client can save the cost of preparing one gadget
on the left hand side. The client can simply give the description of a key pair {x(2)0 , x(2)1 } to the
server, and ask the server to prepare the gadget itself to complete this mapping. And the table will
not be broken (in some sense) since the permutation provides additional protection.
Then we make use of a subprotocol called “padded Hadamard test” to ensure this permutation
can be removed (which means, the client reveals perm to the server, and the server permutes the
bits correspondingly) without affecting the security too much. This “padded Hadamard test” is a
padded variant of the Hadamard test in [18], but the extra padding gives it some new properties
that do not exist in the unpadded version. This test is done on gadget |x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉, and consumes
it. We will prove (in Section 8.2 and Appendix F) that informally this test works as a “proof of no
knowledge”, which informally means, if the server wants to pass this test with high probability, it
loses the ability to compute the corresponding keys from the post-test state. This helps us argue
about the weak security after the permutation is removed. In this way we get a protocol that is
weakly secure — but still not “gadget-increasing”.
The reason is although the robust reversible garbled table saves one input gadget, this test
consumes one. But this problem can be solved through an additional step. We observe that, if we
can create n such tables, n = Θ(κ), and do n blocks of this protocol in parallel, and let them share
one of the gadgets — we can prove that the gadget consumed in the test can be shared — we get
an n+ 1→ 2n protocol, which is gadget-increasing, and weakly-secure.
This part is formalized and completed in Section 8.
Amplification Step After we complete the first step in Section 8, we move to the amplification
part. We put an overview and description of ideas of the amplification in Section 9, and in Section
10 and 11 we complete the amplification formally and complete Outline 2.
Roughly speaking, we call our technique “repeat-and-combine”. We notice that in the definition
of weak security there are two sources of the weakness: (1)the bound on the accepting probability
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in the first case is too weak; (2)the norm that the server can compute both keys is not negligible.
We solve the first problem through a procedure called the “repeat” technique, and solve the second
problem through the “combine” technique. (We note that the upper-level idea of “repeat-and-
combine” is not that new since some papers in some other problems use a similar upper-level idea
to improve the security, like [9, 12].) Here we not only need to complete each step of the security
amplification in our setting, but also need to ensure the final protocol is still gadget-increasing and
everything is still within the scope of our security proof techniques.
In the “repeat” part, we run many different blocks of the same protocol, and require the server
to pass on all the blocks. We can intuitively know, if the attacker wants to pass all the test with
non-negligible probability, it can only choose to attack a small number of blocks. (Here we describe
the intuition using a setting where the attack is independent in each blocks.)
The “combine” technique combines multiple gadgets into one gadget to reduce the server’s
ability to compute both keys in a key pair. Let’s give a minimal example of our “combine” technique,
where only two key pairs are combined.
Suppose the server holds (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉), while the client knows all the keys. Addi-
tionally suppose the server knows the hash tags of all the keys. Then it can make a measurement
on the xor of the indexes:
(|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉)→
(output = 0)(|x0〉 |x′0〉+ |x1〉 |x′1〉) (output = 1)(|x0〉 |x′1〉+ |x1〉 |x′0〉)
then it reports the measurement result to the client, and the client can compute and store the
new key pairs ({x0x′0, x1x′1} or {x0x′1, x1x′0}). Intuitively, if the server can output both keys in the
output key pair, intuitively it means it not only know both x0 and x1, but also know x
′
0 and x
′
1.
Thus we can hope the parameters in the “SC-security” — defined to be the “norm of computing
both keys” — for the new key pair is the multiplication of “norm of computing both keys” for the
two input key pairs. And if we repeat this combination and combine
√
κ key pairs one-by-one, we
can hope this parameter goes down to an exponentially small value.
However the story is not that simple. As far as we know, such a simple combination does not
always imply the multiplication of the “bound of the ability (norm) of computing both keys”. To
solve this problem, we add an additional layer — called “SecurityRefreshing” layer — in the
middle of each round of the combination process. This additional layer can be used to “strengthen
the security” in each round. It makes use of (and consumes) some “freshly secure” gadgets, but the
consumption is small and it can refresh the security of a large number of key pairs simultaneously.
And we can prove, the new protocol, with the “combine” technique and this additional layer, is
exponentially secure (in the sense of SC-security, the “norm of computing both keys”).
This is still not the end of the story. The combination part decreases the number of gadgets
multiplicatively and thus we need to do more to make it gadget-increasing again! The solution is,
before we do this “repeat” and “combine”, we need to first self-compose the protocol to boost the
“gadget-expansion ratio” from 2 to Θ˜(κ). Then since we only combine
√
κ gadgets into one gadget
the overall gadget-expansion ratio is still Θ˜(
√
κ) > 2.
Finally we get a remote gadget preparation protocol that is gadget-increasing (with gadget
expansion ratio > 2) and secure (not just weakly-secure). Intuitively we can simply run this
protocol again and again to increase the number of gadgets until we get enough gadgets. Again,
we make use of the SecurityRefreshing layer to bypass the obstacles in the security proof.
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1.4.3 Overcoming the difficulty in the security proof — especially the “combine”
part
Besides the ideas for protocol design, we also need to develop a framework for the security proof.
First, we design a notation system to track all the information in the protocol and security
proof, and to make them modular. In Section 4 we formalize the weak security, and introduce
the concept of “weak security transform parameter”. It basically makes the parameters in the
weak security definition explicit, thus when we compose the subprotocols and we can argue about
their security in a modular way. And in this paper, during the security proof, we assume all the
randomness are purified by the environment thus we can describe everything using a simple Dirac
symbol.
Section 6 contains some technical lemmas and ideas for the security proof. In Section 6.1 we
formalize the SC-security, ANY-security and unpredictability in our setting. They describe the
hardness-of-computation for some key or key pairs when the system is in some state.4 The “SC-
security” is what we have seen in the last subsubsection: we say a state |ϕ〉 (where randomness are
purified by the environment) is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for a key pair {x0, x1} (stored on the client side)
if for any server-side operation U with query number at most 2κ (and assume the server already
knows some hash values of the keys), there is
|Px0||x1U |ϕ〉 | ≤ A
where Px0||x1 is the projection onto the space that the server guess x0||x1 correctly. (And U can
introduce extra ancilla qubits, which is implicit here.) In Section 6.3 we discuss a series of “state
decomposition lemmas”, which play an important role in the security proofs later, since it links
the weak security to the (normal) security. As we said before, we will first design a weakly-secure
protocol, then amplify it to a fully secure protocol. Then we will meet an obstacle on the security
proof: how can we prove the “combine” technique really work? In this subsection, we prove that,
if a state has some SC/ANY-security/unpredictability for some key(s) — which can be seen as
an alternative description of the input-output behaviors of the weakly-secure protocols, we can
decompose it into two states where one state is “exponentially secure”, and the other state has
bounded norm.
Let’s give a simple, informal example for that. Assume the state of all the parties is described
by |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are already purified thus we can use Dirac symbol). And we want
to study the unpredictability (on the server side) for a key x0 that is stored in some client-side
register. The condition is, assume for any server-side operation U which makes at most 2κ queries,
there is5
|Px0U |ϕ〉 | ≤ A| |ϕ〉 | (2)
(Again, the server should know some hash tag of x0.)
Then we can prove, the state, together with some server-side ancillas, can be decomposed into
|φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• |φ〉 is (2O(κ), 2−O(κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x0 — which means, the right hand side of (2)
becomes exponentially small.
• The norm of |χ〉 can be bounded: | |χ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A| |ϕ〉 |.
4For comparison, the “weak security” describes the security of protocols when the input states have some prop-
erties.
5Here the meaning of A is different from what is shown in the formal description of the lemma. In the formal
description the right hand side of the condition is simply A, not A| |ϕ〉 |.
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Which means, if we use |ϕ〉 as the initial state of some subprotocol, we can analyze the post-
execution state |ϕ′〉 := subPrtl ◦ |ϕ〉 through subPrtl ◦ |φ〉+ subPrtl ◦ |χ〉.
Furthermore, this decomposition, in some cases, for example, in the cases where a subprotocol
is iterated for many times, could be repeated in each round. This will become a basic technique
that we will use in the security proof, especially in the “combine” part of the protocol. Simply
speaking, when A is not too big, the norm of |χ〉 will decrease multiplicatively compare to the
original state, and if we do this decomposition in each step — and view |χ〉 as the initial state in
the next round, etc — this will lead to an exponential decay on the norm of this term. Informally
this technique is as follows:
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PpassPrtl |ϕ〉 (3)
:= PpassPrtl |χ0〉 (Here we denote |χ0〉 := |ϕ〉 to make the notation consistent) (4)
= PpassPrtl>1 |φ1〉+ PpassPrtl>1 |χ1〉 (5)
= · · · (6)
= PpassPrtl>1 ◦ |φ1〉+ PpassPrtl>2 ◦ |φ2〉+ · · · + Ppass |φκ〉+ Ppass |χκ〉 (7)
Then we can see the last term is exponentially small and the other terms can be analyzed using
other techniques. (For more details, see Section 6.8.)
1.4.4 From Remote Gadget Preparation to UBQC-GT
Now we give an informal overview of how to reduce the universal blind quantum computation
problem to the remote gadget preparation problem. We will give a more detailed description in the
beginning of Section 12.
Recall that in BFK’s UBQC protocol[4], to delegate a circuit C, the client needs to prepare
the state |+θi〉, θi ∈r {nπ/4 : n = 0, · · · 7} for each gate gi in C. Thus the total number of client
side quantum computation is linear in |C|. One natural idea is to delegate the preparation of these
states further; such a primitive for preparing secret single qubit states is abstracted and formalized
into a concept called “8-basis qfactory” [7]. However there is an important difference of our setting
from [7] here: we cannot delegate the preparation of these single qubit state “from scratch”; instead,
we make use of the output of the remote gadget preparation protocol.
Let’s first describe our protocol using the honest setting. First, the client and the server run
a remote gadget preparation protocol, with output number L := |C|. The honest server will get
the “gadgets” ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉 + |y(i)1 〉). Then we need to design an 8-basis qfactory protocol that can
transform each gadget |y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉 into a single qubit state |+θi〉, where θi = θi1π+ θi2π/2+ θi3π/4,
θi2, θ
i
3 ∈r {0, 1}2 are initially sampled by the client randomly, and θi1 ∈ {0, 1} appears during the
protocol, and the client gets it in the end. Finally both party can run the BFK’s UBQC protocol
to complete the task.
Now let’s describe how our “gadget-assisted 8-basis qfactory” works. Starting from the state
|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉, the client and the server do the followings6:
1. The client samples θi2, θ
i
3 ∈r {0, 1}2
2. The client computes and sends the “phase garbled table” ([25], or Section 2.4) on phase gate
RZ(θ˜
i) = |0〉 〈0| + eiθ˜i |1〉 〈1| where θ˜i = θi2π/2 + θi3π/4. This allows the server to transform
6This is not a complete description. In the formal protocol there is a “non-collapsing basis test” step, which does
not affect the honest behavior but important for the security proof
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the state into
|0〉 |y(i)0 〉+ eiθ˜
i |1〉 |y(i)1 〉
3. Ask the server to make a Hadamard measurement on the registers that stores y. And the
server reports the output d. If the server is honest, it will hold the state (after removing the
global phase):
|0〉+ eiθi |1〉 , θi = θi1π + θi2π/2 + θi3π/4, θi1 = d · (y(i)0 + y(i)1 )
And the client can computes θi from d, y
(i)
b .
From our description we can see in the honest setting the server can get |+θi〉 from a single gadget
|y(i)0 〉 + |y(i)1 〉. Since the server gets ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉 + |y(i)1 〉) from the remote gadget preparation step,
applying this subprotocol on each gadget, the server will get ⊗Li=1 |+θi〉 while the client gets all the
angles. And this is enough for running the BFK’s UBQC protocol. What’s more, the client side
quantum computation only appears in the remote gadget preparation part, and the transformation
discussed here only uses classical interactions.
We will give a more detailed discussion of this protocol and its security in Section 12.
1.5 Discussions
This result naturally gives rise to the following questions:
1. How can we use these techniques on other problems? (for example, quantum computation
verification, or zero-knowledge proof.)
2. Is it possible to do universal blind quantum computation using completely classical client and
quantum random oracle model, and make it secure again any unbounded adversary which
only makes polynomial number of queries? Is it possible to do universal blind quantum com-
putation using succinct client side quantum computation without relying on any assumptions?
We conjecture the answer is no, but we need a formal proof for it.
3. Is it possible to directly base the protocol on standard model assumptions (quantum-secure
oneway functions, or hash functions?)
One intuitive way to think about the future direction is through Table 1. There are many unknown
cells in this table, and the completion of this table will be interesting. And one interesting thing
is: similar (although not the same) tradeoffs also appear in many other problems, not restricted
to the delegation-style quantum protocols. For example, in the classical world, for the “secure
key agreement” problem, symmetric key encryption scheme allows two parties to expand succinct
size of pre-shared keys; to achieve key agreement without pre-shared keys, public key encryption
is necessary. Thus we wonder whether this is fundamental tradeoff in quantum (or even not only
quantum) cryptography.
1.6 Paper Outline
This paper is organized as follows. A more detailed overview of the overall construction can be
found in Section 4 and 5.
• In Section 2 we give some background, preliminaries and notations, including a simple intro-
duction to reversible garbled tables and phase tables in [25].
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• The setting and notation systems that we use during the whole paper are formalized in Section
3.
• In Section 4 we design a modular framework for tracking the correctness and security prop-
erties of different subprotocols.
• In Section 5 we give a summary of the subprotocols in the following sections. And we put an
intuitive diagram there.
• In Section 6 we give some basic lemmas and techniques for the security proofs later. Thus Sec-
tion 1 to 6 are mainly summaries and preparations before we move to the formal construction.
The protocol design begins at Section 7.
• In Section 7 we study a class of subprotocols which we call “non-collapsing basis test”. This
class of subprotocols will be useful later, mainly in Section 8 and Section 12.
• In the end of the Section 8 we give a remote gadget preparation protocol with weak security,
that is gadget increasing (Protocol 8). This section contains the protocol design and security
proof.
• In Section 9 we give an overview of how to amplify the security to normal security. In Section
9.4 we formalize part of the protocol (by the end of the “repeat” technique) and discuss the
“combine” technique part.
• In Section 10 we give part of the proofs for the amplified protocol (which is the “repeat”
part).
• In Section 11 we give the formal protocol for the “combine” part and complete the security
proof, and complete the amplification and give a fully secure remote gadget preparation
protocol. In Section 11.1 we give the “SecurityRefreshing” protocol that we use to overcome
the obstacles in the security proof and make the “combine” technique really works. By this
time step 1 of Outline 1 is completed.
• Finally in Section 12 we give a universal blind quantum computation protocol and complete
the proof of Theorem 1.1.
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2 Preliminaries and Some Basic Notations
2.1 Basics of Quantum Computation
We refer to [19] for the introduction of quantum computation. And we refer to [5] and the prelim-
inary section of [25] for an introduction of quantum cryptography. We first clarify some notation
here.
Notation 2.1. We write |ϕ〉 ≈ǫ |φ〉 if | |ϕ〉 − |φ〉 | ≤ ǫ, where | · · · | means the norm of a complex
vector.
Note that in the sections later we will give many similar notations, including ≈Adv∈Aǫ , ≈st−indǫ
and so on. The notation given in Notation 2.1 is the strongest one.
Below we give an overview of the quantum random oracle model.
2.2 The Quantum Random Oracle Model
The quantum random oracle model was raised in [2], which can be seen as an ideal model of
hash functions in quantum world. It allows quantum queries to an oracle of a random function
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∞. In this section we clarify some notations about the quantum random oracle.
The random oracle is denoted as H in this paper. H also represents the query operations to
the random oracle.
All the parties can query the random oracle.
2.2.1 Notations for string concatenation
When we need to concatenate some strings to form an input to the random oracle (for example,
add a random pad before some keys), we use the || symbol. Note that || operation is not limited to
the input of the random oracle.
We also use this notation to describe the concatenation of sets of inputs:
Notation 2.2. Suppose Set1, Set2, Set3 are three sets where each set contains strings of some fixed
length. We use Set1||Set2||Set3 to denote the set S = {x||y||z}x∈Set1,y∈Set2,z∈Set3 .
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2.2.2 Blinded Oracle
One common operation when we study the random oracle is the “blinded oracle”.
Definition 2.1 (Blinded Oracle). Suppose Set is a set of inputs, we say H ′ is a blinded oracle of
H where inputs in Set are blinded to mean (1)H ′(x), x ∈ Set are independently random to the
content of H and each other; (2)H ′(x), x 6∈ Set are the same as H(x).
For example, we can sayH(Set||Kout|| · · · ) is blinded to mean we blind all the entriesH(pad||yb||other)
where pad ∈ Set, yb ∈ Kout, other can be any string (of some fixed length).
2.3 qIND-CPA Security of the Blind Quantum Computation
The security of the blind quantum computation can be formalized as the “qIND-CPA” security, as
discussed in [5].
Definition 2.2 (qIND-CPA game). Suppose the protocol that we consider is called UBQC−GT ,
which takes the security parameter κ and a quantum circuit C as the input. Consider the following
game between a challenger and an adversary:
• The adversary chooses a quantum circuit C (whose size is at most a fixed subexponential
function of κ).
• The challenger samples b ∈r {0, 1}. If b = 1, it runs UBQC −GT (κ,C) with the adversary.
If b = 0, it runs UBQC −GT (κ, 0|C|) with the adversary.
• The adversary tries to guess b.
The distinguishing advantage is defined to be
|Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ, 0|C|) = 0)| (8)
where the first term inside is the probability that the adversary outputs 0 in the case of b = 1, and
the second term inside is the probability that the adversary outputs 0 in the case of b = 0.
In this paper we describe the security using the “qIND-CPA security in the quantum random
oracle model against unbounded adversaries with up-to subexponential random oracle queries”,
which is defined as Definition 2.3 below.
Notation 2.3 (subexponential functions). We say a function f is a subexponential function of κ
if there exist 0 < c1, c2 ≤ 1 such that f = Ω(2κc1 ) and f = O(2κc2 ).
Definition 2.3. We say a protocol UBQC − GT is qIND-CPA secure in the quantum random
oracle model against unbounded adversary with up-to subexponential RO queries if for any Adv
with number of RO queries at most subexp1(κ), for any quantum circuit C of size at most subexp2(κ),
there is
|Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ, 0|C|) = 0)| ≤ 1/subexp3(κ) (9)
where subexp1, subexp2, subexp3 are some fixed subexponential functions.
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The advantage of talking about subexponential instead of polynomial functions in se-
curity statements We often use subexponential functions in this paper because subexponential
functions can upper-bound arbitrary polynomial functions. In cryptography we often discuss secu-
rity by saying “for any polynomial something, there exists a negligible function, something”. But
this can lead to complicated order or dependency of quantifiers. We will instead say “for any some-
thing less than subexp1(κ), the distinguishing advantage (or something) is less than 1/subexp2(κ),
where subexp1, subexp2 are fixed subexponential functions and κ is the security parameter”. By de-
scribing the statement in this way we avoid the complicated dependency-of-quantifiers, since many
things are fixed.
2.4 Garbled Tables, Reversible Garbled Tables and Phase Tables
The garbled table[24] is a fundamental primitive for the randomized encoding and two party com-
putation of classical circuits. In this construction the client will sample two different keys kw0 , k
w
1
for each wire w, where each key is of length poly(κ), kw0 6= kw1 , where poly is a fixed polynomial.
And for each gate g from the input wires w1, w2 to the output wire w3, it computes a table, where
each row of this table is of the following form, where Enc is some “symmetric encryption scheme
with a key tag”:
Encxw1b1 ||x
w2
b2
(yw3g(b1,b2))
(Note that in this paper we use concatenation instead of cascading to deal with the multi-key case.)
Here we switch the notation from k to x, y: we use x to denote the input keys and use y to denote
output keys.
Let’s first introduce a notation for the garbled table. Before that, we give a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme with a key tag:
Definition 2.4 (Underlying encryption scheme Enc used in this paper). Enck(p;PadLen = l, TagLen =
κtag), or Enck(p) if the parameters are implicit, is defined as follows:
The client samples R1 ← {0, 1}l, R2 ← {0, 1}l, output
((R1,H(R1||k)⊕ p), (R2,H(R2||k)))
. The first part is the ciphertext and the second part is the key tag. The length of the random
oracle output in the first part is the same as the length of p and the length of the random oracle
output of the second part is κtag .
Then we can give a notation for the garbled table:
Definition 2.5 (Notation for classical garbled tables).
GT (∀b : xb → yg(b);PadLen = l, TagLen = κtag)
is defined as the garbled table that maps xb to yg(b), where {xb} and {yb} are two sets of keys (here
two symbols whose only difference is the subscript have the same string length), which means, a
table where each row is Encxb(yg(b);PadLen = l, TagLen = κtag), and the order of rows is shuffled
randomly.
And we also use this notation for multi-input multi-output gates: for example, for a Tof-
foli gate where the input keys are K = {x(1)b , x(2)b , x(3)b }b∈{0,1} and the output keys are Kout =
{y(1)b , y(2)b , y(3)b }b∈{0,1}, the notation for the garbled table is
GT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : x(1)b1 , x
(2)
b2
, x
(3)
b3
→ y(1)b1 , y
(2)
b2
, y
(3)
b1b2⊕b3 ;PadLen = l, TagLen = κtag)
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, and each row in this garbled table is
Enc
x
(1)
b1
||x(2)b2 ||x
(3)
b3
(y
(1)
b1
||y(2)b2 ||y
(3)
b1b2⊕b3 ;PadLen = l, TagLen = κtag)
The garbled table can be applied in quantum world, as discussed in [25]. First, we note that,
the garbled table can be evaluated on quantum superposition of keys. Take the Toffoli gate as an
example. When we evaluate the garbling of Toffoli gate on superpositions of the input keys, we
get: ∑
b1b2b3
αb1b2b3 |xb1〉 |xb2〉 |xb3〉 →
∑
b1b2b3
αb1b2b3 |xb1〉 |xb2〉 |xb3〉 |yb1〉 |yb2〉 |yb1b2⊕b3〉
However, in the mapping above the input and the output are entangled. In [25], the “reversible
garbled table” is raised, which allows the server to implement the following mapping:∑
b1b2b3
αb1b2b3 |xb1〉 |xb2〉 |xb3〉 →
∑
b1b2b3
αb1b2b3 |yb1〉 |yb2〉 |yb1b2⊕b3〉
while also provides some form of security.
The reversible garbled table contains a forward table and a backward table. Let’s define the
following notation:
Definition 2.6 (Definition and notation for reversible garbled tables).
RevGT (∀b : xb ↔ yg(b);PadLen = l)
is defined as the reversible garbled table that maps xb to yg(b), which is, the combination of the
following two garbled tables:
• Forward table: GT (∀b : xb → yg(b);PadLen = l), where the tag length is the same as the
length of keys yg(b).
• Backward table: GT (∀b : yg(b) → xb;PadLen = l), where the tag length is the same as the
length of keys xb.
As Definition 2.5, this notation can be applied in the multi-key case and the keys in different wires
are concatenated before feeding into the Enc operation. The tag length is the same as the total
output length.
Definition 2.7 (Simplified notations for some reversible garbled tables). For a reversible garbled
table on input key set K and the output key set K ′, if the type of the gate is implicit, when there
is no ambiguity, we can use RevGT (K ↔ Kout;PadLen = l) to denote the reversible garbled table
that maps the keys in K to the corresponding keys in Kout, and back.
Example 2.1. A reversible garbled table for Toffoli gate where the input keys areK = {x(1)b , x(2)b , x(3)b }b∈{0,1}
and the output keys are Kout = {y(1)b , y(2)b , y(3)b }b∈{0,1} is composed of a forward table and a back-
ward table, where the forward table is
GT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : x(1)b1 , x
(2)
b2
, x
(3)
b3
→ y(1)b1 , y
(2)
b2
, y
(3)
b1b2⊕b3 ;PadLen = l)
and the backward table is
GT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : y(1)b1 , y
(2)
b2
, y
(3)
b1b2⊕b3 → x
(1)
b1
, x
(2)
b2
, x
(3)
b3
;PadLen = l)
And the reversible garbled table can be written compactly as follows:
RevGT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : x(1)b1 , x
(2)
b2
, x
(3)
b3
↔ y(1)b1 , y
(2)
b2
, y
(3)
b1b2⊕b3 ;PadLen = l)
As we said before, here in K and Kout, two symbols whose only difference is the subscript have
the same string length.
20
2.4.1 Phase tables
[25] also provides a garbling technique for phase gates. Suppose a phase gate R(θ) = |0〉 〈0| +
eiθ |1〉 〈1|, θ = nDπ needs to be applied on a wire, where the key pair from garbling on this wire is
K = {x0, x1}, then the phase table is defined as follows.
Definition 2.8. PhaseGT (K, θ;PadLen = l,Denominator = D) where K = {x0, x1}, θ = nDπ is
defined to as follows: the client samples m← {0, · · ·D − 1}, prepares the garbled table
GT (x0 → m,x1 → m+ n;PadLen = l, TagLen = l)
(Note that we simply choose the tag length to be the same as the pad length, which is enough for
usage later.)
The phase table allows the server to do the following transform, as described in [25]:
α |x0〉+ β |x1〉 → α |x0〉+ eiθβ |x1〉
In this paper we always chooseD = 4. Thus we can simplify the notation as PhaseGT (K, θ;PadLen =
l).
2.5 Mathematics-level Notations
First we clarify that all the log functions are on base 2.
Another concept that we need to clarify is the concept of “polynomial function”. In this paper
we allow the polynomial poly to have a degree between 0 and 1. So κ1/3, κ1/3 + κ+ κ2 are all seen
as polynomial functions.
Definition 2.9. Define a positive-value function f(κ) to be a polynomial function if f(κ) = O(κα),
where α is positive. Denote the infimum value of α that makes this expression true as the degree
of this polynomial. Denote it as poly.
We have already defined the “subexponential function” in Notation 2.3. Let’s repeat it here.
Definition 2.10. We say a function f is a subexponential function of κ if there exist 0 < c1, c2 ≤ 1
such that f = Ω(2κ
c1 ) and f = O(2κ
c2 ). Denote it as subexp.
Finally let’s clarify what O(1) means in this paper.
Definition 2.11. When we use O(1) in a statement, it means there exist some positive constants
such that when we replace the O(1)-s in the statement by these constants the statement is true.
3 The Problem Setting and Notation System
3.1 The Problem Setting, and its Notation System
3.1.1 CQ-states, purified notation and natural notation
In our protocol, if we temporarily ignore the “read-only buffer” system that will be introduced
later, there are four parties: the random oracle, the client, the server and the environment. The
first two parties are classical during the protocol, while the last two parties can be in quantum
state. Thus at any time during the execution of the protocol, the state of the whole system can be
described as a cq-state [19].
21
Definition 3.1. [19] A cq-state is described as the state ensemble {pc, c, |ϕc〉}, c ∈ C,
∑
c pc = 1.
Note that the |ϕc〉 is not necessarily normalized. And it can be equivalently and simply described
as {c, 1√pc |ϕc〉}, c ∈ C.
It’s convenient to study a cq-state by studying its purified state:
Definition 3.2. [19] The purification of a cq-state given in Definition 3.1 is defined to be |ϕ〉 =∑
c∈C
1√
pc
|c〉 |ϕc〉 |c〉, where the first |c〉 is held by the parties that are originally considered to be
classical (which are the client and the random oracle in our protocols), and the last |c〉 is in the
environment. And its norm is
| |ϕ〉 | = |
∑
c∈C
1√
pc
|c〉 |ϕc〉 |c〉 | = |
∑
c∈C
1√
pc
|c〉 |ϕc〉 | =
√∑
c∈C
1
pc
| |ϕc〉 |2
In our protocol, the client will be completely classical after the first step of the protocol (which
is, to send a quantum gadget to the server), and the server will hold a quantum state. So the
joint state of the client, the random oracle, the server and the environment will form a cq-state.
Temporarily denote such a state as |ϕHCSE〉, where H is the inner content of the random oracle, C
is the memory on the client side, S is the server’s system and E is the environment that the state
is entangled with. The HC systems are the classical part and the SE systems are the quantum
part.
This state can be purified by imagining these classical parts are entangled with the environ-
ment. As a simplified example, if we assume the client side memory contains key register K and
randomness register R, which are independently random, the purified state will be:
|ϕHKRSE〉 :=
∑
hkr
1√
#h
|h〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random Oracle
⊗ 1√
#k
|k〉 ⊗ 1√
#r
|r〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Client side
⊗ |ϕSEH=h,K=k,R=r〉 ⊗ |hkr〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Server+Environment
where h is the content of the random oracle, k is the client’s keys, and r is the client’s randomness,
# means the number of possible choices. |ϕSEH=h,K=k,R=r〉 is the server-plus-environment’s state
when the choice of H,K,R is correspondingly h, k, r.
Natural notation and purified notation We note that in this paper we use two types of
notations to describe the state of the whole system during the protocol. The notation described
above, where everything is purified, is called “purified notation”. In this notation the state of the
whole system can be simply described as a pure state |ϕ〉. However, in the honest setting, we can
use a more natural notation: for example, we can simply write |x0〉 + |x1〉, to means the server’s
state is |x0〉+ |x1〉 when the client side keys are {x0, x1}; if we insist on using the purified notation
the expression will be quite long (something like
∑
x0x1
1√
|K| |x0〉 |x1〉 (|x0〉 + |x1〉) |x0〉 |x1〉). The
natural notation is suitable for the honest setting and the purified notation is suitable for the security
proof. In this paper we will use the natural notation in the honest setting and use the
purified notation when we prove the security, except explicit stated exceptions. And
we further emphasize that using purified notation in the security proof is only a security
proof technique and does not mean the client has to hold quantum states.
Finally we note that by now we assume in the protocols there are four parties, HCSE. In the
subsubsections below we will introduce the fifth register. Thus there are five registers (HCSE plus
the read-only buffer introduced below).
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3.1.2 Different phases of a protocol
Let’s explain what a “protocol” means in this setting. The notion of “protocol” is quite common
now, but a formal discussion is still needed.
Each “phase” of a protocol can be one of the following:
• The client does some local computation;
• The client sends some message to the server;
• The server does some local computation;
• The server sends some message to the client.
In some protocols in some other papers, the protocols may have an “adaptive structure”, which
means, for example, the round of interactions, or even whether some interaction exists, can depend
on the output of some previous step. But in our paper all the protocols have fixed structures
that only depends on the initial parameters of the protocol. So we don’t need to consider
this issue.
Let’s discuss these four types of phases one by one.
The “client side local operation” does not contain too much ambiguity. Note that the client is
always honest and it only does classical operations after the first step of the protocol.
In the “the server sends some message to the client” phase, the server copies some of its register
to a client-side empty register.
For the server-side operation phase, we note that
• Server’s operation is of finite size. Although we prove the security against unbounded adver-
sary, it is arbitrarily finite, and does not include “infinite size” attack. Thus the total size of
memory that the server uses is also finite.
• The attacker can introduce server-side ancilla qubits. In the later proofs we might make this
part implicit and simply write, for example, U |ϕ〉 where U is a server-side operation.
• We assume the server could only do server-side operations from the time it receives some
client side messages to the time it sends out the result. (In other words, we assume the client
side computation “takes no time”, and the adversary could not do anything from the time it
sends out the result to the time the client sends the messages in the next round.) The reason
for it is, the adversary can always “postpone” the attack until it receives the client’s message
in the next round thus this assumption does not make it weaker.
• When we discuss the adversary during a protocol, we do not take the server-side operation
after the adversary receives the last message into consideration. Instead, we will consider it
separately. In the security statement of our protocol, there are usually two adversaries: Adv
and D, where Adv is the adversary during the protocol, and D is the adversary’s operation
after the protocol completes. D is also a server-side operation. And we note that D can be
implicit within the “SC-security/ANY-security/unpredictability” (which will be introduced
later). (And note that this rule does have exceptions: Definition 2.2, 2.3.)
In the next subsubsection we will formalize the operation of “the client sends some messages to
the server”. We will introduce the “read-only buffer” system, and formalize “the client sends some
messages to the server” as the operation that the client copies the content of some registers in its
inner system to the read-only buffer. What’s more, in the server-side operation phase, the adversary
can read the content of the read-only buffer but could not revise it.
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3.1.3 Introducing the “read-only buffer”, and the “⊙” symbol for auxiliary informa-
tion
Definition 3.3. The “read-only buffer” is a standalone system, where the client can write to it
using classical gates but the server can only read it.
Definition 3.4. In the server-side operation phase, the adversary can read the read-only buffer
and the server-side system and can query the random oracle but can only write on the server-side
system. Which means the adversary can do a control-operation controlled by the content of the
read-only buffer but not the other operations on the read-only buffer.
Note that, if we purify all the randomness, the read-only buffer will also be entangled with the
environment. But the definition above still makes sense.
So why do we want to introduce it? The reason is, assuming some information cannot be erased
can make the proof much easier. These information allows us to understand what the server can
do more clearly.
As we said in Section 3.1.2, the read-only buffer will be used to store the client-to-server tran-
script of a protocol. But it’s not limited to that. In the security proof we will need to add some
more information into it and give the server some “auxiliary information”, or intuitively, assume
the adversary can know more than what is given in the honest execution.
Definition 3.5. We write |ϕ〉 ⊙ Z to denote the state that starts from |ϕ〉, the client sends Z to
the “read-only buffer”.
Here Z might be the client’s messages during a protocol, part of the client’s stored key set K,
or the hash values of part of the keys, or the output of some algorithm run by the client. In the
security proof we need to frequently assume the client sends some additional information to the
buffer (which does not happen in the protocol, but only in the security proof). Actually we already
see an example in Definition 1.2, the definition of SC-security, where {y(j)b }j 6=i,b∈{0,1} and Tag(K)
are provided as the auxiliary information. We will give a more detailed discussion for this technique
in Section 6.2.
Finally we note that introducing the read-only buffer does not make the adversary weaker, thus
proving the security in the “HCSE + read-only buffer” model implies the security in the HCSE
model described in Section 3.1.1.
3.1.4 Global tags
In the security proof, one setting that we will use is to introduce the existence of “global tags”:
Definition 3.6. The global tag of x, which is Tag(x), is defined to be H(tag||x), where tag is a
special symbol (which is never used in the honest setting). Note that tag is considered to be a
single character, and it can only be used in the beginning of the input of the random oracle. Thus
Tag can be seen as a new, independent oracle other than H.
Why do we call it “global tags”? We will see there are a lot of tags (which mean “hash values
with paddings”) for the keys in the protocol construction, for example, in Enck(x) (Definition 2.4),
the output contains two parts, the “ciphertext” and the “key tags”. These “ciphertexts” can be
further used as the inputs of the computation of some other messages, to achieve some advanced
functionalities; however, the “key tags” part is usually simply given to the server as key tags, as
the name suggests, and does not carry advanced functionalities. It’s simply used and (intuitively)
it can only be used on the server side to verify “this is the key”.
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The global tags also have such properties: it’s used in the security proof, but not in the honest
setting. In the security proof we frequently assume the client additionally provides the global tags
of some key sets to the server as auxiliary information. In most cases, it will not be used in some
complicated way.
Why do we need to introduce this concept? The answer is to make the proof simpler. We
frequently need to assume the adversary holds a version of key tags for some key sets. Lots of key
tags appear in the honest execution of our protocol, but in the security proof it’s convenient to
have a version of key tags that is consistent during the whole proof. It’s not “fair” to choose any of
these key tags that appear during the honest execution, and this will make the proof less readable.
Thus we choose to introduce the “global tag” for the security proof.
We note that in this definition we expand the input character tables from {0, 1} to {0, 1, tag}.
This does not make the adversary weaker.
We emphasize that these global tags only appear during the security proof, and the client does
not give the server such message in the real protocol. So why could we assume this and change
the protocol to a different protocol? The reason is simple: “it does not make the adversary
weaker”. If an adversary cannot break the protocol even if the client provides the global tags,
the protocol is certainly secure in its original form, since the adversary with global tags can do
anything it can do when it does not have them.
The next question is: what is the length of the output of “global tags”? For usual random oracle
outputs the output length is either described explicitly, or implicit in the protocol description; but
for global tags we hardcode it into the definition, which depends on the length of the input.
Definition 3.7. The output length of Tag(x) is 22
2|x|
(Why is such an ill-looked definition reasonable? The answer is still “it does not make the
adversary weaker”! In fact we believe some much smaller functions like 2|x| or even polynomial
functions are enough, but we choose to write it in this way to (1) emphasize that the actual length
of it does not matter (as long as it’s long enough) and (2) it makes the descriptions and proofs of
some lemmas later a little bit easier. And we note that since it does not appear in the real protocol
and is only used as a security proof tools, it does not make the protocol inefficient.
But we do need to make it big enough. The reason is to rule out the possibility of
“collision of global tags”. By making the output length very big Tag becomes almost-impossible
to be non-injective. We will formalize this fact in Section 3.1.7.
Sometimes the client needs to provide the global tags for all the keys in a set to the server. We
introduce a simplified notation for it.
Notation 3.1. Tag(K) is defined to be the tuple of the global tags of all the keys in K.
3.1.5 The language for describing key sets
When we do the security proof we use the purified notation. This notation consider the purification
of everything including the client. But we still need some “language” for describing key sets. Here
we clarify some ambiguity.
The security statement often contains some pieces similar to the following:
For key set K = {x0, x1}, the initial state |ϕ〉, if following conditions are satisfied, (......), then the
following conclusion holds, (......).
First note |ϕ〉 is the state of all the parties when all the randomness are purified by the environment.
We emphasize that here x0, x1 should not be understood as concrete values. Instead, we should
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understand “for key set K = {x0, x1}” as “the symbol for this key set is K = {x0, x1}”.
In other words, the client holds many systems that stores these keys; but in the purified notation
these systems are also purified, and these systems are in the superpositions of different possible
values of these keys.
3.1.6 Notations on projections
We will use P··· to denote the projections onto some space. The following projections will be used
in this paper:
We use Ppass to denote the projection onto the passing space. This is not a server-side operation.
(But sometimes the server can also do it on its own, when it gets enough information to do it.)
For key set K = {x0, x1}, PSxb is the projection onto the subspace that the content in S is the
same as the client side register that stores xb. (We do not say “it’s the same as xb” to consider the
purified notation setting.) And here S is usually a server-side system.
And we use PSK to denote the projection P
S
x0 +P
S
x1 , which is the space that “the server outputs
one key in K”.
For the examples above, the superscript S can be omitted when it’s not important.
3.1.7 The “initial state” in the beginning of the whole protocol
Finally let’s discuss the initial state of our protocols. Our protocol is composed of several subpro-
tocols and the initial state of these subprotocols might vary. But what we are going to discuss, is
the initial state in the very beginning, defined as follows:
Definition 3.8. Define |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉 as the state where the systems of
the client and the server are all zeros, and the random oracle is not queried, the read-only buffer
is empty, and all the parties haven’t done any operations. All the randomness are purified by the
environment.
Recall that in Section 3.1.4 we say Tag is almost-impossible to be non-injective. Now we can
formalize this fact.
Fact 1. We have, when κ is bigger than some constant,
PTag is injective on {0,1}κ |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉 (10)
≈
2−22
κ/2 |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉 (11)
(where P in (10) is the projection operation.)
If a state |ϕ〉 can be written as
|ϕ〉 =
∑
i∈[2α1 ]
Pi |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉
where each Pi is some sequence of (client or server side) unitaries, projections and oracle
queries, we have
PTag is injective on {0,1}κ |ϕ〉 ≈
2−2
2κ/2+α1
|ϕ〉 (12)
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3.1.8 Blinded oracles, revisited
Let’s recall the notation for blinded oracles in Section 2.2.2. Note that in Section 2 we haven’t
introduce the purified notation and this definition is given under the natural notation. Here Set can
also come from some probability distribution and the construction of the blinded oracle actually
depends on the actual value of Set.
Let’s understand what this definition means in the purified notation. After we purify the system
that stores Set, the symbol Set does not refer to a concrete set anymore; it’s used as the symbol to
describe the content of the system that stores the superposition of different possible Set. However,
the definition above still works, in the following sense: suppose we are currently studying the
following state
|ϕ〉 =
∑
s ∈ all the possible choices of Set
|s〉︸︷︷︸
system that stores Set
⊗ |ϕs〉
for different basis states of the system that stores Set, the blinded oracle constructed out can be
different. To make the definition well-behaved, we need to additionally assume the system that
stores Set is “read-only” in the protocol later, defined below:
Definition 3.9. We say a system is read-only after some time if no party writes on it in the
remaining protocol. In other words, all the possible operations starting from this time that contain
this system are control gates controlled by this system.
Definition 3.10. Then the “blinded oracle of H where Set is blinded” where Set is stored in
superposition in some read-only system is interpreted as follows: first for each basis s of the system
that stores Set, (as we said before, s is some set of inputs), define a blinded oracle following
Definition 2.1. For each application of this blinded oracle, the oracle query is made as follows:
controlled on the content of the system Set, apply the corresponding oracle.
Another way is to imagine that the system that stores Set is actually already measured thus
Definition 2.1 makes sense. Since this system is read-only whether it’s measured does not affect the
protocol execution. In Definition 3.10 we purify this system and the construction of the blinded
oracle takes this system as inputs, which is an equivalent definition.
3.2 Notations for Analyzing the Protocols
We introduce the following notations to simplify our security analysis. First, since we are consid-
ering the unbounded adversary with limited random oracle queries, the “power” of the adversary
is characterized by the number of queries it can make. Thus we introduce the following notations:
Definition 3.11. We use U to denote the server-side operation that can be written as a sequence
of unitary operations and random oracle queries: U = HtUtHt−1 · · ·H1U1 where each Ui can be
applied without RO queries. What’s more, we denote |U| = t as the number of oracle queries in U .
We use P to denote server-side operation that contains random oracle queries and projection
on some subspace: if P = HtPtHt−1 · · ·H1P1 where each Pi can be applied without RO queries,
and similarly write |P| = t for the number of RO queries.
We write |Adv| ≤ t to mean the total number of random oracle queries in the execution of the
adversary Adv during the whole protocol is at most t.
Recall that each of Ui, Pi can read the read-only buffer.
When we write U |ϕ〉 in this paper, U is always a server-side operation (see Definition 3.3).
Since the client is considered to be classical after the first step of the complete protocol, usually we
do not describe the client side computation in this way in the security proof.
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And recall that U can introduce server-side ancilla qubits that are at the zero state. This part
is implicit in “U |ϕ〉”
We note that | · · · | symbol is used for both the number of RO queries in an operation, and the
norm of a state. But it should be easy to distinguish them.
We then note that, if the initial state |ϕ〉 (we purify all the randomness as discussed in Section
3.1), the protocol itself, the parameters of the protocol and the code of the adversary is fixed, the
post-execution state can be determined uniquely. Thus we can write the post-execution state of
the protocol concisely:
Definition 3.12. We use
ProtocolName(Keys;Parameters) (13)
to denote a protocol which takes the description of a set of keys Keys and parameters Parameters
as the input.
The reasons that we separate “keys” and “parameters” in the protocol argument list are as
follows. (1)Note that in the honest setting both parties should run in polynomial time. This
polynomial is polynomial in the parameters (not the length of the parameters) and the length of
keys. (2)When all the randomness are purified, “Keys” does not carry any concrete value. Instead,
it should be understood as the symbols of the key sets, which point to some client side read-only
system that store these keys. On the other hand, “Parameters” still carries concrete values.
We use
|ϕ′〉 := ProtocolNameAdv(Keys;Parameters) ◦ |ϕ〉
to denote the post-execution state of running protocol ProtocolName(Keys; parameters) on |ϕ〉
against adversary Adv. Note that the state contains both the passing space and the failing space.
And we use
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PpassProtocolNameAdv(Keys;Parameters) ◦ |ϕ〉
to denote the state projected onto the passing space.
We note that if we do not explicitly add the Ppass operation, the state should contain both the
passing part and the failing part. And we note that the initial state is not necessarily normalized,
and after the projection Ppass, the state is not automatically normalized either.
When we analyze a protocol, we may need to study the behavior of the state under this protocol
step-by-step, or block-by-block. Thus we introduce a notation that represents some part of a
protocol.
Notation 3.2. We often use Prtl as an abbreviated notation of (13) for the protocol that we are
studying when there is no ambiguity. In a protocol that contains multiple steps and iterations,
we use subscripts to denote some part of this protocol. For example, a protocol has 5 steps, then
Prtl1∼4 means the protocol from the first step to the fourth step (including the fourth step). Prtl=4
means the protocol on the fourth step (so it should be applied on some state after the third step).
If the first step contains a loop, then Prtl1.1∼1.n represents the protocol from the beginning to the
end of the n-th iteration of the loop.
3.3 Other Notations
3.3.1 Notations for indexing the keys
In this paper we will use lots of pairs of keys. We introduce the following notation to simplify the
operation of “slicing” a subset of keys:
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Definition 3.13. ForK := {x(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}, we use the following notation that allows us to extract
the keys with a specific superscript: K(i) = {x(i)b }b∈{0,1}.
And this can also be applied to multi-dimension superscript: for K := {x(i)(j)b }i∈[L],j∈[J ],b∈{0,1},
we can extract a set of keys corresponding to one superscript: K(i) = {x(i)(j)b }j∈[J ],b∈{0,1}. And we
can use two superscripts to extract a pair of keys: K(i)(j) = {x(i)(j)b }b∈{0,1}
And we use K(≥i) to denote the key set {x(i′)b }b∈{0,1},i′≥i.
Suppose K ′ is a pair of keys in K (which contains multiple pairs of keys, and can be multi-
dimensional). We use K −K ′ to denote the set of keys in K other than K ′.
Note In this paper when we say “key set” or “set of keys”, the elements in this “set” are indexed
by superscripts and subscripts. (The superscripts or subscripts can be empty.) And they could be
the same (although frequently we explicitly avoid it.) So the “set” here is not “set” in math; it’s
more similar to “tuple”.
4 The Modular Framework for Protocol Design
4.1 Remote Gadget Preparation: the Stepping Stone towards UBQC
To construct a protocol that satisfies Theorem 1.1, our idea is to first construct a protocol for an
intermediate problem, which we call the “remote gadget preparation” protocol. We have already
discussed this concept informally in the introduction, and here we give a formal definition for it.
The correctness and security of the remote gadget preparation protocol are defined as follows.
4.1.1 What is the gadget?
We will see, in our construction of the remote gadget preparation protocol, the client needs to
first sample a set of initial keys K = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1}, and prepare the gadgets in the form of
⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+ |x(i)1 〉), and send them to the server; but the initial gadget number N , and the initial
key length are succinct. Let’s introduce a convenient notation to describe such form of states.
Notation 4.1. IfK = {x(i)0 , x(i)1 }i∈[N ], ∀i, x(i)0 6= x(i)1 , we defineGadget(K) to be⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+|x(i)1 〉).
The goal of the client is to allow the server to prepare the gadget ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉), where L is
an arbitrary polynomial (or even subexponential), while keeps Kout = {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1} “secure” (in
some sense we are going to define). Notice that these initial states have the same form as the final
gadgets to be prepared; the only difference is the number of gadgets. (The key lengths are both
succinct, although might be different.) Thus our protocol can be seen as a protocol that securely
“reproduce” many gadgets on the server side from poly(κ) gadgets. (poly is fixed.)
4.1.2 Correctness of remote state preparation
Definition 4.1 (Correctness). Suppose κ is the security parameter. We call a protocol a remote
gadget preparation protocol with output number L(κ) and output length κout(κ) if: taking κ,
L = L(κ) and κout = κout(κ) as the input parameters, in the end of the protocol, an honest server
can pass the protocol with probability ≥ 1 − negl(κ) and hold the state ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉) in the
end, where y
(i)
b ∈ {0, 1}κout such that y(i)0 6= y(i)1 ; and the client gets the description of the output
keys Kout := {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}.
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And we say a protocol is a correct remote gadget preparation protocol if there exist a fixed
subexponential function subexp and a fixed polynomial poly such that for any 0 ≤ L(κ) < subexp(κ)
and poly(κ) < κout(κ) < subexp(κ), the protocol is a remote gadget preparation protocol with
output number L(κ) and output length κout(κ).
Definition 4.2 (Correctness, with explicit input gadget number). Suppose N,L are functions of
κ. A remote gadget preparation protocol is an N → L remote gadget preparation protocol if it has
output number L and in the honest setting, initially the server holds ⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉 + |x(i)1 〉) and the
client knows all the keys.
We call L/N the “gadget expansion ratio”. If L/N > 1 we say it’s gadget-inceasing.
And we can define the efficiency requirement for the remote gadget preparation:
Definition 4.3 (Efficiency). We call a remote gadget preparation protocol with output num-
ber L(κ) and output length κout(κ) efficient if the client and the honest server runs in time
poly(κ,L, κout), where poly is a fixed polynomial.
And we additionally assume there is no quantum communication in the middle of the protocol.
(The quantum communication can only happen in the very beginning of the protocol, where the
client sends the initial gadgets to the server. Or equivalently, we assume the server already holds
the gadgets before the protocol, then there is no quantum communication.)
4.1.3 Security of remote state preparation
The formal definition of the security of remote gadget preparation protocol uses the “purified state
notation” where all the randomness are purified, described in Section 3.1. Note that we view the
state in different ways in the security and the correctness.
Definition 4.4 (Security). We say a remote gadget preparation protocol run on the security
parameter κ (and correspondingly, output number L = L(κ) and κout = κout(κ)) is secure against
adversary of query number ≤ 2λ with output security η if:
Suppose initially the adversary’s state is all-zero. For any adversarial server Adv of query
number |Adv| ≤ 2λ, denote the post-execution state as |ϕ′〉 (which includes the system of the client,
the server, the environment and the random oracle, purified as a pure state, as described in Section
3.1), and denote the output keys as Kout := {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}, we have, for any server-side operation
D of query number |D| ≤ 2η, for any index i ∈ [L],
|P
y
(i)
0 ||y
(i)
1
D(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η
where
• < AuxInf > contains all the {y(j)b }j 6=i,b∈{0,1} together with the global tags Tag(y(i)0 ) and
Tag(y
(i)
1 ). (See Section 3.1.4.)
• Ppass is the projection onto the passing space (as described in Definition 3.5).
• As described in Definition 3.11, Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf > is the state prepared as follows:
beginning from the state Ppass |ϕ′〉, the client computes and sends < AuxInf > to the server
side.
• Recall that D can introduce server-side ancilla qubits, which is inherent in the expression.
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• P
y
(i)
0 ||y(i)1
is a projection on the server side onto the space where the server output y
(i)
0 ||y(i)1 ;
recall that the system that stores these output keys is also purified, thus in more details
this is the projection onto the space that the output is the same as the concatenation of the
client-side system that stores the value of y
(i)
0 and y
(i)
1 .
We say a remote gadget preparation protocol is secure if there exist fixed polynomials λ(κ) =
poly(κ), η(κ) = poly(κ) (which could have degrees between 0 and 1, see Definition 2.9) such that
for any security parameter κ, the protocol is secure against any adversary of query number ≤ 2λ(κ)
with output security η(κ).
We note that we can understand this definition as a game: the client runs the protocol with the
adversary. After the protocol completes the client gets the output keys Kout := {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}
and the adversary will hold a quantum state. We purify the whole system and denote the state of
the whole system as |ϕ′〉. Then the adversary is going to try to output both keys at index i, and
the client will provide the keys at all the other indexes and the hash values of the keys at index i
as the auxiliary information. Then the adversary win if it can correctly output y
(i)
0 ||y(i)1 .
Intuitively, a gadget preparation protocol allows the honest server to prepare a special gadget,
but does not reveal two keys simultaneously; and we require that such a property holds even if the
keys on all the other indexes, and the hash tags of keys in this index are given.
Why do we need to add the auxiliary information < AuxInf >? This is for the com-
posability: it make these gadgets “disconnect” with each other. If we do not add this part, the
correlation between different key pairs in the final state could be very strange, for example, we do
not want the output state to contain something like Ency0||y1(y
′
0||y′1). Such form of “disconnection”
is important and will be used frequently in the security proof.
4.1.4 Making the security definition concise: introducing the “SC-security”
To describe this concept more concisely, we will first define the “SC-security”, which means, two
keys can’t be simultaneously computed with norm bigger than some value. This concept will be
used frequently in the following sections.
Definition 4.5. We say |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for keys K = {x0, x1} given Z if for any server
side operation U with query number |U| ≤ 2κ, (note that U can introduce server-side ancilla qubits
in the zero state, which is inherent in the expression below,)
|Px0||x1U(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Z ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A
The message Z here can be anything: it might be some other keys, some tags of the keys, or
empty.
And recall that under the purified notation K = {x0, x1} is just a symbol, not concrete values.
Px0||x1 is the projection onto the space that the server guess x0||x1 correctly.
Using this definition, we can re-formalize the security of the remote gadget preparation problem
as follows:
Definition 4.6 (Security, with concise notation). We say a remote gadget preparation protocol
with output number L run on security parameter κ is secure against adversaries of query number
≤ 2λ with output security η if:
Suppose initially the adversary’s state is all-zero. Purify all the randomness by the environment.
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ, denote the post-execution state projected
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onto the passing space as Ppass |ϕ′〉 and the output keys asKout, then for any index i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉
is (2η , 2−η)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
And we say a remote gadget preparation protocol is secure if it is secure against adversaries
of query number ≤ 2λ with output security η where λ, η are all fixed polynomials of the security
parameter κ.
4.1.5 A summary
Thus we have the following natural requirements on the remote gadget preparation protocol that
we want: (1)correctness (Definition 4.1); (2) security (Definition 4.6); (3) efficiency (Definition 4.3);
(4) succinct client-side quantum operations.
In step 1 of Outline 1, we need to design a protocol that satisfies these properties. As we said in
the introduction, this step is the more difficult step of Outline 1. As we said before, the idea is to
first design a weakly-secure protocol, then amplify it to a secure one. Let’s formalize the concept
of weak security.
4.2 Remote Gadget Preparation with Weak Security: the Stepping Stone to-
wards the Remote Gadget Preparation
To introduce the notion of the weak security of remote gadget preparation, we first note that the
security of the remote gadget preparation protocol can also be described as follows: (with one
difference from Definition 4.6: we add the initial state to the definition and it’s not necessarily the
“all-zero state”.)
Suppose the initial state is |ϕ〉. For the output state of the protocol, denote it as |ϕ′〉, at least
one of the following is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 2−η | |ϕ〉 |
• For any index i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
It can be interpreted as follows: for any adversary that makes polynomial RO queries, it either can
only pass the protocol with very small probability, or it passes and gets both keys on any index with
very small probability. The reader may get confused on why we make the statement redundant
— this is to introduce the definition of weak security. We note that there are two appearances of
the exponentially small function 2−η, which stand for correspondingly “the square-root of passing
probability” and “the square-root of the probability of computing both keys”. Let’s introduce an
incomplete definition of the weak security of the remote gadget preparation as follows, which comes
from replacing these two 2−η by some values that are not necessarily negligible:
Definition 4.7. (Incomplete) We say an N → L remote gadget preparation protocol run on
security parameter κ has “weak security transform parameter” (p|η,C → η′, C ′) against adversaries
of query number ≤ 2κ if assuming the input |ϕ〉 satisfies
• For any i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given K −K(i);
• |ϕ〉 is not too “ill-behaved”.
For any adversary Adv of query number ≤ 2κ, suppose the corresponding post-execution state is
|ϕ′〉 = ProtocolNameAdv(Keys;Parameters) ◦ |ϕ〉
and the output keys are Kout, at least one of the followings is true:
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• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 |
• For all i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η′ , C ′| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
By separating the “probability” coefficient and the “SC-security” parameters, this concept gives
us better control on the behavior of the protocols.
As we can see, the conditions on the input state and the conclusions on the output state have a
similar part — they are both talking about the SC-security of the keys. This allows us to compose
the security when the subprotocols are composed.
The missing part of this definition is what it means by saying the input state is not too “ill-
behaved”. As an example, we don’t want the server to know the xor of all the random oracle
output. In the next section we will formalize the “representable” property, which is what we want.
4.3 Ruling out the ill-behaved cases: the representable property, and the be-
havior of states under padded RO
Let’s start to thinnk what will happen when the random oracle is padded. The garbled table
construction, and many protocols in our paper, have the following procedure: the client samples
pad ←r {0, 1}l, and computes something later using H(pad|| · · · ). Intuitively, if the adversary’s
state is “nice”, if l is long enough, H(pad|| · · · ) should “seems like” a new random oracle that is
not queried by the adversary. On the other hand, if the adversary holds the xor of all the outputs
in the random oracle, which is intuitively in the “ill cases”, such an oracle padding won’t work (at
least in the simple way). If we want to argue about the security of the protocols abstractly, we
need a definition that helps us rule out these “ill cases”.
We will define a property called “representability”, which intuitively means the state can be
“represented” from a state that “does not depend on the random oracle” through bounded number
of operations. Let’s first give the concept of “the state does not depend on the random oracle”.
Definition 4.8. We say a state |ϕ〉 (recall all the randomness are purified by the environment)
does not depend on the random oracle H if, when |ϕ〉 is expanded under different descriptions of
H:
|ϕ〉 =
∑
|h〉︸︷︷︸
description of H
⊗ |ϕh〉 ⊗ |h〉︸︷︷︸
in the environment, coming from the purification of H
(14)
|ϕh〉 for different h are all the same.
Definition 4.9. Suppose a string of length l, denoted as pad, is stored in some read-only system.
Using the purified notation, the system that stores pad is also purified:
|ϕ〉 =
∑
pad∈[2l]
|pad〉 ⊗ |ϕpad〉 ⊗ |pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
in the environment
(15)
Using Pad to denote the content of the first system. We say |ϕ〉 does not depend on H(Pad|| · · · )
(where “· · · ” can mean “arbitrary strings” or “arbitrary strings of a fixed length”, depending on
the setting) if for any basis pad of Pad, when we further expand |ϕpad〉 in (15):
|ϕpad〉 =
∑
h
|h〉︸︷︷︸
description of H(pad|| · · · )
⊗ |ϕpad,h〉 ⊗ |h〉︸︷︷︸
in the environment, coming from the purification of H(pad|| · · · )
(16)
|ϕpad,h〉 are all the same for different h.
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Similarly, suppose Pads is a system that stores a set of pads where elements in the set are in
{0, 1}l and the number of elements in this set is fixed. And the state we are currently studying is
|ϕ〉 =
∑
all the possible pads of this size and element length
|pads〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pads
⊗ |ϕpads〉 ⊗ |pads〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
in the environment
(17)
We say |ϕ〉 does not depend on H(Pads|| · · · ) if for any basis pads of Pads, when we further expand
|ϕpads〉 in (17):
|ϕpads〉 =
∑
h
|h〉︸︷︷︸
description of {H(pad|| · · · )}pad∈pads
⊗ |ϕpads,h〉 ⊗ |h〉︸︷︷︸
in the environment
(18)
|ϕpads,h〉 are all the same for different h.
And we can similarly define “|ϕ〉 does not depend on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · )” (where · · · means ar-
bitrary strings of a fixed length) if we replace {H(pad|| · · · )}pad∈pads by {H(· · · ||pad|| · · · )}pad∈pads.
For example, if the client and server only hold state |0〉 (natural notation), it does not depend
on H, since no matter what the content of H is, the state is the same. But if the server holds
|H(pad||0)〉 (the output of H on input pad||0 ), this state depends on H(Pad|| · · · ).
If the server’s state |ϕ〉 does not depend on H(Pad|| · · · ), when we do the security proof we
can imagine, for each possible pad, the padded oracle H(pad|| · · · ) is a freshly new random oracle
that has not been queried by the adversary before. But this is usually too strong to apply. What
we are going to prove is, if the state can be “represented” through limited number of RO queries,
we can prove the state is close to a state that does not depend on the padded oracle after the
padding. This means the state is not “ill-behaved”. And we note the upper bound on the number
of RO-queries can actually be quite loose: it can even be 2poly(κ) where poly is a fixed polynomial.
Definition 4.10 (Representability of a state). We say |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |ϕinit〉 if
|ϕ〉 =
2α1∑
i=1
Pi |ϕinit〉 (19)
, and ∀i, Pi can contain unitaries, projections and RO queries, and the query number |Pi| ≤ 2α2 .
We call (19) the “representation” of |ϕ〉. (This is not related to the “representation” in other
fields.)
And we say |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-server-side-representable from |ϕinit〉 if (besides on the definition
above) all the Pi are server side operations.
We note that the “server-side representable” is defined mainly for other purpose. Here we study
the “representable” property, which allows the client and the server cooperate to prepare this state.
One common choice of the |ϕinit〉 is the |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉 state described
in Section 3.1.7.
And we have the following lemmas:
Lemma 4.1. If
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉;
• |χ〉 is (2α′1 , 2α′2)-representable from |ϕ〉
, then |χ〉 is (2α1+α′1 , 2α2 + 2α′2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
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Lemma 4.2. If |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, then
after the client samples pad ←r {0, 1}l (assume this randomness is purified by the environment),
consider the post-sampling state
|ϕ′〉 =
∑
pad∈{0,1}l
1√
2l
|pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pad
⊗ |ϕ〉 ⊗ |pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
environment
Define |ϕ′′〉 as the result of the following: expand |ϕ〉 using its representability property, and replace
each oracle query by H · (I−PPad||···) (removing the subspace in queries that have prefix equal to the
content of Pad before each query. Here “· · · ” can mean “arbitrary strings” or “arbitrary strings of
a fixed length”, depending on the setting). Then
• |ϕ′′〉 does not depend on H(Pad|| · · · )
• | |ϕ′′〉 − |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 2α1+α2−l/2
Lemma 4.2 gives what we want: it implies, if the client samples the random pad from strings
of length l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + η), after the sampling |ϕ′′〉 ≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |ϕ′〉.
What’s more, this lemma can be generalized to the case where multiple random paddings are
sampled. Suppose we use Pads to denote the set of random pads here, and we can prove the
post-sampling state is close to a state that does not depend on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ).
Lemma 4.3. If |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, then
after the client samples a tuple of strings pads where each element in pads is sampled independently
randomly from {0, 1}l, consider the post-sampling state
|ϕ′〉 =
∑
pads
1√
2l·|Pads|
|pads〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pads
⊗ |ϕ〉 ⊗ |pads〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
environment
where |Pads| is the number of strings in Pads. Define |ϕ′′〉 as the result of the following: expand |ϕ〉
using its representability property, and replace each oracle query by H(I − P···||Pads||···) (removing
the queries that have prefix in Pads before each query; the “· · · ” here has fixed length). Then
• |ϕ′′〉 does not depend on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · )
• | |ϕ′′〉 − |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 2α1+α2+log |Pads|−l/2.
The proof is by a hybrid method and we put it in Appendix A.
4.4 Complete definition of the weak security of remote gadget preparation
Since we have defined the SC-security and representable property, we are prepared to introduce the
full definition of the weak security.
Definition 4.11. We say an N → L remote gadget preparation protocol run on security parameter
κ has “weak security transform parameter” (p|η,C → η′, C ′) if a statement in the following form
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holds for the protocol:
The following statement holds when the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the input keys areK = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5). Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉
of the protocol (the randomness are already purified by the environment) satisfies the following
conditions:
• ∀i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given K −K(i)
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, where
α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ poly(κ), where poly is a fixed polynomial.
For any adversary Adv of query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the final state when the protocol completes,
denoted as
|ϕ′〉 = ProtocolNameAdv(Keys;Parameters) ◦ |ϕ〉
, (and correspondingly, output keys are Kout = {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}) at least one of the followings is
true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 |
• ∀i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η′ , C ′| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
And we also introduce a variant of it, which is also useful:
Definition 4.12. We say an N → L remote gadget preparation protocol run on security parameter
κ has “weak security transform parameter” (η,C → η′, C ′) if a statement in the similar form as
Definition 4.11 holds for the protocol, and the only difference is the first case (|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 |)
is removed.
Here p, η, C, η′, C ′ can all be viewed as functions of κ. But they can also be constants.
Note In the following sections, when we write down the security statements of our protocols, we
usually write the second condition (about the “representability” of the input state) in a weaker
form: α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ subexp(κ). What’s more, to allow us to apply Lemma 4.3, we need
to assume the “pad length” l and the “output key length” κout are enough, which is not shown in
these definitions. But these definitions still work: we can view the lowerbounds of l and κout part
of the protocol description; “≤ subexp(κ)” is more general than “≤ poly(κ)”.
5 An Index and a Diagram of Protocols in the Remaining Sections
Now we have completed all the preparations for protocol design. In the following sections we will
give concrete protocols that can achieve various tasks. Before that let’s give a summary of different
protocols.
The protocol design in the remaining sections can be summarized as follows:
1. The Section 7 and 8 are to design a weakly secure remote gadget preparation protocol that
can generate more gadgets than it consumes. Section 7 is not for remote gadget preparation,
but for a class of protocols called “non-collapsing basis test”.
The protocols in Section 8 are different remote gadget preparation protocols:
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(a) GdgPrepSimplified: This is a protocol which takes two gadgets as the input and outputs
two gadgets.
For the security we need to assume the initial state has a specific form. Since we have
additional requirement on the form of the input we cannot say it has weak security (as
defined in Definition 4.11), but if we abuse the definition and temporarily ignore it, it
has weak security transform parameters (1−κ−O(1)|η,C → η/O(1), O(1)C), against any
adversary of query number ≤ 2κ, assuming η,C ∈ [poly(κ), subexp(κ)].
The protocol is given in Protocol 6, Section 8.3. The security proof is informally discussed
in Section 8.4 and formally completed in the appendix.
(b) GdgPrep1+1→2: in this protocol, we combine the non-collapsing basis test protocol
BasisTest to the previous GdgPrepSimplified, to get rid of the requirement on the form
of the input.
As shown in the name, it takes two inputs gadgets and generate two output gadgets.
So the protocol is still not “gadget-increasing”, and we will aim for this problem in the
next step.
Compared to the GdgPrepSimplified protocol, there is no requirement on the form of
the input state, and we can say this protocol has weak security transform parameter
(1 − κ−O(1)|η,C → η′, C ′) against any adversary of query number ≤ 2κ, where η′ =
η/O(1), C ′ = O(1)C, assuming η,C ∈ [poly(κ), subexp(κ)].
The protocol is given in Section 8.5, Protocol 7.
(c) GdgPrepn+1→2n. We run n GdgPrep1+1→2 protocols in parallel, and make them share
one of the input gadget (which is the gadget on K(1)).
Thus the protocol takes n+ 1 gadgets as the input state and can prepare 2n gadgets.
We can prove this protocol still has weak security transform parameter (1−κ−O(1)|η,C →
η′, C ′) against adversary of query number ≤ 2κ, where η′ = η/O(1), C ′ = O(1)C.
This is given in Section 8.6, Protocol 8.
At this time we complete the step 1 of Outline 2.
2. The Section 9, 10 and 11 are to design an amplification technique and amplify the weakly
secure protocol to a secure remote gadget preparation protocol. Section 9 is an informal
overview, which contains the protocol (a), (b) below, and a simplified version of (d).
(a) GdgPrep1+log κ→κ. We iterate the GdgPrepn+1→2n protocol for log κ times, thus get a
protocol that takes 1 + log κ gadgets as the input state and prepares κ gadgets. Thus
we increase the gadget number expansion ratio (recall that it is the number of output
gadgets divided by the number of input gadgets) from 2 to Θ(κ/ log κ).
This protocol still has weak security transform parameter (1−κ−O(1)|η,C → η/κO(1), C ′)
against adversary of query number ≤ 2κ, where C ′ = O(1)C, O(1)-s are some constants.
This is given in Section 9.4, Protocol 10, while the security proof is in Section 10.1.
(b) GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→M×κ: We apply the “repeat” technique. We run M independent
blocks of the GdgPrep1+log κ→κ, and if M > poly(κ) (where poly is some fixed polyno-
mial) this protocol will have weak security transform parameter (η, 2−η → η/κO(1), 1/3).
We can see we get a protocol that is weakly secure under Definition 4.12 instead of 4.11.
This protocol takesM×(1+log κ) gadgets as the input and can preparesM×κ gadgets,
thus the “gadget number expansion ratio” is still Θ(κ/ log κ).
This is given in Section 9.4, Protocol 11, while the security proof is given in Section 10.2.
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(c) SecurityRefreshing protocol: One motivation for it is to “recover” the η/κO(1) param-
eter for the output state of the last step back to Θ(η). Recall that this characterize the
adversary’s query number the output state can resist. Another motivation is to make
the “combine” technique really work.
This protocol is an N + succinct → N protocol, which means, on the one hand, it
actually consumes some extra gadgets. On the other hand, we only need a small number
of (which means, succinct) extra gadgets to strengthen and refresh the security on a lot
of places: N can be very large (which can be an arbitrary polynomial, or even up to a
fixed subexponential function).
The protocol provides the security property we need: Slightly abusing the notation, it
has security transform parameter (η1, 2
−η1 , η2, 2−η2 → Θ(η2/κ), 2−Θ(η1)). The meaning
is as follows: suppose the input key sets are K,Λ, where K has N pairs of keys and Λ
has J pairs of keys, where N can be very large and J is succinct. (They correspond
to the two terms in the correctness property, see above.) The security statement says,
informally, if the input state |ϕ〉 is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for any key pair in K, and
(2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for any key pair in Λ given the other keys, the output state
will be (2Θ(η2/κ), 2−Θ(η1)| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for any output key pair given the other keys.
Thus we only need to make η2 > Θ(η1κ) to “refresh the security”.
7
This is given in Section 11.1, Protocol 13. And the security proof is in Section 11.2.
(d) GdgPrepOneRound: Here we apply the “combine” technique.
This protocol is an N + succinct→ 2N protocol. Since N can be very large the gadget
expansion ratio is approximately at least 2. (Actually it’s much bigger, but to make the
analysis cleaner we simply use 2.)
The security has security transform parameter (η1, 2
−η1 , η2, 2−η2 → Θ˜(η2), 2−
√
κ). Sim-
ply speaking, starting from theM × (1+ log κ)→Mκ protocol, we combine √κ number
of gadgets together into a single gadget. Thus intuitively the second parameter describ-
ing the security of the output part can increase from 13 to an exponentially small value.
Its simplified version is given in Section 9.4. But we don’t know whether this simpli-
fied protocol really works. To make it really work, we insert the SecurityRefreshing
protocol into each round of the simplified protocol to get the protocol GdgPrepOneRound.
This is given in Section 11.3, Protocol 15.
(e) The final secure remote gadget preparation protocol GdgPrep: Intuitively speaking,
since GdgPrepOneRound already doubles the number of gadgets in the honest setting
and provides exponential security in the adversarial setting, we can self-compose it for
log(L/N) times to get a N + succinct → L protocol. However, to make the security
proof work, we need to further make use of a special property of the SecurityRefreshing
protocol. This will introduce some extra gadgets but the total number and size of the
gadgets are still succinct.
This is given in Section 11.4, Protocol 16.
By this time we complete the step 2 of Outline 2 thus complete the whole Outline
2.
3. The Section 12 is to design our universal blind quantum computation (UBQC−GT ) protocol,
which completes the step 2 of Outline 1 and proves Theorem 1.1. The construction
7We believe η2 > Θ˜(η1) is enough, but we didn’t do the calculation in the security proof very precisely thus we
leave an extra κ here.
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is based on the output of the remote gadget preparation protocol constructed in the previous
sections.
Here we give a diagram for the relation between different subprotocols, and list their parameters for
correctness and security (Definition 4.2 and 4.11, 4.12: for the correctness we describe the input and
output gadget numbers, and for weak security we use the “weak security transform parameter”).
Step 2 of Outline 2
Amplification
Step 1 of Outline 2
Design of Weakly Se-
cure Protocols
Step 2 of Outline 1
Use the gadgets to do
the computation
Non-collapsing
basis test,
Protocol 2, 3
1 + 1→ 2,
(1−κ−O(1)|η,C → η/O(1), O(1)C)
assuming specific input form,
Protocol 6
1 + 1→ 2, (1− κ−O(1)|η,C →
η/O(1), O(1)C),
Protocol 7
n+ 1→ 2n, (1− κ−O(1)|η,C →
η/O(1), O(1)C),
Protocol 8
1 + log κ→ κ, (1− κ−O(1)|η,C →
η/κO(1), O(1)C),
Protocol 10
M(1 + log κ)→Mκ,
(η, 2−η → η/κO(1), 1/3),
Protocol 11
N + succinct→ 2N ,
normal security,
Protocol 15
SecurityRefreshing,
Protocol 13
N → L,
normal security,
Protocol 16
Full Protocol,
Protocol 18
Robust reversible garbled table, padded Hadamard test
parallel repetition, gadget sharing
self-composition
repeat technique
combine technique
self-composition
8-basis qfactory,
Protocol 19
Here Prtl1 → Prtl3, Prtl2→ Prtl3 means the construction of Prtl3 is based on the subprotocol
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Prtl1 and Prtl2.
6 A Collection for Notations, Lemmas and Techniques for Secu-
rity Proofs
In this section we give several basic concepts, techniques and lemmas that are useful in the later
sections. These lemmas are usually intuitive, but play a fundamental role in the security proofs
later. Since these lemmas are mostly very general, it’s also interesting to study whether these
concepts, techniques and lemmas can be applied to some other problems.
6.1 Necessary Notations and Definitions
Let’s first start from some basic concepts.
6.1.1 State-related: SC-security, ANY-security and unpredictability for key(s)
In Section 4.1 we give the definition of “SC-security”. We will discuss something more in this
subsubsection. Let’s first repeat the definition of SC-security:
Definition 6.1 (Definition of SC-security, repeated). We say |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for keys
K = {x0, x1} given Z if for any server side operation U with query number |U| ≤ 2κ,
|Px0||x1U(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Z ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A
The following definition will be useful in the proof, which is similar to the SC-security, but
replace Px0||x1 with Pspan{x0,x1} = Px0 + Px1 , which is the projection onto the 2-dimensional space
spanned by x0 and x1, and the projection is done on some fixed implicit system. (When the
randomness of these keys are purified by the environment it’s the projection onto the space whose
value is equal to the content of the systems that store x0 or x1.) In other words, if the adversary
can compute any one of the keys, it breaks the ANY-security. For comparison, in the definition of
SC-security the adversary has to know both.
Definition 6.2 (Definition of ANY-security). We say |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-ANY-secure for keys K =
{x0, x1} given Z if for any server side operation8 U with at most 2κ RO queries,
|Pspan{x0,x1}U(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Z ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A
The reason for the existence of auxiliary information Z is similar to the SC-security case dis-
cussed in Section 4.1. And we refer to Section 3.1.4 for the “global tag” Tag.
In the following section we will need the triangle inequality of the SC security, formalized as
follows:
Lemma 6.1 (Triangle Inequality of the SC/ANY-security). • If |ϕ1〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for
K given Z, |ϕ2〉 is (2κ, B)-SC-secure for K given Z, then |ϕ1〉+ |ϕ2〉 is (2κ, A+B)-SC-secure
for K given Z.
• If |ϕ1〉 is (2κ, A)-ANY-secure for K given Z, |ϕ2〉 is (2κ, B)-ANY-secure for K given Z, then
|ϕ1〉+ |ϕ2〉 is (2κ, A+B)-ANY-secure for K given Z.
8Recall that U can introduce server-side ancillas, which is implicit in the expression below.
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SC-security and ANY-security are both for a pair of keys. We can also define the unpredictability
for a single key:
Definition 6.3 (Definition of unpredictability for a key). We say |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-unpredictable for
a key xb ∈ K = {x0, x1} given Z if for any server side operation9 U with at most 2κ RO queries,
|PxbU(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Z ⊙ Tag(xb))| ≤ A
6.1.2 Protocol-related, ⊙ < · · · > symbol
In this paper we need to construct lots of protocols, and to analyze these protocols, we need a way
to formalize some protocol-level concepts and operations. The ⊙ symbol and < · · · > symbol are
useful and used very frequently in this paper. ⊙ symbol means the client sends this to the server;
and < · · · > symbol denotes the output of some algorithms. We note that we already use and
define these two symbols in Section 4. In this section we recall the definitions and make them more
generally and formally.
Definition 6.4. Suppose AuxInf is a randomized algorithm whose input is K. K is stored in
some read-only system in the client’s memory during the protocol. Then < AuxInf > denotes the
output of the algorithm.
And for a state |ϕ〉 that describes the state of all the parties during a protocol (as described
in Definition 3.1), |ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is defined as the following state: the client samples random
coins, runs AuxInf on keys K and random coins and stores the output in a separate register, and
then copies the result to an empty register in the read-only buffer. (And note that the randomness
are also purified by the environment thus and the whole state can still be described as a pure state.)
We note that the < · · · > symbol currently can only be used to describe the output of some
algorithms run on the client’s memory. We’d like to generalize this notation a little bit, and use it
to describe the transcript of all the client-side messages during a protocol.
Definition 6.5. For a fixed-structure interactive protocol Prtl, if the computation of all the client-
side messages just takes some read-only client side system as the input (especially it does not use the
server’s response), we use < Prtl > to denote the string that contains all the client side messages
in the execution of Prtl.
More formally, for initial state |ϕ〉, |ϕ〉⊙ < Prtl > denotes the following state: suppose the
computation of client side messages in Prtl uses algorithm Alg1, · · ·AlgI . Starting from |ϕ〉, the
client samples the randomness, computes all the < Algi > for all possible i, stores all of them
as a whole string and sends it to the read-only buffer. (The randomness are also purified by the
environment to keep the state pure.)
Note that if the computation of client side messages needs some freshly new random coins,
we can also view it “read-only”, since we can assume these random coins are sampled before we
consider this protocol.
6.2 Proving the Security by Adding Auxiliary Information
In our security proof, one very common technique is to consider the behavior of the protocol when
some auxiliary information is provided to the adversary.
9Recall that U can introduce server-side ancillas, which is implicit in the expression below.
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The intuition is as follows. If the client provides some auxiliary information to the adversary, it
does not make the adversary weaker: an adversary with this auxiliary information can do anything
that an adversary without it can do, by simply ignoring it. Thus proving a security statement when
such auxiliary information exists implies the same statement when such auxiliary information does
not exist.
But why do we want to give extra auxiliary information to the adversary? The reason is, in
many cases, sending an auxiliary information to the server (by copying it to the read-only buffer)
will make the server’s state more “well-behaved”. This allows us to analyze the structure of the
state in many different ways.
We have the following lemma, which is intuitive, but turns out to be very useful in our security
proof:
Technique 6.2 (Auxiliary-Information technique). The following statements are true when “some
property” is replaced by appropriate concrete statements:
1. Suppose a protocol Prtl, initial state |ϕ〉 and auxiliary information < AuxInf > satisfy: for
any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ,
PrtlAdv ◦ (|ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf >)
satisfies some property, then for any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ,
PrtlAdv ◦ |ϕ〉
satisfies this property.
This is the most basic form of the “Auxiliary-Information” technique: providing some auxiliary
information does not make the adversary weaker.
2. Suppose a protocol Prtl, initial state |ϕ〉 and auxiliary information < AuxInf > satisfy: for
any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ,
PrtlAdv ◦ (|ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf >)
satisfies some property, then for any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ,
((PrtlAdv ◦ |ϕ〉)⊙ < AuxInf >)
satisfies this property.
Intuitively, it means, if the auxiliary information is provided earlier, it does not make the
adversary weaker.
3. Suppose a protocol Prtl, initial state |ϕ〉 and auxiliary information < AuxInf > satisfy: for
any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ,
PrtlAdv ◦ (|ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf >)
satisfies some property, and if < AuxInf ′ > can be computed from < AuxInf > using a
randomized algorithm that makes at most Q RO-queries, then for any adversary Adv with
query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ −Q,
PrtlAdv ◦ (|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf ′ >)
satisfies this property.
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We note that this is not a formal statement, but a technique. This technique can be seen as a
simpler way to write the “simulation-based proof” in our setting. Obviously, the “some property”
cannot be chosen arbitrarily, for example, it cannot be replaced by the size of the state; but the
choices are very general, and it can be replaced by one of the follows, which is general enough for
our proof:
• The SC/ANY-security: |ϕ〉 is (B,C)-SC/ANY secure for some keys given something;
• The SC/ANY-security on the passing space: Ppass |ϕ〉 is (B,C)-SC/ANY secure for some
keys given something;
• The weak security of remote gadget preparation: |ϕ〉 satisfies either |Ppass |ϕ〉 | ≤ A| |ϕ〉 | or
Ppass |ϕ〉 is (B,C)-SC/ANY secure for some keys given something.
The proof of the correctness of the technique is as follows. The proof is similar for all the three
cases.
Proof. Note that for all the three cases of the technique, the adversaries in the conclusions (the
statement after the word “then”) are no more powerful than the adversaries in the conditions (the
“suppose” part): For example, in the first case, the adversary in the “suppose” part can simply
ignore the auxiliary information. Thus if the statement after the word “then” does not hold, the
adversary in the “suppose” part can simply ignore the auxiliary information, run the adversary’s
code in the “then” part, and break the condition.
In the second case of Technique 6.2, if the auxiliary information is provided in advance, the
adversary can choose to keep it in a separate register and use it later.
In the third case, the adversary can compute < AuxInf ′ > from < AuxInf > using at most
Q queries.
In the following sections we will need to use this method very frequently. We can apply this
technique to reduce the statement we want to prove to a new statement where the adversary: (1)
gets the auxiliary information; (2)gets the auxiliary information in advance; (3) gets < AuxInf >
instead of < AuxInf ′ >.
We also have the following lemma. It allows us to “flatten” a protocol to simplify the proof of
some SC or ANY security:
Lemma 6.3. Consider a fixed-structure interactive protocol Prtl, where the computation of all the
client-side messages just takes some read-only client side systems and random coins as the inputs
(especially it does not use the server’s response). If |ϕ〉⊙ < Prtl > is (2κ, A)-SC/ANY-secure for
K given auxiliary information Z where Z is previously stored in some read-only client side system,
then for any adversary Adv, PrtlAdv ◦ |ϕ〉 is (2κ − |Adv|, A)-SC/ANY-secure for K given Z.
Proof. Suppose the adversary U wants to break the SC/ANY-security of |ϕ〉⊙ < Prtl >, it can
simulate the protocol execution and run the code of Adv.
We often use it together with the auxiliary-information technique. < Prtl > can be still very
complicated, but we can further simplify it using the case 3 of the Technique 6.2.
Finally, we show we can “flatten” a part of a protocol.
Lemma 6.4. Consider a fixed-structure interactive protocol Prtl, where the computation of all the
client-side messages just takes some read-only client side systems and random coins as the inputs
(especially it does not use the server’s response). If it can be divided into three parts: Prtlpart1,
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Prtlpart2, Prtlpart3. If we can prove the following statement:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = (Prtlpart3 ◦ Prtlpart1)Adv(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < Prtlpart2 >)
satisfies either |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 | or Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (B,C)-SC/ANY secure for some keys given Z
where Z is previously stored in some read-only client side system.
Then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ, the post-execution state |ϕ′〉 = PrtlAdv ◦
|ϕ〉 satisfies either |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 | or Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (B,C)-SC/ANY secure for some keys given
Z.
We will use this lemma to analyze the security of Protocol 8.
Finally we give a convenient lemma that combines the auxiliary-information technique and the
SC/ANY security. (The “SC/ANY” in the statement below can be replaced by either “SC” or
“ANY”.)
Lemma 6.5. Suppose K1 is a set of keys and K2 is a pair of keys. The initial state |ϕ〉 is (B,C)-
SC/ANY-secure for K2 given K1. A protocol Prtl with non-adaptive structure satisfies: at any
time of this protocol, the computation of all the client-side messages only uses algorithms that only
takes (1) the description of K1; (2) freshly new random coins; and (3) the server’s response before
this time during this protocol as the inputs, and the number of queries to prepare these messages is
at most Q. Adv is an adversary with query number |Adv|. Then PrtlAdv ◦ |ϕ〉 is (B−|Adv|−Q,C)-
SC/ANY secure for K2 given K1.
If |ϕ˜′〉 can be written as the sum of 2α1 terms where each term has the form of PrtlAdv ◦ |ϕ〉
(but for different terms Adv can be different), |ϕ˜′〉 is (B−|Adv|−Q,C2α1)-SC/ANY secure for K2
given K1.
6.3 State Decomposition Lemmas
Compare the weak security with the usual meaning of security, one source of “weak” is: the final
state can be (2κ, A)-SC-secure for some keys, where A can be a constant or inverse-polynomial
instead of exponentially small values. To analyze a protocol that is weakly secure, we need some
lemmas to understand the structure of the state |ϕ〉 that is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for K. We will show
that, such “non-negligibly-secure SC-security” can be related to the SC-security with exponentially
small “the second parameter in the SC-security”, through some decomposition lemmas. In this
section we will give many decomposition lemmas for this (and related) problem, and these lemmas
will be useful in the security proof in the later sections.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose a state |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for K = {x0, x1}. For sim-
plicity let’s temporarily assume |ϕ〉 is normalized. Imagine A is a constant less than 1. Intuitively,
when the adversary makes more and more queries, it should get more and more power on comput-
ing the keys in K. However, if κ is big, it means the “information”, or the “ability of outputting
both keys” that the adversary can get from querying the random oracle for 2λ times, λ < κ, is
“bounded”. Let’s first understand what the state can be: the most natural construction of such a
state is to first find a state |φ〉 that is (2κ, 2−κ)-SC-secure for K (for example, |x0〉+ |x1〉, assuming
the key length is long enough), then take | |χ〉 | ≤ A− ǫ which can be any state(for example, x0||x1,
which simply gives the adversary both keys), and define |ϕ〉 = |φ〉+ |χ〉. We can see |ϕ〉 constructed
in this way is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for K: if the adversary wants to get both keys with non-negligible
amplitude with small number of queries, it can only make use of the |χ〉 part.
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The question is: is the inverse also true? Which means, if |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for K,
could we decompose it as |φ〉+ |χ〉 where |φ〉 is SC-secure for K with the second parameter being
exponentially small (instead of putting an “A” there), and |χ〉 has bounded norm? In the following
lemma we will show such a decomposition always exists.
Lemma 6.6. (State decomposition lemma for SC-security)
The following statement is true when κ is bigger than some constant.
For keys K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), suppose the global tag Tag(K) is stored in some
fixed place of the read-only buffer, if a state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment)
satisfies:
• |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure.
• PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as keys in K |ϕ〉 = 0. (Recall P denotes the projec-
tion.)
then we can decompose |ϕ〉, together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all
at state zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉 and is (2κ/5, 2−κ/6A)-SC-secure for K
• | |χ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A and is (κ/2, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉.
A note on the second condition This condition is not a “natural” condition on |ϕ〉 since in
the proofs later we will not meet a state |ϕ〉 that perfectly satisfies this condition. But we can use
Fact 1 to prove many states that we will meet later is close to this condition. Thus we can use this
lemma on the injective subspace and use Fact 1 to deal with the error term. Other lemmas in this
subsection are also used in this form.
A note on the second parameter in the SC-security Here the condition is “|ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-
secure”. Note that the second parameter is A, not A| |ϕ〉 |. And the initial state is not necessarily
normalized. For some lemmas and cases we describe the properties of states in a “relative” way
(for example, the lemmas in Section 6.4), and sometimes we describe it in the “absolute” way, like
this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6.6. We can prove the following strengthened lemma: there exist server-side op-
erators P0,P1, · · · Pκ/3 such that:
• Each Pi is a sequence of projections and unitaries and random oracle queries,
∑
i Pi = I
• ∀i, the query number |Pi| ≤ 2κ
• P0 |ϕ〉 is (2κ/5, A(
√
2)−κ/3)-SC-secure for K
• |∑i≥1Pi |ϕ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A
Then we can choose |φ〉 = P0 |ϕ〉 and |χ〉 =
∑
i≥1Pi |ϕ〉.
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Ideas for the proof Repeatedly apply an argument to construct a series of server-side operators
(which can contain projections) P ′1,P ′2 · · · one by one. Here Pi+1 is constructed based on the
properties of |ϕi〉, during which |ϕi+1〉 also gets defined. Each |ϕ···〉 has a security property of a
similar form. And the exponent on the SC-security of |ϕ···〉 decreases only additively by a constant
in each round thus we can afford this decrease for κ/3 times.
And P1,P2, · · · can be represented using P ′1,P ′2 · · · .
We will put the argument in the box, and outside the box, we will first use the first round as
an example, and then show how to apply this argument recursively to the end.
To construct P ′1, we first denote |ϕ0〉 = |ϕ〉 to make the argument more consistent in each
round. Which means
|ϕ0〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for K. (20)
The construction is given below.
Construct P ′i+1 from |ϕi〉
The condition is: |ϕi〉 is (2κ−i log2 5.1, ωi)-SC-secure for K. (ω0 := A)
Discuss by cases:
• (Case 1) If |ϕi〉 is (2κ−i log2 5.1/5, ωi/
√
2)-SC-secure for K, choose P ′i+1 = 0.
• (Case 2) Otherwise, there exists a server-side operation Ui+1 with query number |Ui+1| ≤
2κ−i log2 5.1/5 such that |Px0||x1U1 |ϕi〉 | > ωi/
√
2. Choose P ′i+1 = U†i+1Px0||x1Ui+1. Note
here |P ′i+1| ≤ 2κ−i log2 5.1 · 2/5 + 2.
In the both cases, we can prove that
|ϕi+1〉 := |ϕi〉 − P ′i+1 |ϕi〉 = U†i+1(I − Px0||x1)Ui+1 |ϕi〉
is (2κ−i log2 5.1/5− 1, ωi/
√
2)-SC-secure for K. (21)
Let’s say it in another way: |ϕi+1〉 is (2κ−i log2 5.1/5− 1, ωi+1)-SC-secure for K, for some value
ωi+1 ≤ ωi/
√
2.
The proof of (21) follows.
• For Case 1 above it’s obvious.
• For Case 2, that’s because otherwise (here we use the proof-by-contradiction, and as-
sume there is a server-side operation with ≤ 2κ−i log2 5.1/5 − 1 queries that can compute
x0||x1 from |ϕi+1〉 with norm at least ωi/
√
2), we can construct the following server-side
operation on |ϕi〉 to violate the property that “|ϕi〉 is (2κ−i log2 5.1, ωi)-SC-secure for K”:
1. In Pi+1, after applying U1, instead of making a projection onto x0||x1, purify the
projection operator as a unitary (that is, taking an auxiliary qubit to store the
result of checking whether the state is in x0||x1.) This can be done with the help of
Tag(K).
2. Then controlled by the |0〉 part of the auxiliary qubit (which corresponds to (I −
Px0||x1)Ui+1 |ϕi〉), apply U†1 and continue to apply the operation from the “proof-
by-contradiction assumption” that computes both keys from |ϕi+1〉 (which compute
x0||x1 with norm at least ωi/
√
2).
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The whole operation computes x0||x1 with norm >
√
(ωi/
√
2)2 + (ωi/
√
2)2 = ωi, and the
query number is at most |Ui+1|+ 2+ 2(|U†i+1|+ 2κ−i log2 5.1/5− 1) ≤ 2κ−i log2 5.1, which is
a contradiction.
Thus (by taking i = 0 in (21))
|ϕ1〉 := (I − P ′1) |ϕ0〉 is (2κ−log2 5.1, ω1)-SC-secure for K, (22)
ω1 ≤ A/
√
2, |P ′1| ≤
2
5
2κ + 2 (23)
Note that I − P ′1 can be implemented using 252κ + 2 queries. And define
P1 = P ′1
Thus in the first step P1 and P ′1 are the same. (But later Pi and P ′i will not be.) Now we complete
the construction of P ′1,P1 by analyzing |ϕ0〉, and define |ϕ1〉.
Note that (22) has the same form as the condition on |ϕ0〉 (we mean (20)). Thus we can repeat
the similar argument on |ϕ1〉 (similar to the “construct P ′1 from |ϕ0〉”, with differences on indexes
and parameters) and construct P ′2 such that
|ϕ2〉 = (I − P ′2) |ϕ1〉 is (2κ−2 log2 5.1, ω2)-SC-secure for K, (24)
ω2 ≤ ω1/
√
2, |P ′2| ≤
2
5
2κ−log2 5.1 + 2 (25)
, and P2 comes from expanding P ′2 |ϕ1〉 until reaching |ϕ〉, which is
P2 = P ′2(I − P ′1)
Then based on (24), repeat the argument on |ϕ2〉 to get P ′3, and
P3 = P ′3(I − P ′2)(I − P ′1)
. Repeat this process until all the Pi are constructed. Then P0 = I −
∑
i≥1Pi. Notice for each Pi,
the query number ≤∑t∈[κ/3](2κ−t log2 5.1 + 2) ≤ 2κ.
And for the security of P0 |ϕ〉, we can verify κ− κ3 log2 5.1 ≥ κ/5.
To bound |∑i≥1 Pi |ϕ〉 |, it’s easy to see |Pi |ϕ〉 | can be bounded by a geometric decreasing
sequence A/(
√
2)t thus their sum converges and can be bounded by A/(1− 1/√2). To get a better
bound, we can make use of the relations
ω0 := A, ∀i ∈ [0, κ/3 − 1], ωi+1 ≤ ωi/
√
2 and ω2i+1 + |Pi+1 |ϕ〉 |2 ≤ ω2i
. Some elementary calculation (see Appendix A) gives the bound |∑i≥1 Pi |ϕ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A.
Let’s explain one subtleness of this lemma. This lemma allows us to decompose a state |ϕ〉 that
is SC-secure into |φ〉 + |χ〉. However, there is no guarantee that these two states are orthogonal.
What’s more, the bound on the norm of |χ〉 does not come from the orthogonality either.
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Application Scenario We will use this lemma heavily in the protocol design and security proof
in the next section. The reason is when we design a subprotocol and state its security, the conditions
are usually in the form of “|ϕ〉 is (2poly(κ), 2−poly(κ))-SC-secure for the input keys”. (Let’s temporarily
only consider the normalized state to simplify the expression.) However the conclusions can be
“Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2poly(κ), A)-SC-secure for the output keys”. Thus when we compose the subprotocols
together, the security proofs can’t be composed directly. Using this lemma, we can decompose a
state that is (2poly(κ), A)-SC-secure into two states |φ〉 and |χ〉. Since |φ〉 is (2poly(κ), 2−poly(κ))-SC-
secure, when this part is given as the initial state of some other protocols, the security proof goes
through. And we can deal with the |χ〉 part using some other techniques.
Using similar techniques we can also prove a similar lemma for ANY-security:
Lemma 6.7. (State decomposition for ANY-security)
The following statement is true when κ is bigger than some constant.
If for keys K = {x0, x1} (See Section 3.1.5), initial state |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are purified
by the environment), suppose the global tag Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only
buffer, and the followings are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-ANY-secure for K.
• PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as keys in K |ϕ〉 = 0. (Recall P denotes the projec-
tion.)
we can decompose |ϕ〉 together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all at
state zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉 and is (2κ/5, 2−κ/6A)-ANY-secure for K.
• | |χ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A and is (κ/2, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof above, and the only difference is we need to replace
the server-side projection Px0||x1 with Pspan{x0,x1}. Both operations can be done given Tag(K).
And for the unpredictability discussed in Definition 6.3:
Lemma 6.8. (State decomposition for unpredictability)
The following statement is true when κ is bigger than some constant.
If for keys K = {x0, x1}, (See Section 3.1.5), initial state |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are purified
by the environment), suppose a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, the global tag Tag(xb) is stored in some fixed place
of the read-only buffer, and the followings are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-unpredictable for key xb ∈ K = {x0, x1};
• PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as keys in K |ϕ〉 = 0. (Recall P denotes the projec-
tion.)
then we can decompose |ϕ〉 together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all
at state zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉 and is (2κ/5, 2−κ/6A)-unpredictable for xb.
• | |χ〉 | ≤ (√2 + 1)A and is (κ/2, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof above, and the only difference is we need to replace
Pspan{x0,x1} with Pxb . This can be done given Tag(K).
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And we also need the following lemma in the later sections, which is similar to the lemma above,
but the parameters are different:
Lemma 6.9. (Another state decomposition for ANY-security) The following statement is true when
κ is bigger than some constant:
If for keys K = {x0, x1}, (See Section 3.1.5), initial state |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are purified
by the environment), suppose the global tag Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only
buffer, and the followings are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2κ, (1− 1T )| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K. T > 2.
• PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as keys in K |ϕ〉 = 0. (Recall P denotes the projec-
tion.)
then we can decompose |ϕ〉 together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all
at state zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉 and is (2(κ−150T 2)/6, 2−(κ−150T 2)/6| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-
secure for K.
• |χ〉 is (κ, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉, | |χ〉 | ≤ (1− 12T )| |ϕ〉 |.
Note that the main difference from the previous lemmas is here the second parameter in the
SC-security of the condition, which is (1 − 1/T )| |ϕ〉 |, is very close to | |ϕ〉 |. If we simply use the
previous lemma, (
√
2 + 1)(1 − 1/T ) > 1, and the conclusion will become trivial. But this lemma
can help us decompose |ϕ〉 in this setting. The burden is the input needs to have higher level of
security: (κ− 150T 2)/6 should be big to make the conclusion non-trivial.
Proof. The proof uses similar ideas as the previous lemma (see the box in the proof of Lemma 6.6),
but we need to use different parameters when we construct Ui (and correspondingly, P ′i) in each
step. The proof starts by constructing P1 on |ϕ0〉 := |ϕ〉.
Starting from U1, instead of considering whether there exists U1 such that |Pspan{x0,x1}U1 |ϕ0〉 | >
(1− 1/T )/√2| |ϕ0〉 | (this is what we did in the previous lemmas), we consider whether there exists
a server-side operation U1 with query number |U1| ≤ 2κ/5 such that
|Pspan{x0,x1}U1 |ϕ0〉 | > (1− 1/T − 1/(50T 2))| |ϕ0〉 | (26)
And we can see the difference to the proof of Lemma 6.6: In that proof the right hand side of (26)
is 1√
2
times the original norm. But in this proof we subtract 1/(50T 2) from it.
We will repeat the argument in the following box step-by-step:
Construct Pt+1 on |ϕt〉
The condition is: |ϕt〉 is (2κ−t log2 5.1, (1− 1/T − t/(50T 2))| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
Discuss by whether there exists a server side operation Ut+1 with query number 2κ−t log2 5.1/5
such that |Pspan{x0,x1}Ut+1 |ϕt〉 | > (1− 1/T − (t+ 1)/(50T 2))| |ϕ〉 |. So there are two cases:
• Exist: take P ′t+1 = U†t+1Pspan{x0,x1}Ut+1, then |ϕt+1〉 := (I − P ′t+1) |ϕt〉 is
(2κ−(t+1) log2 5.1, 15T | |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
• Not exist: take P ′t+1 = 0, then |ϕt+1〉 := (I−P ′t+1) |ϕt〉 is (2κ−(t+1) log2 5.1, (1−1/T − (t+
1)/(50T 2))| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
Then correspondingly:
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• “Exist” case: stop this construction, and jump to the argument below starting from “at
this time the remaining state · · · ”.
• “Not exist” case, repeat the same argument on |ϕt+1〉, and this gives us P ′t+2 and |ϕt+2〉
and so on.
Which means, for the “Exist” case, stop, and jump to the argument below, otherwise continue this
process to the next round, with index increased by 1. If we keep meeting the “not exist” case, every
time we minus 1/50T 2 in the right hand of (26). We note that this process cannot be continued
infinitely, and after at most 50T 2 steps we can get a non-zero P ′i at index i.
Now we have got a non-zero P ′i and all the P ′··· before it are zero. At this time the “remaining
state” |ϕi〉 := (I − P ′i) |ϕi−1〉 = (I − P ′i) |ϕ〉 is (2κ−150T
2
, 15T | |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K. The query
number |P ′i| ≤ 2κ−log2 5.
Then we apply Lemma 6.7 and decompose |ϕi〉 we defined just now as |φ〉+ |χ′〉 where
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ−150T 2)-server-side-representable from |ϕi〉 and is (2(κ−150T 2)/6, 2−(κ−150T 2)/6| |ϕ〉 |)-
ANY-secure for K
• |χ′〉 is (κ− 150T 2, 2κ−150T 2)-server-side-representable from |ϕi〉 and | |χ′〉 | ≤
√
2+1
5
1
T | |ϕ〉 |
. Combining these two decompositions (which means, use the |φ〉 just now and define |χ〉 = |χ′〉+
P ′i |ϕ〉) gives the decomposition we need. (Note |P ′i |ϕ〉 | ≤ (1− 1/T )| |ϕ〉 | and | |χ′〉 | ≤
√
2+1
5
1
T | |ϕ〉 |
thus | |χ〉 | ≤ (1− 12T )| |ϕ〉 |.)
The previous lemmas only consider the decomposition for a single pair of keys. The following
lemma can help us decompose the state for multiple keys simultaneously:
Lemma 6.10. (Multi-keys state decomposition lemma) The following statement is true when κ is
bigger than some constant.
If for a state |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are purified by the environment), a key set K =
{x(i)0 , x(i)1 }i∈[L] (see Section 3.1.5), suppose the global tag Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of
the read-only buffer, and the following conditions are satisfied:
• ∀i ∈ [L], |ϕ〉 is (2κ, A)-SC-secure for keys K(i), κ > 4 log(6L).
• PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as keys in K |ϕ〉 = 0. (Recall P denotes the projec-
tion.)
then we can decompose |ϕ〉 together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are
all at state zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 where:
• |φ〉 is (1, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉 and ∀i ∈ [L], |φ〉 is (2 κ2 log 6L , 2− κ4 log 6LA)-SC-
secure for K(i).
• |χ〉 is (κL, 2κ)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉, and | |χ〉 | ≤ 4AL.
We note that after applying this lemma, in the state |φ〉 the exponent in the security decreases
multiplicatively, but the decrease ratio only depends logarithmically on L.
And note that, when we use this lemma — the only application of this lemma is in Section 11
— A is already exponentially small. And AL is also exponentially small (Note that if AL > 1 this
lemma will become trivial, but luckily L is not big enough to make it big), thus | |χ〉 | is small and
can be omitted.
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Proof. The overall technique is similar to the proof of the single-key decomposition lemma. We need
to repeat an argument multiple times, but here in each round of this repetition we construct up to L
operators, instead of 1 operator. We will construct P ′t,1, · · · P ′t,L from |ϕt−1〉, and define |ϕt〉 during
this process. Thus we can begin at |ϕ0〉 and repeat the following argument round-by-round.
Construct P ′t,1, · · · P ′t,L from |ϕt−1〉
The condition is |ϕt−1〉 is (2κ−(t−1) log2(6L), ωt−1)-SC-secure for K(i).
Repeat the following for at most L times:
• Suppose this is the l-th round. (l ∈ [1, L].)
Consider whether there exists a server-side operation Ut,l with query number |Ut,l| ≤
2κ−(t−1) log2 6L/(6L) such that
For some i ∈ [L], |P
x
(i)
0 ||x
(i)
1
Ut,l |ϕt−1,l−1〉 | ≥ ωt−1√
2
. (27)
(Denote |ϕt−1,0〉 := |ϕt−1〉.) Discuss by cases:
– If it exists, define P ′t,l := U†t,lPx(i)0 ||x(i)1 Ut,l and |ϕ
t−1,l〉 := (I−P ′t,l) |ϕt−1,l−1〉, as what
we did in the proof of Lemma 6.6.
Then continue to the next round, with l increased by 1. We note that in the next
round the right hand side of (27) is the same.
– If we reach a state such that such a server-side operation Ut,l does not exist, stop the
iteration. Define P ′t,l,P ′t,l+1, · · · P ′t,L to be all-zero. And define |ϕt−1,L〉 = |ϕt−1,l−1〉.
Now we have completed the iterated construction. And we get Ut,1 · · · Ut,L and correspondingly
P ′t,1 · · · P ′t,L and Pt,1 · · · Pt,L (similar to the proof of Lemma 6.6, we define Pt,l = P ′t,l(I −
Pt,l−1) · · · (I − Pt,1) ). If the construction above stops because a “not exist” case is reached,
we already get a decomposition, and we can skip the argument below and go to the “thus we
can decompose ...” in the end of this box. Otherwise, the iterated construction ends when all
the l ∈ [1, L] rounds have been completed, this means:
∀l ∈ [L],∃i ∈ [L] such that |P
x
(i)
0 ||x
(i)
1
Pt,l |ϕt−1〉 | ≥ ωt−1√
2
. (28)
If there is still some server-side operation U ′ with query number |U ′| ≤ 2κ−(t−1) log2(6L)/(6L)
such that |P
x
(i)
0 ||x(i)1
U ′ |ϕt−1,L〉 | ≥ ωt−1√
2
holds for some i ∈ [L], by the pigeonhole principle it’s
always possible to choose two operations in {P1, · · · PL} ∪ {U ′} such that they correspond to
the same pair of keys. Then by the same technique as the proof of Lemma 6.6 |ϕt−1〉 will not
be (2κ−(t−1) log2 6L, ωt−1)-SC-secure for this pair of keys. Thus we get a contradiction and thus
we prove that ∀i ∈ [L], |ϕt−1,L〉 is (2κ−(t−1) log2(6L)/(6L), ωt−1√
2
)-SC-secure for K(i).
Thus we can decompose |ϕt−1〉 as ∑l≤L Pt,l |ϕt−1〉+ |ϕt〉 where
• ∀l, the query number |Pt,l| ≤ 2κ−(t−1) log2 6L.
• |ϕt〉 := |ϕt−1,L〉 is (1, 2κ−(t−1) log2 6L)-server-side-representable from |ϕt−1〉, and
• ∀i ∈ [L], |ϕt〉 is (2κ−t log2 6L, ωt−1/
√
2)-SC-secure for K(i).
Thus we can repeat this process for t ∈ [1, κ/(2 log(6L))] and complete the proof. Then we can
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define |φ〉 := |ϕκ/(2 log(6L))〉. And the inequality on the norm of |χ〉 := ∑t(∑l≤L Pt,l |ϕt−1〉) holds
from the convergence of the sum of geometric sequence.
6.4 Security Influence of Adding Garbled Tables
In this section we study how the client providing extra garbled tables to the server will influence
the SC-security or ANY-security of the state.
Suppose a state |ϕ〉 is SC-secure for K with parameters being exponential. If an extra garbled
table, for example, GT (K → Kout), is provided, where Kout is sampled randomly, it’s still hard
for the server to compute two keys simultaneously. Intuitively by the SC-security property the
adversary can only get at most one of the keys, thus it can only decrypt one row in the garbled
table. And this in turn implies the garbled table does not give the adversary extra power and
the state should still be SC-secure for K with similar parameters. The intuition might seem to
be a “circular proof”, but the result itself is indeed true. Formalizing this under different cases
(SC/ANY security, garbled table or reversible garbled table, etc) leads to the following lemmas.
We put the proofs of these lemmas in Appendix B.
Lemma 6.11. The following statement is true when η is bigger than some constant.
Suppose the key pair is K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), and the initial state is |ϕ〉 (where the
randomness are purified by the environment). Suppose the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η.
A client side algorithm AuxInf is defined as follows, where the choices for each round, bt, pti are
chosen by the adversary non-adaptively:
For t = 1, · · · n, the adversary selects one of the followings, and the client adds the result into
< AuxInf >:
• The adversary chooses bt ∈ {0, 1}, and pt1, pt2, pt3 for this round. The client samples padt ←r
{0, 1}l, and computes (padt,H(padt||pt1||xbt ||pt2)⊕ pt3) as the result.
• The client computes GT (K → Kout t;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout), where Kout t is sampled
randomly from {0, 1}κout .
• The client computes RevGT (K ↔ Kout t;PadLen = l) and Tag(Kout t), where Kout t is
sampled randomly differently from {0, 1}κout .
Then for all n < 2
√
η, the choices in each round, and bt, pti in each round, we have: |ϕ〉⊙ <
AuxInf > is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. What’s more, suppose in the t-th round the server
chooses for the third choice above, we have |ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for
Kout t.
Note that everything is chosen non-adaptively, thus we can view AuxInf as a client-side algo-
rithm, and use the notation as above.
The condition “α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ 2η” is weaker than what is used in Definition 4.11. This
is to cover more cases and to make this lemma more general. This lemma still holds.
One limit of this lemma is the security decreases multiplicatively. We can prove, when we do
not consider the reversible garbled table, the decrease is actually additively:
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Lemma 6.12. The following statement is true when η is bigger than some constant.
Suppose K = {x(i)0 , x(i)1 }i∈[N ] (see Section 3.1.5), and the initial state is |ϕ〉. Suppose the
following conditions are satisfied:
• ∀i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i).
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + η), κout > l + η
A client side algorithm AuxInf is defined as follows, where it, bt, pt··· in each round are chosen by
the adversary non-adaptively:
For t = 1, · · · n:
• The adversary chooses it ∈ [N ], bt ∈ {0, 1}, strings pt0, pt1, pt2, pt3 where each of
them has fixed length when t varies. The client samples padt ← {0, 1}l, computes
(padt,H(pt0||padt||pt1||x(i
t)
bt ||pt2)⊕ pt3) and adds it to < AuxInf >.
Then for any n < η2, any adversary, for any i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η−4, 2−η+4| |ϕ〉 |)-
SC-secure for K(i).
Note (1) In the conditions we deal with multi-key setting, and we do not require the initial state
to be secure “given the other keys”; (2)And the condition n < η2 might seem unnatural. It could
be much looser, but we choose to assume it since the more general version is not used later.
The following lemma consider the case where the initial state |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for
K, where C might be non-negligible.
Lemma 6.13. The following statement is true when η is bigger than some constant.
Suppose the key pair is K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), and the initial state is |ϕ〉. Suppose
the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K, C > 2−η/100.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 3η), κout > l + η.
A client side algorithm AuxInf is defined as follows, where the choices for each round, bt, pti are
chosen by the adversary non-adaptively:
For t = 1, · · · n, the adversary chooses one choice below, and the client adds the result into <
AuxInf >:
• The adversary chooses bt ∈ {0, 1}, pt1, pt2, pt3. The client samples padt ← {0, 1}l, and computes
(padt,H(padt||pt1||xbt ||pt2)⊕ pt3) as the result.
• The client computes GT (K → Kout t;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout), where Kout is a pair of
keys sampled randomly from {0, 1}κout .
• The client computes RevGT (K ↔ Kout t;PadLen = l), where Kout is a pair of different keys
sampled randomly from {0, 1}κout .
Then for all n < η2, the adversary’s choices in each round, and bt, pti in each round, we have:
|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/37, 3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
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Note The condition C > 2−Θ(η) does not mean the lemma cannot be applied to a initial state
that is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. We can always “relax” the parameter before we apply this
lemma: if |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K, it’s certainly (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K for any
bigger C. We add this inequality to get rid of the extra exponentially-small terms in the conclusion.
Without this condition, the second parameter in the conclusion will be in the form of O(C)+2−Θ(η),
and with this condition this become 3C, which is simpler to understand.
6.5 Oneway-to-hiding and Collapsing Property
For the lemmas from Section 6.5 to the end of Section 6, we postpone their proofs to Appendix C.
6.5.1 Oneway-to-hiding
The following lemma is a variant of the famous oneway-to-hiding lemma[22] of the random oracle,
described in a way that is more suitable in our setting. This can be proved by a simple hybrid
method.
Lemma 6.14. Suppose the client and the server (adversary) run protocol Prtl on initial state |ϕ〉
(all the randomness are purified by the environment). The adversary is Adv. The number of queries
in Adv during the protocol is at most 2λ. Suppose Set is a set of inputs to the random oracle (which
might be a deterministic function of the content of some read-only system). Suppose H ′ is a blinded
oracle of H where Set is blinded.
If at any time during the protocol when the adversary is going to make a random oracle query,
denote the state as |ϕt〉, there is
|PSet |ϕt〉 | ≤ 2−η| |ϕ〉 | (29)
where the projection is done on the system that is used for the random oracle query, to the space
that the query is in Set. And assume the client-side queries does not contain any component in
Set. Then denote the final state as |ϕ′〉, and denote the final state when all the oracle queries by
the adversary are replaced by queries to the blinded oracle H ′ as |ϕ˜〉, we have
|ϕ〉 ≈2−η+λ+1||ϕ〉| |ϕ˜〉 (30)
The hybrid method can also be done in another direction, and we have:
Lemma 6.15. Suppose the client and the server (adversary) run protocol Prtl on initial state |ϕ〉.
The adversary is Adv. The number of queries in Adv during the protocol is at most 2λ. Suppose
Set is a set of input to the random oracle (that might be a deterministic function of some read-only
system). Suppose H ′ is a blinded oracle of H where Set is blinded.
Suppose |ϕt〉 is defined as follows: replace all the oracle queries in Adv before the t-th query by
queries to H ′, denote the state just before the t-th query as |ϕt〉. If for any t, there is
|PSet |ϕt〉 | ≤ 2−η| |ϕ〉 | (31)
where the projection is done on the system that is used for the random oracle query, to the space
that the query is in Set. Then denote the final state as |ϕ′〉, and denote the final state when all the
oracle queries are replaced by the queries on the blinded oracle H ′ as |ϕ˜〉, we have
|ϕ〉 ≈2−η+λ+1||ϕ〉| |ϕ˜〉 (32)
The difference of Lemma 6.14 and 6.15 is in (29) |ϕt〉 comes from queries to the original oracle
while in (31) it comes from queries to the blinded oracle. Both lemmas are useful later.
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6.5.2 Collapsing property
And another lemma is the ”collapsing property” of some special input state. We are not sure where
it is first used, one appearance of this technique is in [18]. We describe it in a way that is more
suitable in our setting.
Lemma 6.16. Suppose K = {x0, x1} (See Section 3.1.5). The current state is |ϕ〉. PSspan{x0,x1} |ϕ〉 =
|ϕ〉 where PSspan{x0,x1} is the server side projection on some system S onto the space of {x0, x1}.
And |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. A server-side operation D satisfies the query number
|D| ≤ 2η−4. Then
| |P0D |ϕ〉 | − |P0D ◦ COPY ◦ |ϕ〉 | | ≤ 2−η/2+2| |ϕ〉 | (33)
where COPY is a operation that copies the system S into a system that is not used by D. P0 is a
projection onto |0〉 on some bit on the server side.
Intuitively, the first condition means |ϕ〉 can be written as |x0〉 |· · ·〉 + |x1〉 |· · ·〉 (if we use the
natural notation instead of the purified notation). This lemma is similar to saying the state is
indistinguishable to the mixed state of |x0〉 |· · ·〉 and |x1〉 |· · ·〉. But here we use COPY operator
instead of the standard-basis measurement since this form is useful later.
6.6 Lemmas about the Blinded Oracle
The proof of lemmas in this section is also in Appendix C.
6.6.1 A blinded oracle does not make the adversary more powerful
We also need to give some lemmas about the blinded oracle. Recall the definition of the blinded
oracle. For a pair of keys K = {x0, x1}, when we talk about blinded oracle H ′ where · · · ||K|| · · ·
part of the inputs for the oracle H is blinded, we mean an oracle where on the · · · ||K|| · · · part
(which contains H(· · · ||x0|| · · · ) and H(· · · ||x1|| · · · )) the output of H is independently random
from H but on all the other part it’s the same as H. Note that the paddings before and after K
are usually fixed-length, whose values depend on the setting when we use the blinding operation.
If we just look at the random oracle itself, H and H ′ are “symmetric”, and if the initial state
does not depend on the random oracle, giving the adversary H ′ is not stronger or weaker than H;
but since when we consider a blinded oracle, the protocol has already be run for some time and the
protocol and the adversary all query H instead of H ′, if during some time in the security proof we
need to consider an adversary which can only query the blinded oracle H ′, it means we temporarily
restrict the power of the adversary and do not want it to query the blinded part of H. On the
other hand, if the adversary has access to the full oracle H, it can “simulate” the blinded part with
random values, thus giving it access to the blinded oracle does not give it extra power either.
Lemma 6.17. K is a pair of keys, stored in some client side read-only system. If Tag(K) is stored
in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, an adversary can simulate H ′ to any finite output length
on the space “Tag is injective on the inputs with the same length as the keys in K”, where H ′ is
defined to be a new blinded oracle of H with · · · ||K|| · · · part being blinded (the input before and
after K are arbitrary but have fixed length). Each query to H ′ costs four queries to H.
(Here “· · · ” means it’s arbitrary strings of a fixed length, but if we replace it with some values
that can be computed from the read-only buffer, the statement is still true.)
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We note that the adversary does not need to know K itself to do this simulation. Having
Tag(K) is enough. We further emphasize H ′ is a new blinded oracle; which means, H ′ does not
appear before the time of blinding. Thus this lemma simply says “having an extra blinded oracle
is no more powerful than having the original oracle”. The nontrivial thing here is the adversary
may not know K.
Proof. The simulator samples fresh new random values for the outputs on the · · · ||K|| · · · part of
the inputs of the blinded oracle. On each query to H ′, the simulator checks whether the query
input has the form of · · · ||K|| · · · , (note that this checking does not need the description of K; the
simulator can use Tag(K) to do it.) stores the checking result (1 for yes and 0 for no) in a separate
bit, then behaves as H in the 0 space and uses the sampled randomness as the output in the 1
space. Then use another RO queries to disentangle the bit that stores the checking result.
6.6.2 The interplay between ANY-security and the blinded oracle
For these reasons (discussed in the last subsubsection), we can view the blinded oracle as a restricted
form of the normal oracle, and the adversary which can only query a (freshly new) blinded oracle
is no more powerful than an adversary that can query the original oracle. On the other hand,
sometimes we can prove the properties under normal oracle by proving the properties under the
blinded oracle, like the lemma below: (before that, we first generalize the SC/ANY-security to the
blinded oracle setting.)
Definition 6.6 (SC/ANY security under blinded oracles). Suppose K = {x0, x1}.
• We say a state |ϕ〉 is (2η, A)-ANY-secure for K under a blinded oracle H ′ if for all the server-
side operation D that only queries H ′ and the number of oracle queries to H ′ is at most 2η ,
|Pspan{x0,x1}D(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A.
• We say a state |ϕ〉 is (2η , A)-SC-secure for K under a blinded oracle H ′ if for all the server-
side operation D that only queries H ′ and the number of oracle queries to H ′ is at most 2η ,
|Px0||x1D(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A.
Lemma 6.18. The following is true when η is bigger than some constant.
Suppose K = {x0, x1}. The initial state is |ϕ〉. Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of the
read-only buffer. If:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K under H ′ where H ′ is a new blinded oracle of H with
· · · ||K|| · · · being blinded (paddings have fixed length);
• |PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as K |ϕ〉 | < 2−2η| |ϕ〉 |
, then |ϕ〉 is (2η/2, 2−η/2+2| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
Here “· · · ” means it’s arbitrary strings of a fixed length. If we replace it with some values that
can be computed from the read-only buffer, the statement is still true.
This lemma is also intuitive: note that we are talking about the ANY security. Informally
speaking, since the adversary is hard to compute the keys in K, it’s hard for it to distinguish H
and H ′, which in turn implies the adversary is hard to compute the keys. This sounds like a circular
proof, but we can actually prove it in this way via a hybrid method.
The following lemma combines the decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.7) with a generalization of
the previous lemma:
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Lemma 6.19. The following is true when η is bigger than some constant.
Suppose K = {x0, x1}. The initial state is |ϕ〉. Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of the
read-only buffer. Suppose:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K. 13 > C > 2−η/24.
• |PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as K |ϕ〉 | < 2−2η| |ϕ〉 |.
Then for any server-side operation D with query number |D| ≤ 2η/12, consider Dblind which comes
from replacing the oracle queries in H by oracle queries to the blinded oracle H ′ where · · · ||K|| · · ·
is blinded (the prefix and suffix “· · · ” have fixed length), we have
D |ϕ〉 ≈3C||ϕ〉| Dblind |ϕ〉 (34)
Let’s compare these two lemmas. Lemma 6.18 is in the form of unpredictability and Lemma
6.19 is in the form of indistinguishability (actually even stronger, in the form of trace-distance).
What’s more, in Lemma 6.19 C can be inverse-polynomial. These two lemmas are convenient in
different cases.
6.6.3 The interplay between SC-security and blinded oracle
In the last subsubsection we know how the blinding can affect the ANY-security. In this subsub-
section we consider how it affects the SC-security.
When the initial state has SC-security, one technique that we will use commonly is to write
the adversary’s operation as a sequence of unitaries and queries, insert some projections into them,
analyze their properties and combine them back by linearity. Such a method can be used together
with the blinded oracle, which leads to the following lemmas that are very useful:
Lemma 6.20. Suppose K = {x0, x1}, the initial state is |ϕ〉. Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place
of the read-only buffer. Suppose
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
• |PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as K |ϕ〉 | < 2−2η| |ϕ〉 |.
Consider state |ϕ′〉 := PxbU |ϕ〉 , b ∈ {0, 1}, where U is a server-side operation with query number
|U| ≤ 2η/3. Suppose U blind is the blinded version of U by replacing the queries in U with queries to
H ′, which is the blinded oracle of H with · · · ||x1−b|| · · · being blinded (the prefix and suffix “· · · ”
have fixed lengths), correspondingly define |ϕ˜′〉 = PxbU blind |ϕ〉, then
|ϕ˜′〉 ≈2−η/3||ϕ〉| |ϕ′〉
Intuitively, in the end there is a projection onto Pxb , thus it should be hard to find a place in
the middle of the operation where the adversary can get x1−b, otherwise the SC-security of the
initial state will be broken.
Note that in many previous lemmas they talk about the blinded oracle where H(· · · ||xb|| · · · )
and H(· · · ||x1−b|| · · · ) are both blinded; here this lemma only makes one key blinded.
Note that Lemma 6.20 is “backward blinded”, where we replace the oracle queries before the
projection onto xb happens. We can also get a “forward blinded” lemma:
Lemma 6.21. Suppose K = {x0, x1}, the initial state is |ϕ〉. Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place
of the read-only buffer. Suppose
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• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
• |PTag is not injective on inputs with the same length as K |ϕ〉 | < 2−2η| |ϕ〉 |.
Consider state |ϕ′〉 := UPxb |ϕ〉, b ∈ {0, 1}, where U is a server-side operation and query number
|U| ≤ 2η/3. Suppose U blind is the blinded version of U by replacing the queries in U with the queries
to H ′ which is the blinded oracle with · · · ||x1−b|| · · · being blinded (the prefix and suffix “· · · ” have
fixed length), correspondingly define |ϕ˜′〉 = U blindPxb |ϕ〉, then
|ϕ˜′〉 ≈2−η/3||ϕ〉| |ϕ′〉
6.7 Indistinguishability of Garbled Tables
The following lemma is also intuitively but will be used several times in the later sections. It
says if a key is unpredictable then the ciphertexts and garbled tables encrypted under this key is
indistinguishable from random strings.
Lemma 6.22. The following statement is true when η is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the key is xb ∈ K (see Section 3.1.5) and the initial state is |ϕ〉 (all the randomness
are purified by the environment). If the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for xb.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η.
Consider the following protocol between the client and the adversary:
For t = 1, · · · n < η2, the adversary chooses to execute one of the followings non-adaptively
(which means, the adversary’s operation is only to send some pre-computed values to the client and
does not do any additional operations between each round):
• The server chooses and sends pt0 to the client. The client computes and sends Encxb(pt0;PadLen =
l, TagLen = κout) to the server.
• The server chooses and sends pxt, sxt, pyt, syt to the client. Each term has a fixed length
when t varies. The client samples y from {0, 1}κout , and if y is already sampled out in some
previous round, use the existing y. And the client computes and sends the reversible garbled
table RevGT (pxt||xb||sxt ↔ pyt||y||syt;PadLen = l) to the server.
Denote the post-execution state as |ϕ′〉. Further denote the post-execution state where the client’s
responses are all replaced by random strings of the same length as |ϕ′′〉. Then for any server-side
operation (distinguisher) D with query number |D| ≤ 2η/6, we have
| |P0D |ϕ′〉 | − |P0D |ϕ′′〉 | | ≤ 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |
where P0 is some server-side projection.
Then we can combine (a variant of) this lemma with the decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.8) to
get:
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Lemma 6.23. The following statement is true when η is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the key is xb ∈ K (see Section 3.1.5) and the initial state is |ϕ〉. If the following
conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for xb. C > 2−η/38.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η.
Consider the following protocol between the client and the adversary:
For t = 1, · · · n < η2, the adversary chooses to execute one of the followings non-adaptively
(which means, the adversary’s operation is only to send some pre-computed values to the client and
does not do any additional operations):
• The server chooses and sends pt0 to the client. The client computes and sends Encxb(pt0;PadLen =
l, TagLen = κout) to the server.
• The server chooses and sends pxt, sxt, pyt, syt to the client. The client samples y from
{0, 1}κout , and if y is already sampled out in some previous round, use the existing y. And the
client computes and sends the reversible garbled table RevGT (pxt||xb||sxt ↔ pyt||y||syt;PadLen =
l) to the server.
Denote the post-execution state as |ϕ′〉. Further denote the post-execution state where the client’s
responses are all replaced by random strings of the same length as |ϕ˜′〉. Then for any server-side
operation (distinguisher) D with query number |D| ≤ 2η/6, we have
| |P0D |ϕ′〉 | − |P0D |ϕ˜′〉 | | ≤ 2.95C| |ϕ〉 |
where P0 is some server-side projection.
We note that this lemma still holds if there is a fixed bit-wise permutation on the output key
part. (Which means, the rows in the RevGT is in the form of pxt||x||sxt ↔ perm(pyt||y||syt). This
case is useful in some later sections.)
6.8 Some Upper-level Ideas for the Security Proofs
In this section we give some basic ideas of how the security proof works, and discuss some techniques
in the security proof.
6.8.1 Composing the security statement: From (weak) security of subprotocols to
(weak) security of big protocols
Since our protocol comes from the composition of many small subprotocols, we want the security
property of the subprotocols to be “composable”, too. Thus we can argue about the security of
the big protocol with a series of statements in the form of “the input state of this subprotocol
satisfies some properties, so the output state of this subprotocol satisfies some properties”. Our
proof basically uses such technique, although the details may be different somewhere.
So what kind of properties will we study? As we showed in the definition of the weak security
(Definition 4.11), there are three properties that we care about:
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• (1) the norm of a state, like | |ϕ〉 |, or |Ppass |ϕ〉 |, etc, which intuitively describes the “passing
probability”;
• (2) the SC-security of a state for some keys;
• (3) the state is not too “ill-behaved”, which is characterized by the “representable” property.
The first two are already covered by the definition of weak security of protocols; and the third one
is easy to deal with: as long as the initial state is not “ill-behaved” and |Adv| is bounded during the
whole protocol, the output state will not be “ill-behaved” by Lemma 4.1. So to study the security
of the subprotocols given later, our main work will be to prove the weak security of the protocols,
which is, to study how a subprotocol affect the property (1) and (2) of the server’s state. We refer
to the definition of weak security (Definition 4.12, and the whole Section 4) for more details.
6.8.2 Linear decomposition technique
Another technique that we will use is the “linear decomposition technique”. This is also why we
develop the lemmas in Section 6.3.
For example, suppose the initial state of a subprotocol Prtl is |ϕ〉, and Prtl is some remote
gadget preparation protocol with some weak security. And we want to know something about the
post-execution state |ϕ′〉 = Prtl ◦ |ϕ〉. However, sometimes it’s hard or impossible to prove the
initial state |ϕ〉 satisfies the conditions in the security statement of the protocol Prtl. One example
is the security statement of Prtl requires the initial state to be (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K,
while we only have |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K where C might be inverse-polynomial, thus
the security statement of Prtl cannot be applied directly.
In this case, we can first apply the decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.6) and do the decomposition:
|ϕ〉, together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all at state zero), into
|φ〉 + |χ〉, then we can study Prtl ◦ |ϕ〉 through Prtl ◦ |φ〉 and Prtl ◦ |χ〉 separately. Usually we
can directly apply the security property of Prtl to understand the Prtl ◦ |φ〉 part (since from the
decomposition we know |φ〉 is (2Θ(η), 2−Θ(η)| |φ〉 |)-SC-secure for K), and for the Prtl ◦ |χ〉 part, we
can study it in some other ways, for example, we can simply bound the norm |PpassPrtl |χ〉 | ≤ | |χ〉 |
and add it back by triangle inequality.
This technique is used commonly in the sections later. For example, it is used in Section 7, and
its “advanced” form is discussed below and used in Section 11.
6.8.3 Multi-round linear decomposition technique
The method in the previous subsubsection can be further generalized to a multi-round protocol.
As an example, suppose a protocol Prtl is in the following form:
Structure of Prtl:
For i = 1, · · · κ:
Run subprotocol subPrtl.
Suppose subPrtl has weak security with security transform parameter (η, 2−η → η′, 1/3), and
the input state is (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for some key K. Thus we can argue that after the
first round the output state (denoted as PpasssubPrtl |ϕ〉) is (2η′ , 1/3| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for some key.
Then we can decompose the state into |φ1〉+ |χ1〉. If the final state of the whole protocol is denoted
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as |ϕ′〉, we can write
Ppass |ϕ′〉 := PpassPrtl |ϕ〉 (35)
= PpassPrtl>1subPrtl |ϕ〉 (36)
= PpassPrtl>1 |φ1〉+ PpassPrtl>1 |χ1〉 (37)
Where Prtl>1 is the protocol starting from the second round.
If η′ is big enough, or the initial state satisfies some other conditions, we can prove either |φ1〉
or |χ1〉 still satisfies the conditions in the security statement of subPrtl, which means we can apply
the same argument on PpassPrtl>1 |χ1〉. (The exact form of how this happens varies in different
protocols and proofs.) This suggests that the same argument can be applied repeatedly and the
proof will be “induction-style”.
For example, if for some reason we can continue the same argument on PpassPrtl>1 |χ1〉, continue
this argument we can get
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PpassPrtl |ϕ〉 (38)
:= PpassPrtl |χ0〉 (Here we denote |χ0〉 := |ϕ〉 to make the notation consistent) (39)
= PpassPrtl>1 |φ1〉+ PpassPrtl>1 |χ1〉 (40)
= · · · (41)
= PpassPrtl>1 ◦ |φ1〉+ PpassPrtl>2 ◦ |φ2〉+ · · ·+ Ppass |φκ〉+ Ppass |χκ〉 (42)
Note that since every time we get a new |χt〉 we need to ensure these states have similar properties
thus the same argument can be applied repeatedly. When we use this method, we will write down
these properties explicitly.
Finally we can argue that each PpassPrtl>t ◦ |φt〉 satisfies some properties and the last term is
exponentially small, (in each round when we apply the decomposition lemmas in Section 6.3 there
is | |χt〉 | ≤ 2.53 | |χt−1〉 |) and we can prove the properties of Ppass |ϕ′〉 by combining them through
triangle inequality.
This technique is used frequently in Section 11.
7 Non-collapsing Basis Test
Before we give our weakly secure remote gadget preparation protocol, in this section we will discuss
a class of subprotocols called “non-collapsing basis test”, which will be a component and used very
frequently in the remaining sections.
7.1 Non-collapsing Basis Test on a Single Pair of Keys
7.1.1 Problem setting
Suppose in some subprotocol an honest server is supposed to hold the gadget corresponding to the
keys K = {x0, x1}, which is the state |x0〉+ |x1〉. But the server can cheat. So the client wants to
verify that the server really holds such a state.
We note that our original problem, the blind quantum computation problem, is only about
“blindness”, instead of the “verification”. Informally, here “blindness” means the server cannot
know the client’s input; while “verification” means the server has to hold a specific state or messages,
otherwise it will not pass the client’s verification procedure. (This is only to informally distinguish
“blindness” and “verification” and should not be considered a definition.) Our original problem
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is only about blindness; but during the construction of our protocols, to simplify the construction
and security proofs, having some verifiability property in the middle can be very useful. The “non-
collapsing basis test” talks about the verifiability, and will be useful in the construction of the
weakly secure remote gadget preparation protocol.
In this setting, the strongest form of verification requires the server to hold the state |x0〉+ |x1〉,
otherwise it will make the client reject. However, such a strong form of verification is hard. So we
will weaken the problem as follows:
Problem setting for a non-collapsing basis test for key K = {x0, x1}:
• In this protocol, the client wants to verify that, (or more formally, if the server makes the client
accept with some probability, then conditioned on the client’s acceptance in this protocol,)
the server’s state can be unitarily transformed into a state close to
|x0〉 |· · ·〉+ |x1〉 |· · ·〉 (43)
Or equivalently, a state that can be unitarily transformed into
|x0〉 |· · ·〉+ |x1〉 |· · ·〉+ |χ′〉 , where | |χ′〉 | is small. (44)
• What’s more, as the “non-collapsing” suggests, it should be possible for the honest server
(which holds the state |x0〉 + |x1〉) to pass these tests with probability close to 1 without
disturbing the state.
We note that if the client asks the server to make a measurement and report the result, (and
accept if it is either x0 or x1,) the state will be destroyed and it’s not possible to use it for further
tasks. Thus we need to add the “non-collapsing” requirement.
We further note that the description above is under the “natural notation” instead of the
“purified notation” (where all the randomness are purified, see Section 2.1). In the purified notation
(43)(44) are all entangled with the client-side description of K. Using the purified notation, what
we want is, there exists some server-side efficient unitary operation U ,
|(I − PK)UPpass |ϕ′〉 |, or (a different notation) |(I − Pspan{x0,x1})UPpass |ϕ′〉 |, is small. (45)
where |ϕ′〉 is the state after the execution of the protocol, PK , or Pspan{x0,x1}, is the projection
onto the space where a server-side register holds either x0 or x1, the keys in K. (When all the
randomness are purified this means the projection onto the space that the content of the register
is equal to the content of one of the key register.)
We will design some protocols that try to address this question.
Note The protocols given below do not really give us (45), but it satisfies (45) if the client
additionally provides some specific auxiliary information. This is enough for later usage, since the
extra auxiliary information can be handled via techniques in Section 6.2.
7.1.2 Protocol design, single round
We first give a single-round protocol for a single pair of keys. To achieve this task, the client sends
a garbled table with the same output keys for both input keys.
Protocol 1. (BasisTest(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout)), where K = {x0, x1}, and the initial
state in the honest setting is (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ |other part〉:
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1. The client picks r←r {0, 1}κout and computes and sends GT (∀b, xb → r;PadLen = l, TagLen =
κout) to the server.
2. The honest server should implement the mapping by evaluating the garbled table:
|x0〉+ |x1〉 → (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ |r〉 (46)
and send r to the client.
3. The client checks if r is correct, if not, reject.
We can see in the honest setting, since the garbled table is GT (x0 → r, x1 → r), and the server
holds |x0〉 + |x1〉, it can decrypt the garbled table in superposition and get r with probability 1,
without disturbing the gadget.
In the adversarial setting, intuitively, we want to argue that if the server’s initial state satisfies
some conditions, if the server can pass the test with high probability, it should hold the state that
can be unitarily transformed to the state (44) (or equivalently, (45)). However proving this fact is
hard. To study its security, first, we will give an improvement to our protocol below; then, when
we discuss their security properties in the next subsection, as we discussed in the end of Section
7.1.1, its verifiability is formalized in a way that an extra auxiliary information is introduced.
7.1.3 Protocol design, multi-round
The first attack to consider is, the server can choose to only pass the test only with constant
probability, for example, 99/100, 2/3, or 1/1000. So there is a tradeoff between the adversary’s
“passing probability” that the client can stand and the verifiability provided by the protocol (which
means, how close the server’s state is to the correct state (43)). Below we will first revise Protocol
1 to partially get rid of this tradeoff. We note that we do not mean the original protocol (Protocol
1) is “broken”; it’s just because the its property is not good enough for some of our later tasks.
Intuitively, if the client runs this test multiple times and requires the server to pass the test in
all the rounds, this test will become more powerful. Thus we get the following test (non-collapsing
basis test for single pair of keys, multiple rounds):
Protocol 2. (BasisTest(K;T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout)), where K = {x0, x1}, and the
server’s initial state in the honest setting is (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ |other part〉:
1. For t = 1, · · · T :
(a) The client picks rt ←r {0, 1}κout and sends GT (∀b, xb → rt;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout)
to the server.
(b) An honest server should implement the mapping
|x0〉+ |x1〉 → (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ |rt〉 (47)
and sends rt to the client.
(c) The client checks if the response from the server is correct, if not, reject.
The following lemma is intuitive. It means, for any adversary, it either can only pass the whole
protocol with some probability, or in some of the iteration it has to pass the protocol with high
probability:
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Lemma 7.1. In the BasisTest(K;T ) protocol, (note that we omit some parameters that are not
important here) suppose the initial state is |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment,
as discussed in Section 3.1) and the post-execution state after the t-th round of iterations is |ϕt〉,
(additionally define |ϕ0〉 := |ϕ〉), at least one of the followings is true:
• |Ppass |ϕT 〉 | ≤ 12 | |ϕ〉 |.
• There exists a t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , such that |Ppass |ϕt〉 | ≥ (1− 1T )|Ppass |ϕt−1〉 |
In the second case of the lemma above, intuitively, |ϕt−1〉 should be close to the form that we
want ((44) or (45)). In the next section, we will prove, this is true when some additional auxiliary
information is provided to the server. (Note that in Section 6.2 we discussed the “auxiliary-
information technique”. This is one of the examples that adding some auxiliary information can be
useful. We further note that since adding this auxiliary information does not affect the SC-security
of the state too much, it does not affect the usage of this protocol.)
7.2 Security of the BasisTest Protocol for Single Key Pair
We give some protocols in the last section. Although it’s hard to prove the state can be unitarily
transformed by a server-side operation to (44), we can prove, when some auxiliary information is
provided, it satisfies this property. Let’s first give the security statement for the single-round basis
test:
7.2.1 Security statement for the single round test
Lemma 7.2. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
For keys K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the
environment, as discussed in Section 3.1) and the protocol BasisTest(K;PadLen = l, OutLen =
κout), suppose Tag(K) is in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, suppose the following conditions
are satisfied, where T is a positive integer:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K, (η/3 − 150T 2)/24 > κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• 20 < T < 2
√
κ
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η
then the following conclusion holds:
For all the adversaries Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the corresponding post-
execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = BasisTestAdv(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
at least one of the followings is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− 1T )| |ϕ〉 |.
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• There exists a server side operation U (whose form deterministically only depends on the code
of Adv) with query number |U| ≤ |Adv|+ 20 such that:
|PSspan{x0,x1}U(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≥ (1−
4√
T
)| |ϕ〉 | (48)
where S is some server-side system, AuxInf is defined as follows: The client samples a pair
of different keys Kout = {r0, r1} with key length κout, and computes and uses the reversible
garbled table RevGT (K ↔ Kout;PadLen = l) as the < AuxInf >.
Note that the conclusion in the second case implies |ϕ〉 can be written as follows:
U(|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf >) = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉 (49)
where for some server-side system S,
PSx0 |ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉, PSx1 |ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉, PSK |χ′〉 = 0, | |χ′〉 | ≤ 3T−1/4| |ϕ〉 | (50)
. This form will be useful in the later sections.
How to understand this lemma First we note the conclusion is what we want in the discussion
around equation (43). And we also note that the form of the theorem is a little bit similar to the
“weak security” definition (Definition 4.11) of the remote state preparation, even if it is a different
problem. The conditions say: if the SC-security is good enough, and if the state is not ill-behaved,
if the number of “test rounds” (see below) is big enough (but not extraordinarily big), if the pad
length and output key length are long enough (intuitively the longer they are the more difficult the
server’s attack will be), we get the conclusions.
Finally, we point out that in this lemma — the security for the single-round protocol, T can be
chosen arbitrarily, as long as the conditions are all satisfied. In the multi-round protocol, T will
become the “test round”. In this lemma, different T has different influences on the two cases in
the conclusion (below “one of the followings is true”). When we make T bigger, the first case will
become a weaker statement but the second case will become a stronger statement.
7.2.2 Proof for single round protocol
The proof of Lemma 7.2 is given below.
Proof. Suppose
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1− 1
T
)| |ϕ〉 | (51)
. Otherwise the lemma is already true.
Discuss by cases:
• (Case 1) There exists a server side operation U1 with query number |U1| ≤ 2η/3 such that
|Pspan{x0,x1}U1 |ϕ〉 | > (1− 4T )| |ϕ〉 |
• (Case 2) |ϕ〉 is (2η/3, (1− 4T )| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
Let’s first rule out “Case 2”. For Case 2, apply Lemma 6.9 we know |ϕ〉 can be decomposed as
|φ〉+ |χ〉, where
• | |χ〉 | ≤ (1− 2T )| |ϕ〉 |
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• |φ〉 is (2(η/3−150T 2)/6, 2−(η/3−150T 2)/6| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K and is (1, 2η/3)-representable
from |ϕ〉.
Then we know |φ〉 is (2(η/3−150T 2)/6, 2−(η/3−150T 2)/6+κ| |φ〉 |)-ANY-secure forK and it’s (2α1 , 2α2+
2η/3)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. This will be useful below.
Then (use Prtl to denote the protocol)
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | = |Ppass(Prtl ◦ |φ〉+ Prtl ◦ |χ〉)| (52)
≤ |PpassPrtl ◦ |φ〉 |+ |PpassPrtl ◦ |χ〉 | (53)
By the properties of |φ〉, we can prove
|PpassPrtl ◦ |φ〉 | (54)
(Expand Prtl) =|PrAdv(|φ〉 ⊙ |GT (∀b, xb → r;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout)〉)| (55)
(By Lemma 6.14) ≤2−(η/3−150T 2)/6+3κ| |φ〉 | (56)
≤2−κ| |ϕ〉 | (57)
Substitute it back to (52), together with | |χ〉 | ≤ (1− 2T )| |ϕ〉 |, this leads to a contradiction to (51).
For “Case 1”, the only difference of it from the final conclusion (48) is the query number of the
server-side operations. We will show the extra < AuxInf > will help the adversary prepares the
state more easily. First we can write
U1 |ϕ〉 = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉
where for some server-side system S,
PSx0 |ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉, PSx1 |ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉, PSK |χ′〉 = 0 (58)
, and
| |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉 | ≥ (1− 4
T
)| |ϕ〉 |, | |χ′〉 | ≤ 2
√
2√
T
| |ϕ〉 | (59)
Expand the protocol and we have
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | = |Pr(Adv(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >))| (60)
= |Pr(Adv(U†1(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉)⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >))| (61)
Then we consider the server-side operation U2 applied on |ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > defined as follows:
1. Take the forward table part of the < AuxInf >, replace the < GT (∀b : xb → r) > above
(right side of equation (60)) by the forward table < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >, and run Adv.
Instead of outputting r on some system, this operation will output a key in {rb}b∈{0,1}. Do
not do the final projection measurement Pr and keep the register that stores {rb}b∈{0,1} in
superposition.
2. Use the backward table to map rb back to xb.
Let’s first analyze the state after the step 1 above. We can prove:
| |Pr(Adv(U†1(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉)⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >)| (62)
− |Pspan{r0,r1}(Adv(U†1(|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉)⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)| | ≤ 2−η/24| |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉 | (63)
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This comes from applying the collapsing property and Lemma 6.14 on both terms. (We put the
detailed proof in Appendix D.)
Thus we get, after summing back U†1 |χ′〉,
| |Pr(Adv(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >)| − |Pspan{r0,r1}(Adv(|ϕ〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >))| |
(64)
≤2−η/24| |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉 |+ 2
√
2√
T
| |ϕ〉 | (65)
≤(2−η/24+2 + 2
√
2√
T
)| |ϕ〉 | (66)
From equation (51)(60) we know the first term in (64) is at least (1− 1T )| |ϕ〉 |. Thus we get
|Pspan{r0,r1}(Adv(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >))| ≥ (1−
3.9√
T
)| |ϕ〉 |
Note that the server does not really do the projection Pspan{r0,r1}, but in the second step in U2,
uses the backward garbled table to map {rb}b∈{0,1} back to K = {xb}b∈{0,1}. Thus
|Pspan{x0,x1}U2(|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≥ (1−
4√
T
)| |ϕ〉 |
Finally we can see the query number |U2| ≤ |Adv|+ 20. This completes the proof.
Then based on this lemma, we get the security for the multiple-round basis test for single pair
of keys.
7.2.3 Security statement and proof for multi-round protocol
Below we give the security statement and proof for Protocol 2.
Lemma 7.3. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
For a pair of keys K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are
purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1), and protocol BasisTest(K;T, PadLen =
l, OutLen = κout), suppose Tag(K) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, and the
following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K, (η/19 − 150T 2)/24 > κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η/7.
• 20 < T < 2
√
κ
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 3η), κout > l + η
then the following conclusion holds:
For all the adversaries Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the corresponding post-
execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = BasisTestAdv(K;T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
and denote the post-execution state after the t-th round as |ϕt〉, |ϕ0〉 := |ϕ〉, at least one of the
followings are true:
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• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 12 | |ϕ〉 |.
• There exists an integer t ∈ [0, T ), a server side operation U (whose form deterministically
only depends on the code of Adv) with query number |U| ≤ |Adv|+ 20 such that
|Pspan{x0,x1}U(Ppass |ϕt〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≥ (1−
4√
T
)|Ppass |ϕt〉 | (67)
where AuxInf is defined as follows: The client samples Kout = {r0, r1} with key length
κout such that r0 6= r1, and computes and adds the reversible garbled table RevGT (K ↔
Kout;PadLen = l) into AuxInf .
This lemma is very similar to Lemma 7.2. (And we refer to the “How to understand this lemma
under that lemma for an explanation.) One difference is here T is a parameter of the protocol
rather than a parameter that can be chosen arbitrarily when we apply the lemma. Again, the
second case in the conclusion implies U(Ppass |ϕt〉⊙ < AuxInf >) can be written as
U(Ppass |ϕt〉⊙ < AuxInf >) = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉
where
Pxb |ψb〉 = |ψb〉, PK |χ′〉 = 0, | |χ′〉 | ≤ 3T−1/4|Ppass |ϕt〉 | (68)
The proof is given below. It’s basically a combination of Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.2.
Proof. Apply Lemma 7.1 and suppose the first case is not true:
|Ppass |ϕT 〉 | > 1
2
| |ϕ〉 | (69)
(Otherwise the statement already holds.) So there exists an 1 ≤ t ≤ T such that
|Ppass |ϕt〉 | ≥ (1− 1
T
)|Ppass |ϕt−1〉 |
Each single round of BasisTest(K;T ) is a BasisTest(K) protocol. (We omit some parameters.)
Apply Lemma 7.2 on initial state Ppass |ϕt−1〉 we get the conclusion we want when t (in (67)) chosen
to be t− 1 here.
Below is a checklist for the conditions of applying Lemma 7.2 on Ppass |ϕt−1〉 in the last step.
Checklist for applying Lemma 7.2 on Ppass |ϕt−1〉
• Ppass |ϕt−1〉 = PpassBasisTestAdv1∼t−1(K; t− 1) ◦ |ϕ〉. First by Lemma 6.11
|ϕ〉⊙ < BasisTest(K, t− 1) > is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K (70)
, thus by Lemma 6.3
Ppass |ϕt−1〉 is (2η/6 − 2κ, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. (71)
Thus by (69) Ppass |ϕt−1〉 is (2η/6−1, 2−η/6+1|Ppass |ϕt−1〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
• The number of RO queries by both parties during BasisTest(K; t − 1) is
≤ |Adv| + O(t) thus Ppass |ϕt−1〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + |Adv| + O(T ))-representable from
|EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. And |Ppass |ϕt−1〉 | > 12 | |ϕ〉 |. Thus when we use
|Ppass |ϕt−1〉 | instead of | |ϕ〉 | to check the inequalities in the 4th condition in Lemma 7.2,
add an additional “η” in the inequality on l is enough.
We can see when we apply Lemma 7.2 we need to choose η (in Lemma 7.2) to be η/6 − 1.
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7.3 BasisTest for Two Pairs of Keys
7.3.1 Problem setting and protocol
In the previous sections, we are considering the non-collapsing basis test for a single pair of keys.
But in the following sections, we will need a non-collapsing basis test protocol for two pairs of keys
simultaneously. In other words, for keys K(1) = {x(1)b }b∈{0,1}, K(3) = {x
(3)
b }b∈{0,1}, we want to
verify the adversary’s state is close to a state that is unitarily isomorphic to the following state:∑
b1∈{0,1}
|x(1)b1 〉
∑
b2∈{0,1}
|x(3)b2 〉 |· · ·〉 (72)
Or, equivalently, a state that is unitarily isomorphic to the state∑
b1∈{0,1}
|x(1)b1 〉 (
∑
b2∈{0,1}
|x(3)b2 〉 |· · ·〉+ |χ′b1〉) + |χ′〉 (73)
where |χb1〉, |χ′〉 are small.
Note The reason that we choose 1, 3 as the superscripts is to make it consistent with its usage
in Section 8.
Note that similar to the previous case the description above is under the “natural notation”
instead of the “purified notation”, and in the purified notation (72)(73) are all entangled with the
client-side description of K(1),K(3). Using the purified notation, the final state can be described as
|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉 (74)
∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, |ψb1 〉 = |ψb10〉+ |ψb11〉+ |χ′b1〉 (75)
where for some server-side system S1,
PS1
x
(1)
0
|ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉, PS1
x
(1)
1
|ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉, PS1K(1) |χ
′〉 = 0, | |χ′〉 | is small
, and furthermore for some server-side system S3, ∀b1 ∈ {0, 1},
PS1
x
(1)
b1
PS3
x
(3)
0
|ψb10〉 = |ψb10〉, PS1x(1)b1
PS3
x
(3)
1
|ψb11〉 = |ψb11〉, PS3K(3) |χ
′
b1〉 = 0, | |χ′b1〉 | is small.
Let’s first give the BasisTest protocol for the two key pairs setting:
Protocol 3. BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout):
1. The client and the server run BasisTest(K(3);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout);
2. The client and the server run BasisTest(K(1);PadLen = l, OutLen = κout);
The first step is Protocol 2 on K(3) where the number of rounds is T , and the second step is
Protocol 1 on K(1), which is only a single round test. Although in the original problem K(1) and
K(3) are in the equivalent places, in the protocol and the security statement we will handle these
two pairs differently. The reason is, in the next section, when we use this protocol, K(1) and K(3)
actually play different roles, so here we also need to handle them differently.
For the security statement, we need to consider the case where the state is (2η2 , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-
secure for K(3) and C may be not exponentially small. This will be needed when we use this
protocol in Section 8.
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7.3.2 Security statement
Lemma 7.4. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
For keys K(1) = {x(1)b }b∈{0,1},K(3) = {x(3)b }b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5), the initial state |ϕ〉
(the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1) and the protocol
BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), suppose Tag(K
(1),K(3)) is already stored
in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, and the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3), (η/19 − 150T 2)/24 > κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1), 2−
√
κ/10 ≤ C ≤ 1/9.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η/100.
• 2/C4 > T > 1/C4
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 3η), κout > l + 4η
then the following conclusion holds:
For all the adversaries Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the corresponding output
state as
|ϕ′〉 = BasisTestAdv(K(1),K(3);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
at least one of the following two is satisfied:
1. |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 |
2. There exists a server-side operation U (whose code depends deterministically on the code of
Adv) with query number |U| ≤ 2κ+3 such that
U(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >) = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉 (76)
∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, |ψb1 〉 = |ψb10〉+ |ψb11〉+ |χ′b1〉 (77)
where for some server-side system S1,
PS1
x
(1)
0
|ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉, PS1
x
(1)
1
|ψ1〉 = |ψ1〉, PS1K(1) |χ
′〉 = 0, | |χ′〉 | ≤ 2
3
C2| |ϕ〉 | (78)
, and furthermore for some server-side system S3, ∀b1 ∈ {0, 1},
PS1
x
(1)
b1
PS3
x
(3)
0
|ψb10〉 = |ψb10〉, PS1x(1)b1
PS3
x
(3)
1
|ψb11〉 = |ψb11〉, PS3K(3) |χ
′
b1〉 = 0, | |χb1〉 | ≤ 8C| |ϕ〉 | (79)
, where < AuxInf > in (76) is defined as the concatenation of the followings:
• < AuxInf1 >: the client samples {r(3)b }b∈{0,1} differently with key length κout, and
prepares the reversible garbled table RevGT (K(3) ↔ {r(3)0 , r(3)1 };PadLen = l).
• < AuxInf2 >: the client samples {r(1)b }b∈{0,1} differently with key length κout, and
prepares the reversible garbled table RevGT (K(1) ↔ {r(1)0 , r(1)1 };PadLen = l).
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How to understand this lemma The “natural notation” version of (76)(77)(78)(79) is in (73),
which is more intuitive. And we again refer to “How to understand this lemma” under Lemma 7.2.
The lemma says: if the security for the keys is good enough (note that the adversary knows the
global tags of the keys), the state is not ill-behaved, the test round is suitable (it could be much
larger, but it’s not needed), the pad length and output key length are enough, we get what we
want: the server either has some non-negligible failing probability, or the final state has the form
we want.
The proof is given in Appendix E. The proof makes use of the lemmas in the single-key-pair
case. Here there are two pairs of keys, we need to apply the previous lemmas (7.2 and 7.3) twice,
and analyze the form of the state carefully.
8 Remote Gadget Preparation With Weak Security
In this section we give the protocol that achieve remote gadget preparation with weak secu-
rity. We construct three remote gadget preparation protocols (GdgPrepsimplified, GdgPrep1+1→2,
GdgPrepn+1→2n) in this section, and the reader can read Section 5 for a summary of what they
are. There are also two more remote gadget preparation protocols that are used to show the ideas.
(GdgPrepfree−lunch, GdgPreptoy .) In the end of this section we complete the step 1 of Outline 2.
8.1 Ideas for the Remote Gadget Preparation With Weak Security
We will discuss our ideas step-by-step. The ideas in this subsection are not enough to solve the
problem, but they lead to a protocol that works. We will show these ideas, and discuss why they
make sense and why they are still not enough.
Idea 1: reversible garbled table Let’s begin with the quantum generalization of the garbled
table, as we discussed in Section 2.4. However, simply using the reversible garbled tables cannot
“generate new superpositions”. In other words, suppose the output gadget number is N ′ and the
input gadget number is N , there is always N ′ ≤ N , thus it does not lead to a “gadget-increasing”
protocol.
Idea 2: To break this barrier, let’s first consider the following trick: the client samples two keys
x0, x1, and simply gives it to the server and lets the server prepare the gadgets |x0〉+|x1〉. Obviously,
although (1) the correctness condition is satisfied; (2)the client can save the quantum computation
of preparing the gadget, this simple protocol doesn’t have any security since the server can output
x0||x1 easily.
Idea 3: combining idea 1 and idea 2 Starting from Idea 2, we can hope the reversible garbled
table can help us in some way: first, the client views {x0, x1} as part of the input keys, sends a
reversible garbled table to map these input keys (together with some other input keys) to some
output keys y0, y1. And we hope that even if the server knows x0||x1, the reversible garbled table
is somehow “robust” and can still hide y0||y1 on the output wire. This idea seems to be a “free
lunch”, but it turns out, by designing and using the “robust reversible garbled table” instead of the
usual reversible garbled table, this idea leads to a remote gadget preparation protocol with weak
security.
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A detailed description, the free-lunch protocol
Let’s describe this idea in more details. First, we consider the reversible garbling of a Toffoli gate.
(The reason for choosing this gate will be explained later.) Suppose the input wire keys are x
(1)
b ,
x
(2)
b , x
(3)
b and the output wire keys are y
(1)
b , y
(2)
b , y
(3)
b , b ∈ {0, 1}. The reversible garbling of Toffoli
gate allows the server to implement the following mapping, as described in Section 2.4:
|x(1)b1 〉 |x
(2)
b2
〉 |x(3)b3 〉 → |y
(1)
b1
〉 |y(2)b2 〉 |y
(3)
b3+b1b2
〉
If the inputs are provided in the form of |x0〉+ |x1〉, the mapping becomes:
(|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(2)0 〉+ |x(2)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+ |y(1)1 〉)⊗(|y(2)0 〉+ |y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+ |y(3)1 〉)
We note that such a reversible garbled table works as a 3 → 3 remote gadget preparation
protocol. However, we want a remote gadget preparation protocol that can “create” more gadgets
than its initial gadgets. Simply speaking, we want to in some way allow the server implement the
following mapping, while also keeping the keys secure (in the sense of SC-security):
(|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+ |y(1)1 〉)⊗ (|y(2)0 〉+ |y(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(3)0 〉+ |y(3)1 〉)
The state is held by the server but the keys are only known to the client. The server can measure
the states to get one of these keys, but there is no way for it to get both (with high probability).
Let’s first consider a “free lunch protocol”, where a normal reversible garbled table is used
(instead of the “robust reversible garbled table” that will be described later). This protocol does
not work, but can give us some intuition of how the final protocol work.
Protocol 4 (Free Lunch Protocol). GdgPrepFreeLunch(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), where
K = {x(1)b , x(3)b }b∈{0,1}.(So there are 2 pairs of keys, with superscript (1), (3), and each pair of keys
are two different strings of the same length.):
For an honest server, the initial state is |ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉).
1. The client samples a pair of different keys K(2) = {x(2)0 , x(2)1 } with the same length as x(3)b ,
and samples three pairs of different keys Kout = {y(1)b , y(2)b , y(3)b }b∈{0,1} with key length κout.
2. The client computes RevGT (K(1,2,3) ↔ Kout;PadLen = l) and sends it together with K(2) to
the server.
3. An honest server should implement the following mapping:
|ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+|x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+|x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+|y(1)1 〉)⊗(|y(2)0 〉+|y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+|y(3)1 〉) (80)
Let’s first understand why this idea based on normal reversible garbled table does not work.
the server can simply break the garbled table as follows: it first makes measurements on the input
states that it holds, and gets x
(1)
b1
, x
(3)
b3
. Then together with x
(2)
0 , x
(2)
1 it can decrypt two rows in
the forward part of the reversible garbled table. Then it combines the different blocks in the two
decryption results, and it can decrypt more than two rows in the backward garbled table and then
also break the forward table.
What can the client do next? The client wants to give the server the power to prepare the output
states, but it doesn’t want it to learn too much about the keys themselves. More specifically, even
if the server runs the attack described above, the server should ONLY be able to decrypt two rows
in the forward garbled table and two rows in the backward garbled table.
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Robust reversible garbled table
Our idea is to give a new construction called “robust reversible garbled table” (RobustRGT ). In
a RobustRGT , even if the server knows both keys on some input wire, it can at most decrypt two
rows in the forward table and two rows in the backward table, and the other entries in the reversible
garbled table will remain secure.
Let’s describe the construction. In a RobustRGT , the client additionally samples a permutation,
and uses it to make the garbled table “robust”. If the server runs the attack above it can only
decrypt two rows in the forward and backward table. On the other hand, we will see, such a
construction still allows an honest server to do some meaningful thing. Currently we only consider
the RobustRGT on a Toffoli gate.
Formally speaking, we define the RobustRGT on a Toffoli gate as follows:
Definition 8.1. RobustRGT (K1 ↔ K2, perm;PadLen = l), whereK1 = {x(1)b , x
(2)
b , x
(3)
b }b∈{0,1},K2 =
{y(1)b , y
(2)
b , y
(3)
b }b∈{0,1}, and the keys with the same symbol and superscript have the same length;
y
(2)
b and y
(3)
b have the same length. perm is a bit-wise permutation on the strings of length 2κout,
where κout is the key length of y
(2)
b .
RobustRGT (K1 ↔ K2, perm;PadLen = l) is defined as the following reversible garbled table
on Toffoli gate:
RevGT (∀b1, b2, b3 ∈ {0, 1}3 : x(1)b1 ||x
(2)
b2
||x(3)b3 ↔ y
(1)
b1
||perm(y(2)b2 ||y
(3)
b3+b1b2
);PadLen = l) (81)
This RobustRGT allows the honest server to implement the following mapping:
(|x(1)0 〉+|x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(2)0 〉+|x(2)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+|x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+|y(1)1 〉)⊗perm((|y(2)0 〉+|y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+|y(3)1 〉))
So the last 2κout bits are under a permutation which is unknown to the server. Such a “permuted
garbled table” offers additional protection, even when the keys on the second control wires are both
revealed. Thus we get the following protocol:
Protocol 5 (Toy Protocol). GdgPrepToy(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), where K = {x(1)b , x(3)b },
b ∈ {0, 1}.(So there are 2 pairs of keys with superscript (1), (3), and each pair of keys are two
different strings with the same length.):
For an honest server, the initial state is |ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉).
1. The client samples a pair of different keys K(2) = {x(2)0 , x(2)1 } with the same length as x(3)b ,
three pairs of different keys Kout = {y(1)b , y(2)b , y(3)b }b∈{0,1} with key length κout.
2. The client computes RobustRGT (K(1,2,3) ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l) and sends it together
with K(2) to the server.
3. An honest server should implement the following mapping:
|ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+|x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+|x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+|y(1)1 〉)⊗perm((|y(2)0 〉+|y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+|y(3)1 〉))
(82)
Now the client can prepare three gadgets on the server side remotely, under a bit-wise per-
mutation, using only two gadgets initially. If the server still runs the attack described below the
“Free-Lunch Protocol”, it won’t succeed: For example, suppose the server measures the gadgets
and gets keys x
(1)
1 and x
(3)
0 . Then together with K
(2), it can decrypt two rows in the forward table
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and get perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)0 ) and perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 ). But since it doesn’t know what the perm is, these
two strings look like two independently random string, and it doesn’t know how to “split” them
and get the output keys on a specific wire. Thus it can only decrypt two rows in the backward
table, and these two rows will only give it x
(1)
1 and x
(3)
0 , and it does not know x
(1)
0 or x
(3)
1 .
But another problem arises: the extra permutation could not be removed directly. We want to
get a protocol which allows the client to prepare (|y(2)0 〉+ |y(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(3)0 〉+ |y(3)1 〉) remotely, instead
of perm((|y(2)0 〉+ |y(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(3)0 〉+ |y(3)1 〉)). However, if the client simply provides this permutation
to the server, the server will be able to break more than two rows in the garbled table, and the
protocol becomes another “free lunch”. To remove it securely, we make use of another idea.
8.2 Padded Hadamard Test
8.2.1 The overview and an informal discussion of the padded Hadamard Test
Another key tool that we need is an updated version of the “Hadamard test”. The “Hadamard
test” is also used in the previous Mahadev’s constructions[17, 3]. The test comes from the following
formula:
H⊗n(|x0〉+ |x1〉) ∝
∑
d:d·x0=d·x1
|d〉
In this test the client will ask for a non-zero d such that d · (x0 ⊕ x1) = 0.
In these protocols the “standard basis measurement” is used to test the form of the server’s state,
and the Hadamard basis measurement is used to “collapse” a state of the form |0〉 |x0〉 + |1〉 |x1〉
to a single qubit. In some sense, if we want to use it for “controlling” the form of the state, the
Hadamard test seems not that powerful. In our protocol, what we need is a protocol called “padded
Hadamard test”. It’s a revised version of the Hadamard test, and this revision allows us to view
the test from a different viewpoint. We will see, the ability of passing the padded Hadamard test
with high probability gives a very strong control on the state of the adversary.
The protocol is as follows:
Definition 8.2 (Padded Hadamard test). The padded Hadamard test PadHadamard(K;PadLen =
l, OutLen = κout) on K = {x0, x1} is defined as follows:
1. The client samples pad←r {0, 1}l and sends R to the server.
2. The server returns d such that d · (x0||H(pad||x0)) = d · (x1||H(pad||x1)) where H(pad||xb)
has length κout, and d is not all zero on the last κout bits. The client checks the server’s
response.
The honest server can pass this test by making Hadamard measurement on |x0〉 |H(pad||x0)〉 +
|x1〉 |H(pad||x1)〉.
Let’s first show some intuition behind our technique. Consider an adversary that can pass this
test with high probability. And we want to understand what this fact can tell us about the server’s
state. It seems to be a hard problem: different from the “standard basis measurement” in [18],
which directly tells us the state of the server before the measurement, Hadamard basis measurement
does not give us anything like that. However, it tells us what the server can not do after the test:
Lemma 8.1. (Informal)For K = {x0, x1}, suppose (1)the initial state is sufficiently SC-secure for
K; (2)the adversary can pass the padded Hadamard test with high probability, then for any b ∈ {0, 1},
the adversary can only compute xb from the post-test state with small probability. (Which means,
the output state has some level of ANY-security.)
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Idea of the proof. Suppose the adversary can pass the padded Hadamard test with high probability.
Then it proceeds and try to compute x0 or x1. Since these two measurements commute (the
measurement of getting the output for the Hadamard test, and the measurement that tries to
compute xb), imagine that this adversary first measures and gets one of x0 and x1 and then sends
out the result for the padded Hadamard test, the probability of passing the test should not change.
On the other hand, if the adversary gets one of x0 or x1, by the SC-security of the initial state it
cannot get the other key, which implies it should be very hard to pass the padded Hadamard test.
(Note that the “unpadded” Hadamard test does not guarantee this!)
Intuitively, this means the padded Hadamard test works as a “proof-of-no-knowledge”.
Below we give the formal definitions and lemmas. Note that these lemmas is actually much more
general than the informal description in Lemma 8.1. For example, we show in Lemma 8.3 that, if
we already have some control on the form of the initial state, we will have some better control on
the post-execution state; and we can even consider the case that some extra auxiliary information
is provided, where this auxiliary information can be chosen arbitrarily, which allows us to apply the
lemma multiple times on different auxiliary information, even if the post-execution state itself is
fixed. This tells us the padded Hadamard test is a powerful tool to test and control the adversary’s
state.
8.2.2 Formal security statements of the padded Hadamard test
As discussed previously, in the security statement of the padded Hadamard test, we will relate
the passing probability with the ANY-security of the post-execution state. We have two security
lemmas for the padded Hadamard test, which correspond to the cases where we have and do not
have control on the form of the initial state.
Lemma 8.2 (First Security of the Padded Hadamard test). The following statement is true when
the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in
Section 3.1) satisfies:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. η > 10κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + η), κout > l + η.
then the following conclusion is true for any C > 2−κ/10:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, consider the post execution state, which
is
|ϕ′〉 = PadHadamardAdv(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
one of the following two is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C2)| |ϕ〉 |
• Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/6, 2C| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K
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How to understand this lemma We refer to Definition 4.11, which is for a different problem,
but has a similar structure. The lemma says: if the state has sufficient security, and is not ill-
behaved, and if the pad length and output key length is enough, the post-execution state has some
properties that we want.
And we get the following corollary by choosing an appropriate C, which is more convenient
later:
Corollary 1. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in
Section 3.1) satisfies:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. η > 10κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + η), κout > l + η.
then for any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, consider the post execution state, which
is
|ϕ′〉 = PadHadamardAdv(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
one of the following two is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 3536 | |ϕ〉 |
• Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/6, 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K.
If we add some condition on the form of the input, we can have better control on server’s
behavior in the padded Hadamard test.
Lemma 8.3 (Second Security of the Padded Hadamard test). The following statement is true
when the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in
Section 3.1) has the form
|ϕ〉 = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉 (83)
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, PSxb |ψb〉 = |ψb〉 (84)
where S is a system on the server side and PSxb is the projection onto xb ∈ K on system S.
Further assume |ϕ〉 and an algorithm AuxInf run on client’s storage satisfies
• AuxInf is a client-side algorithm on some read-only system, and it does not require RO
queries.
• |ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. η > 10κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |+ η), κout > l + η
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Then the following conclusion holds for any C > 2−κ/10:
For any adversary Adv of query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, for the post-execution state, which is
|ϕ′〉 = PadHadamardAdv(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
at least one of the following is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C2)| |ϕ〉 |.
• For any fixed standard basis subspace S on some server-side system (here “fixed” means S
should not depend on keys in K), any server-side operation D with query number |D| ≤ 2η/4,
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, define |ϕ′b〉 as the post-execution state of feeding part of the input to the protocol:
|ϕ′b〉 = PadHadamardAdv(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕb〉
Thus |ϕ′〉 = |ϕ′0〉+ |ϕ′1〉. And define
p = |PSD(|ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >)|/| |ϕ〉 |
p0 = |PSD(|ϕ′0〉⊙ < AuxInf >)|/| |ϕ〉 |
p1 = |PSD(|ϕ′1〉⊙ < AuxInf >)|/| |ϕ〉 |
where PS is the projection onto S on some server-side system. (We note that S is the
abbreviation of “subspace” (for example, |0〉) instead of “subsystem”.)
Then at least one of the following two is true:
p ≤ 5C (85)
min{p0, p1} ≥ p
6
(86)
How to understand this lemma This lemma can be understood as follows: first, suppose
the adversary can pass the test with some high probability, (correspondingly, the first case in the
conclusion is false.) then starting from the post-execution state, the adversary wants to use the
operation PSD to “separate the behavior” of the two parts in the input: note that p0 corresponds to
the case where the input state is |ψ0〉 and p1 corresponds to the case where the input state is |ψ1〉,
and the adversary wants to make one of p0 and p1 big and the other one small. The lemma says it
won’t succeed, in the following sense: if the adversary can pass the test with high probability, then
either p is not big enough, or p0 and p1 do not differ too much.
What’s more, we allow the adversary to get some auxiliary information. The main condition
we need here is |ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is still SC-secure.
Here S can be chosen to be some keys — even if the conditions say it should be fixed, we can
bypass this problem using hash tags in practice — which means the server’s ability to compute
some keys will be small.
One important thing is < AuxInf > and D can be chosen arbitrarily. This is important and
is what makes this lemma powerful: in the following sections, when we analyze a protocol that
contains the padded Hadamard test, we will apply this lemma multiple times on different auxiliary
information and different D to get multiple inequalities, assuming |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1−C2)| |ϕ〉 |. We
will see, these inequalities, together with some other tools, will lead to the result we need.
We put the proofs in Appendix F.
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8.3 A “Simplified Protocol” for Remote Gadget Preparation: GdgPrepSimplified
8.3.1 Protocol design
Now we can give our first remote gadget preparation protocol. We name it as GdgPrepSimplified.
Protocol 6. GdgPrepSimplified(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), where K = {x(1)b , x(3)b }b∈{0,1}.(So
there are 2 pairs of keys, with superscript (1), (3).):
For an honest server, the initial state is |ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉).
1. The client samples the bit-wise permutation perm on strings of length 2κout, a pair of different
keys K(2) = {x(2)0 , x(2)1 } with the same length as x(3)b , three pairs of different keys Kout =
{y(1)b , y
(2)
b , y
(3)
b }b∈{0,1} with key length κout.
2. The client computes RobustRGT (K(1,2,3) ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l) and sends it together
with K(2) to the server.
3. An honest server should implement the following mapping:
|ϕ〉 = (|x(1)0 〉+|x(1)1 〉)⊗(|x(3)0 〉+|x(3)1 〉)→ (|y(1)0 〉+|y(1)1 〉)⊗perm((|y(2)0 〉+|y(2)1 〉)⊗(|y(3)0 〉+|y(3)1 〉))
4. The client and the server run the padded Hadamard test on K
(1)
out. The server can use |y(1)0 〉+
|y(1)1 〉 to pass the test, as described in Definition 8.2. Reject if the server does not pass this
test.
5. The client sends out perm.
6. The server removes the permutation and gets (|y(2)0 〉+ |y(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(3)0 〉+ |y(3)1 〉).
We can see the first three steps are the same as the toy protocol in Section 8.1. Then both
parties do a padded Hadamard test on the output keys of index 1. Finally the client reveals the
perm and allows the server to remove the permutation.
Why the padded Hadamard test, or a “proof-of-no-knowledge” for K
(1)
out, is needed We
note that in the end of Section 8.1 we said the problem of simply revealing the permutation is the
server can use it to break the garbled table. But now with the extra test, if the server wants to
pass the test with high probability, it has to “give up the ability of computing the keys in K
(1)
out”
(this is from the property of the padded Hadamard test in Section 8.2), which intuitively means
the server loses the ability to decrypt the “backward table” since it doesn’t hold the keys in K
(1)
out
(even if it knows all the keys in the second and the third wire)! Thus providing the permutation
after that should be fine.
One alternative way to view the protocol is to start from the Hadamard test. We can view the
garbled table with key x
(1)
0 and with key x
(1)
1 as different “branches” of this test. On the one hand
the properties of the test require the adversary’s behavior on these two branches could not differ
too much; on the other hand the properties of the two garbled tables put further restrictions on the
adversary’s behavior. And when these restrictions are combined together, the protocol becomes
weakly secure.
Certainly, formalizing the security and giving a security proof is still tricky. For example, the
padded Hadamard test protocol does not guarantee that the server throws away the keys in K
(1)
out
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completely: the server can cheat with some probability. We will first give a simple discussion for its
security in the next subsubsection, then discuss the security more formally in the next subsection
(Section 8.4).
One might be confused by the fact that this 2-to-2 protocol uses two input gadgets to generate
two output gadgets, and it seems that there is no benefit out of it. But we will see later that the
gadget Gadget(K(1)) can be shared. In Section 8.6 we will show how to run n such protocol in
parallel and make them share the Gadget(K(1)) gadget thus give a n+1→ 2n protocol, with weak
security.
8.3.2 An informal discussion of the security
We will make use of a statement similar to the “weak security” (Definition 4.11) as the security
statement of Protocol 6. Recall the definition of weak security in Definition 4.11 is based on a
statement in the following form:
A repetition of the statement in Definition 4.11
The following statement holds when the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the input keys are K = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5). Suppose the initial
state |ϕ〉 of the protocol satisfies the following conditions:
• ∀i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given K −K(i)
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, where
α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ poly(κ), where poly is a fixed polynomial.
For any adversary Adv of query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the final state when the protocol completes,
denoted as
|ϕ′〉 = ProtocolNameAdv(Keys;Parameters) ◦ |ϕ〉
, (and correspondingly, output keys are Kout = {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1}) at least one of the followings
is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 |
• ∀i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η′ , C ′| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
When we describe our security statement of Protocol 6, there are following differences from the
form of statement in Definition 4.11:
• We need to assume the initial state has a specific form. This form can be verified by the
“non-collapsing basis test” protocol described in Protocol 3. Thus although this is an extra
requirement, we can remove it later when we further revise the protocol.
• The initial state has different SC-security conditions for different K(i).
• We use a weaker condition than “|ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from
|EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, where α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ poly(κ), where poly is a
fixed polynomial.”. What’s more, in our statement, we simply require the pad length l, the
output key length κout are bigger than Θ(α1 + α2 + η + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |). Thus when l, κout
are chosen to be bigger than some fixed polynomial function of κ, the protocol will satisfy
Definition 4.11.
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Because of the reason 1 and 2 above, Protocol 6, strictly speaking, does not follow the definition
of weak security. But these problems can be overcome later, after we further revise the protocol.
8.4 Formal Statement and Security Proof
8.4.1 An additional requirement on the initial state: it has to have a specific form
We can prove the security of this protocol when the state has a specific form. In more details, the
initial state should be
|ϕ〉 =
∑
b1∈{0,1}
|x(1)b1 〉 (
∑
b3∈{0,1}
|x(3)b3 〉 |· · ·〉+ |χb1〉) (87)
Where the norm of |χb1〉 should be small. The states are not necessarily normalized.
The honest state has this form. We choose to consider this state because, on the one hand, we
can still prove the security on this state; on the other hand, we can test whether a state has such
form with the BasisTest protocol discussed in Protocol 3, Section 7.3. Recall that using Protocol
3 (BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T )) by its security statement (Lemma 7.4) the client can verify the state,
after given some auxiliary information, can be transformed to the following state using a server-side
operation:
|ϕ〉 =
∑
b1
|x(1)b1 〉 (
∑
b2
|x(3)b2 〉 |· · ·〉+ |χb1〉) + |χ′〉 (88)
In this subsection we will first ignore the |χ′〉 part, and deal with it in Section 8.5. (After that we
can easily adding |χ′〉 back, and the final conclusion will not be affected too much.) We further
note that the extra auxiliary information needed for transforming the state into (88) can be easily
handled with the auxiliary-information technique (Technique 6.2).
Finally note that (87)(88) are all “natural notations”, but for the security proof below we need
to use the “purified notation”. It’s less intuitive, and the readers can refer to (87) to get the
intuition.
8.4.2 Security statement and proof
The security statement for GdgPrepsimplified is given below.
Lemma 8.4. There exist constants A,B ≥ 1 such that the following statement is true when the
security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
For keys K = {K(1),K(3)}, where K(1),K(3) are both a pair of keys, if the initial state |ϕ〉
(where all the randomness are purified by the environment) has the form
|ϕ〉 = |ϕ0〉+ |ϕ1〉 , PS1
x
(1)
0
|ϕ0〉 = |ϕ0〉 , PS1
x
(1)
1
|ϕ1〉 = |ϕ1〉 , S1 is a server-side system (89)
∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, |ϕb1 〉 = |ϕb10〉+ |ϕb11〉+ |χb1〉 ,∀b3 ∈ {0, 1}, PS1x(1)b1
PS3
x
(3)
b3
|ϕb1b3〉 = |ϕb1b3〉 , PS3K(3) |χb1〉 = 0
(90)
where S3 is a server-side system,∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, | |χb1 〉 | ≤ 9C| |ϕ〉 | (91)
The protocol is GdgPrepsimplified(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), and the output keys are
Kout = {K(2)out,K(3)out} returned by the protocol.
If the following conditions are satisfied:
1. |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3). η ≥ κ ·B.
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2. |ϕ〉 is (2η , 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1).
3. |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η
0.99
.
4. l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + 4η
5. For simplicity, additionally assume 19 > C > 2
−√κ
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the post-execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrepsimplified
Adv
(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉 (92)
at least one of the following two is true:
1. |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C2)| |ϕ〉 |
2. ∀w ∈ {2, 3}, Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/B , AC| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(w)out given Kout −K(w)out .
How to understand this lemma See Definition 4.11 to understand this lemma more easily. One
complicated part is the additional requirement on the form of the initial state. And we explicitly
control the range of different parameters. The lemma basically says: if the initial state has the
specific form, has the security conditions that we require, is not ill-behaved, the pad length and
output key length are long enough, we get what we want.
And one way to understand this statement is to understand in a reverse way: if we want the
output properties listed below “at least one of the following two is true”, for some C, we can “trace
back” and know what conditions we need for the initial state. And when we use this subprotocol in
an upper-level protocol, we need its pervious steps to be secure enough such that these conditions
are satisfied.
When we use this lemma the choice of C can vary. And it is usually chosen to be some inverse-
polynomial of κ.
Note again that do not be confused by the condition 5 (C > 2−
√
κ) and think |ϕ〉 cannot be
(2η , 2−η| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3). For an initial state that is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure, η >> κ, we
can definitely say it is (2η, 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) thus it satisfies the condition 2.
8.4.3 Intuition behind the security proofs
Let’s first give some intuition of why this lemma is true.
First, let’s consider the case of w = 3 in Lemma 8.4. The ideas behind the proof are as follows:
1. First we assume the first case does not hold (thus |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1−C2)| |ϕ〉 |) thus we need
to prove Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/O(1), O(1)C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)out given K(2)out.
2. Use the notations in (89)(90). Since |ϕ〉 = |ϕ0〉+ |ϕ1〉, if we define
|ϕ′b〉 := GdgPrepsimplifiedAdv (K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕb〉 , b ∈ {0, 1} (93)
we have |ϕ′〉 = |ϕ′0〉+ |ϕ′1〉. Thus we can study these two “branches” separately and draw the
conclusion by the triangle inequality of SC-security.
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3. First, by analyzing the property of the “robust reversible garbled table” we can prove the
adversary can’t compute y
(3)
0 ||y(3)1 on the |ϕ0〉 branch with big norm. The reason is intuitively
as follows: By (90) |ϕ0〉 ≈9C||ϕ〉| |ϕ00〉+ |ϕ01〉. On the |ϕ00〉 “branch” of the initial state the
adversary can’t compute y
(3)
1 with big norm, while on the |ϕ01〉 part of the initial state the
adversary can’t compute y
(3)
0 with big norm. To see it clearly, consider the following further
simplified case, where the input is honest but the adversary is not:
Without loss of generality, assume the initial state is |x(1)0 〉 |x(3)0 〉 (this is using the natural
notation, see Section 3.1). The adversary doesn’t know x
(1)
1 or x
(3)
1 .
Then in the next step of the protocol the adversary gets the “RobustRGT”, and K(2). In
this setting, the adversary can only decrypt the following rows:
x
(1)
0 , x
(2)
0 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)0 , perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)0 ) (94)
x
(1)
0 , x
(2)
1 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)0 , perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)0 ) (95)
which means, the adversary can only decrypt two rows in the forward table and two rows in
the backward table. Each of the↔ symbol represents two rows: → for the forward table and
← for the backward table.
What’s more, even if perm is revealed to the adversary, and when K
(2)
out is given additionally,
the what the adversary knows is still limited to:
x
(1)
0 , x
(2)
0 , x
(2)
1 , x
(3)
0 , y
(1)
0 , y
(2)
0 , y
(2)
1 , y
(3)
0
And no matter how the adversary composes them, it cannot decrypt other rows other than
(94)(95).
Thus we can see the final state corresponding to the |ϕ00〉 branch is unpredictable for y(3)1
given K
(2)
out and thus is SC-secure for K
(3)
out given K
(2)
out. Similarly the final state corresponding
to the |ϕ01〉 branch is unpredictable for y(3)1 given K(2)out and thus is SC-secure for K(3)out given
K
(2)
out. Thus the |ϕ′0〉 is SC-secure for K(3)out given K(2)out. (We omit the parameters in the security
statement in this informal discussion; we can imagine they are all exponentially small values.)
Certainly, this analysis is informal and we omit some important factors here. For example,
we are considering an ideal case where the initial state is simply |x(1)0 〉 (|x(3)0 〉+ |x(3)1 〉). If we
only assume the conditions given in Lemma 8.4, we can still prove it’s (2Θ(η), O(1)C| |ϕ〉 |)-
SC-secure for K
(3)
out given K
(2)
out. (The second parameter is O(1)C instead of 2
−Θ(η).) And the
details are provided later.
4. How can we argue about the whole state |ϕ′〉 from the properties of the |ϕ′0〉 branch? Here
the property of the padded Hadamard test comes in: by Lemma 8.3 we know if on the |ϕ0〉
part the adversary is hard to compute y
(3)
0 ||y(3)1 , it’s hard to compute it with |ϕ1〉 with big
norm either, otherwise it can’t pass the test with big enough norm. (One note: in Lemma
8.3 we assume the subspace S is “fixed”, but here it’s not. However, if the adversary knows
the “global tags” of K
(3)
out, it can verify whether these keys are y
(3)
0 ||y(3)1 and store the result
as a single bit.) Then we are done!
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We will give a more formal proof for this w = 3 case in the next subsubsection.
Then how about the case for w = 2? The proof for the w = 2 case is more challenging. We
need to make use of the permutation in the garbled table: we can prove that, the security of the
w = 3 case, in some sense, is “mixed” with the w = 2 case. Which means, if the adversary can
compute the keys on output wire w = 2, the property of this permuted garbled table will imply the
adversary can also compute some part of the keys at w = 3 under some situation. Then we can use
a similar argument as the w = 3 case above. We will give a more detailed proof in Section 8.4.5.
8.4.4 Security proofs for the w = 3 case
The formal proof of Lemma 8.4 for w = 3 case is given below. The details are postponed to
Appendix G.
Proof of Lemma 8.4 for w = 3 case. By the auxiliary-information technique (see Technique 6.2) we
can assume Tag(K
(3)
out) are given to the server.
Suppose |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1− C2)| |ϕ〉 |.
And we choose B to be a big enough constant to make all the arguments below work. (Note that
when we apply the lemmas mentioned below, one condition that often appear is the adversary’s
query number 2κ and the security of the initial state 2η should satisfy η > κ · O(1). This can be
satisfied by choosing a big enough B. We note that choosing B = 10000000 is enough, but it can
also be much smaller, although we didn’t estimate the exact threshold constant.)
|ϕ′〉 can be written as |ϕ′0〉+ |ϕ′1〉, as defined in (93). Recall that |ϕ′0〉 is the output of using the
state |ϕ0〉 as the initial state (right most state of equation (92)) and |ϕ′1〉 is defined correspondingly.
Furthermore
|ϕ′0〉 ≈9C||ϕ〉| |ϕ′00〉+ |ϕ′01〉
where |ϕ′00〉 is the output state of using the state |ϕ00〉 as the initial state (right most state of
equation (92)) and |ϕ′01〉 is defined correspondingly. Then first we have
• |ϕ00〉 is (2η − 4, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)1 .
• |ϕ00〉 is (2η − 4, 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1 .
By applying Lemma G.3, we can prove |ϕ′00〉 is (2η/37, 12C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for y(3)1 given
K
(2)
out. (Lemma G.3 additionally assumes 4C ≤ 13 , but in the case 4C > 13 , this statement already
holds.) And similarly |ϕ′01〉 is (2η/37, 12C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for y(3)0 given K(2)out. Thus
|ϕ′0〉 is (2η/37, 33C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)out given K(2)out. (96)
Then applying Lemma 8.3 and taking the projection PS to be the projection onto y
(3)
0 ||y(3)1 (what
we mean is actually first using the global tags to check the values then do a projection onto the
“yes” space) we know |ϕ′〉 is (2η/37, 200C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)out given K(2)out. (The condition for
applying this lemma is the SC-security of
|ϕ〉⊙ < RobustRGT > ⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K(2)out ⊙ Tag(K(3)out)
for K
(1)
out, which comes from Lemma G.1.) This completes the proof.
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8.4.5 (An overview of) the security proof of the w = 2 case
We already give some upper level intuition of how different steps protect the security of this protocol
in Section 8.3. But these intuitions are not enough for the formal proof of the security statement.
In this subsubsection we will give some intuition of how the formal security proof for the w = 2
case works. The detailed formal proof is postponed to Appendix H. The ideas we use in the proof
can be informally listed as follows:
1. Similar to the w = 2 case, we assume the first case does not hold (thus |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1 −
C2)| |ϕ〉 |) thus we need to prove Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/O(1), O(1)C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(2)out given
K
(3)
out.
2. Let’s first introduce some symbols. (In the formal proof we will also use the same symbols.)
If an adversary wants to break this SC-security statement, the adversary needs to compute
y
(2)
0 ||y(2)1 . Suppose the adversary’s operation is U , and denote:
p := |P
y
(2)
0 ||y
(2)
1
U(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out))|/| |ϕ〉 | (97)
We want to get an upper bound for p.
3. (97) implies, there exists a server-side operation U ′ with query number O(1) + |U| such that
|P
y
(2)
0 ||y
(2)
1
U ′(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≥ p/
√
3 (98)
TAG is the random shuffling of Tag(K
(2)
out) and two other “fake tags”. We temporarily omit
the definition of TAG and the explanation of this step here since we want to move to the
explanation of the remaining step faster. But this step is indeed an important preparation
for the proof later.
4. The first step is to make use of the idea that the padded Hadamard test is a “proof of no
knowledge” for K
(1)
out. The lemma is Lemma 8.2, and the reason for doing this is discussed
informally in Section 8.3. To formalize these intuitions we will consider the “blinded” adver-
sary where the adversary’s queries in U ′ are replaced by queries to a blinded oracle where
H(· · · ||K(1)out|| · · · ) part are blinded (the prefix padding has length l), and we can prove, the
output of using this blinded operation (denoted as U blind) does not differ too much from the
output of using U ′:
|P
y
(2)
0 ||y
(2)
1
U blind(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≥ O(1)p −O(1)C (99)
where O(1)-s are going to be replaced by some fixed constants. Note that this step is not
needed in the w = 3 case but is crucial in the w = 2 case.
5. Then, similar to the proof of the w = 3 case, by applying Lemma 8.3 we know, the adversary
should be able to compute y
(2)
0 ||y(2)1 on the |ϕ1〉 part of the initial state with a not-too-small
norm:
|P
y
(2)
0 ||y(2)1
U blind(|ϕ′1〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≥ O(1)p −O(1)C (100)
Note that different O(1)-s can be different constants. |ϕ′1〉 is defined as (93), the same as the
w = 3 case.
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A note on the proof structure We will see, in our proof, we keep deriving lower bounds
in the form of O(1)p−O(1)C for different expressions. Once we reach an expression that can
also be upper-bounded by O(1)C, we get O(1)C ≥ O(1)p − O(1)C thus p ≤ AC for some
constant A. We note that the whole structure might be counter-intuitive, since we are not
trying to prove the adversary cannot do something in some settings; instead, we are proving
the adversary can do something in different settings, assuming (97). (Thus (99)(100) are all
“≥” inequalities.) Finally we reach something that can be bounded in the other direction
and complete the proof.
6. Where can we go from (100)? The next idea is to consider what will happen if the client
replaces the perm in the fifth step of the protocol by a random permutation. We would like
to prove, if (100) holds, which means the adversary can compute the description of K
(2)
out when
the real permutation is provided in the fifth step, the same operation will also compute a set
of “fake keys” when the permutation in the fifth step is a random “fake” permutation.
Note that in (100) we only consider the |ϕ1〉 branch of the input, and similar to the w = 3
case, |ϕ1〉 ≈9C||ϕ〉| |ϕ10〉+ |ϕ11〉. (See (89)(90) for the meaning of notations.)
Informally and without loss of generality let’s consider the case where the input is |ϕ10〉. The
adversary already knows or can decrypt the followings directly from the garbled table:
x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
0 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)0 ) (101)
x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 ) (102)
(101) is what the adversary can get before the 5th step of the garbled table. Since perm is
hidden before the 5th step, the server can’t extract y
(w)
b , w ∈ {2, 3} from the right of (101),
and the right of (101) looks (almost) the same as two independently random strings.
In the 5th step of the protocol the client provides perm. Then since the goal of the adversary
is to output y
(2)
0 ||y(2)1 , it has to extract y(2)0 from (101) and extract y(2)1 from (102):
x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
0 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)0 )
perm−−−→ y(2)0 (103)
x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 )
perm−−−→ y(2)1 (104)
Imagine that in the 5th step, instead of providing the real permutation perm, the client pro-
vides a different perm′. The key observation is, from (103)(104), the server can’t distinguish
this “fake permutation” perm′ from the real perm using only the decrypted plaintext in (101).
In the server’s viewpoint, perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)0 ), perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 ) are (almost) just two strings whose
bits are all independently random. Thus if some adversary can do the extraction shown in
(103)(104), if the client chooses to provide a different perm′, it should also be able to compute
the “fake keys” K
fake−0−(2)
out ,K
fake−0−(3)
out , defined as the key pairs that have the same length
with K
(2)
out,K
(3)
out, and satisfy the following equation:
∀w ∈ {2, 3},Kfake−0−(w)out = {yfake−0−(w)b }b∈{0,1} satisfy :
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, perm′(yfake−0−(2)b ||yfake−0−(3)b ) = perm(y(2)b ||y(3)b )
Writing it in the form of (103)(104), in the server’s viewpoint, it gets the following:
x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
0 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)0 )
perm′−−−→ yfake−0−(2)0 := first half of perm′−1(perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)0 ))
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x
(1)
1 , x
(2)
1 , x
(3)
0 ↔ y(1)1 , perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 )
perm′−−−→ yfake−0−(2)1 := first half of perm′−1(perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1 ))
Formally speaking, it implies
qblind,fake,01 := |Pyfake−0−(2)0 ||yfake−0−(2)1 U
blind(|φ′1〉⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≥ O(1)p−O(1)C
(105)
where |φ′1〉 is the output state when the initial state is |ϕ1〉 and the permutation provided is
perm′.
Note There is one more detail missing above: in the argument above we implicitly assume
the adversary can only decrypt at most two rows in the forward table and two rows in the
backward table ((103)(104)). But why is this still true when the perm is provided to the
server? The reason is, we have already “blinded” the server’s operation U ! In other words,
before the adversary knows perm, this property is guaranteed by the fact that the adversary
does not know perm; after the perm is provided, the adversary has already been blinded, and
this property still holds.
7. On the other hand, we can prove, these “fake-keys” cannot be simultaneously computed in
the |ϕ0〉 part of the input:
qblind,fake,00 := |Pyfake−0−(2)0 ||yfake−0−(2)1 U
blind(|φ′0〉 ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≤ O(1)C
(106)
where |φ′0〉 is the output state when the initial state is |ϕ0〉 and the permutation provided is
perm′. Then using (105)(106) and applying Lemma 8.3 again complete the proof.
We note that this is only an overview of the formal proof and there are a lot of details missing here.
In the formal proof we will combine all these details.
We leave the complete proof to Appendix H.
8.5 The 1 + 1→ 2 Gadget Preparation Protocol
8.5.1 Protocol design and security statement
In the last section we formalized the protocol that “generate” two output gadgets from two input
gadgets. However, to prove the security, we need to assume the input state has a specific form.
However, if we want to glue the subprotocols together into a big protocol, the only things we want
to assume about the initial state are its norm, the SC-security property and the representable
property, as discussed in Section 6.8.1.
So in this section we add a BasisTest step before it. Then we can get rid of the condition
on the form of the initial state: using the property of the BasisTest protocol, we can derive that
some state in the middle of the execution is close to the state we want, and then we can consider
this state as the initial state and apply Lemma 8.4. (The reader can refer to Section 8.4.1 for some
discussions on it.)
Then we give the remote gadget preparation protocol of this subsection. Using the notation in
Definition 4.2, this protocol is a 2→ 2 protocol. Since the two pairs of keys play different roles, we
name it as “1 + 1→ 2 protocol”, or GdgPrep1+1→2.
Protocol 7. GdgPrep1+1→2(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ) is defined as fol-
lows, where K = {K(1),K(3)}, K(1),K(3) are both single pairs of keys:
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1. The client and the server execute BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout).
(Protocol 3)
2. The client and the server execute GdgPrepSimplified(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout). The
client stores the returned output keys.
Lemma 8.5. There exist constants A2, B2 > 1 such that the following is true when the security
parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
For keys K = {K(1),K(3)}, K(1) = {x(1)b }b∈{0,1}, K(3) = {x(3)b }b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5), if
the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1),
protocol GdgPrep1+1→2(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ) satisfy the following
conditions:
1. |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3). η > B2κ. η > 500κ + 2000T 2.
2. |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1); 1/9 > C > 2−
√
κ/10.
3. |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η
0.98
.
4. 2/C4 > T > 1/C4.
5. l > 2(α1 + α2 + 2κ+ log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 3η), κout ≥ l + 4η
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote post-execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrep1+1→2Adv (K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ) ◦ |ϕ〉 (107)
, use Kout to denote the returned output keys, at least one of the following two is true:
1. |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 |
2. For any w ∈ {2, 3}, Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/B2 , A2C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(w)out given Kout −K(w)out .
We add the following note to help the reader understand the conditions in Lemma 8.5.
Note on Lemma 8.5:
• See Definition 4.11 to understand this lemma more easily. The complicated part of the descrip-
tion of this lemma is mainly because we explicitly control the range of different parameters.
The lemma basically says: if the initial state has the security conditions that we require, is
not ill-behaved, the test round is suitable and the pad length and output key length are long
enough, we get what we want.
• The relations between different variables in the statement might seem complicated. One way
to understand this statement is to understand it in the “reverse” way: we can view C as a
value that decides the properties of the output. If we want the post-execution state to satisfy
the conclusion (which is parameterized by C, 19 > C > 2
√
κ/10, then the protocol parameter
should satisfy the condition 4, 5, and the initial state should satisfy the first three conditions.
• In the sections later, 1/C, T are all at most chosen to be a fixed polynomial of κ. Thus η only
needs to be a fixed polynomial of κ, thus the size of the initial gadgets is succinct.
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• The reader might get confused on the fact that we seem to be requiring C to be “not-too-
small”: in the conditions we say |ϕ〉 is (2η, C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1) and we
additionally require C > 2−
√
κ. Intuitively it’s better to have |ϕ〉 to be (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-
secure, does that mean we want the initial state to be “insecure”? The answer is no: for an
input state |ϕ〉, if |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure, then we can also say it’s (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-
secure for C = poly(κ) > 2−
√
κ > 2−η! Thus the reader should not think the condition 3
means |ϕ〉 is “only” SC-secure with that parameter.
• The requirement C > 2−
√
κ/10 is a simple way to cover the all cases where C is a fixed
inverse-polynomial function of κ.
• Similar to Lemma 7.4, we need a two-sided constraint on T . We can definitely choose T in a
bigger interval, but it’s not needed here.
8.5.2 Security proof
Proof. The problem here is to combine the analysis of the BasisTest protocol and the simplified
gadget preparation protocol. Denote the state after the first (BasisTest) step of the protocol as
|ϕ1〉, apply the property of the BasisTest protocol (Lemma 7.4), we know:
Either
|Ppass |ϕ1〉 | ≤ (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 | (108)
or there exists a server-side operation U , query number |U| ≤ 2κ+3 such that
|ϕ˜1〉 := U(Ppass |ϕ1〉⊙ < AuxInf >) = |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉+ |χ′〉 , (109)
for some server-side system S1, ∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, PS1
x
(1)
b1
|ψb1〉 = |ψb1〉 , PS1K(1) |χ
′〉 = 0 (110)
∀b1 ∈ {0, 1}, |ψb1 〉 = |ψb10〉+ |ψb11〉+ |χb3〉 , (111)
for some server-side system S3, ∀b1, b3 ∈ {0, 1}2, PS1
x
(1)
b1
PS3
x
(3)
b3
|ψb1b3〉 = |ψb1b3〉 , PS3K(3) |χb1〉 = 0 (112)
< AuxInf > is defined as in Lemma 7.4, (113)
| |χ′〉 | ≤ 2C2/3| |ϕ〉 |, ∀b3 ∈ {0, 1}, | |χb3 〉 | ≤ 8C| |ϕ〉 | (114)
To prove the conclusion in this lemma (the statement below “then the following conclusion holds”),
we can instead view |ϕ′〉 as the output state of applying the second step of the protocol (which is
a GdgPrepsimplified protocol against Adv=2, the adversary for the second step of the protocol) on
initial state Ppass |ϕ1〉, and Ppass |ϕ1〉 satisfies (108)-(114).
Do a small discussion by cases. Note that the first case (we mean (108)) already implies the
final conclusion in the lemma. So we need to understand what the second case ((109)-(114)) gives
us.
Then by the auxiliary-information technique (Technique 6.2) adding the extra < AuxInf > can
only make the conclusion stronger, thus we only need to prove the final conclusion in the lemma
(the statement under “then the following conclusion holds”) when:
1. the initial state (the right-most state of (107)) is |ϕ˜1〉
2. the bound on the query number of the adversary becomes |Adv′| ≤ |Adv=2|+ |U| ≤ 2κ+4
3. the protocol becomes a GdgPrepsimplified
Adv′
protocol with the same parameters (the same key
set, pad length and output length, and the “TestRound” parameter is useless here)
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We will make use of the security statement of GdgPrepsimplfied (Lemma 8.4). Note that in Lemma
8.4 the initial state should have a specific form, and here |ϕ˜〉 is already very close but not exactly
the same. Denote
|ψ〉 := |ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉 ≈ 2
3
C2||ϕ〉| |ϕ˜〉 (115)
We will first study what happens when the initial state is |ψ〉, and the case when |ϕ˜〉 is the initial
state will be close to it. We can verify the conditions of applying Lemma 8.4 as follows:
1. Query number of the adversary: |Adv′| ≤ 2κ+4
2. |ψ〉 has the form we need: (110)(111)(112)(115), and ∀b3 ∈ {0, 1}, | |χb3〉 | ≤ 8C| |ϕ〉 | ≤
9C| |ψ〉 |.
3. |ψ〉 is (2η/7, 2−η/7| |ψ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3). Its proof is given below.
To prove it, by (109)(115) this can be reduced to proving
|ϕ1〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/7 + |U|, 2−η/7−1| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3).
By Lemma 6.3 this is reduced to proving
|ϕ〉⊙ < BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T ) > ⊙ < AuxInf > is
(2η/7 + |U|+ |Adv|, 2−η/7−1| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3).
When K(3) is given beforehand, the < BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T ) > ⊙ < AuxInf > are sets of
padded hash values and reversible garbled tables on K(1) (with pad length l). Since |ϕ〉⊙K(3)
is (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure forK(1), by Lemma 6.11 |ϕ〉⊙K(3)⊙ < BasisTest(K(1),K(3);T ) >
⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1), which completes the proof.
4. Applying Lemma 6.13 and use a similar argument as above we can prove
Ppass |ϕ1〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/37, 3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1).
Then |ψ〉 is (2η/40, 4C| |ψ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3) given K(1).
5. |ψ〉 is (1, |Adv| + |U| + O(T ))-representable from |ϕ〉 thus is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2κ+5)-representable
from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. Here l is chosen to be bigger than the one given
in Lemma 8.4 thus the pad length is enough.
By the security of the GdgPrepsimplified protocol (Lemma 8.4) we know |ψ′〉, defined as the output
of using |ψ〉 as the input of equation (107), satisfies either
|Ppass |ψ′〉 | ≤ (1−C2)| |ψ〉 | (116)
or
Ppass |ψ′〉 is (2η/40B , 4AC| |ψ〉 |)-SC-secure for (∀w ∈ {2, 3}) K(w)out given Kout −K(w)out (117)
Now we can combine this with (115) to draw the final conclusion. In the first case (we mean (116))
we have 1−C2+2/3C2 < 1−C12 and in the second case (117) we only need to choose the constant
A2 to be slightly bigger than 4A.
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8.6 An n+ 1→ 2n Gadget Preparation Protocol
In the previous section we designed the GdgPrep1+1→2 protocol. However, this protocol cannot
generate new gadgets, even on an honest server. To solve this problem, we introduce the idea of
“gadget sharing”:
8.6.1 Gadget sharing: the idea to double (asymptotically) the number of gadgets
We introduce the following idea: we note that, the gadget corresponding to K(1) can be shared
among different execution of the protocol. If we run n such protocols simultaneously and let them
share the Gadget(K(1)) gadget, we get a protocol which can generate 2n gadgets from n+1 gadgets.
In more details, recall that in the GdgPrepsimplified protocol the client needs to prepare a
special “robust reversible garbled table” on input keys K(1),K(2),K(3) and output keys K
(1)
out, K
(2)
out,
K
(3)
out. In this section, the client will create n such robust reversible garbled tables with shared K
(1)
and K
(1)
out. In other words, each of these garbled tables encodes mapping in the following form:
i-th table, i ∈ [n]: K(1),K(2)(i),K(3)(i) ↔ K(1)out, perm(i)(K(i)(2)out ,K(i)(3)out ) (118)
(where each of K(1),K(2)(i),K(3)(i),K
(1)
out,K
(i)(2)
out ,K
(i)(3)
out is a single pair of keys.)
(118) informally and intuitively shows what these garbled tables do:
• As the previous protocols (Protocol 6, 7), perm(i) is a bit-wise permutation on strings of
length 2κout. For different i, they are sampled independently randomly.
• Here the key pair K(1) is shared, thus is the same in all the garbled tables.
• K(3) part is not shared, thus for each garbled table this part should be different, and we index
them with K(3)(i), i ∈ [n]. Thus there should be n+ 1 initial gadgets in the initial state.
• Recall that in the GdgPrepsimplified protocol the K(2)(i) part is sampled during the protocol
and the gadget is prepared on the server side, thus does not require initial gadgets.
• For the output part similarly K(1)out is shared.
• If we focus on a specific i ∈ [n], these are all the same as the GdgPrepsimplified protocol.
• For the other two wires in the output part we use a different superscript order: inK(i)(2)out ,K(i)(3)out ,
i ∈ [n] comes first and w ∈ {2, 3} comes behind it. This is only for the convenience of the
later proof.
Similar to equation (82), (the mapping of the GdgPrepsimplified protocol in the honest setting)
such a construction allows the server to do the following mapping:
(|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (⊗ni=1(|x(3)(i)0 〉+ |x(3)(i)1 〉))
n RobustRGT tables, together with {K(2)(i)}i∈[n]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(|y(1)0 〉+ |y(1)1 〉)⊗ (⊗ni=1perm(i)((|y(i)(2)0 〉+ |y(i)(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(i)(3)0 〉+ |y(i)(3)1 〉))
where the keys are correspondingly: K(1) = {x(1)0 , x(1)1 },K(3)(i) = {x(3)(i)0 , x(3)(i)1 },K(1)out = {y(1)0 , y(1)1 }.
K
(i)(w)
out = {y(i)(w)0 , y(i)(w)1 }
Then we need to make one further revision to the idea above: note that the discussion above
focuses on running n blocks of GdgPrepsimplified protocol. But this is not enough: what we will
do next is to run n blocks of GdgPrep1+1→2 protocol simultaneously, thus we need to insert the
BasisTest part suitably. The formal description of the protocol is given below.
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8.6.2 Protocol design
Note that in the protocol below we use notation K˜out to denote the output keys used in the garbled
table, since in the final step there a “change of notation” step, and we will denote the final key set
as Kout.
Protocol 8. GdgPrepn+1→2n(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ) is defined below,
where
K = {K(1),K(3)}, K(3) := {K(3)(i)}i∈[n], K1 = {x(1)b }b∈{0,1}, K(3)(i) = {x(3)(i)b }b∈{0,1}.
In the honest setting the server should hold (|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (⊗ni=1(|x(3)(i)0 〉+ |x(3)(i)1 〉)) initially.
1. For i = 1, · · · n, the client and the server execute Protocol 3:
BasisTest(K(1),K(3)(i);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout)
2. The client samples a pair of different keys K(2)(i) for each i ∈ [n] whose length is the same
as K(3)(i).
And it samples K˜
(1)
out, {K˜(i)(2)out , K˜(i)(3)out }i∈[n], where
K˜
(1)
out = {y(1)0 , y(1)1 } and K˜(i)(w)out = {y(i)(w)0 , y(i)(w)1 }, i ∈ [n], w ∈ {2, 3}
and each key pair are sampled differently independently and each key has length κout.
3. For each i, the client samples perm(i) from the bit-wise permutations on strings of length
2κout and sends
RobustRGT ((K(1),K(2)(i),K(3)(i))↔ (K˜(1)out, K˜(i)(2)out , K˜(i)(3)out ), perm(i);PadLen = l)
together with the description of K(2)(i) to the server.
The honest server can implement the mapping
(|x(1)0 〉+ |x(1)1 〉)⊗ (⊗ni=1(|x(3)(i)0 〉+ |x(3)(i)1 〉)) (119)
→(|y(1)0 〉+ |y(1)1 〉)⊗ (⊗ni=1(perm(i)((|y(i)(2)0 〉+ |y(i)(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(i)(3)0 〉+ |y(i)(3)1 〉))) (120)
4. The client and the server run the padded Hadamard test on K˜
(1)
out. The honest server can use
|y(1)0 〉+ |y(1)1 〉 in (120) to pass this test. Reject if the server cannot pass the test.
5. The client sends out all the perm(i), i ∈ [n]. The honest server can remove the permutation
and get the state
Gadget({K˜(i)(2)out , K˜(i)(3)out }i∈[n]) = ⊗ni=1((|y(i)(2)0 〉+ |y(i)(2)1 〉)⊗ (|y(i)(3)0 〉+ |y(i)(3)1 〉))
The protocol outputs Kout on the client side as the returned output keys where Kout is just a
change of the notation from {K˜(i)(2)out , K˜(i)(3)out }i∈[n] to Kout = {K(i)out}i∈[2n] where K(i)out corresponds to
K˜
([i/2])(i mod 2+2)
out .
This protocol allows an honest server to (asymtotically) double the number of states, and also
has the weak security. Thus this protocol completes the step 1 of Outline 2.
The security lemma is given below.
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Lemma 8.6. There exist constants A3, B3 > 1 such that the following is true when κ is bigger than
some constant:
For keys K that is compatible with the protocol above (which means, the form of K is shown
in the beginning of the protocol), if the initial state is |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the
environment, as discussed in Section 3.1) and the protocol is
GdgPrepn+1→2n(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ), n ≤ κ
, if the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3). η ≥ κB3, η > 2000T 2 + 500κ.
• ∀i ∈ [n], |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)(i) given K(1) and K(3) −K(3)(i). 1/9 > C >
2−
√
κ/10
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η
0.97
.
• 2/C4 > T > 1/C4
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + 3κ+ log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 3η), κout > l + 4η
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the post-execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrepn+1→2n
Adv
(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T ) ◦ |ϕ〉 (121)
, at least one of the following two is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 |
• For any i ∈ [2n], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/B3 , A3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
(See Definition 4.11 to understand this lemma more easily. The complicated part of the de-
scription of this lemma is mainly because we explicitly control the range of different parameters.)
8.6.3 Security proof
Proof overview For the proof, we make use of the security statement of GdgPrep1+1→2 (Lemma
8.5). First, we can prove this statement separately, for each i ∈ [2n]. Use the notation before
the re-indexing, the second case of the statement becomes: for any i ≤ n, w ∈ {2, 3}, Ppass |ϕ′〉 is
(2η/B3 , A3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K˜(i)(w)out given K˜out−K˜(i)(w)out . For a specific i ∈ [n], such a statement
can be reduced to the security of GdgPrep1+1→2 by the auxiliary-information technique (Section
6.2): recall that the protocol can be seen as a simultaneous running of n blocks of subprotocols,
and using this technique we can “remove” the part of the subprotocol that is not at index i (by
applying Technique 6.2 and Lemma 6.3, 6.4), and the remaining protocol becomes a GdgPrep1+1→2
protocol. And the new initial state becomes |ϕ〉 ⊙ < Prtlotherpart > where < Prtlotherpart > comes
from applying the auxiliary-information technique.
The formal proof is given below.
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Proof. Consider a specific i ≤ n, which corresponds to the input keysK(3)(i) and output keys K˜(i)(w)out
(w ∈ {2, 3}). Thus to prove the conclusion (the statement below “then the following conclusion
holds”), proving it for i is enough.
We only care about the input, protocol and the output that are applied on the keys at index
i ∈ [n]. (Note that “i ∈ [n]” and “i ∈ [2n]” represent different things. The former one is the index
before the change-of-notation, and the later one is the index after the change-of-notation, and will
not be used in this proof. See the last step of the protocol.) Applying the auxiliary-information
technique (Technique 6.2, Lemma 6.3, 6.4), proving this is reduced to proving a new statement
where:
• The initial state (the right side of equation (121)) is replaced by |ϕ〉 ⊙ X ⊙ Y where X :=
K(3) −K(3)(i). Y is the client-side messages of the first, third and fifth steps of the protocol,
except the index i. In more details, Y contains
1. < BasisTest(K(1),K(3)(i
′);T, PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) > for all i
′ 6= i;
2. For all i′ 6= i, the description of K(2)(i′), and
RobustRGT ((K(1),K(2)(i
′),K(3)(i
′))↔ (K˜(1)out, K˜(i
′)(2)
out , K˜
(i′)(3)
out ), perm
(i′);PadLen = l)
3. perm(i
′) for all i′ 6= i.
• Correspondingly, the messages in the protocol that are not on the index i in the first, third
and fifth step are removed. And the remaining protocol is just an execution of GdgPrep1+1→2
protocol applied on K(1), K(3)(i).
• The adversaries are of query number ≤ 2|Adv|+O(κ)
In summary, to prove the original conclusion in Lemma 8.6, we only need to prove the following
under the same conditions of Lemma 8.6:
For any adversary Adv′ with query number |Adv′| ≤ 2|Adv|+O(κ) ≤ 2κ+2, denote the post-execution
state as (where X, Y are defined above)
|ϕ˜′〉 = GdgPrep1+1→2
Adv′
({K(1),K(3)(i)};PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = T )◦(|ϕ〉⊙X⊙Y )
(122)
, denote the output keys as {K˜(i)(w)out }w∈{2,3}, at least one of the following two is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ˜′〉 | ≤ (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 |
• ∀w ∈ {2, 3}, Ppass |ϕ˜′〉 is (2η/B3 , A3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K˜(i)out given K˜(i)out − K˜(i)(w)out .
Note that i is already fixed.
We are almost at the place to apply the property of GdgPrep1+1→2 to draw the conclusion. We
check the conditions as follows:
• SC-security of |ϕ〉⊙X⊙Y for K(1) given K(3)(i): After K(3)(i) is given to the server, together
with X = K(3) − K(3)(i), we can simply assume the adversary gets K(3) in the beginning.
And everything in Y can be simulated using some garbled tables or reversible garbled tables
encrypted under K(1), with some extra paddings. The total number of (reversible) garbled
tables is at most O(nT ). Since |ϕ〉 ⊙ K(3) is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1), by Lemma
6.11 we know
|ϕ〉 ⊙X ⊙ Y is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3)(i). (123)
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• After K(1) is provided, since Y can be simulated from X and K(1) with O(nT ) queries, and
we know |ϕ〉 ⊙X ⊙K(1) is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)(i), by Technique 6.2
|ϕ〉 ⊙X ⊙ Y is (2η −O(nT ), C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)(i) given K(1). (124)
• Since |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, and since X
and Y can be prepared using O(nT ) queries,
|ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 +O(nT ))-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. (125)
Note that the length of l in this lemma is bigger than the one in Lemma 8.5 by κ. Thus the
inequalities on the parameters in Lemma 8.5 (the 5th condition) are satisfied.
Thus we can apply Lemma 8.5 and conclude that the final state |ϕ˜′〉 in (122) satisfies either
|Ppass |ϕ˜′〉 | ≤ (1 − C12)| |ϕ〉 | or Ppass |ϕ˜′〉 is (2η/6B2 , A2C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K˜(i)(w)out given K˜(i)out −
K˜
(i)(w)
out (∀w ∈ {2, 3}). Thus we complete the proof.
8.6.4 A final note: Protocol 8 completes the step 1 of Outline 2
Note that if the test round T is chosen appropriately, Lemma 8.6 can be abbreviated using the
definition of weak security (Definition 4.11):
Lemma 8.7. There exist constants A3 > 1, B3 > 1 such that the following is true when κ is bigger
than some constant:
For any n < κ, there exists an n+1→ 2n protocol with weak security of transform parameter (1−
κ−O(1)|η,C → η/B3, A3C) assuming the condition η, 1/C ∈ [poly(κ), subexp(κ)) is satisfied, where
O(1) is some constant, poly, subexp are correspondingly some fixed polynomial, subexponential
functions.
Which means, step 1 of Outline 3 is completed!
And in the next section we will see how to amplify it to a fully secure protocol.
9 Overview of the Amplification Techniques
In this section we give an overview of how to “amplify” the weak security to normal security for
the remote state preparation protocol. The formal protocols are given in Sections 10 and 11.
9.1 How to Simplify Things to Get Intuitions
In the previous section we get an n+ 1→ 2n protocol with weak security of transform parameter
(1 − κ−O(1)|η,C → η/O(1), O(1)C) (O(1) are some constants). Recall the definition of the weak
security (Definition 4.11), it means (informally) if the input state is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for
its keys, the output state either satisfies either |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1 − κ−O(1))| |ϕ〉 | or Ppass |ϕ′〉 is
(2η/O(1), O(1)C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for its output keys.
As discussed in Section 6.8.1, in the security proof, we will focus on (1)the norm of the state
(which reflects the “passing probability”) and (2)the SC-security of a state. This fact in turn
implies, to get some intuitions for the following steps, we can first consider a setting, where the
protocols and adversaries are of a specific form, such that
• does not differ too much from the general setting if we only care about the norm of a state
and the SC-security
94
• is easier to understand intuitively.
Let’s give the definition of the i.i.d adversaries, as follows.
9.2 General Setting, simplified Adversary Setting and i.i.d Adversary Setting
9.2.1 Definitions of different settings, on a weakly-secure remote gadget preparation
protocol
To get the intuitions for the further steps, we first analyze the adversaries that have a specific form.
We first define the “simplified adversary”, on a single execution of some remote gadget preparation
protocol, and then define the “i.i.d adversary” for multi-round execution of some remote gadget
preparation protocol:
Definition 9.1 (Simplified adversary setting). For initial state |ϕ〉, and an N → L remote gadget
preparation protocol Prtl that has weak security of transform parameter (p|η,C → η′, C ′), we
define the simplified adversary setting as follows:
Suppose the input state |ϕ〉 is honest: |ϕ〉 = ⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉 + |x(i)1 〉), where {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1} are
the input keys, and the adversary chooses to do one of the following two:
• Make the client reject with probability 1−p2. Then all the keys are revealed to the adversary,
no matter the client accepts or rejects.
• With probability C2, all the keys are revealed to the adversary.
Otherwise (with probability 1−C2), the adversary behaves honestly and generate ⊗Li=1(|y(i)0 〉+
|y(i)1 〉), where {y(i)b }i∈[L],b∈{0,1} are the output keys. The client gets the output keys.
What’s more, the client will not remember the adversary’s choices, and it will not remember whether
the adversary gets the keys. We can imagine in both choices, the adversary can get the keys without
the help from the client.
The simplified adversary captures the case where a single round of some protocol Prtl is ex-
ecuted. We also need to consider the case where multiple rounds of a subprotocol is executed on
different blocks of the input. Thus we define the “i.i.d” adversary setting as a generalization of the
“simplified adversary setting”:
Definition 9.2 (i.i.d adversary setting). The i.i.d adversary setting is defined as follows. Suppose
the initial state is |ϕ〉 = ⊗Mm=1(|Blockm〉), and a remote gadget preparation protocol Prtl is applied
separately (which might be parallelly or sequentially) on each block of the input. In the i.i.d
adversary setting, each block is an honest state (for example, if each block has κ gadgets, it is of
the form |Blockm〉 = ⊗κi=1(|x(m)(i)0 〉+ |x(m)(i)1 〉)) the adversary behaves independently as a simplified
adversary on each block.
These definitions might be counter-intuitive, since the adversary seems to be over-powerful (it
can even “control” the client to do something), and there is no explicit way to achieve what we
assume it can do in practice. Why we still want to consider such a setting? Actually this setting
is natural: recall that in the security proof we focus on the norm (or the “passing probability”) of
the state, and the SC-security of the output state. Thus in the security proof we (note that we are
talking about “we”, not “client”) only have very limited control on what the adversary actually
can do. For example, if the output state falls into the first case in the conclusion of a weakly-secure
protocol (see Definition 4.11 for weak security), which is |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ p| |ϕ〉 |, in this case, we do
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not know any other thing about the adversary’s state except the fact that it at most passes the
protocol with probability p2, and it’s even possible that the adversary already knows all the keys
after the protocol completes! So the principle behind the design of the simplified adversary setting
and the i.i.d setting is: Once during the security proof we lose the control on the SC-
security (which reflects “with how much norm” the adversary can compute the keys),
intuitively we can simply imagine the adversary already knows everything, because
our security proof technique does not distinguish them.
We emphasize that we give this definition only to explain intuition behind our amplification
technique, and in the formal security proof this “i.i.d setting” is not needed at all.
9.2.2 Form of states in the simplified setting and i.i.d setting
And in this setting, when we meet a state |ϕ〉 which is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for {x0, x1}, we can
simply assume the server’s state is the mixture of the honest state (|x0〉 + |x1〉, with probability
1− C2) and a state where the adversary already knows everything (x0||x1, with probability C2).
We note that we go back to use the “natural notation” instead of the “purified notation”. (See
Section 3.1)
The advantage of considering such i.i.d setting is we only need to consider the mixtures of
adversaries at the two extreme cases: the adversary that is honest and the adversaries that already
break everything for a given block of the protocol.
Below we discuss our amplification technique using the i.i.d adversary setting.
9.3 Amplification: the Repeat-and-combine Technique
Now we show some intuitions and ideas on how to “amplify” a weakly secure protocol. As discussed
before, we will consider the i.i.d adversary setting to get the ideas and intuition behind our protocol.
(Later we will give the protocols and prove the security against general adversaries.)
9.3.1 Amplification on the “(square root of the) passing probability”
First, as we showed in the end of Section 8, there exists a n+ 1→ 2n protocol with weak security
transform parameters (p|η,C → η′, C ′) where p = 1− κ−O(1), η′ = η/O(1), C ′ = O(1)C (O(1)-s in
the statement should be replaced by constants).
This n + 1 → 2n protocol is only a “weak” protocol since p,C ′ are all bounded by an inverse
polynomial, but we want them to be negligible. First, let’s see what we can do for the “(square
root of) passing probability” p. We will show a technique to reduce the parameter p in the weak
security from 1 − κ−O(1) to a constant, and give a protocol with weak security (η,C → η′, C ′),
where η′ is not too small and C ′ is not too big. (See Definition 4.12 for the notation without p.)
The technique is simple: (Step 1 of this technique) The client and the server run M
blocks of the original protocol on (if the input is honest) M blocks of states, and
require that the server passes in all the blocks of protocol.
The correctness is obvious. To analyze the security, we temporarily use the i.i.d adversary setting
and assume the input is honest and the adversary behaves independently on each block. We will see
when the number of blocks is bigger than some “threshold polynomial” (which isM > 40κ(1−p)−1),
such a technique amplifies a protocol with weak security of transform parameter (p|·, · → ·, ·) to a
protocol with weak security of transform parameter (·, · → ·, ·). (We omit four characters in the
“security transform parameter” that we do not want to consider in this step.)
We will refer to this technique as the “repeat” technique.
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Why it works (in the i.i.d setting): Notice that in the i.i.d setting the adversary needs to
choose a choice for each block (see Definition 9.1), and here the server can only choose the first
choice in less than κ(1−p)−1 number of blocks, otherwise the probability of passing the verification
will be negligible! (because p(1−p)−1 ≤ 12 .) So if the attacker wants to pass this protocol with non-
negligible probability, it has to choose the second choice (which means it should behave “partially
honest”) on at least M −κ(1−p)−1 blocks. Since we already assumeM > 10κ(1−p)−1 this means
the server has to be partially honest on most of the blocks!
If the client can know in which block the adversary will choose the second choice, and throws
away the blocks where the server choose the first choice, this will be a remote gadget preparation
protocol with weak security of transform parameter (2−Θ(κ)|η,C → η′, C ′). When C ′ is not too
small we can omit the p term and say it has weak security (η,C → η′, C ′). However, the client
doesn’t know on which blocks the server will choose so it can’t drop the corresponding blocks. The
solution is: (Step 2 of this technique) The client does a random shuffling on all the blocks
of keys, and asks the server to do the shuffling on the gadgets too. Then for any fixed
index, with > 910 probability the block after the shuffling is an “honest block”. (Which means,
the adversary behaves honestly here.) Thus this is a protocol with weak security of transform
parameter (η,C → η′, O(1)).
The next problem is, even if we already make p negligibly small and make the protocol weakly-
secure under Definition 4.12 instead of 4.11, C ′ is still inverse-polynomial (actually, becomes a
constant). To solve these problems, we will describe the “combine” technique in the next subsub-
section.
9.3.2 Combine technique: constant-to-negligible amplification on the SC-security
In Section 9.3.1 we describe the “repeat” technique for amplifying the “passing probability” pa-
rameter, and raise a problem.
Let’s first consider a simplified case. Assume there are only two pairs of keys: K1 = {xb}b∈{0,1}
and K2 = {x′b}b∈{0,1}. The initial state is (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉). Now a malicious server can
choose to break one block and get both keys on this block, and it has to stay honest on the other
block. In other words, the malicious server can choose to get one of the followings:
(|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉)⊗ x0||x1, (|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉)⊗ x′0||x′1
the client knows all the keys, but doesn’t know which state the server holds.
The client wants to transform it into a state with good SC-security for some output keys, without
knowing which block the server chooses to break. To solve this problem, we use a “combine”
technique, as follows: the client can ask the server to make a measurement on the xor of the
subscripts of the keys; in other words, for the honest server, it’s a projection onto states |x0x′0〉+
|x1x′1〉 and |x0x′1〉 + |x1x′0〉. This measurement can be done easily given the hash value of these
keys. On the one hand, for an honest server, after it reports the measurement result, the client can
update the output keys Kout as {x0x′0, x1x′1} (if output is 0) or {x0x′0, x1x′1} (if output is 1). On
the other hand, for a malicious party, if it can only break one of the blocks, it can’t get both keys
in the updated keys (in other words, output x0x
′
0x1x
′
1 or x0x
′
0x1x
′
1, depending on the measurement
output), even if it can report the measurement output maliciously.
A more formal description is given below.
Protocol 9. Combine(K1,K2), where K1 = {x0, x1}, K2 = {x′0, x′1}
The honest server should hold Gadget(K1) ⊗ Gadget(K2). Suppose the server knows some hash
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values of these keys.
The server makes a measurement on the xor of the indexes:
(|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉)→
(output = 0)(|x0〉 |x′0〉+ |x1〉 |x′1〉) (output = 1)(|x0〉 |x′1〉+ |x1〉 |x′0〉)
and sends the output to the client. The client updates the keys based on the concatenation of the
keys in K1 and K2: if output = 0, the client stores {x0||x′0, x1||x′1}; if output = 1, the client stores
{x0||x′1, x1||x′0}.
Generalize the technique above, suppose the initial state is ⊗κi=1(|Blocki〉) where |Blocki〉 =
⊗Mm=1(|x(i)(m)0 〉+ |x(i)(m)1 〉). The server can break each block independently, and in each block, the
server can break half of the indexes and get both keys at these places. For a fixed m ∈ [M ], the
client will run the Combine protocol step by step, as follows: First combine the states in |Block1〉
and |Block2〉 into a new state, then combine this new state with the randomly-chosen state in
|Block3〉 into a new state, etc. If the adversary wants to get both keys in the combined key pair,
it has to know all the key pairs that the client chose when they do the combination. For each
block this probability is at most 1/2 from the original assumption, thus the total probability is
exponentially small (in the i.i.d setting).
There is another way to understand this process. Note that in the end of the “repeat” technique,
the client does a random shuffling on the indexes within each block, and provides the permutation to
the server thus the server can also permute correspondingly. Then both parties run the “combine”
technique as described above. Then the random shuffling, together with this “combine” technique,
can be seen as a process as follows: the client picks a random subset of all the keys, and ask the
server to combine them into one pair of keys.
9.3.3 Putting everything together, dealing with both the honest setting and the
malicious setting
We have described the “repeat” and “combine” technique separately. Now return to the original
problem and see how this technique works.
An overview of our technique by now is as follows. First the “repeat” technique gives us a
”M × (n + 1) → 2n(M − κ(1 − p)−1) remote gadget preparation”, which aympototically doubles
the number of gadgets. On the other hand, the protocol has weak security transfer parameter
(2η , 2−η → 2η/O(1), 1/3).
Then apply the “combine” technique described above to amplify the constant 1/3 to an expo-
nentially small value. The post-measurement state will only be broken if the client is so unlucky and
the corresponding indexes in all the blocks are all broken by the server initially. This probability
is exponentially small.
This is still not the end of the story: the honest behavior is affected! The number of gadgets
become fewer, since in the “repeat” step the protocol only doubles the number of gadgets and in
the “combine” step it decreases the number of gadgets by a factor κ. But this can be solved by
revising the lower level protocol as follows:
• Previously we are doing the “repeat” technique based on the n + 1 → 2n protocol, but it’s
actually possible to first self-compose the protocol to get a 1 + log κ → κ protocol, which
asymptotically increase the number of gadgets by a factor of Θ˜(κ);
• On the other hand, in the “combine” technique, we do not need so many blocks: in the formal
protocol we will use
√
κ blocks, which is still enough.
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Thus the whole protocol will be gadget-increasing and still preserve security (in the i.i.d setting).
A good reference is the diagram in Section 5: we have discussed the “self-composition — repeat
— combine” step in the “amplification” part.√
κ blocks := M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
Mκ
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
Mκ
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
Mκ Time
A picture for the structure of the “combine” technique by this time, which works in the simpli-
fied/i.i.d setting. The number in each node represents the number of gadgets. Initially there are√
κ blocks of gadgets where each block containsM(1+log κ) gadgets. The snake line represents the
protocol we get after we self-compose the weakly secure protocol and use the “repeat” technique.
The straight line represents the gadgets in two nodes are combined together. Each node contains
Mκ gadgets and when they are combined together correspondingly we get Mκ output gadgets.
And from the time arrow we can see the execution process is: Generate new gadgets using the 1st
block (snake line) — Generate new gadgets using the 2nd block (snake line) — Combine them to
the old gadgets — Generate new gadgets using the 3rd block (snake line) — Combine them — · · · .
9.3.4 Overcoming the obstacles in the security proof of the “combine” technique and
really get a secure protocol: the introduction of the “SecurityRefreshing” layer
As we said before, we use the simplified/i.i.d setting to describe our intuition for the protocol
design. But this protocol could not be proven secure in the actual setting. However, we can
overcome these obstacles by further revising the protocols: we will design a new protocol, named
SecurityRefreshing (Protocol 13), and use it to bypass the obstacles: we will use it before each
round of the “combine technique”. We will explain it in details in Section 11.1. Let’s informally
discuss its properties.
If we go through the security properties of the previous protocols, we will see, when we say
they have the weak security transform parameters (p|η,C → η′, C ′), there is always η′ < η. When
we compose the subprotocols together such decrease will accumulate and make the upper-level
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protocol insecure. Thus we need to design a “SecurityRefreshing” layer, which is a specially-
designed M + succinct→M protocol. We will use it as an extra layer when we revise Protocol 12
to overcome the obstacles. This protocol also has some additional properties that helps us do the
security proof.
On the one hand, in the honest setting, this SecurityRefreshing layer only uses succinct extra
client side quantum computation; (note that this protocol does not generate new gadget; it even
consumes gadgets, but the consumption is succinct.) On the other hand, (informally speaking,) it
has weak security transform parameters (p|η,C → η′, C ′) where p,C ′ are exponentially small, and
η′ can be much bigger than η. This helps us overcome the obstacles.√
κ blocks := M(1 + log κ)
SecurityRefresh
Mκ
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
SecurityRefresh
Mκ
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
SecurityRefresh
Mκ
· · ·
· · ·
SecurityRefresh
· · ·
M(1 + log κ)
Mκ
SecurityRefresh
Mκ
poly(κ)
poly(κ)
poly(κ)
poly(κ)
poly(κ)
Time
A diagram for the protocol execution after we add the SecurityRefreshing layer. In the end we
get Mκ gadgets from
√
κM(1 + log κ) +
√
κpoly(κ) gadgets. Here poly is a fixed polynomial but
M can be very big thus the whole protocol is gadget-increasing. We can see the execution process
is: Generate new gadgets using the 1st block (snake line) — SecurityRefreshing for this part —
Generate new gadgets using the 2nd block (snake line) — SecurityRefreshing for this part —
Combine them to the old gadgets — Generate new gadgets using the 3rd block (snake line) —
SecurityRefreshing for this part — Combine them — · · · .
9.4 Formal Description of the Amplification, Part I: Self-Composition, the Re-
peat Technique and the Simplified Combine Technique
As what we said before, we first self-compose the n + 1 → 2n protocol for log κ times to get a
1 + log κ→ κ protocol:
Protocol 10. GdgPrep1+log κ→κ(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) is defined as follows, where
K = {K1,K2}, K1 = {K(i)1 }i∈[log κ], where K(i)1 (for each i) and K2 are all single pairs of keys:
The honest server should hold the state Gadget(K) initially.
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1. For t = 1, · · · log κ:
(a) Client and server execute
GdgPrepn+1→2n(K(t)1 ,K2;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout, T estRound = 1.5×104A8(log κ−(t−1))3 )
where A3 is the constant in Lemma 8.7 (the security of the n + 1 → 2n protocol). The
client updates K2 as the returned keys of this protocol call.
The client stores the final K2 as the returned keys of this protocol.
The security statement and proof are given in Section 10.1. Compare to Protocol 8, the
main improvement of this protocol is: the “gadget expansion ratio” is asymptotically
Θ˜(κ) instead of 2.
Then we use the “repeat” technique to get an M × (1+ log κ)→Mκ protocol. In the following
protocol the client and the server runs many rounds of the previous protocol and do a random
permutation on the returned keys. We call the protocol as GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ:
Protocol 11. GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) is defined as follows,
where K := {K(m)}m∈[M ], and ∀m ∈ [M ], the form of K(m) is compatible with the input of
GdgPreplog κ+1→κ (thus each K(i) contains (1 + log κ) pairs of keys):
The honest server should hold the state Gadget(K) initially.
1. For m = 1 to M :
(a) The client and the server execute GdgPreplog κ+1→κ(K(m);PadLen = l, OutLen = κout).
The client stores the output keys of this step as K˜
(m)
out . (Note that K˜
(m)
out contains κ pairs
of keys.)
2. The client chooses a random permutation perm on [M ], permutes the key sets K˜
(m)
out ,m ∈ [M ]
to K
(m)
out ,m ∈ [M ], based on the following relation:
K
(m)
out = K˜
(perm(m))
out
. The client sends perm to the server so that the honest server can permute the position of
different gadgets correspondingly.
3. Change the notation for the output keys from K
(m)
out ,m ∈ [M ] (where each K(m)out contains κ
pairs of keys) to the “flatten notation” K
(i)
out, i ∈ [Mκ] (where each K(i)out is a single pair of
keys).
The security statement and proof are given in Section 10.2. Simply speaking, this protocol has
weak security transform parameters (η,C → η/O(1), 13). (Thus we reach a protocol whose
security can be described under Definition 4.12.)
Finally, we apply the “combine” technique to get a protocol which is secure in the i.i.d setting.
This formalization follows the intuition in the previous section. The first step of each iteration comes
from the “repeat” technique described above. (The details are encapsulated in the subprotocol calls
to Protocol 11.) The second step is the “combine” technique, which combines the “already combined
keys from the previous round” and the “new keys generated in this round” into the combined keys.
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Protocol 12. GdgPrepOneRound−simplified(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) where K := {K(t)}t∈[κ],
where each K(t) is compatible with the input of GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ (which means, K(t) con-
tains M sets of keys, where each set is compatible with the input of GdgPrep1+log κ→κ. Note that
each K(t) contains the same number of sets of keys.)
The honest server should hold the state Gadget(K) initially.
For t = 1 to κ:
1. The client and the server execute GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ(K(t);PadLen = l, OutLen =
κout). Denote the returned output keys as Ktemp t.
2. If i = 1, skip this step and simply let Kout 1 = Ktemp 1. Otherwise do the following:
For each m ∈ [M ]:
(a) The client and the server run Combine(K
(m)
temp t,K
(m)
out (t−1)) (Protocol 9).
Store the result as K
(m)
out t.
Denote the returned keys in the last step as Kout.
We will give a proof for the security (in the general setting) of Protocol 10 and 11 in Section
10. However, our current security proof technique is not powerful enough to prove the security of
Protocol 12. However, we can do some revisions on the protocol above to get a secure protocol. (In
other words, informally speaking, a protocol with security transform parameter (η, 2−η → η, 2−η)
(see Definition 4.12), and can asymptotically double the number of gadgets). Let’s first give an
overview in the next subsection.
9.5 A summary of the whole amplification techniques, and the organizations of
the next two sections
Thus the design of the whole amplification technique is as follows:
Outline 3 (Outline of the Amplification Technique).
1. As the discussion in the previous subsection, we design an M × (1 + log κ)→M × κ protocol
by applying the “repeat” technique on the self-composition of the n+ 1 → 2n protocol (given
in Protocol 8).
2. Use the “combine” part of the repeat-and-combine technique to design the protocol GdgPrepOneRound,
and after each iteration within the “combine” protocol, add a SecurityRefreshing layer to
strengthen and refresh the security.
3. To get an N → L protocol, both parties repeat the GdgPrepOneRound protocol for log(L/N)
times and after each round the number of gadgets doubles (in the honest setting.) And to over-
come the difficulties in the security proof, after each iteration, again we add a SecurityRefreshing
layer into it.
We organize the next two sections as follows:
1. In Section 10, we discuss the security of the protocols given in Section 9.4. (For Protocol 10
and 11 we give the security statement and prove them; for Protocol 12 we discuss some obsta-
cles.) These are the protocols that we can study before introducing the SecurityRefreshing
layer. Protocol 10 and 11 correspond to the step 1 of Outline 3.
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2. In Section 11, we first discuss the SecurityRefreshing layer in Section 11.1 and 11.2, then
use the “combine” technique together with this layer to give the GdgPrepOneRound protocol
in Section 11.3. This completes the step 2 of Outline 3.
3. Then in Section 11.4 we complete the step 3 above, thus complete the design of the remote
gadget preparation protocol (thus complete step 1 of Outline 1).
10 Security of the Amplification, Part I (The Self-composition
and “Repeat” Part)
In this section we give the security statements and proofs for Protocol 10 and Protocol 11 in Section
9.4.
10.1 Security of the 1 + log κ → κ Remote Gadget Preparation Protocol (the
Self-composition Step)
In Section 8 we get an n + 1 → 2n protocol, whose gadget-increasing ratio is approximately 2.
As described in Section 9.3, this is still not enough for later use, since later we will encounter a
protocol that combines
√
κ gadgets into one gadgets.
In Protocol 10 we give a 1 + log κ → κ protocol by self-composing the n + 1 → 2n protocol
for log κ times, whose gadget-increasing ratio is approximately Θ˜(κ), and is enough for later use.
Below we give the security statement for it.
10.1.1 Statement
For this protocol, we have the following security statement:
Lemma 10.1. There exist constants A4 > 1, B4 > 1 such that the following statement is true when
the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the key set K is compatible with the input of GdgPrep1+log κ→κ (which means, the
form of the key set satisfies the requirement in the beginning of Protocol 10), for the initial state
|ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1) and protocol
GdgPrep1+log κ→κ(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout), if the following conditions are satisfied:
• ∀i ∈ [log κ], |ϕ〉 is (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)1 given K2 and K1−K(i)1 ; 2κ > η > κB4+2.
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K2 given K1.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2κ
0.95
.
• l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + 4κ+ 4 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 4η), κout ≥ l + 4η
then the following conclusion holds:
For all the adversaries Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the corresponding post-execution
state
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrep1+log κ→κAdv (K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
satisfies at least one of the following two:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ (1− κ−A4)| |ϕ〉 |
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• ∀i ∈ [κ], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/κB4 , 110 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(i)
out given Kout −K(i)out, where Kout is
the returned output keys from the protocol.
How to understand this lemma See Definition 4.11 to understand this lemma more easily.
The complicated part of the description of this lemma is mainly because we explicitly control the
range of different parameters and we need to rule out some extreme cases. This lemma is saying
the protocol has security transform parameter (1− κ−O(1)|η, 2−η → η/κO(1), 110).
Intuitively, since within the protocol the composition of the n+1→ 2n protocol is only repeated
by log κ times, the “exponential blows-up” is actually a polynomial: Blog κ3 = κ
logB3 , Alog κ3 = κ
logA3 ,
where A3, B3 are the constants appeared in the security of the n+ 1→ 2n protocol. And the test
round in each iteration is also succinct (we will see the C we use when we apply Lemma 8.6 can be
lower-bounded by a reciprocal of a fixed polynomial of κ), thus the η > 2000T 2+500κ condition in
the Lemma 8.6 can be satisfied by choosing η to be a big enough fixed polynomial function. Thus
it’s still succinct we can stand it.
10.1.2 Proof
The 1 + log κ → κ protocol is a self-composition of the GdgPrepn+1→2n protocol, and the proof
also uses the security of GdgPrepn+1→2n (Lemma 8.6) inductively.
Proof of Lemma 10.1. Define A3, B3 as in Lemma 8.6. Denote Cmin =
1
10A
−2 log κ
3 . Assume
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1− C12min)| |ϕ〉 | (126)
otherwise the first case in the conclusion (the cases below “satisfies at least one of the following
two” in the lemma) is already true.
Denote the post-execution state of all the parties’ systems after the t-th round of the iteration
as |ϕt〉. Thus |ϕlog κ〉 = |ϕ′〉. Additionally define |ϕ0〉 := |ϕ〉.
First we have |Ppass |ϕt〉 | > (1− C12min)|Ppass |ϕt−1〉 | holds for any t ∈ [log κ].
Denote the set of output keys in the t-th round as Ktemp t. Ktemp 0 is defined to be the initial
K2. We will avoid using K2 below since it has different meaning in each round.
Each round of the protocol is an execution of the n+1→ 2n protocol. We will argue about the
SC-security of the state for the output keys in each round inductively. The problem is how to write
down the argument for the inductive proof. We will show that, inductively for ∀t = 0, 1, · · · log κ:
∀i, Ppass |ϕt〉 is (2η/Bt3 , 110A
−2(log κ−t)
3 |Ppass |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp t given Ktemp t −K(i)temp t
and {K(t′)1 }t′>t.
The statement is already true for t = 0 by the conditions. (Note that 110A
−2(log κ−t)
3 is only inverse-
polynomial in κ.) Assume the statement is true for time t. The protocol in the (t+ 1)-th round is
just an n+ 1→ 2n protocol. To apply the security of GdgPrepn+1→2n (Lemma 8.6) on Ppass |ϕt〉
and argue about the property of the state Ppass |ϕt+1〉, let’s first verify that the conditions for
applying the lemma are satisfied by the state Ppass |ϕt〉:
• First we will prove Ppass |ϕt〉 is (2η − |Adv| − poly(κ), 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(t+1)1 given
Ktemp t and {K(t
′)
1 }t′>t+1. This is because
1. |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(t+1)1 given (K1 −K(t+1)1 ) ∪K2;
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2. The client’s messages by the completion of the t-th round, together with Ktemp t, can be
computed from (K −K(t+1)1 ) ∪K2 and random coins with RO queries at most poly(κ).
By Lemma 6.5 we get the conclusion.
Then note the fact that |Ppass |ϕt〉 | and |ϕ〉 | are almost the same (equation (126)). Thus
Ppass |ϕt〉 is (2η−1, 2−η+1|Ppass |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for K(t+1)1 given Ktemp t and {K(t
′)
1 }t′>t+1.
• ∀i, Ppass |ϕt〉 is (2η/Bt3 , 110A
−2(log κ−t)
3 |Ppass |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp t given Ktemp t−K(i)temp t
and {K(t′)1 }t′>t by the inductive hypothesis.
• Ppass |ϕt〉 is (1, |Adv|+poly(κ)·t)-representable from |ϕ〉 thus is (2α1 , 2α2+2κ+1)-representable
from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. We choose the length of l to be bigger than the
l in Lemma 8.6 by κ+ 1 thus the pad length is enough.
Thus we can apply Lemma 8.6. Since the first case in the conclusion of Lemma 8.6 is already ruled
out, applying this lemma with C (we mean C in Lemma 8.6) chosen to be 110A
−2(log κ−t)
3 , and η
(we mean η in Lemma 8.6) chosen to be η/Bt3, we prove that
∀i, Ppass |ϕt+1〉 is (2η/B
t+1
3 ,
1
10
A
−2(log κ−t)+1
3 |Ppass |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp (t+1) given (127)
Ktemp (t+1) −K(i)temp (t+1) and {K
(t′)
1 }t′>t+1.
Note that we implicitly use the “auxiliary-information technique” (Technique 6.2) here: the conclu-
sion of Lemma 8.6 does not have the “and {K(t′)1 }t′>t+1” term. But Lemma 8.6 allows us to prove
the property of Ppass |ϕt+1〉 when {K(t
′)
1 }t′>t+1 is provided in advance (which means, the initial
state is Ppass |ϕt〉 ⊙ {K(t
′)
1 }t′>t+1). Thus by Technique 6.2 we can conclude about the property of
Ppass |ϕt+1〉 when {K(t
′)
1 }t′>t+1 is provided after the (t+ 1)-th round of the protocol completes, as
described here.
Finally |Ppass |ϕt〉 | and |Ppass |ϕt+1〉 | are very close by equation (126): in the statement above
we have (note that we can choose κ to be bigger than some constant to make it true)
1
10
A
−2(log κ−t)+1
3 |Ppass |ϕt〉 | ≤
1
10
A
−2(log κ−(t+1))
3 |Ppass |ϕt+1〉 |
substituting it into (127) proves the inductive hypothesis thus completes the inductive proof.
Finally choose t = log κ completes the proof.
10.2 Security for the “Repeat” Technique (Protocol 11)
In this section we complete the security proof the “repeat” part of the “repeat-and-combine”
technique, described in Section 9.3.
10.2.1 Statement
We can prove, in Protocol 11, when M is chosen to be bigger than a fixed polynomial, the p
parameter in the weak security will be at most 13 — thus we can switch the security definition from
Definition 4.11 to Definition 4.12. For comparison, in Protocol 10, this parameter is 1 − κ−O(1),
which is very close to 1.
The security statement of Protocol 11 is given below. (The “40” below is to make the statement
consistent with the security proof.)
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Lemma 10.2. There exists a fixed polynomial THRESHOLD(κ) = 40κA4 , A4 > 1, a constant
B4 > 1 such that the following is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant:
If the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section
3.1) and the protocol GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ(K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) satisfy:
• For any single pair of keys K ′ in K, |ϕ〉 is (2η, 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K ′ given K − K ′;
2κ > η > 2κB4+2.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2κ
0.9
.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + 6κ+ 6 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 4η), κout > l + 4η
• 2
√
κ > M > THRESHOLD(κ)
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv of query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→MκAdv (K;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
satisfies: For any i ∈ [Mκ], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/κB4 , 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(i)
out given Kout − K(i)out,
where Kout is the returned keys of this protocol.
This lemma means the protocol is a weakly secure remote gadget preparation protocol with
weak security transform parameter (η, 2−η → η/κO(1), 1/3). (See Definition 4.12.) (This also helps
us understand this lemma easily. The complicated part of the description of this lemma is mainly
because we explicitly control the range of different parameters.)
10.2.2 Proof
The proof is given below.
Proof. Suppose
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > 1
3
| |ϕ〉 | (128)
(otherwise the conclusion is already true).
Then suppose the state after the m-th round of the first step is |ϕm〉. |ϕ0〉 := |ϕ〉 and |ϕM 〉 is
the state when the first step completes.
A4, B4 are the same as the constants in Lemma 10.1.
Consider the quotient |Ppass |ϕm〉 |/|Ppass |ϕm−1〉 |, the “square-root of the passing probability”
in the m-th round. Denote S as the set of time m such that this quotient is ≤ 1− κ−A4 . Then
|S| ≤ 4κA4 ≤M/10
(otherwise |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | will be too small), and
∀m 6∈ S, |Ppass |ϕm〉 | > (1− κ−A4)|Ppass |ϕm−1〉 |.
Consider an arbitrary m 6∈ S, and we are going to prove the keys generated in the m-th round
(for example, K˜
(m)(i)
out ) is SC-secure with some parameters given all the other keys (which are
K˜out − K˜(m)(i)out ).
We are going to prove the following statement:
106
(Statement 1)For any m ∈ [M ], if |Ppass |ϕm〉 | > (1− κ−A4)|Ppass |ϕm−1〉 |, then ∀i ∈ [κ],
Ppass |ϕM 〉 is (2η/κB4 , 110 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K˜
(m)(i)
out given K˜out − K˜(m)(i)out
note that Ppass |ϕM 〉 is the state by the beginning of the second step of the protocol onto the passing
space. (That is, before the random permutation.)
Let’s divide K˜out − K˜(m)(i)out into three parts:
Y< = {K˜(m
′)
out }m′<m, K˜(m)out − K˜(m)(i)out , Y> = {K˜(m
′)
out }m′>m
Thus K˜out − K˜(m)(i)out = Y< ∪ (K(m)out − K˜(m)(i)out ) ∪ Y>.
Define X> = {K(j)}j∈[M ],j>m, the subset of the initial keys after the index m. Note that the
client’s messages on the rounds after the m-th round, together with Y>, can all be simulated from
X> using O(poly(κ)M) RO queries, poly is a fixed polynomial. So by the auxiliary-information
technique (Technique 6.2) and Lemma 6.3 we only need to prove the following statement:
For any adversary Adv′ with query number |Adv′| ≤ 2κ+2, the state
|ϕ˜〉 = GdgPrep1+log κ→κ
Adv′
(K(m);PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ (Ppass |ϕm−1〉 ⊙X> ⊙ Y<)
satisfies one of the following two:
• |Ppass |ϕ˜〉 | ≤ (1− κ−A4)|Ppass |ϕm−1〉 |
• Ppass |ϕ˜〉 is (2η/κB4 , 110 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K˜
(m)(i)
out given K˜
(m)
out − K˜(m)(i)out
Once we prove it, we prove Statement 1.
To prove it, first notice that if |Ppass |ϕm−1〉 | ≤ 110 | |ϕ〉 | the statement is already true. Otherwise
we can apply the security property of the 1 + log κ→ κ protocol (Lemma 10.1). We need to verify
the conditions for applying this lemma.
Checklist for conditions for applying Lemma 10.1
1. The main condition that we need to prove is:
For any single pair of keys K ′ in K(m), Ppass |ϕm−1〉 ⊙X> ⊙ Y< is
(2η − 2κ −O(Mpoly(κ)), 2−η+4|Ppass |ϕm−1〉 |)-SC-secure for K ′ given K(m) −K ′
This is true since first we know
|ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K ′ given X<, X> and K(m) −K ′.
(X< = {K(j)}j∈[M ],j<m. Thus X< ∪X> ∪ (K(m) −K ′) = K −K ′.)
Then since the client’s messages on the rounds before the m-th round, together with Y<,
can all be computed from X< and random coins using O(poly(κ)M) RO queries, and the
number of adversary’s queries is at most 2κ, applying Lemma 6.3 we know
Ppass |ϕm−1〉 ⊙X> ⊙ Y< is (2η − 2κ −O(Mpoly(κ)), 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K ′ given
K(m) −K ′.
Finally using |Ppass |ϕm−1〉 | > 110 | |ϕ〉 | completes the proof of this condition.
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2. Ppass |ϕm−1〉 is (1, 2κ +O(poly(κ)M))-representable from |ϕ〉. Thus if we choose the pad
length to be 2κ longer than the requirement given in Lemma 10.1 the pad length is
enough.
Thus we complete the proof of Statement 1 above.
Now we can return to the proof of Lemma 10.2. The conclusion of Statement 1 holds for any
m 6∈ S. Since M ≥ 10|S|, the number of m that are not in S will occupy at least 9/10 of [M ].
Since
√
(
√
9/10 × 1/10)2 + 1/10 < 1/3, after the permutation of the index, for any index m ∈ [M ],
i ∈ [κ], the final state is (2η/κB4 , 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(m)(i)
out given Kout − K(m)(i)out . Then after
flattening the notation we complete the proof.
10.3 A Brief Discussion of the Security of the “Combine” Technique
Let’s briefly discuss the security of Protocol 12, again, for completeness.
As we said before, Protocol 12 is secure in the i.i.d setting, but we don’t know how to prove the
security in the general setting. But in the next section we will overcome this obstacle by further
revising the protocol, and prove the security of the revised protocol. In this section we discuss some
difficulty in the security proof.
From the security lemmas in the previous section, we can observe that, in the statement of the
weak security of the protocols, suppose the weak security has transform parameter (p|η,C → η′, C ′),
there is always η′ < η, or even multiplicative decreases. And the other tools that we have now do
not help either: for example, we can’t improve the η using the decomposition lemmas in Section 6.3.
Thus, when we try to glue the subprotocols together, this parameter will decrease multiplicatively in
each composition and finally “blows up” (to a very small value). This problem does not exist in the
i.i.d setting since such a decay is not obvious. We have no idea whether this phenomenon is inherent
in our protocol, or it’s just because our proof techniques are not powerful enough. However, we
can get rid of this problem by revising the protocol as follows: we design a “SecurityRefreshing”
layer (Protocol 13), which can help us recover this parameter before it accumulates and blows up.
And it also, in some sense, “de-correlates” the keys in different places. We will insert this layer to
each round of Protocol 12, and get a secure protocol (Protocol 15).
11 Amplification, Part II (the “combine” part, and the whole
protocol for remote gadget preparation)
11.1 The “SecurityRefreshing” Layer
In the last section, we have already discuss why we need to design a “SecurityRefreshing” layer
in our protocol. In this subsection we will design such a protocol and in the next subsection we
will show how to use it to overcome the obstacle in the “Combine” technique (Protocol 12).
Briefly speaking, in this layer, we need to “refresh ” and strengthen the security of many key
pairs. We will make use of a small number of extra “freshly secure” gadgets to “refresh” the security
of many gadgets.
In more details, this “SecurityRefreshing” layer will satisfy:
• It is a remote gadget preparation protocol with security transform parameter (η, 2−η →
η′, 2−Θ(η)) where η′ can be bigger than η. (The notation is not formal, and we will explain it
later.)
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• What’s more, we need this protocol to only use succinct extra client side quantum operations,
which means, this protocol will be an L+ succinct→ L protocol: with the help of a gadget
that can be prepared using succinct extra client side quantum computation, the protocol can
map L input gadgets to L output gadgets, where L can be very big (an arbitrary polynomial
of κ, or even sub-exponential).
The protocol is given below. We will first give the formal definition, then discuss some intuition
behind it. We note that it has some additional features (other than improving η): it helps us
“disconnect” the output keys on different indexes. The exact meaning of these will become clear
later.
Protocol 13. The protocol SecurityRefreshing(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) is defined as
follows. Suppose K = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1}, Λ = {r(j)b }j∈[J ],b∈{0,1}.
The honest server should hold the state (⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+ |x(i)1 〉))⊗ (⊗Jj=1(|r(i)0 〉+ |r(i)1 〉)).
For j = 1, · · · J :
1. For all i ∈ [N ], the client samples K(i)(j)temp = {y(i)(j)0 , y(i)(j)1 }, which are N pairs of different
keys with key length κout. Then for all i ∈ [N ], the client computes
GT (∀b, b2 ∈ {0, 1}2 : (x(i)b , r
(j)
b2
)→ y(i)(j)b ;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout) (129)
and sends them to the server.
Note that in (129) different b corresponds to different output keys, but different b2 corresponds
to the same output key.
2. Denote
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [N ], x(i)(0)b := x(i)b , x(i)(j)b := x(i)b ||y(i)(1)b ||y(i)(2)b · · · y(i)(j)b (130)
The honest server can use the garbled tables from the last step to implement the following
mapping
(⊗Ni=1(|x(i)(j−1)0 〉+ |x(i)(j−1)1 〉))⊗ (|r(j)0 〉+ |r(j)1 〉)→ (⊗Ni=1(|x(i)(j)0 〉+ |x(i)(j)1 〉))⊗ (|r(j)0 〉+ |r(j)1 〉)
3. The client and the server run the padded Hadamard test on Λ(j) with pad length l and output
length κout. The honest server uses and measures the |r(j)0 〉 + |r(j)1 〉 state as the initial state
of this step.
After all the J rounds completes, the client and the server do the following:
The client samples {padi}i∈[N ] where each padi is sampled independently randomly from {0, 1}l,
and sends it to the server. The client stores {padi||x(i)(J)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1} as the returned output keys
Kout. (Note that there are N pairs of keys.) The honest server can add the random pads to the
output states and prepare
Gadget(Kout) = (⊗Ni=1(|padi||x(i)(J)0 〉+ |padi||x(i)(J)1 〉))
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Correctness We can see the honest server does the following mapping in the whole protocol:
(⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+ |x(i)1 〉))⊗ (⊗Jj=1(|r(i)0 〉+ |r(i)1 〉))→ ⊗Ni=1 |Gadget(K(i)out)〉 (131)
where, as defined in (130) and what we discussed above,
K
(i)
out = {padi||x(i)(J)b }b∈{0,1}, x(i)(J)b := x(i)b ||y(i)(1)b ||y(i)(2)b · · · y(i)(J)b (132)
In the beginning of this subsection we say this protocol is an L+ succinct→ L protocol. Here we
use a different symbol N which plays the role of L, which can be an arbitrary polynomial (up to
a fixed subexponential). The parameter related to the “succinct” part is the number of “extra”
gadgets J and the keys in Λ, which only need to be succinct.
Security For the security, in the beginning of this subsection we say this protocol has security
transform parameters (η, 2−η → η′, 2−Θ(η)). The left hand side is about the security for K part.
And η′ will depend on the security for Λ. We note that this notation is not very suitable here, since
Gadget(K) and Gadget(Λ) are both part of the honest input. That’s why we say this is informal.
We can also describe the security transform parameter of this protocol as follows by generalizing
Definition 4.12: we can say this protocol has security transform parameter (η, 2−η1 , η2, 2−η2 →
2η
′
, 2−Θ(η1)), where:
• The left hand side means the conditions for the security statement of the protocol is in the
form of (1)∀i ∈ [N ], the initial state is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i); (2)∀j ∈ [J ], the
initial state is (2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j) given the other keys.
• And the right hand side means the conclusion from the security of the protocol is in the form
of “Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η′ , 2−Θ(η1)| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out”.
(We will see η′ ≥ η2/O(κ), which can be much bigger than η1.)
11.1.1 Intuitions and ideas behind Protocol 13
Informally, we summaries the ideas of the protocol as follows:
1. Initially, the system is in a state that is not-very-secure: the first parameter in its SC-security
is 2η1 . (In other words, the condition on the input is in the form of “|ϕ〉 is (2η1 , ·)-SC-secure
for K(i)”.) We want to amplify it to 2η2 (for some Kout), η2 > η1. Recall that the first
parameter in the definition of the SC-security describes the query number of the adversary.
(Note that simply extending the key length by providing a reversible garbled tableRevGT (K ↔
Kout) with longer output key length does not work: although it extends the key length, it does
not improve the security, since the adversary can break the input keys using 2Θ(η1) queries,
then the reversible garbled table will be broken either.)
2. We note that, in the protocol, in step 1 of each round, the client creates garbled tables that
are encrypted under rb2 , b2 ∈ {0, 1}. (They are also encrypted under xb, but we temporarily
focus on the r part.) If the server knows one of r0 and r1, together with xb, (or, as in the
protocol, the honest server holds the superposition of |r0〉 and |r1〉,) the server can decrypt
the garbled table and get the output. However, if the server doesn’t know any of them, it
cannot decrypt the garbled table and get the output.
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So there seems to be a dilemma: for the correctness the client wants to give the server the
values of r, but for the security the client does not want to give the server the value of r. So
what if the client first gives server the knowledge of r, then uses some method to “force” the
server to “throw away” r? This is what the client does in the protocol! Let’s explain it by
focusing on a fixed j ∈ [J ], and the corresponding “temporary output keys” K(i)(j)temp :
(a) The honest server initially holds |r(j)0 〉+ |r(j)1 〉, and it can use it to do the step 2, which
is to decrypt the table.
(b) In step 3 a padded Hadamard test on Λ(j) = {r(j)0 , r(j)1 } is executed. By the discussion
in Section 8.2 we know padded Hadamard test is a “proof-of-no-knowledge” for
the keys being tested. After the third step of the protocol, intuitively, it has to
break the Λ part to decrypt the garbled table to get the output keys y
(i)(j)
b . Then the
SC-security for Kout will somewhat rely on the security of the initial state for Λ, which
has parameter η2, which can be much bigger than η1.
3. The fact that (informally) the adversary doesn’t know the keys in Λ relies on the properties
of the padded Hadamard test. As we discussed in Section 8.1, after the Hadamard test the
server shouldn’t be able to learn the keys any more, otherwise it will not be able to pass
the test with high probability. But the server can still choose to only pass the test with
constant probability, thus there is a “random guessing attack”: if we simply take J = 1, the
adversary can try its best to get the keys, and to pass the padded Hadamard test by simply
flipping random coins, hoping it can work. Thus we choose J pairs of “extra gadgets and
keys” {Λ(j)}j∈[J ]. We repeat the previous ideas for J times, and if J is a big enough succinct
value we avoid this problem. Note that the final output keys are the concatenation of the
output keys in each round.
4. The final paddings are for the ease of the security proof.
Finally, we note the gadgets on the Λ part are shared: this protocol can let us refresh and
strengthen the security on all theN keys simultaneously, but the extra client side quantum resources
(we mean the gadgets corresponding to Λ) are succinct. In other words, we refresh the security
for many keys by introducing only a small number of “freshly secure” gadgets. And in the later
section we only need to use this protocol for succinct times, each time it consumes succinct number
of gadgets.
11.2 Security of the SecurityRefreshing Layer
The formal security statement is given below. We note that there are two additional features of this
statement: in the conditions, for keys K, we only require the state to be SC-secure for K given the
tags (which does not offer the “disconnection” among the keys), but the output state is SC-secure
for K
(i)
out given all the other keys (Kout−K(i)out); (2) an extra < AuxInf > can be considered, which
will be useful when we use this protocol in some upper level protocols.
Lemma 11.1. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
For two sets of keys K = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1}, Λ = {r(j)b }j∈[J ],b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5), the initial
state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1), and a
randomized algorithm AuxInf applied on some client-side read-only system, and the protocol
SecurityRefreshing(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout)
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, if Tag(K,Λ) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, and the following conditions are
satisfied:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given Tag(K) and Tag(Λ). 2κ > η1 > 8κ. N < 2
√
κ.
• For any j ∈ [J ], |ϕ〉 is (2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j) given K, Λ−Λ(j), and < AuxInf >.
2κ > η2 ≥ 10000κη1, η22 > J ≥ η2.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2κ.
• The AuxInf algorithm does not contain any random oracle query.
• l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 4η2), κout ≥ l + 4η2.
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the post-execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = SecurityRefreshingAdv(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
and suppose the output keys are Kout, then: Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η2/100κ, 2−η1/4+2κ+2| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for
K
(i)
out given Kout −K(i)out and < AuxInf >.
How to understand this lemma The parameter inequalities and conditions might seem com-
plicated. We refer to Definition 4.12. Informally speaking, we are proving the weak security of this
protocol, and we explicitly write down the conditions (note that there are two initial key sets, and
the conditions are not really the same as what is required in the weak security transform parameter
— one difference is the first condition does not take the other keys as the auxiliary information.
This is important and it helps us use this protocol to overcome the difficulty in the security proof
of the “combine” technique.). And we note the inequalities in the first two conditions all have the
form of [poly(κ), subexp(κ)]. The third condition is to rule out some “ill-behaved” cases, and the
final condition just means the pad length and output key length should not be too small — but
they don’t need to be too big either.
Why the lemma and protocol are very useful later Let’s continue the motivation discussion
in the beginning of this section. As we said before, one motivation is to “recover the first parameter
in the SC-security”, which means, in the input part, initially the condition only says the state is
(2η1 , · · · )-SC-secure for the keys in K, but the output state can have a much better resilience on
the query number of the attacker. There are two more additional importances: as we said before,
the first condition is even weaker than what is required in the definition of the weak security.
Furthermore, we can consider an additional auxiliary information < AuxInf >. These two points,
in some sense, “de-correlate” different key pairs, and broaden the application scope of this protocol.
These properties are important on the road to a provable-secure “combine” technique.
The proof is through a linear decomposition of the adversary’s operations. The details are
postponed to Appendix I.
And we have the following immediate corollary, which deal with multiple single key pairs simul-
taneously instead of single key pair. The differences are on the first condition and the conclusion:
whether i is fixed in advance, or there are “∀i”.
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Corollary 2. The following statement is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some
constant:
For two sets of keys K = {x(i)b }i∈[N ],b∈{0,1}, Λ = {r(j)b }j∈[J ],b∈{0,1} (see Section 3.1.5), the initial
state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1), an index
i ∈ [N ], and a randomized algorithm applied on some read-only system on the client side AuxInf ,
and the protocol
SecurityRefreshing(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout)
, if Tag(K,Λ) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer, and the following conditions are
satisfied:
• ∀i ∈ [N ], |ϕ〉 is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given Tag(K) and Tag(Λ). 2κ > η1 > 8κ.
N < 2
√
κ.
• For any j ∈ [J ], |ϕ〉 is (2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j) given K, Λ−Λ(j), and < AuxInf >.
2κ > η2 ≥ 10000κη1, η22 > J ≥ η2.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2κ.
• The AuxInf algorithm does not contain any random oracle query.
• l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 4η2), κout ≥ l + 4η2.
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, denote the post-execution state as
|ϕ′〉 = SecurityRefreshingAdv(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
and suppose the output keys are Kout, then: ∀i ∈ [N ], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η2/100κ, 2−η1/4+2κ+2| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-
secure for K
(i)
out given Kout −K(i)out and < AuxInf >.
We note that the structure of Corollary 2 is almost the same as Lemma 11.1. The proof is just
to apply Lemma 11.1 on different i ∈ [N ].
11.3 Formalizing and Completing the “Combine” Technique: Remote Gadget
Preparation Protocol with Normal Security
Finally we can give a protocol that allows to at least double (asymtotically) the number of gad-
gets with normal security (instead of weak security). This protocol basically follows the idea
in Section 9.3 and simplified protocols (Protocol 12): we can make the output keys exponen-
tially secure by combining the output keys from different subprotocol calls. Here we add an extra
SecurityRefreshing layer in it, and that helps us complete the security proof.
We name it as GdgPrepOneRound since the final protocol is from iterations of this protocol.
11.3.1 Protocol design
To design such a protocol, we need to first revise the Combine protocol a little bit to make it better.
Protocol 14. Combineimproved(K1,K2;PadLen = l, TagLen = κout), where K1 = {x0, x1}, K2 =
{x′0, x′1} is defined as follows.
The honest server should hold Gadget(K1)⊗Gadget(K2).
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1. The client samples R0, R1, R
′
0, R
′
1 independently randomly from {0, 1}l. And it sends H(R0||x0),
H(R1||x1), H(R′0||x′0), H(R′1||x′1) together with these random pads to the server.
2. The server makes a measurement on the xor of the indexes:
(|x0〉+ |x1〉)⊗ (|x′0〉+ |x′1〉)→
(output = 0)(|x0〉 |x′0〉+ |x1〉 |x′1〉) (output = 1)(|x0〉 |x′1〉+ |x1〉 |x′0〉)
and sends the output to the client (which is a single bit). The client updates the keys based
on the response from the server: if output = 0, the client temporarily stores {x0||x′0, x1||x′1};
if output = 1, the client temporarily stores {x0||x′1, x1||x′0}.
3. The client samples two random pads pad0, pad1 ←r {0, 1}l and sends it to the server. The
client stores the output keysKout by concatenating pad to the keys stored temporarily in the last
step: it stores Kout as {pad0||x0||x′0, pad1||x1||x′1} or {pad0||x0||x′1, pad1||x1||x′0}, depending
on the server’s response in the last step. The former one in the output key set is considered
to have subscript 0 and the later one is considered to have subscript 1.
The honest server can also pad the gadget and holds Gadget(Kout).
So compare to Protocol 12, in the last step the client samples a new random pad and replaces
the keys by the padded keys. The reason for doing this is in the security proof of this protocol
the client needs to provide a lot of “global tags”. Such a padding allows us to analyze them more
easily.
Now we can give our protocol.
Protocol 15 (GdgPrepOneRound protocol). Suppose the key sets K,Λ satisfy:
• K := {K(t)}t∈[√κ], and each K(t) is compatible with the input of GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ and
has M sets of keys (thus each K(t)(m)(t ∈ [√κ],m ∈ [M ]) contains (1 + log κ) pairs of keys);
• Λ := {Λ(t)}t∈[√κ], and each Λ(t) has J pairs of keys.
Then the protocol GdgPrepOneRound(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) is defined as follows:
Initially the honest server should hold the state Gadget(K) ⊗Gadget(Λ).
For t = 1 to
√
κ:
1. The client and the server execute GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ(K(t);PadLen = l, OutLen =
κout). Denote the returned output keys as Ktemp t. Ktemp t has Mκ pairs of keys.
2. The client and the server execute SecurityRefreshing(Ktemp t,Λ
(t);PadLen = l, OutLen =
κout). Denote the returned keys as Ktemp′ t.
3. If t = 1, skip this step and simply let Kout 1 = Ktemp′ 1. Otherwise do the following:
For each m ∈ [Mκ]:
(a) The client and the server run Combineimproved(K
(m)
temp′ t,K
(m)
out (t−1);PadLen = l, TagLen =
κout). The client stores the returned keys as K
(m)
out t.
4. Thus by the end of this round the client stores Kout t and the honest server holds Gadget(Kout t)⊗
Gadget(K(>t))⊗Gadget(Λ(>t)).
Denote the returned keys in the last step as Kout. And the honest server holds Gadget(Kout).
114
Correctness In summary, this protocol is a
√
κM(1+ log κ)+
√
κJ →Mκ remote gadget prepa-
ration protocol.
Gadget Expansion Ratio In the first step of each round, the number of gadgets increases by a
factor of Θ˜(κ); and since the “Combine” technique combines
√
κ gadgets into one big gadget, the
number of gadgets decrease by a factor of
√
κ here. (Note that here we use
√
κ, not κ, which
is important for making the whole protocol gadget-increasing.) So totally the “gadget
expansion ratio” is still Θ˜(
√
κ) > 2. In other words, when κ is bigger than some constant and J is
succinct it at least doubles the number of initial gadgets. (The “gadget expansion ratio” is actually
much bigger than that, but we don’t need too much and 2 is good enough.)
The extra gadget is succinct So compared to Protocol 12, this protocol requires
√
κ × J
number of extra gadgets for the SecurityRefreshing step. (Because in the i-th round Gadget(Λ(t))
is consumed, and Λ(t) contains J pairs of keys). The size of K can be as big as an arbitrary
polynomial, but Λ is succinct, and the gadgets in Gadget(Λ) are shared thus the total number of
extra client side gadgets is still succinct.
11.3.2 Security statement
Below is the security statement for Protocol 15.
Lemma 11.2 (Security of GdgPrepOneRound). Define THRESHOLD(κ) = 40κA4 , A4 > 1, con-
stant B4 > 1 as in Lemma 10.2. The following statement is true when κ is bigger than some
constant:
Suppose key sets K,Λ satisfy the forms described in the beginning of Protocol 15.
If the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section
3.1) and protocol GdgPrepOneRound(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) satisfy:
• For any single pair of keys K ′ in K, |ϕ〉 is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K ′ given K −K ′
and Tag(Λ). 2
√
κ > η1 > 48κ
B4+2. 2
√
κ ≥ M ≥ THRESHOLD(κ) (recall that M is the
number of key sets in K(i)).
• For any t ∈ [√κ], j ∈ [J ], |ϕ〉 is (2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(t)(j) given K and Λ−Λ(t)(j).
2
√
κ/5 ≥ η2 ≥ 40000κη1. η22 ≥ J ≥ η2.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2
√
κ.
• l ≥ 2(α1 + α2 + 6κ+ 6 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 6η2), κout ≥ l + 4η2.
then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrepOneRoundAdv (K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
satisfies: for any i ∈ [κM ], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η2/350κ, 2−
√
κ/10| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −
K
(i)
out, where Kout is the output keys from the protocol (which contains κM pairs of keys).
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How to understand this lemma The parameter inequalities and conditions might seem com-
plicated. We refer to Definition 4.12. We are proving the weak security of this protocol, and we
explicitly write down the conditions. And we note the inequalities in the first two conditions all
have the form of [poly(κ), subexp(κ)]. The third condition is to rule out some “ill-behaved” cases,
and the final condition just means the pad length and output key length should not be too small
— but they don’t need to be too big either.
We note that the final security statement has parameter (2Θ(η2/κ), 1/subexp(κ)), while in the
security statement of Protocol 10 and 11, the first parameter is 2O(η1). Here the introduction of
SecurityRefreshing layer makes a difference: the first parameter in the SC-security in the security
statement depends on η2 instead of η1. When we use this protocol in an upper level protocol, η2
can be much bigger than η1.
11.3.3 Security proof
The proof is given below. Let’s first give a summary for different characters used in this proof.
• i is used for the index of keys.
• t ∈ [√κ] denotes the round of iterations, and is used as the index of the first dimension of Λ.
• j ∈ [J ] is used as the index of the second dimension in Λ: for example, Λ(t′)(j).
Proof overview We will use the multi-round decomposition method described in Section 6.8.3.
Overall speaking, we will repeat an argument of the same form for many rounds, and decompose
the final state step-by-step. Note that in this protocol we iterate a block of subprotocols for
√
κ
rounds, so it has the structure described in Section 6.8.3. But the details are more complicated.
Note that in each round — for example, at round t — the followings are executed:
1. Generate new gadgets;
2. Run the security refreshing layer SecurityRefreshing;
3. Combine the new gadgets to the old gadgets.
Correspondingly, each round (suppose it’s the t-th round) of the proof goes as follows:
0. The analysis starts with a state denoted by |χt〉.
1. Prove the security properties for the newly-generated gadgets;
1.5. Apply the decomposition lemma to decompose the state into two terms. This is the idea we
discussed in Section 6.8.3. Let’s discuss these two terms separately:
• For branch |φ〉:
2. The SecurityRefreshing layer refreshes and strengthens the security property.
3. Prove the combination of the old gadgets, and the combination of the future gadgets,
do not affect the security too much.
• For branch |χ〉: the main property we need is the norm of this part decrease multiplica-
tively compared to the state in the beginning of this round. And the SecurityRefreshing
step and the combination step do not increase the norm. So we can simply go to analyze
the next round.
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... Finally we combine all the terms together. The |φ〉 terms all have the security properties
we want and can be summed up through triangle inequality; and the |χ〉 term in the end is
exponentially small.
The following proof will be organized in the following way: we will divide the argument (in
round t, for some arbitrary t) into pieces, and put it into boxes; outside the box, we will first show
how the argument goes in the first round, as an explicit example, then show how the argument goes
in an arbitrary round, and finally gives the decomposition and completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 11.2. Without loss of generality, consider the i-th output keys K
(i)
out. Thus i will
be fixed in the following proof.
By the auxiliary-information technique (Technique 6.2) we assume the adversary gets Tag(K,Λ)
in the read-only buffer in advance. Additionally assume after the first step of each round of the
iteration the client provides Tag(K
(i)
temp t) to the read-only buffer. This can only make the adversary
more powerful thus proving the lemma under this assumption is enough to prove the original lemma.
To make the symbol consistent in different steps of the induction, we define |χ1〉 := |ϕ〉. We
will consider |χ···〉 as the initial state of each round of the proof. And we know |χ1〉 satisfies the
following conditions:
Properties of |χ1〉, the state before the 1st iteration:
• |χ1〉 is (2η1 , 2−η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for any single pair of keys K ′ given K−K ′ and Tag(K,Λ).
• ∀t′ ∈ [√κ], ∀j ∈ [J ], |χ1〉 is (2η2 , 2−η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(t′)(j) given Λ − Λ(t′)(j) and
K. (The reason that we use t′ instead of t is to make it consistent with the conditions for
general |χt〉.)
• |χ1〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Let’s first analyze the first round (t = 1) of this protocol.
Let’s first analyze the property of the output state after the first step of the first
round of the protocol, which can be denoted as Prtl=1.1, an execution of GdgPrep
M×(1+log κ)→Mκ
protocol. We can apply Lemma 10.2 (the security of GdgPrepM×(1+log κ)→Mκ) and prove the
following:
PpassPrtl=1.1 |χ1〉 is (2η1/3κB4 , 1
3
| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp 1 given Ktemp 1 −K(i)temp 1 (133)
The details for proving (133) is given below. First note that the following proof is written in a way
to support general time step t. In this step we can simply choose t = 1. (Currently when t > 1
many arguments inside do not make sense, but they will make sense after all the first (t−1) rounds
have been analyzed.)
How to prove PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 is is (2η1/3κB4 , (2.53 )t−1 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(i)
temp t given
Ktemp t −K(i)temp t:
If | |χt〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |, the statement is already true.
Otherwise we can get the followings from “properties of |χt〉”:
• (2.53 )t−1| |ϕ〉 | ≥ | |χt〉 |. And we know | |χt〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |
• |χt〉 is (2η1/2, 2−η1/2| |χt〉 |)-SC-secure for any single pair of keys K ′ inK(t) given K(t)−K ′.
Note η1/2 > 6κ
B4+2, as required in Lemma 10.2.
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• |χt〉 is (2α1+η1 , 2α2 + 2η1)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. We
can see the pad length is enough.
Note that we relax some parameters to make these statements invariant in each round of this
induction-style proof.
Thus by Lemma 10.2 we know PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 is is (2η1/3κB4 , 13 | |χt〉 |)-SC-secure for
K
(i)
temp t given Ktemp t −K(i)temp t and this completes the proof.
Note that as we discussed in the beginning of this proof Tag(Ktemp t) (in this round t = 1)
has already been put in the read-only buffer. (It’s assumed to be within the Prtl=t.1 in (133).)
Then by applying Lemma 6.6 to decompose the state: PpassPrtl=1.1 |χ1〉 can be decomposed as
|φ1.1〉+ |χ1.1〉, as follows. As before, the decomposition below is written under general round count
t, and for this step we can simply substitute t = 1:
State Decomposition: PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 to |φt.1〉+ |χt.1〉:
If |PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |, simply choose |φt.1〉 = 0. Otherwise by Fact 1 and Lemma 6.6:
• | |χt.1〉 | ≤ (2.53 )|PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 | ≤ (2.53 )t| |ϕ〉 | and is (η1/3κB4 , 2η1/3κ
B4 )-server-side-
representable from PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉.
• |φt.1〉 is (2η1/18κB4 , 2−η1/18κB4 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(i)
temp t, and is (1, 2
η1/3κB4 )-server-side-
representable from PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉.
Then the final state can be written as:
Ppass |ϕ′〉 =PpassPrtl≥1 |ϕ〉 (134)
=PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |φ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉 (135)
=PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ Prtl1.3 ◦ Prtl1.2 ◦ |φ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ |χ2〉 (136)
(where we denote |χ2〉 := Prtl1.3 ◦ Prtl1.2 ◦ |χ1.1〉) (137)
We first analyze the |φ1.1〉 term in (136). Define
|φ1.2〉 := PpassPrtl1.2 ◦ |φ1.1〉 = PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv1.2(Ktemp 1,Λ(1)) ◦ |φ1.1〉 (138)
. We can apply the security property of the SecurityRefreshing protocol (Lemma 11.1) on initial
state |φ1.1〉: to make the conclusion strong enough for later usage, take
< AuxInf1 >= Λ(≥2) ∪K(≥2) ∪ (Kout 0 −K(i)out 0) (139)
(the last term is empty, since in the first round we simply define Kout 1 to be Ktemp′ 1 and there
is no “output keys from the last round”. but we add this to make its form consistent with the
auxiliary information for general round count t. This will be discussed again later.)
Then we can apply Lemma 11.1 and conclude that
|φ1.2〉 is (2η2/300κ, 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp′ 1 given Ktemp′ 1 −K
(i)
temp′ 1 and < AuxInf
1 >
(140)
The details for this step is given below. The proof is described for general t. Some notations for
general t will be defined later. Substitute t = 1 we get the proof we need currently.
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How to prove the property of |φt.2〉
We want to prove
|φt.2〉 is (2η2/300κ, 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp′ t given Ktemp′ t −K
(i)
temp′ t and < AuxInf
t >
(141)
where
< AuxInf t >:= Λ(≥t+1) ∪K(≥t+1) ∪Kout (t−1) (142)
|φt.2〉 := PpassSecurityRefreshingAdvt.2(Ktemp t,Λ(t)) ◦ |φt.1〉 (143)
First, if | |φt.1〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |, the final statement is already true. Otherwise, we can verify that
|φt.1〉 satisfies the conditions for applying Lemma 11.1, as follows:
1. We already proved |φt.1〉 is (2η1/18κB4 , 2−η1/18κB4 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K
(i)
temp t given
Tag(Ktemp t,Λ
(t)). (See the box of “State Decomposition”.) Thus
|φt.1〉 is (2η1/18κB4 , 2−η1/18κB4+κ| |φt.1〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp t given Tag(Ktemp t,Λ(t)).
(144)
2. We can prove
∀j ∈ [J ], |φt.1〉 is (2η2/3, 2−η2/3| |φt.1〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(t)(j) given
(Λ(t) − Λ(t)(j))∪ < AuxInf t > (145)
. Because:
(a) From the “Properties of |χt〉” we can know |χt〉 is (2η2 − t2η2/3, 2−η2+t log η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-
SC-secure for Λ(t)(j) given Λ(≥t) − Λ(t)(j) and Kout (t−1) and K(≥t).
(b) The computation of client side messages in Prtl=t.1 is run only on key set K
(t),
Ktemp t (sampled randomly in this step) and random coins. The adversary makes
queries ≤ 2κ.
(c) |φt.1〉 is (1, 2η1/κ)-server-side-representable from PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉.
Applying Lemma 6.5 and noting | |φt.1〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 | give (145).
3. Since |χt〉 is (2α1+t log η1 , 2α2+t2η1)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉,
by the same reasons as above, we know |φt.1〉 is (2η1+α1 , 2α2 + 22η1)-representable from
|EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. Thus the pad length is enough.
Thus applying Lemma 11.1 completes the proof.
We note since (informally) Ktemp′ 1 −K(i)temp′ 1 and < AuxInf1 > contain enough information to
let the adversary simulate the protocol after this round, we can use an argument similar to Lemma
6.3 to conclude that
PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ Prtl1.3 |φ1.2〉 is (2η2/350κ, 2−0.9κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out. (146)
The details for this part of the proof are given below. The proof is described for general t. Substitute
t = 1 we get the proof we need currently.
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How to prove the property of PpassPrtl>t.1 |φt.1〉 = PpassPrtl≥(t+1) ◦ Prtlt.3 |φt.2〉
What we know is (from (141)) |φt.2〉 is (2η2/300κ, 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp′ t given
Ktemp′ t −K(i)temp′ t and < AuxInf t >. And we want to prove
PpassPrtl≥t+1 ◦ Prtlt.3 |φt.2〉 is (2η2/350κ, 2−0.9κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
(147)
Define |φt.3〉 := Prtlt.3 |φt.2〉. In Prtlt.3 (which are Combineimproved(K(m)temp′ t,K
(m)
out (t−1)) for
each m), for index i (not “for any index i”; recall that i ∈ [κM ] is already fixed in the
beginning of the security proof), the followings are executed (see Protocol 14):
1. The client sends some hash values about K
(i)
temp′ t and K
(i)
out (t−1).
2. The server sends back a one-bit response.
3. The client computes K˜
(i)
out t, defined to be the key set by the completion of the second
step of the Combineimproved protocol. This is a (deterministic) function of the server’s
response and K
(i)
temp′ t and K
(i)
out (t−1). And the keys in K
(i)
temp′ t and K
(i)
out (t−1) can be
extracted given K˜
(i)
out t and the server’s response in the last step.
4. The client samples pad0, pad1 ←r {0, 1}l, and K(i)out t comes from adding pad0, pad1 before
K˜
(i)
out t.
We proceed in two steps.
1. Starting from (141), we will prove
|φt.3〉 is (2η2/300κ−20, 2−κ+20| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out t given
Kout t −K(i)out t and < AuxInf t > (148)
Note that there are two things that we need to care about: (1) when we discuss the
SC-security of K
(i)
out t, Tag(K
(i)
out t) needs to be revealed to the server; (2) the protocol in
this step is interactive. But these two issues can be handled, and the proof of (148) is as
follows:
Suppose (148) is not true. Notice that no matter what the adversary returns in the i-th
round of Prtl=t.3, if in the end it can compute both keys in K
(i)
out t, it can also compute
both keys in K
(i)
temp′ t by “extracting” the corresponding bits. In other words, if (148) does
not hold, the adversary can run the following attack on |φt.2〉. whenKtemp′ t−K(i)temp′ t and
< AuxInf t > are given as auxiliary information, to break the SC-security for K
(i)
temp′ t:
(a) The adversary goes through the operation of Prtlt.3 and the adversary’s operation
step-by-step. For each round of Prtlt.3 that is not at superscript (i), since Ktemp′ t−
K
(i)
temp′ t and Kout (t−1) − K(i)out (t−1) (in < AuxInf t >) are provided as auxiliary
information, the adversary can simulate all the client-side messages; thus it can
simulate all the steps locally. (When we say “simulate” we do not mean the server
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can create the same state that we consider in the purified notation; we use the
usual meaning: the server can create a state that looks the same if we switch to the
non-purified notation (by throwing away the environment).)
(b) For the i-th round inside Prtlt.3 (which is Combine
improved(K
(i)
temp′ t,K
(i)
out (t−1)), see
Protocol 14), the adversary:
i. In the first step the adversary asks the client to provide the hash values, as
shown in the first step of Protocol 14;
ii. The adversary simulates the remaining protocol; this is possible using the in-
formation that it can read.
iii. And it asks the client to provide Tag(K
(i)
out t).
So this is not an attack that can be executed completely on the server-side; instead, in
this “attack” the attacker can ask the client to provide some padded hash values, which
corresponds to the client-side messages in the protocol.
Notice that the client side messages in the step b above include
Hash tags of K
(i)
temp′ t shown in the first step of Protocol 14 (149)
Hash tags of K
(i)
out (t−1) shown in the first step of Protocol 14 (150)
Tag(K
(i)
out t) (151)
where (149)(151) can be seen as hash tags of K
(i)
temp′ t (with extra paddings), and (150)
can be computed on the server-side. Thus by applying Lemma 6.12 to handle (149)(151)
we get an upper bound on the “norm of outputting both keys in K
(i)
temp′ t” of this attack.
On the other hand if (148) is not true we give an attack to break it. Thus we complete
the proof of (148).
2. Then we move to study Prtl≥t+1 |φt.3〉. We can study each round in Prtl≥t+1 step-by-
step. Without loss of generality, suppose this is in the t′-th round. t′ ∈ [t + 1,√κ]. We
can prove the following statement inductively:
PpassPrtl(t+1)∼t′ |φt.3〉 is (2η2/300κ−20−22(t′−t), 2−κ+20+22(t′−t)| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out t′
given Kout t′ −K(i)out t′ and < AuxInf t >.
Similar to the proof above, let’s assume this is not true for t′ and construct an interactive
attack for the server and lead to a contradiction.
(a) First notice that the first and second step of Prtl=t′ can all be simulated using
K(≥t+1) and Λ(≥t+1);
(b) And within the third step of each round, the Combineimproved protocol on key sets
with superscripts that are not (i) can also be simulated;
And every time we meet a Combineimproved protocol on key sets with superscript
(i), we apply a similar argument as above (the step (b) of the arguments below
(148)).
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And we can construct an interactive attack for the adversary where the client side mes-
sages are
Hash tags of K
(i)
temp′ t′ shown in the first step of Protocol 14 (152)
Hash tags of K
(i)
out (t′−1) shown in the first step of Protocol 14 (153)
Tag(K
(i)
out t′) (154)
One difference is we should reduce the SC-security for K
(i)
out t′ to the SC-security of
K
(i)
out (t′−1) (instead of K
(i)
temp′ t). Here (152) could be computed from the auxiliary in-
formation but (153)(154) are handled by Lemma 6.12.
Finally taking t′ =
√
κ completes the proof.
Then let’s analyze the second term in equation (136). We can view |χ2〉 as the new ini-
tial state and use the same technique above. We only need to verify that |χ2〉 has the necessary
properties. (Note that we want to use the argument “inductively”, we will describe the properties
of |χt〉 directly, which are the states that will appear step-by-step in this proof, and taking t = 2
gives the conditions we need for this round:)
Properties of |χt〉, the state we consider before the t-th round of iterations:
We have
• For any single pair of keys K ′ in K(≥t), |χt〉 is (2η1 − t2η1/3, 2−η1+t log η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure
for K ′ given K(≥t) −K ′ and Kout (t−1).
• ∀t′ ≥ t, j ∈ [J ], |χt〉 is (2η2 − t2η1/3, 2−η2+t log η1 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for any Λ(t′)(j) given
K(≥t), Λ(≥t) − Λ(t′)(j) and Kout (t−1).
• |χt〉 is (2α1+t log η1 , 2α2 + t2η1)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
• | |χt〉 | ≤ (2.53 )t−1| |ϕ〉 |
The first three properties can all be proved inductively (through Lemma 6.5), since we can
notice the following about the protocol:
1. In Prtl(t−1).1 the computation of all the client-side messages only takeK(t−1) andKtemp (t−1)
(sampled randomly in this step) as the input.
2. When we do the decomposition, |χ(t−1).1〉 is (η1/2κB4 , 2η1/2κB4 )-server-side-representable
from PpassPrtl(t−1).1 |χt−1〉.
3. In Prtl(t−1).2 the computation of all the client side messages only take Ktemp (t−1), Λ(t−1)
and Ktemp′ (t−1) (sampled randomly in this step) as the input.
4. In Prtl(t−1).3, the new keys Kout (t−1) can be computed on the server-side from its re-
sponse, Kout (t−2) and Ktemp′ (t−1), and the random pads.
5. The query number of the adversary is bounded by 2κ.
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Then we can complete the proof of the first three properties. The fourth property (norm of
|χt〉) appeared during the argument in the last round (see the “State Decomposition” box).
Now we have completed the argument for one round. Let’s describe how the argument goes in
round t. We have put pieces of this argument into boxes. And the overall structure of the proof is
actually the same as what we described in the t = 1 case:
1. From “the conditions on |χt〉” we can prove (which is analogous to (133), but is for general
t.)
PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 is (2η1/3κB4 , (2.5
3
)t−1
1
3
| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp t given Ktemp t −K(i)temp t
(155)
This can be proved using the same argument as described in “How to prove the properties
of PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉” before. Here we implicitly use the fact that η1 − t log η1 > η1/2 and
η2− t log η2 > η2/2 hold when t ≤
√
κ. (This is the reason that we cannot do these arguments
for t→ +∞.)
2. Starting from PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉, we can continue to apply the decomposition lemma (as shown
in the box “State decomposition PpassPrtl=t.1 |χt〉 to |φt.1〉+ |χt.1〉”).
3. Substitute the decomposition back to the protocol, we have
PpassPrtl≥t |χt〉 = PpassPrtl≥t+1 ◦ Prtlt.3 ◦ Prtlt.2 ◦ |φt.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥t+1 ◦ |χt+1〉 (156)
where we denote |χt+1〉 := Prtlt.3 ◦ Prtlt.2 ◦ |χt.1〉.
4. For the |φ···〉 part in (156):
Define |φt.2〉, < AuxInf t > similarly to (138)(139),
|φt.2〉 := PpassSecurityRefreshingAdvt.2(Ktemp t,Λ(t)) ◦ |φt.1〉 (157)
< AuxInf t >:= Λ(≥t+1) ∪K(≥t+1) ∪Kout (t−1) (158)
we can prove the following statement, using the proof described in box “How to prove the
property of |φt.2〉”:
|φt.2〉 is (2η2/300κ, 2−κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)temp′ t given Ktemp′ t −K(i)temp′ t and < AuxInf t >
(159)
And similarly to (146), by the argument in the box “How to prove the properties of PpassPrtl>t.1 |φt.1〉 =
PpassPrtl≥(t+1) ◦ Prtlt.3 |φt.2〉, we can get
PpassPrtl≥(t+1) ◦Prtlt.3 |φt.2〉 is (2η2/350κ, 2−0.9κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out.
(160)
5. Finally we can prove the properties of |χt+1〉 (using the arguments in the box with the same
title) and continue to the next round of this argument.
Continue these arguments inductively and we get
Ppass |ϕ′〉 =PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |φ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉 (161)
= · · · (162)
=PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |φ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl>2.1 ◦ |φ2.1〉+ · · · (163)
+ PpassPrtl>
√
κ.1 ◦ |φ
√
κ.1〉+ PpassPrtl>√κ.1 |χ
√
κ.1〉 (164)
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And the last term has norm ≤ (2.53 )
√
κ| |ϕ〉 |. And each other term is (2η2/350κ, 2−0.9κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-
secure for K
(i)
out given Kout−K(i)out. We can see (2.53 )
√
κ >
√
κ2−0.9κ. Combining them together using
triangle inequality of SC-security (Lemma 6.2) and doing a slight relaxing using log2(
2.5
3 ) < −1/10
gives us the conclusion.
11.4 Full Formal Description of the Secure Remote Gadget Preparation Pro-
tocol
11.4.1 Protocol design
Finally we put all the pieces together and give the final protocol for remote gadget preparation.
This will complete Outline 2 and complete the first step in Outline 1.
Since in the last section we have already got a secure protocol that can “double” the number of
gadgets, intuitively we can get anN → L protocol by simply repeating it for logL/N times: starting
from N gadgets, in each step, the number of gadgets becomes 2N, 4N, · · · , L, with √κJ logL/N
extra gadgets.
However there is some loss on the second parameter of the SC-security of the output keys.
(Which means, in Lemma 11.2 the final state is (2Θ(η2/κ), 2−Θ(
√
κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for the output
keys, instead of (2Θ(η2/κ), 2−Θ(η2/κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for the output keys.) The first idea to solve this
problem is to use the decomposition lemmas (in Section 6.3) and the linear decomposition method
(in Section 6.8.2). However there is still some obstacle when we do the security proof. To solve this
problem, we add another SecurityRefreshing layer into the protocol. This layer, together with
the decomposition lemmas, helps us get rid of the obstacle and we can prove the final protocol is
secure.
The protocol is given below. Note that different from the previous protocols, in this protocol
we hardcode the various parameters inside the protocol and only keep the security κ and number
of output gadgets L as the parameters of this protocol.
Protocol 16. (Remote Gadget Preparation Protocol) The protocol
GdgPrep(Security = κ,OutNum = L)
is defined as follows:
Define
η = κB4+6, N = κ · THRESHOLD(κ) = 40κA4+1, T = log(L/N), J = η
, where A4, B4 are the constants given in Lemma 11.2, and everything is rounded to the ceiling.
1. The client samples
K = {K(i)}i∈[N ],Λ1 = {Λ(t)(s)(j)1 }t∈[T ],s∈[√κ],j∈[J ],Λ2 = {Λ(t)(j)2 }t∈[T ],j∈[J ]
, where
• K(i) = {x(i)0 , x(i)1 }, each of them is a single pair of different keys with key length η;
• Λ(t)(s)(j)1 = {r(t)(s)(j)0 , r(t)(s)(j)1 }, Λ(t)(j)2 = {g(t)(j)0 , g(t)(j)1 }, each of them is a single pair of
different keys with key length η.
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2. The client prepares
|ϕ〉 =Gadget(K) ⊗Gadget(Λ1)⊗Gadget(Λ2) (165)
=(⊗Ni=1(|x(i)0 〉+ |x(i)1 〉)) (166)
⊗ (⊗Tt=1 ⊗
√
κ
s=1 ⊗Jj=1(|r(t)(s)(j)0 〉+ |r(t)(s)(j)1 〉)) (167)
⊗ (⊗Tt=1 ⊗Jj=1 (|g(t)(j)0 〉+ |g(t)(j)1 〉)) (168)
and sends it to the server.
3. For t = 1, · · · T :
Take lt := 100tη. κtout := l
t.
(a) Organize the keys from the last step (which is K initially and Kout (t−1).b if it’s not the
first round) into a form that is compatible with the input of GdgPrepOneRound. Denote
it as Kin t. The client and the server run
GdgPrepOneRound(Kin t,Λ
(t)
1 ;PadLen = l
t;OutLen = κtout)
. Suppose the returned keys are Kout t.a.
(b) The client and the server run
SecurityRefreshing(Kout t.a,Λ
(t)
2 ;PadLen = l
t;OutLen = κtout)
. Denote the returned keys as Kout t.b.
The client stores the keys from the last execution of the protocol above as the returned keys of the
whole protocol. Denote it as Kout. The honest server should get Gadget(Kout).
Let’s briefly explain what the “organize the keys” means. The returned keys and the initial keys
are organized in the “flatten notation”, which is, for example, K = {K(i)}i∈[N ] where each K(i) is
a single key pair. However when we call some subprotocols the input key set needs to have some
inner structure, for example, in the GdgPrep1+log κ→κ protocol the input key set is K = {K1,K2}
where K1 is a single key pair while K2 contains log κ pairs of keys. Thus we need to “organize”
these input keys. The order of the keys doesn’t matter. This is basically a change of notations.
And we note that the initial state in the very beginning is all-zero for both the client and the
server. In the purified notation viewpoint, it’s |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. But in the
security proof our analysis starts at the third step, thus |ϕ〉 (transformed into purified notation) is
the “initial state”.
11.4.2 Security statement
The security statement is given below.
Theorem 11.3 (Security of Protocol 16). The following statement is true when the security pa-
rameter κ is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the GdgPrep protocol (Protocol 16) is run on Security = κ,OutNum = L. logL ≤
κ1/5. The initial state on the server side is all-zero.
Then for any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2
√
κ/2, denote the post-execution state
as |ϕ′〉:
|ϕ′〉 = GdgPrepAdv(Security = κ,OutNum = L)
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then ∀i ∈ [L], Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2κ, 2−κ1/4/10)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out, where Kout is the
output key set of this protocol.
In other words, using the language from Definition 4.2, Definition 4.6, we can describe the
correctness and security of this protocol as follows:
Theorem 11.4 (Correctness and Security of Protocol 16, concise notation). Suppose κ is the
security parameter. When κ is bigger than some constant, for any L ≤ 2κ1/5 , GdgPrep(Security =
κ,OutNum = L) is an N → L remote gadget preparation protocol that is secure against adversaries
of query number ≤ 2
√
κ/2 with output security −κ1/4/10.
Thus once we can prove Theorem 11.3, and complete the first step of Outline 1.
11.4.3 Proof of Theorem 11.3
The proof is given below. As a comment for the proof, the alphabetical letters are used in the
following way:
• i is used for indexing the keys in K (and also Kin t, Kout t.a, Kout t.b).
• t is used for different round. t ∈ [T ].
• For key sets that have multi-dimensional structure: for Λ1 we use t ∈ [T ], s ∈ [
√
κ], j ∈ [J ] as
the index, for Λ2 we use t ∈ [T ], j ∈ [J ].
We will use the multi-round decomposition method described in Section 6.8.3. The organization of
the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 11.2. Overall speaking, we will repeat the an argument
of the same form for many rounds, and decompose the final state step-by-step. We will divide the
argument (in round t, for some arbitrary t) into pieces, and put it into boxes; outside the box, we
will first show how the argument goes in the first round, as an explicit example, then show how the
argument goes in an arbitrary round, and complete the proof.
But here the detailed structure of arguments in each round is different from the proof of Lemma
11.2. First note the protocol in each round of this protocol only has two steps: generate new gadgets,
and strengthen the security. And the security analysis for round t goes as follows:
0. The analysis starts with a state denoted by |ϕt〉.
1. Prove the security properties for the newly-generated gadgets;
1.5. Apply the decomposition lemma to decompose the state into two terms. This is the idea we
discussed in Section 6.8.3. Let’s discuss these two terms separately:
• For branch |φ〉:
2. The SecurityRefreshing layer strengthens the security property. And the output
state is viewed as |ϕt+1〉, which is the initial state for the analysis in the next round.
• For branch |χ〉: it’s already exponentially small.
... Finally we combine all the terms together. The only |ϕT 〉 term has the security properties
we want and the |χ···〉 terms in the end are all exponentially small.
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Proof of Theorem 11.3. Assume |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > 2−κ1/4 , otherwise the statement is already true.
Our goal is to analyze the property of |ϕ′〉 = Prtl ◦ |ϕ〉, where Prtl is an abbreviated notation
for the whole protocol, |ϕ〉 is defined in (165)(168).
By Technique 6.2 we can assume Tag(Λ1,Λ2) are additionally stored in the read-only buffer.
Additionally assume Tag(Kout t.a) is revealed to the server after the first step of each round. These
auxiliary information will only make the adversary more powerful thus prove the theorem under
this assumption will imply the original theorem.
We will use |ϕ···〉 to denote the initial state in each round of the argument. Denote |ϕ1〉 := |ϕ〉,
which is the input state before the first round. Then we have the following conditions on |ϕ1〉:
Properties of |ϕ1〉:
• ∀i, |ϕ1〉 is (2η/7, 2−η/7)-SC-secure for K(i) given K −K(i) and Tag(Λ1,Λ2).
• ∀t′ ∈ [T ], ∀s ∈ [√κ], j ∈ [J ], |ϕ1〉 is (2η/7, 2−η/7)-SC-secure for Λ(t′)(s)(j)1 given K, Λ1 −
Λ
(t′)(s)(j)
1 , and Λ2. (The reason that we use t
′ instead of t is to make it more consistent with
the symbols later.)
• ∀t′ ∈ [T ], ∀j ∈ [J ], |ϕ1〉 is (2η/7, 2−η/7)-SC-secure for Λ(t′)(j)2 given K, Λ1, and Λ2 −Λ(t
′)(j)
2 .
• |ϕ1〉 is (1, 2κ)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉, then 12 l1 − (α1 +
α2) ≥ log(1/| |ϕ1〉 |) + 10η, where α1 = 0, α2 = κ.
The first step of the first round of the protocol is Prtl=1.1, which is a GdgPrep
OneRound protocol
applied on Kin 1, Λ
(1)
1 . Then we can apply its security property (Lemma 11.2) on initial state |ϕ1〉.
Using this lemma we can know the state after the first round of execution of 3(a)(denoted as |ϕ1.1〉)
satisfies:
∀i, Ppass |ϕ1.1〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−
√
κ/10)-SC-secure for K
(i)
out 1.a given Kout 1.a −K(i)out 1.a. (169)
The details for this step is given below. Note that the following proof is written in a way to support
general round count t. In the analysis of the first round we can simply choose t = 1 below.
Details for arguing about the properties of Ppass |ϕt.1〉.
If | |ϕt〉 | ≤ 2−κ, this statement is already true. Otherwise, from “the properties of |ϕt〉”, we can
loosen the parameters and know the followings:
• ∀i, |ϕt〉 is (2η/κ3 , 2−η/κ3 | |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)in t given Kin t −K(i)in t and Tag(Λ1).
(Note that the exponent η/κ3 > 48κB4+2.)
• ∀s ∈ [√κ], j ∈ [J ], |ϕt〉 is (2η/20, 2−η/20| |ϕt〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(t)(s)(j)1 given Kin t, Λ(t)1 −
Λ
(t)(s)(j)
1 .
• |ϕt〉 is (1, t2η)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Which implies the pad length is enough.
Then applying Lemma 11.2 completes the proof.
Note that we have already put Tag(Kout 1.a) into the read-only buffer, as we said in the beginning of
this proof. (We assume this is part of the first step of each round.) From (169), we can decompose
Ppass |ϕ1.1〉 as |φ1.1〉+ |χ1.1〉, as follows:
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Decomposition: Ppass |ϕt.1〉 to |φt.1〉+ |χt.1〉:
If |Ppass |ϕt.1〉 | ≤ 2−
√
κ/20, simply take |φt.1〉 = 0. Otherwise:
Based on the “properties of Ppass |ϕt.1〉”, apply the multi-key decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.10)
(together with Fact 1) we can decompose Ppass |ϕt.1〉 as |φt.1〉+ |χt.1〉 and we have:
• | |χt.1〉 | ≤ 4.5L2−
√
κ/20
• ∀i, |φt.1〉 is (2η/(4κ2 log 6L), 2−η/(4κ2 log 6L))-SC-secure for K(i)out t.a. And |φt.1〉 is (1, 2η/κ
2
)-
server-side-representable from Ppass |ϕt.1〉.
We can write
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ Prtl=1.2 ◦ |φ1.1〉
Note that Prtl=1.2 is a SecurityRefreshing protocol run on key sets Kout 1.a and Λ
(1)
2 . Denote
|ϕ2〉 := PpassPrtl=1.2 ◦ |φ1.1〉
, by the security of the SecurityRefreshing protocol (Corollary 2 of Lemma 11.1) we can prove
∀i, |ϕ2〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−η/κ2.5)-SC-secure for K(i)out 1.b given Kout 1.b −K
(i)
out 1.b. (170)
The details are given below. The details are written for general t to support the induction-style
proof. For this round just substitute t = 1.
Details for arguing about the properties of |ϕt+1〉 for Kout t.b (given the other keys)
Recall that
|ϕt+1〉 := PpassPrtl=t.2 ◦ |φt.1〉 = PpassSecurityRefreshingAdvt.2(Kout t.a,Λ(t)2 ) ◦ |φt.1〉
First we can assume
| |φt.1〉 | ≥ 2−η/κ2.5 (171)
, otherwise the statement is already true.
We will apply Corollary 2 of Lemma 11.1. The checklist for applying Corollary 2 of Lemma
11.1 on |φt.1〉:
• From the result in the last step and (171) we know ∀i, |φt.1〉 is
(2η/4κ
2 log 6L, 2−η/8κ2 log 6L| |φt.1〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out t.a. Tag(Kout t.a) and Tag(Λ2) are
already stored in the read-only buffer.
• ∀j ∈ [J ], |φt.1〉 is (2η/30, 2−η/30| |φt.1〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(t)(j)2 given Λ(t)2 − Λ(t)(j)2 and
Kout t.a. This is because:
1. |φt.1〉 is (1, 2η/κ2)-server-side-representable from Ppass |ϕt.1〉.
2. Ppass |ϕt.1〉 = PpassGdgPrepOneRoundAdvt.1 (Kin t,Λ
(t)
1 ) ◦ |ϕt〉. Note that in this part the
computation of client side messages does not take Λ
(t)
2 as the inputs, and all the
messages sent to the server in this round can be computed from Kin t, Λ
(t)
1 , Kout t.a
(sampled randomly in this round), the server’s response and random coins.
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3. ∀j ∈ [J ], |ϕt〉 is (2η/25, 2−η/25)-SC-secure for Λ(t)(j)2 given Kin t, Λ(≥t)1 , Λ(≥t)2 −Λ(t)(j)2 .
This comes from “properties on |ϕt〉”. (We will see it later. Since we are doing this
induction-style proof on round t this is not a circular-proof.)
4. We already assume | |φt.1〉 | > 2−η/κ2.5
5. The query number of the adversary is at most 2
√
κ.
Then applying Lemma 6.5 proves it.
• For the same reason described above and “the properties on |ϕt〉”, we know |φt.1〉 is
(1, 2η)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. Thus the pad length
and output key length is enough.
Then we can repeat the same argument on Prtl≥2 ◦ |ϕ2〉, as what we did from the beginning of
this proof to analyze Prtl ◦ |ϕ1〉. Note that |ϕ2〉 defined above satisfies very similar conditions
as what we showed for |ϕ1〉. Thus we can repeat the same argument above and construct |ϕt〉
inductively. The following is the properties for |ϕt〉, and substituting t = 2 gives the conditions we
need currently:
The Properties on |ϕt〉:
• We have already proved in the last round that
∀i, |ϕt〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−η/κ2.5)-SC-secure for K(i)out (t−1).b given Kout (t−1).b −K
(i)
out (t−1).b.
(172)
(Note that (170) is a special case for this statement when t = 2.)
In other words,
∀i, |ϕt〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−η/κ2.5)-SC-secure for K(i)in t given Kin t −K(i)in t. (173)
• ∀t′ ≥ t, ∀s ∈ [√κ], j ∈ [J ], |ϕt〉 is (2η/7 − t2η/100, 2−η/7)-SC-secure for Λ(t′)(s)(j)1 given
Kin t, Λ
(≥t)
1 − Λ(t
′)(s)(j)
1 and Λ
(≥t)
2 .
This comes from the fact that
1. Kin t is a change of notation of Kout (t−1).b.
2. |ϕt〉 := PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv(t−1).2(Kout (t−1).a,Λ(t−1)2 ) ◦ |φ(t−1).1〉, where:
The query number of the adversary in this round (which is Adv(t−1).2) is at most
2
√
κ;
In the protocol the computation of the client side messages only use Kout (t−1).a,
Kout (t−1).b (sampled randomly in this round) and Λ
(t−1)
2 and random coins. (Espe-
cially, the computation does not use Λ
(t′)
1 .)
3. |φ(t−1).1〉 is (1, 2η/κ2)-server-side-representable from Ppass |ϕ(t−1).1〉.
4. Ppass |ϕ(t−1).1〉 = PpassGdgPrepOneRoundAdv(t−1).1 (Kin (t−1),Λ
(t−1)
1 ) ◦ |ϕt−1〉, where:
The query number of the adversary in this round (which is Adv(t−1).1) is at most
2
√
κ.
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In this protocol the computation of the client side messages only use Kin (t−1),
Λ
(t−1)
1 and Kout (t−1).a (sampled randomly in this round), together with the server’s
response and the random coins. Especially, it does not use Λ
(t′)
1 .
5. From the last step we know for any t′ ≥ t, s ∈ [√κ], j ∈ [J ], |ϕt−1〉 is (2η/7 −
(t− 1)2η/100, 2−η/7)-SC-secure for Λ(t′)(s)(j)1 given Kin (t−1), Λ(≥t−1)1 − Λ(t
′)(s)(j)
1 and
Λ
(≥t−1)
2 .
Thus applying Lemma 6.5 completes the proof.
• From (almost) the same reasons, ∀t′ ≥ t, ∀j ∈ [J ], |ϕt〉 is (2η/7− t2η/100, 2−η/7)-SC-secure
for Λ
(t′)(j)
2 given Λ
(≥t)
2 − Λ(t
′)(j)
2 , Kin t and Λ
(≥t)
1 .
• From (almost) the same reasons |ϕt〉 is (1, t · 2η/100)-representable from
|EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Thus we can use the same technique on |ϕ2〉 and decompose Prtl≥2 |ϕ2〉 into two states.
And we can repeat this argument to the end without changing anything except the time step
index. Recall that the proof pieces in the boxes of “Details for arguing about the properties of
Ppass |ϕt.1〉” and the “state decomposition” still hold here, since we already write it in a general
form. Thus we can repeat the following arguments in an induction-style:
1. Starting from the properties of |ϕt〉, we can prove the general form of (169), which is
∀i, Ppass |ϕt.1〉(:= PpassPrtl=t.1 |ϕt〉)
is (2η/κ
2
, 2−
√
κ/10)-SC-secure for K
(i)
out t.a given Kout t.a −K(i)out t.a. (174)
This can be proved using the same arguments shown in the box “Details for arguing about the
properties of Ppass |ϕt.1〉”, and one implicit detail, which is also the reason that this argument
can’t be applied infinitely, is
∀t ≤ log(L/N), 2η/7 − t2η/100 > 2η/20
2. We can decompose Ppass |ϕt.1〉 as |φt.1〉+|χt.1〉 as discussed in the box of “state decomposition”.
3. And we can write
PpassPrtl≥t |ϕt〉 = |ϕ′〉 = PpassPrtl>t.1 ◦ |χt.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥t+1 ◦ Prtl=t.2 ◦ |φt.1〉
Denote |ϕt+1〉 := PpassPrtl=t.2 ◦ |φt.1〉
And as discussed in the box of “Details for arguing about the properties of |ϕt+1〉 for Kout t.b”,
we can prove
∀i, |ϕt+1〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−η/κ2.5)-SC-secure for K(i)out t.b given Kout t.b −K
(i)
out t.b. (175)
4. Finally we can prove “the properties of |ϕt+1〉” and continue to the next round of this argu-
ment.
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Continue the whole argument to the end, and we know:
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PpassPrtl≥1 |ϕ〉 (176)
= PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ SecurityRefreshing ◦ |φ1.1〉 (177)
= PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl≥2 ◦ |ϕ2〉 (178)
= · · · (179)
= PpassPrtl>1.1 ◦ |χ1.1〉+ PpassPrtl>2.1 ◦ |χ2.1〉+ · · · + PpassPrtl>T.1 |χT.1〉+ |ϕT 〉
(180)
where each term about |χ〉 has norm ≤ 4.5L2−
√
κ/20. The last term |ϕT 〉 is (2η/κ2 , 2−η/κ2.5)-SC-
secure for K
(i)
out given Kout−K(i)out (for all i). Thus Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/κ
3
, (1+ logL) · 4.5L2−
√
κ/20)-SC-
secure for K
(i)
out given all the other keys. Substitute logL ≤ κ1/5 inside completes the proof.
Notice that Protocol 16 satisfies the correctness and only uses succinct client side quantum com-
putation. Thus by this time we complete the design and proofs of the remote state
preparation protocol, thus complete the first step of Outline 1.
12 Universal Blind Quantum Computation from Remote Gadget
Preparation
In the previous section we design a secure remote gadget preparation protocol using succinct client
side quantum gates. In this section we will show how to make use of the remote gadget preparation
protocol to design a universal blind quantum computation protocol.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 12.1 we review the work of BFK[4] and give
our protocol (Protocol 18, or UBQC − GT protocol). In Section 12.2 we complete the missing
piece in Protocol 18, which is a “8-basis qfactory” protocol. In Section 12.3 we give the security
statement of Protocol 18. In Section 12.4 we study the security of our “8-basis qfactory” protocol.
And in Section 12.5 we complete the security proof of Protocol 18 (the details are postponed to
the appendix).
12.1 A Review of the UBQC Protocol and 8-basis Qfactory, and an Overview
of Our Protocol
Before we give the full protocol, let’s first review the original UBQC protocol[4].
12.1.1 BFK’s universal blind quantum computation protocol[4]
Protocol 17. (Universal Blind Quantum Computation)
Input: circuit C to be evaluated, described by the MBQC angles {si}i∈[|C|].
1. For i = 1, · · · |C|, the client samples θi = θi1π + θi2 π2 + θi3 π4 , θic ←r {0, 1}(c = 1, 2, 3), prepares
the state |+θi〉 and sends them to the server.
2. The server connects these gadgets as a brickwork state.
3. For i = 1, · · · |C|:
(a) The client computes the measurement angle φi using:
131
• The circuit description;
• The measurement results of the previous rounds;
• Angles θ, bits r of the previous rounds (or more formally, θt, rt for t < i).
(b) The client samples ri ←r {0, 1}, and computes δi = θi + φi + πri. Send it to the server.
(c) The server makes the measurement corresponding to δi and reports the result.
We omit some details like the form of the brickwork state and how to compute the angles, and
only keep what we need.
Notice that in the UBQC protocol [4] the client only needs to prepare some quantum states in
the form of |+θ〉 := |0〉 + eiθ |1〉, θ = nπ/4, n = 0, · · · 7, and sends them to the server; then it can
instruct the quantum server with classical interactions to do some quantum operations on these
gadgets, and it will get the computation result C |0〉 by decoding the server’s measurement results.
The problem of this approach is to delegate a circuit C, the client has to prepare one such gadget
for each gate in C, thus the client side quantum operations will be linear in |C|. One natural idea
is to further delegate the preparation of these states using other protocols. An abstraction of this
concept is given in paper [7], which is called the “8-basis qfactory”.
12.1.2 The concept of 8-basis qfactory[7], and the adaptation to our setting
The “8-basis qfactory” is defined in [7] using the unpredictability language (which is, it’s hard to
compute some values with probability bigger than some constant.) in the standard model (against
polynomial adversaries). We revise the definition in the form of indistinguishability in the quantum
random oracle model, which is more suitable in our setting. And we further add one revisions that
is important in our setting: we add the initial state |ϕ〉 into the definition. The reason is, in
our setting, we can’t construct a qfactory protocol “from scratch”; what the protocol can do is to
transform some initial gadget (which in our protocols is part of |ϕ〉) into the state |+θ〉. We will
see, in our protocol, the client and the server can first run the remote state preparation protocol to
create the gadgets |ϕ〉 on the server side, then run the 8-basis qfactory protocol using these gadgets
as the initial states.
Definition 12.1 (8-basis qfactory). (Correctness) In an 8-basis qfactory protocol from initial state
|ϕ〉, the client samples θ2, θ3 ∈r {0, 1}2 in the beginning, and when the protocol completes, the
honest server should get |+θ〉 where θ = πθ1 + π2 θ2 + π4 θ3, θ1 can be either 0 or 1. The client gets
θ1.
(Security) And we say this protocol is secure in the quantum random oracle model against
adversaries of query number ≤ 2λ with output security η for initial state |ϕ〉 if for any malicious
server Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2λ, for any θ2, θ3 ∈ {0, 1}2, suppose the state when the
protocol finishes is |ϕ′〉 and the angles that the client gets are θ = πθ1 + π2 θ2 + π4 θ3, for any server
side distinguisher D with query number |D| ≤ 2η ,
|Pr(D(Ppassϕ′Ppass, (θ2, θ3)) = 0)− Pr(D(Ppassϕ′Ppass, (θ′2, θ′3)←r {0, 1}2) = 0)| ≤ 2−η| |ϕ〉 |
(181)
which means the distinguisher can’t distinguish the real (θ2, θ3) from the randomly generated (θ
′
2, θ
′
3)
given the final server side state of the protocol.
An 8-basis qfactory protocol can be used to replace the quantum operations and quantum
communications in the UBQC protocol, and its correctness guarantees such replacement won’t
affect the correctness of the blind quantum computation protocol.
132
For the security, one may get confused since we only require two bits of the three bits are
indistinguishable from random bits. We will discuss the reason in the end of Section 12.2.
After the replacement, we get our UBQC − GT protocol, as follows. In our UBQC − GT
protocol, both parties first runs the remote gadget preparation protocol, which gives the server the
necessary initial gadgets, and then run the 8-basis qfactory protocol for each gadget to prepare the
state |+θi〉 , i ∈ [|C|]. We call the 8-basis qfactory protocol QFac8−GT .
12.1.3 Our UBQC −GT protocol
Below we give a top-down description of our protocol. The construction of the QFac8−GT protocol
in it is given later.
Protocol 18. (UBQC −GT (C;Security = κ))
1. The client and the server run GdgPrep(Security = κ9, OutNum = |C|) (Protocol 16). De-
note the keys got by the client as Kout = {y(i)b }i∈[|C|],b∈{0,1}. The honest server should hold
the state Gadget(Kout) = ⊗|C|i=1(|y(i)0 〉+ |y(i)1 〉).
2. For i = 1, · · · |C|:
Run the protocol QFac8−GT (K(i)out;PadLen = 100κ3, Security = κ) from initial state |y(i)0 〉+
|y(i)1 〉. Suppose the client gets angle θi from this protocol call. Reject if the subprotocol rejects.
3. The client and the server run the UBQC protocol (Prtl 17) from its second step (“the server
creates a brickwork state”), and the client uses θi computed above to do the computation in
3.a and 3.b.
Our remaining work is divided into three steps:
Outline 4. Remaining work to complete the UBQC-GT protocol:
1. Design a 8-basis qfactory protocol QFac8−GT from (in the honest setting) |y0〉+|y1〉 which is
secure against adversaries of query number subexp(κ) with output security κO(1) from initial
state |ϕ1〉 where |ϕ1〉 is the output of the remote gadget preparation protocol described in step
1 of Protocol 18. (Note that in the correctness we can consider the specific server-side state,
but for the security we need to consider general output states.)
2. Prove the security (under Definition 12.1) of the 8-basis qfactory protocol above.
3. Prove the security of the full protocol (Protocol 18).
12.2 The 8-basis Qfactory Protocol
12.2.1 Protocol design
Our 8-basis qfactory protocol is defined as follows.
Protocol 19. (QFac8 −GT (K;PadLen = l, Security = κ)), where K = {y0, y1}
The honest server should hold the state (|y0〉+ |y1〉)⊗ |φ〉 (where (|y0〉+ |y1〉) is useful here and |φ〉
just means some unrelated state for other purposes.)
1. The client and the server execute BasisTest(K;κ2, PadLen = l, OutLen = l + κ2). The
server runs this step with the |y0〉+ |y1〉 part in the input.
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2. The client chooses θ2, θ3 ←r {0, 1}2.
3. The client sends PhaseGT (K, π2 θ2 +
π
4 θ3;PadLen = l) to the server. (We refer to Section
2.4 for PhaseGT .)
4. The server first prepares the state
|0〉 |y0〉+ ei(
pi
2
θ2+
pi
4
θ3) |1〉 |y1〉
using the phase garbled table (as described in Section 2.4), then makes Hadamard measure-
ments on all the registers of y. Send the results d to the client.
5. The client computes and stores θ1 = d · (y0+ y1). Now an honest server should hold the state
|+θ〉 where θ = θ1π + θ2 π2 + θ3 π4 .
The protocol description already proves the correctness of this protocol. Note that the first
BasisTest step is non-collapsing and it does not destroy the state in the honest setting. In more
details, the step 3 to 4 we make use of the phase garbled table, which is described in Section 2. In
step 4 to 5 we make use of the following observation from [18], where Pd is the projection onto the
event that the Hadamard basis measurements output d:
Pd(|0〉H⊗n |y0〉+ β |1〉H⊗n |y1〉) ∝ |0〉+ eiπd·(y0+y1)β |1〉
Now we discuss the security.
12.2.2 Security statement
Assuming the initial state |ϕ〉 satisfies some properties, we can prove this is a secure 8-basis qfactory
protocol from |ϕ〉. The lemma is given below.
Lemma 12.1. Suppose the initial state is |ϕ1〉 (assuming all the randomness are purified by the
environment, as discussed in Section 3.1), the protocol is QFac8−GT (K;PadLen = l, Security =
κ), if κ is bigger than some constant, and the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ1〉 is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K, η > 5000κ2
• |ϕ1〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2
√
κ.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ1〉 |) + 5η)
, then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = QFac8−GTAdv(K;PadLen = l, Security = κ) ◦ |ϕ1〉 (182)
satisfies: for any server-side operation D with query number |D| ≤ 2κ,
|Pr(D(Ppassϕ′Ppass, (θ2, θ3)) = 0)− Pr(D(Ppassϕ′Ppass, (θ′2, θ′3)←r {0, 1}2) = 0)| ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 |
(183)
We can see this lemma follows the form of our security definition of 8-basis qfactory (Definition
12.1). Thus if the conditions given in the lemma are satisfied, we can say the protocol is secure
in the quantum random oracle model against unbounded adversaries of queries number ≤ 2κ with
output security κ.
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12.3 Security Statement of Our UBQC −GT Protocol
Then based on this lemma, we can prove our UBQC −GT protocol (Protocol 18) is secure:
Theorem 12.2. When κ is bigger than some constant, |C| ≤ 2κ1/5 , for any adversary |Adv| ≤ 2κ,
|Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ, 0|C|) = 0)| ≤ 2−κ/3
which is the “qIND-CPA” distinguishing advantage discussed in Section 2.3.
We will prove Lemma 12.1 in Section 12.4 and prove this theorem in Section 12.5. Once we
prove this theorem, we complete the security proof of the whole protocol and complete the proof
of Theorem 1.1.
Some intuitions for the security of these protocols
Below we will discuss some intuition and subtleness of these protocols and theorems, and why
Protocol 18 is secure when the 8-basis qfactory is defined as above.
Why is the protocol still secure when the qubit preparation in UBQC is replaced by an 8-basis
qfactory protocols? The proof is by a hybrid method. We can replace θi2, θ
i
3 that the client gets in
the qfactory protocol by random values one-by-one, and the security of each step is guaranteed by
the security of the 8-basis qfactory protocol. As we discussed previously, although the security of
the 8-basis qfactory protocol only allows us to change two bits, the most significant bit is hidden
by the extra random bit ri which is sampled by the client in the UBQC protocol (see Protocol 17).
Then the angle used by the client will look completely random on the server side.
There is one more thing to care about: as we showed in Protocol 18, to prepare the states
we need to repeat the qfactory protocol above for many times, so why is Protocol 19 composable
when it’s used on different key pairs? In general, it’s not (as far as we know). However, in our
case, we note that the initial state of the qfactory protocol, which is |ϕ1〉, is the output state
of a secure remote state preparation protocol, and the security of the remote gadget preparation
protocol (Protocol 16, Lemma 11.3) says for all i ∈ [L], the output state (|ϕ1〉 here, |ϕ′〉 in Lemma
11.3) is SC-secure for K
(i)
out even given other keys (Kout − K(i)out), and the auxiliary information
Kout −K(i)out here gives us the composability: we can define a series of hybrids, and if an adversary
can distinguish two consecutive hybrids, it can “simulate” the extra messages using the auxiliary
information (Kout −K(i)out) and break Lemma 12.1.
12.4 Security of our 8-basis Qfactory: the Proof of Lemma 12.1
In this section we prove Lemma 12.1.
First note that the other steps in Protocol 19 except the BasisTest step follow the informal
introduction in Section 1.4. Why do we need the extra BasisTest step? The reason is, if we remove
the first step of this protocol, the client doesn’t have any control on the form of the server’s state,
and proving the security will be difficult. So we add a BasisTest step in the protocol, which gives
the client some ability to “verify” server’s state.
However, we note that in the analysis of BasisTest in Section 7, it does not give us “exponential
verifiability”, which means, the adversary may cheat with inverse polynomial probability, and we
only know the state is close to the state we want by an inverse-polynomial distance. However, we
will show, we can get rid of this problem by giving a different analysis of the BasisTest protocol.
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Simply speaking, for key pair K = {x0, x1}, in Section 7 we try to prove the adversary’s state,
for an adversary that can pass the test with big probability, after adding some auxiliary information,
is close to a state in the form of
U(|x0〉 |· · ·〉+ |x1〉 |· · ·〉) (184)
by an inverse polynomial distance. (Note that we are using the “natural notation”, but in the
security proof we purify everything, and the server’s state will be entangled with the client’s keys.)
However the blindness requires exponential security, and such “verifiability with inverse-polynomial
distance” is not enough. In this section, we will prove, after theBasisTest step, we can “reduce” the
server’s state in the lemma into a state in the following form, after using some auxiliary-information
technique: ∑
i∈[κ]
Pi(|x0〉 |· · ·〉+ |x1〉 |· · ·〉) + some exponentially small value (185)
Where each Pi is an efficient sequence of server-side projection, unitaries and RO queries. Compare
to equation (184), the main difference is we allow it to be the sum of κ terms. And we also need
to consider the server-side operations with projections.
Thus our proof is divided into two steps. First we can prove the security of our 8-basis qfactory
for a restricted case where the initial state can be described in this form, assuming the inner part
|x0〉 |· · ·〉+ |x1〉 |· · ·〉 all have some SC-security property. This is done in Lemma 12.3. Then making
use of Lemma 12.3, we complete the proof of Lemma 12.1 thus prove the security of our 8-basis
qfactory protocol.
12.4.1 Security proof
We note that the initial state of our 8-basis qfactory protocol should not be understood as the
initial state in Protocol 16, even if in the security proof some notations are similar. Instead, we
will see, when we use this lemma, it is replaced by “the state after the first step of Protocol 19
completes, projected onto the passing space” (which is the post-execution state of Protocol 16,
projected onto the passing space).
We divide the proof into two parts. First we prove the statement when the initial state is in
the form of equation (185):
Lemma 12.3. The following is true when the security parameter κ is bigger than some fixed
constant:
Suppose the key set is K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), and the initial state has the form
|ϕ1〉 =
∑
i∈[κ]
Pi(|ϕi,0〉+ |ϕi,1〉), where Pi is a server-side operation (with projections),
∀i, query number |Pi| ≤ 2κ
∀i ∈ [κ], b ∈ {0, 1}, PSixb |ϕi,b〉 = |ϕi,b〉 , where Si is some server-side system
, and the protocol is QFac8−GT≥2(K;PadLen = l), where ≥ 2 means the first step (the BasisTest
step) is omitted, and we omit one parameter from the parameter list of the QFac8 − GT protocol
since it has no influence on this lemma.
If the following conditions are satisfied:
• |ϕ1〉 is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K, η > 100κ2,
• |ϕ1〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
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• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 5η)
, then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv with query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = QFac8−GT≥2Adv(K;PadLen = l) ◦ |ϕ1〉
satisfies: for any server-side operation D with query number |D| ≤ 2κ,
|Pr(D(ϕ′, (θ2, θ3)) = 0)− Pr(D(ϕ′, (θ′2, θ′3)←r {0, 1}2) = 0)| ≤ 2−η/9| |ϕ1〉 | (186)
Note that we do not need to project onto the passing space since there is no client-side checking
after the first step of the protocol. Further note that we do not consider the “Security” of the
parameter list of QFac8−GT here since it’s not used after the first step.
The proof of Lemma 12.3 is relatively simpler, and is given in Appendix J.
Below we discuss the overall idea for reducing Lemma 12.1 to Lemma 12.3. The details are
given in Appendix K.
Ideas for reducing Lemma 12.1 to Lemma 12.3 The “keywords” are “elimination of test
rounds” and “step-by-step reduction”. We will construct a series of statements, and reduce the
proof of Lemma 12.1 to these statements step-by-step, and finally reach a statement that has the
form of Lemma 12.3.
Notice that in Lemma 12.1 there are κ2 rounds of the single-key-pair basis test in the original
protocol; we will divide it into κ blocks, where each block contains κ rounds; and we we will see,
we will analyze and these blocks one-by-one, and since each block is itself a multi-round BasisTest
protocol, we can apply Lemma 7.3 in each block. Every time we do this kind of argument, we
eliminate one block of tests and reduce the statement to a new statement whose form is closer to
Lemma 12.3. And we can do this step-by-step until we reach a statement that is basically Lemma
12.3.
The statement we use in each round is as follows. We name it as “Statement-round-i-completed”.
Lemma 12.1 is “Statement-round-0-completed”. In the 1st round of reduction, we reduce Lemma
12.1 to “Statement-round-1-completed” — and you can see what the name means. Then we can
continue and reduce it to “Statement-round-2-completed”, and so on, until s = κ or hitting some
stopping condition in the middle.
Statement-round-i-completed
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the fol-
lowing conclusion holds”), with one difference: the right side of (183) is replaced by (2−κ −
i2−2η)| |ϕ1〉 |.
The conditions have the following differences:
• The initial state is
P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + P2(|ψ20〉+ |ψ21〉) + · · ·+ Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉) (187)
+ |φi〉 (188)
where | |φi〉 | ≤ 2−i| |ϕ〉 |. Note that some terms in the middle can be zero.
The notations in equation (187) are as follows:
– ∀i′ ∈ [i],Pi′ is a server-side operations with query number ≤ i · 2κ+3.
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– ∀b ∈ {0, 1},∀i′ ∈ [i], PSi′xb |ψi
′
b 〉 = |ψi
′
b 〉, where Si′ is some server-side system.
– ∀b ∈ {0, 1},∀i′ ∈ [i], |ψi′b 〉 is (1, i′2κ+2)-server-side-representable from
|φ0〉⊙ < AuxInf1∼i1 > ⊙ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ iκ) > ⊙ < TAG1∼i > (189)
where |φ0〉 is just a change of notation for the initial state |ϕ1〉, and (note that some
notations, for example, the subscript of AuxInf , are chosen to be consistent to the
detailed security proof)
∗ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ iκ) > contains the client-side messages in the BasisTest
protocol from round 1 to round iκ; the parameters are the same as the original
protocol.
∗ < TAG1∼i > is the set of global tags Tag(rt) where rt is the output key used
in the t-th round of < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ iκ) >;
∗ < AuxInf1∼i1 >=< AuxInf11 > ⊙ < AuxInf21 > ⊙ · · · < AuxInf i1 >, where
each one is the same algorithm as the < AuxInf > appeared in Lemma 7.3,
but for different superscripts the random coins are independently random.
– |φi〉 is also (1, i2κ+2)-server-side-representable from (189).
• The BasisTest step is executed for (κ2− iκ) rounds. The parameters of the protocol are
the same.
• The RO query number of the adversary is ≤ 2κ + iκ.
Thus to complete this reduction, what we we need to do is to prove we can reduce the
“Statement-round-i-completed” to “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”. We will give the details
of such a reduction in Appendix K.2. (Note that this is actually the (i+1)th round of reductions.)
How to understand this statement Let’s explain the statement above.
1. The conclusion is (almost) the same as Lemma 12.1, and the extra “2−2η” term is small
enough to be ignored if you are trying to get an intuitive understanding.
2. As we do the inductive reduction step-by-step, the conditions will change step-by-step. For
the initial state we consider, the number of terms inside will increase, and the norm of the
last |φ···〉 term will decrease.
3. If we ignore the last term, the form of the state is the same as what we want in the beginning
of Section 12.4.
And as we can see, the query number in each P··· is bounded.
4. The different auxiliary information might seem complicated. This comes from the details of
the security proof, and they play different roles.
One important property is these auxiliary information does not affect the SC-security of each
term too much. We can view them as “specially designed auxiliary information” that both
(somewhat) preserves the SC-security and helps the security proof.
The reader might get confused when the ⊙ symbol and the addition of states are used together.
This is allowed.And recall that ⊙ symbol means “the client computes this function using its
own system and random coins, and sends the result to some fixed place of the read-only buffer
as the auxiliary information”.
138
5. The number of rounds decreases since one block is removed after one step of this inductive
reduction.
6. And the query number bound increases slightly, which is small enough to be ignored in an
intuitive understanding.
See Appendix K for details.
12.5 Security of the UBQC −GT Protocol
Now we will prove the final security statement of our protocol, which is Theorem 12.2.
Proof of Theorem 12.2. The proof is via a hybrid method. We will replace the bits that the client
uses by random bits step-by-step.
For i = 0 · · ·L, define Hybridi as follows: in Hybridi, before the third step of Protocol 18, for
each t from i + 1 to L, the client replaces θt2 and θ
t
3 in its stored angles with two new random
bits, and runs the third step using the replaced angles. So HybridL = UBQC −GT , the original
protocol. Note that we are doing the hybrids in a “backward” way, in other words, replace the
angles from the last to the first.
Then we will prove for any i, under the conditions of Theorem 12.2,
|Pr(AdvHybridi(κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybridi−1(κ,C) = 0)| ≤ 2−κ (190)
Which means it’s hard for the adversary to distinguish whether it’s run on Hybridi or Hybridi−1.
Here C can be assumed to be public. The only difference of Hybridi and Hybridi−1 is whether the
second and third bits of the i-th angle are replaced by random bits. Note that the i-th angle comes
from an execution of QFac8−GT (K(i)out), which is in the i-th round of the second step of Protocol
18.
First by the security statement (Theorem 11.3) of remote gadget preparation (first step of
Protocol 18) we know Ppass |ϕ1〉, defined as the state after the first step (of Protocol 18) projected
onto the passing space, either satisfies (Case 1) |Ppass |ϕ1〉 | ≤ 2−κ (then (190) is already true), or
(Case 2) it is (2η , 2−η |Ppass |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout−K(i)out, where η = 10000κ2 . (Note
that when we need to substitute Security = κ9 when we apply Theorem 11.3.) Then we only need
to consider the Case 2.
If some adversary Adv (with query number ≤ 2κ) can distinguish Hybridi−1 and Hybridi from
initial state Ppass |ϕ1〉 with distinguishing advantage
|Pr(AdvHybridi≥2(κ,C, Ppass |ϕ1〉) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybrid
i−1
≥2 (κ,C, Ppass |ϕ1〉) = 0)| = p > 2−κ (191)
where Pr(AdvHybrid
i
≥2(κ,C, Ppass |ϕ1〉) = 0) is the probability (formalized to be the square of norm)
of outputting 0 when the initial state is Ppass |ϕ1〉, and the protocol is executed from the second
step of Hybridi, we can construct an adversary which can break the security (Lemma 12.1) of the
protocol QFac8−GT (K(i)out). The construction is as follows.
The adversary makes use of the Adv in equation (191). The initial state is Ppass |ϕ1〉 together
with some auxiliary information. We need to be careful here because in the protocols shown in
(191) many new messages are provided besides what are part of QFac8−GT (K(i)out). However, here
we assume the circuit C is already public, and the adversary gets the keys at all the other index
(which is Kout −K(i)out) as the auxiliary information, and the new initial state,
|ϕ˜〉 := Ppass |ϕ1〉 ⊙ (Kout −K(i)out)
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, is (2η , 2−η|Ppass |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out by the security property of the GdgPrep protocol. (See
in the discussion above equation (191).)
Revealing these keys can only make the adversary more powerful. In the other words, the same
adversary in (190) can simply ignore these information and distinguish the two hybrids with the
same advantage:
|Pr(AdvHybridi≥2(κ,C, |ϕ˜〉) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybridi−1≥2 (κ,C, |ϕ˜〉) = 0)| = p > 2−κ (192)
Let’s explain why (192) is a contradiction to Lemma 12.1. Note that
• Everything the client sends to the server from the beginning (which is the beginning of the
second step of Protocol 18) to the (i − 1)-th round of the third step of Protocol 18 can be
simulated using Kout −K(i)out and an execution of QFac8−GT (K(i)out) protocol.
• And from the client-side message in the i-th round of the third step of Protocol 18 the
adversary can recover θ2, θ3 or θ
′
2, θ
′
3.
• And everything the client sends to the server after the i-th round of the third step of Protocol
18 can be replaced by completely random strings without affecting the distinguishing advan-
tage, since all the θj2,3, j > i are already replaced by random bits when we do the hybrid, and
for θj1, j ≥ i, a random string rj is sampled in each round and their sums look random.
Thus we get an adversary of query number ≤ 2κ that can break QFac8 −GT on initial state |ϕ˜〉
with distinguishing advantage p and get a contradiction to Lemma 12.1.
Thus
|Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybrid0(κ,C) = 0)| ≤ L · 2−κ ≤ 2−κ/2 (193)
Similarly we can prove
|Pr(AdvUBQC−GT (κ, 0|C|) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybrid0(κ, 0|C|) = 0)| ≤ 2−κ/2 (194)
In Hybrid0, the computation of messages from the client does not use any of the real θi2, θ
i
3. Note
that what the server gets in each round is in the form of δi = θi
′
+φi+πri = θi1π+θ
i
2
′ π
2+θ
i
3
′ π
4+φ
i+πri.
Since θi+ πri is a new random value in nπ/4, φi is hidden. (Formally, replacing φi with a random
angle is indistinguishable from the original case.) Thus
|Pr(AdvHybrid0(κ,C) = 0)− Pr(AdvHybrid0(κ, 0|C|) = 0)| = 0 (195)
Summing up (193)(194)(195) completes the proof.
At this time we complete all the protocol construction and the security proof.
Especially, we prove the main theorem (Theorem 1.1).
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A Missing Proofs Before Section 6.4
Proof of Lemma 4.2. First consider the case where 2α1 = 1. Suppose
|ϕ〉 = P |ϕinit〉 , | |ϕinit〉 | = 1,P = P2α2H · · · P1HP0 is a server-side operation
142
. Consider the states coming from replacing the last i queries by queries to Hpad where Hpad is the
blinded oracle where H(pad|| · · · ) is blinded:
|ϕblind,i〉 = Pblind,i |ϕinit〉 ,Pblind,i = P2α2Hpad · · ·HpadP2α2−iH · · · P1HP0
Then
| |ϕblind,i〉 − |ϕblind,i−1〉 | = |
∑
pad
1√
2l
|pad〉 ⊗ (H −Hpad)(P2α2−iH · · · P1HP0 |ϕinit〉)| ≤ 2−l/2+1
Thus take |ϕ′〉 = |ϕblind,2α2 〉, then | |ϕ′〉 − |ϕ〉 | ≤ 2α2−l/2+1.
For the 2α1 > 1 case, by the triangle inequality taking |ϕ′〉 = ∑j Pblind,2α2j |ϕinit〉 completes the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2.
The “elementary calculation” in Lemma 6.6. The problem is reduced to the following problem:
ω0 = A, ∀i ≥ 1, ωi ≤ ωi−1/
√
2, maximize
∑∞
i=1
√
ω2i−1 − ω2i .
Consider it as a function of ω0 = A. Denote it as f . Then f(A) = O(1)A. And we have
f(A) = maxω1≤A/
√
2(f(ω1) +
√
A2 − ω21). Substitute and we get f(A) = (
√
2 + 1)A.
B Proofs of Lemmas in Section 6.4
Proof of Lemma 6.11. The main technique in this proof is the hybrid method. (This is not the
first step below, but it will be used.) However, the backward tables in the reversible garbled tables
are one of the obstacles here. To solve this problem, when we define the blinded oracle, we will
also make the outputs corresponding to the keys in the backward table blinded. Now let’s start
the proof.
By Technique 6.2 we can assume Tag(K) is stored in the read-only buffer.
Define Pads as the set of random paddings used in all the rounds, and for the reversible garbled
tables, this include the padding used in both forward tables and backward tables.
The paddings in Pads are all sampled independently randomly. By Lemma 4.3 if we replace
all the oracle queries in the representation (see Definition 4.10) of |ϕ〉 by H · (I −PPads||···), denote
the final state as |ϕ˜〉, there is
|ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η/2||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 (196)
Thus
|ϕ˜〉 ⊙ Pads is (2η , 2−η/2.1| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K. (197)
Let’s move to study the SC-security of |ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >. For any server-side operation
D = U2λHU2λ−1H · · ·HU0, λ ≤ η/6
applied on |ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >, define Dt,b as the operator that does a projection onto (I−PPads||K)
before each of the first (t− 1) RO queries and does a projection onto PPads||xb before the t-th RO
queries. (See Notation 2.2 for what Pads||K means.) Define D0 as the operator that does a
projection onto (I − PPads||K) before each of the RO queries. Then
D =
∑
t∈[2λ],b∈{0,1}
Dt,b +D0 (198)
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We will prove
∀t ∈ [2λ], b ∈ {0, 1}, |Px1−bDt,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/3−2| |ϕ˜〉 |. (199)
Intuitively, this means: once the adversary knows xb, it’s hard to know x1−b. Let’s use the
hybrid method to prove it. Denote Kout rev (1−b) is the set of keys used in the reversible garbled
tables with subscript 1− b. Consider a blinded oracle H ′ where
H on inputs Pads||x1−b, Pads||Kout rev (1−b); Tag(Kout rev (1−b))
are blinded. Denote D′t,b as the operation where each oracle query in Dt,b is replaced by H ′.
To prove (199), first we can prove
Dt,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >) ≈2−η/3−3||ϕ˜〉| D′t,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >) (200)
The proof is given below.
Proof of (200)
The reason is we can apply the hybrid method and replace H by H ′ one by one, from the
first query to the last query, and bound the difference caused by each step of this replacement.
Define the operations by the first q queries in D′t,b as D′qt,b. What we need to prove is:
∀q ∈ [2λ], |PPads||x1−bD′
q
t,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/2−5| |ϕ˜〉 |, (201)
|PKout rev (1−b)D′qt,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/2−5| |ϕ˜〉 | (202)
1. If q ≤ t, since the queries never contain the input in the form of Pads||K (recall that we
add a projection onto I − PPads||K before each query in Dqt,b, and add a projection onto
I − PPads||··· for each query in |ϕ˜〉) thus (201) holds.
And by the same reasons above we can get, in the adversary’s viewpoint, all the cipher-
texts of Kout rev (1−b) can be replaced by random strings without affecting the left hand
side of (202), thus (202) holds since it’s the same as guessing a random string.
2. If q > t, (201) holds because otherwise the adversary can break (197). And (202) holds
by the same reason as before.
Then the difference caused by each step of the replacement in the hybrid method can be
bounded by (201)(202), and since 2−η/2 · 2η/6 ≤ 2−η/3 and we complete the proof of (200).
Then use (197) again we know |Px1−bD′t,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/3−3| |ϕ˜〉 |. Thus together with
(200) we know (199) is true.
And (199) implies
|Px0||x1Dt,b(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/3−2| |ϕ˜〉 |
And by similar reasons
|Px0||x1D0(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ |Px1−bD0(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/2| |ϕ˜〉 |
. Summing it up for all the t, b we know |Px0||x1D(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 2−η/6−0.5| |ϕ˜〉 |.
Finally adding back the difference of |ϕ˜〉 and |ϕ〉 we get |Px0||x1D(|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤
2−η/6−0.2| |ϕ〉 |, thus completes the proof. The SC-security of Kout t holds because otherwise the
adversary can compute K through it.
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Proof of Lemma 6.12. By Technique 6.2 we can assume Tag(K) is stored in the read-only buffer.
Suppose there exist i0 ∈ [N ], a server-side operation U with query number |U| ≤ 2η−4 such that
|P
x
(i0)
0 ||x
(i0)
1
U(|ϕ〉 ⊙ < AuxInf >)| > 2−η+4| |ϕ〉 |
Suppose the set of random pads used in < AuxInf > is Pads. Pads is sampled randomly.
Applying Lemma 4.3 we know there exists |ϕ˜〉 such that |ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 and |ϕ˜〉 does not depend
on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ). (Recall the definition of “does not depend on” in Definition 4.9) where the
prefix “· · · ” has length the same with the length of pt0 and the suffix “· · · ” has length the same
with the length of pt1||x0||pt2. Thus
|P
x
(i0)
0 ||x
(i0)
1
U(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙Pads)| > 2−η+3| |ϕ˜〉 | (203)
∀i, |ϕ˜〉 ⊙ Pads is (2η , 2−η+1| |ϕ˜〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i). (204)
Our goal is to find some contradiction between these two. In more details, we will make use of the
code of the adversary in (203) to construct an adversary that does not satisfy (204).
Since |ϕ˜〉 does not depend on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ), it looks the same no matter whether the ran-
domness of H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ) is sampled beforehand (in the oracle before |ϕ˜〉 appear) or afterwards
(after |ϕ˜〉 appear but before the server makes further attack). Thus we can observe that the adver-
sary itself can also sample these randomness by itself and simulate an oracle that looks the same
as the original oracle. (When we say “look the same”, we do not mean the new random oracle
should reuse the random coins; instead, it should sample some freshly new randomness, and since
the original oracle has not been queried either these two oracles look the same.) And we note that
in the “purified notation” the description of the system Pads itself is also in superposition; the
“does not depend on” is in the sense of Definition 4.9.
Let’s first view the idea 1 below, which does not work completely, but takes us to the main
proof.
Idea 1 Consider the following adversary, denoted by U ′, applied on |ϕ˜〉 ⊙ Pads (note: it’s not
|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf >), which make use of the unitary-query sequence of U and (203), to break the
(204). U ′ is defined as follows:
First U ′ can sample random strings that correspond to all the outputs of H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ). (It
does not query H, but sample strings that have the same size and length needed to “imitate” this
part.) (Since the output length used by U in (203) is finite it only needs to sample finite amount
of randomness.)
Then it can create a new oracle H˜ using these random strings:
For query to H˜ on input e:
1. If e has the form · · · ||Pads|| · · · (which means, the “Pads” part of the string are contained
in the set pads stored in the system Pads), return the random values sampled just now that
are used to “imitate” H(e).
2. Otherwise, return H(e).
And replace the oracle queries in U by H˜. This new oracle should look the same (as freshly random
as) the original oracle, if the operation is applied on |ϕ˜〉. And we note that for different choices of
Pads the new random oracle could be different. In other words, this is not a stand-alone oracle,
but an oracle whose construction takes Pads as part of the parameter. However, this does not
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affect the statement that “this oracle can be used to replace the original oracle without affecting
the adversary’s ability of computing the keys in K(i)”
The main problem is, if we compare U ′ and U , U ′ does not have < AuxInf >, and since U ′
does not hold the keys, it cannot collect the right values of H˜ to get a simulated < AuxInf >. To
solve this problem, we consider the following idea:
Idea 2: Let the new oracle H˜ be actually constructed as follows:
Before the construction of H˜, the adversary samples random outputs in the following steps:
1. First the random oracle entries that corresponds to H(pt0||padt||pt1||x(i
t)
bt ||pt2) (∀t ∈ [n]) are
sampled randomly and stored separately. Note that the adversary doesn’t know the actual
values of x
(i)
b for any b, i, but it knows their tags, so it can still create a look-up tables to store
these values.
2. Then it samples a set of random values on input in the form of · · · ||Pads|| · · · as “background
values”. This step is the same as the idea 1 above, but these background values are not
necessarily the output values of H˜.
Then H˜ is defined as follows. For input e:
1. Check if e is in the form of pt0||padt||pt1||x(i
t)
bt ||pt2, t ∈ [n]. If so, return the values from the
look-up table. Note that the checking can be done using Tag(K).
2. Otherwise if e is in the form of · · · ||Pads|| · · · (see Idea 1 for the meaning), return the value
from the corresponding background value.
3. Otherwise return H(e).
For each query, H˜ requires at most 3 queries to H to complete the construction.
Now we can construct the attack U ′:
1. As described in the steps below Idea 2, it samples the “background values”, and samples the
random oracle outputs that correspond to H(pt0||padt||pt1||x(i
t)
bt ||pt2) (∀t ∈ [n]), and collects
them into the corresponding places of < AuxInf >. Denote it as < AuxInf fake >. Fill the
system that should store < AuxInf > in (203) with this fake version.
2. Construct H˜ as above.
3. Run the code of U , and replace the oracle queries by queries to H˜. Denote the new operation
in this step as Ufake.
Since |ϕ˜〉 does not depend on H(· · · ||Pads|| · · · ), H˜ and < AuxInf fake > constructed above should
look the same as H and < AuxInf > on the ability of outputting the keys in K (on the space that
Tag is injective), which means
|P
x
(i0)
0 ||x
(i0)
1
U ′(|ϕ˜〉 ⊙ Pads)| = |P
x
(i0)
0 ||x
(i0)
1
Ufake(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf fake > ⊙Pads)| (205)
≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |Px(i0)0 ||x(i0)1 U(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙Pads)| (206)
(the approximation comes from Fact 1). And the query number to H satisfies |U ′| ≤ 3|U| ≤ 2η−1,
which contradicts (203)(204). This completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 6.13. By Technique 6.2 we can assume Tag(K) is stored in the read-only buffer.
First use the decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.6)(together with Fact 1) to decompose |ϕ〉 as
|φ〉+ |χ〉 , where
• | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.5C| |ϕ〉 |.
• |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K and is (1, 2η)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉.
Thus |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. What’s
more, since | |φ〉 | ≥ | |ϕ〉 | − | |χ〉 | ≥ 16 | |ϕ〉 |, we know |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6+1| |φ〉 |)-SC-secure for
K.
Apply Lemma 6.11 on |φ〉 we know |φ〉⊙ < AuxInf > is (2η/36−1, 2−η/36+1| |φ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
Add back |χ〉 completes the proof.
C Proof of Lemmas from Section 6.5 to the End of Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6.14. This can be proved by a simple hybrid method. Denote Advt as the adversary
where the RO queries from the t-th RO query to the last one are replaced by queries to H ′, then
by (29)
Advt |ϕ〉 ≈2−η+1||ϕ〉| Advt−1 |ϕ〉
. Summing up this inequalities for every t completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.15. This can be proved by a simple hybrid method. Denote Advt as the adversary
where the RO queries from the first to the t-th RO query are replaced by queries to H ′, then
Advt |ϕ〉 ≈2−η+1||ϕ〉| Advt−1 |ϕ〉
. Summing up this inequalities for every t completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.16. Define |ϕb〉 = PSxb |ϕ〉. Then |ϕ〉 = |ϕ0〉 + |ϕ1〉. If for some b ∈ {0, 1},
| |ϕb〉 | ≤ 2−η/2| |ϕ〉 |, the statement is already true. Otherwise:
| |P0D |ϕ〉 |2 − |P0D ◦ COPY ◦ |ϕ〉 |2 | (207)
=|tr(P0D |ϕ〉 〈ϕ| D†)− tr(P0D(|ϕ0〉 〈ϕ0|+ |ϕ1〉 〈ϕ1|)D†)| (208)
=| 〈ϕ1| DP0D |ϕ0〉+ 〈ϕ0| DP0D |ϕ1〉 | (209)
≤(| 〈x1| DP0D |ϕ0〉 |+ | 〈x0| DP0D |ϕ1〉 |) · 2η/2| |ϕ〉 | (210)
(By SC-security) ≤2−η/2+1| |ϕ〉 |2 (211)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.18. Suppose D = U2λHU2λ−1H · · ·HU0 where λ ≤ η/2. We need to give a
bound for |Pspan{x0,x1}D |ϕ〉 |.
Define Dt as the operation where the first t queries in D are replaced by queries to H ′. Since
a freshly new blinded oracle can be simulated by the adversary using Tag(K) (on the space that
Tag is injective on inputs with length the same as the keys in K), by the ANY-security of |ϕ〉 we
know |Pspan{x0,x1}D˜t |ϕ〉 | ≤ 2−η+0.5| |ϕ〉 | where D˜t is the operation in Dt from the beginning to the
t-th queries. Applying Lemma 6.15 completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 6.19. By Lemma 6.7 (and adding the space that Tag is not injective) we can
decompose |ϕ〉 together with finite number of server-side ancilla qubits (which are all at state
zero), into |φ〉+ |χ〉 such that
• |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6+0.5| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K;
• | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.9C| |ϕ〉 |.
Since C ≤ 1/3 we know | |ϕ〉 | ≥ | |φ〉 | ≥ 16 | |ϕ〉 | thus |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6+3| |φ〉 |)-SC-secure for K.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.18, applying Lemma 6.15 on D |φ〉 we know
D |φ〉 ≈2−η/12+O(1)||φ〉| Dblind |φ〉
. Adding |χ〉 back completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.20. Define U t as the operation where the first t queries in U are replaced by
queries to H ′. We only need to prove for all t, PxbU t |ϕ〉 ≈2−2η/3||ϕ〉| PxbU t−1 |ϕ〉. This is then
reduced to prove |PxbD1(H − H ′)Px1−bD2 |ϕ〉 | ≤ 2−2η/3−1| |ϕ〉 | where D1, D2 are the operations
after and before the t-th oracle queries in U t. This comes from the SC-security of the initial state
thus we complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.21. Similar to the proof fo Lemma 6.20. Define U t as the operation where the
first t queries in U are replaced by queries toH ′. We only need to prove for all t, U tPxb |ϕ〉 ≈2−2η/3||ϕ〉|
U t−1Pxb |ϕ〉. This is then reduced to prove |D1(H−H ′)Px1−bD2Pxb |ϕ〉 | ≤ 2−2η/3−1| |ϕ〉 | where D1,
D2 are the operations after and before the t-th oracle queries in U t. This comes from the SC-security
of the initial state thus we complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6.22. Suppose the set of random pads used in the computation of the client’s
messages is Set. First apply Lemma 4.3 to prove that, if we expand |ϕ〉 using its representation
and replace all the queries to H by H · (I −PSet||···) (where · · · denotes strings of arbitrary length),
denote the final state as |ϕ˜〉, we have
|ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉
And we use the hybrid method to do the remaining steps. Suppose H˜ is a blinded oracle of H
where the following inputs are blinded:
Set|| · · · ||x|| · · · , Set|| · · · ||y|| · · · , (212)
where the first · · · denotes all the possible strings with the same length as pxt, the second · · ·
denotes all the possible strings with the same length as sxt, the third · · · denotes all the possible
strings with the same length as pyt, and the fourth · · · denotes all the possible strings with the
same length as syt.
And define |ϕ˜′〉, |ϕ˜′′〉 as the result of replacing the initial state by |ϕ˜〉 in the construction of
|ϕ′〉, |ϕ′′〉. And use Dblind to denote the operation that comes from replacing all the queries in D
by queries to H˜. Use Dblind,t to denote the operation coming from replacing the first to the t-th
queries in D by queries to H˜. And to prove this lemma, we will first prove
Dblind,t |ϕ˜′〉 ≈2−η+4||ϕ〉| Dblind,t−1 |ϕ˜′〉 (213)
This is further reduced to the following two expressions ((214)(215)), where we use D˜blind,t to denote
the operation in Dblind just before the t-th query:
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•
|PxD˜blind,t |ϕ˜′〉 | = |PxD˜blind,t |ϕ˜′′〉 | ≤ 2−η+2| |ϕ〉 | (214)
where the inequality comes from the fact that |ϕ˜〉 is (2η , 2−η+1| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for xb.
•
|PyD˜blind,t |ϕ˜′〉 | = |PyD˜blind,t |ϕ˜′′〉 | ≤ 2−η| |ϕ〉 | (215)
where the inequality comes from the fact that this is predicting a random string.
And (213) implies
D |ϕ˜′〉 ≈2−η/2||ϕ〉| Dblind |ϕ˜′〉 (216)
And from (214)(215) we get
D |ϕ˜′′〉 ≈2−η/2||ϕ〉| Dblind |ϕ˜′′〉 (217)
And we also have
|P0Dblind |ϕ˜′〉 | = |P0Dblind |ϕ˜′′〉 | (218)
and these three expressions imply the final lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6.23. Apply Lemma 6.8 we can decompose |ϕ〉 as |φ〉 + |χ〉. Apply Lemma 6.22
on |φ〉 and then add |χ〉 by additivity. This completes the proof.
D Missing Proofs in Section 7.1 to Section 7.2
Proof of (62)(63). Let’s write U˜ = Adv ◦ U†. The query number is at most 2η/3+1. Then for (63)
there is (where the ≈ǫ below just means the absolute value of their difference is at most ǫ):
|Pspan{r0,r1}U˜((|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉)⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)| (219)
≈2−η/3||ϕ〉|
√
|Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)|2 + |Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)|2
(220)
This step is by applying Lemma 6.16. Note that the projection does not have the form as required
in Lemma 6.16 (since the projection is not P0); but we can first strengthen the statement by adding
r0, r1 into the auxiliary information and then apply Lemma 6.16.
Define Shuffle(x0 → r0, $) as the result of replacing the x1 row in the garbled table by random
strings, and Shuffle(x1 → r1, $) as the result of replacing the x0 row in the garbled table by random
strings. Then√
|Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)|2 + |Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → rb) >)|2
(221)
≈2−η/3||ϕ〉| (222)√
|Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < Shuffle(x0 → r0, $) >)|2 + |Pspan{r0,r1}U˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < Shuffle(x1 → r1, $) >)|2
(223)
≈2−η/3||ϕ〉|
√
|Pr0 U˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < Shuffle(x0 → r0, $) >)|2 + |Pr1 U˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < Shuffle(x1 → r1, $) >)|2
(224)
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where the first step is by Lemma 6.22 and the second step is because it’s guessing a random values
without giving any information.
Similarly for (62) there is
|PrU˜((|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉)⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >)| (225)
≈2−η/3||ϕ〉|
√
|PrU˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >)|2 + |PrU˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < GT (∀b : xb → r) >)|2 (226)
≈2−η/3||ϕ〉|
√
|PrU˜(|ψ0〉⊙ < Shuffle(x0 → r, $) >)|2 + |PrU˜(|ψ1〉⊙ < Shuffle(x1 → r, $) >)|2
(227)
Notice (224) and (227) are the same since r, r0, r1 are all sampled randomly. Thus we can combine
these expressions and complete the proof.
E Proof of Lemma 7.4
Before we prove this lemma, we introduce a notation. We note that this is only a temporary
notation needed for this proof.
Notation E.1. Suppose K(1), K(3) are the key pairs that we are studying.
We write |ϕ〉 =st−ind |ϕ′〉 if for any server-side operation D that is unbounded and can make
unbounded number of RO queries, |P0D(|ϕ〉 ⊙K(1) ⊙K(3))| = |P0D(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(1)⊙K(3))|, where P0
is the projection onto |0〉 on some server-side system.
And we write |ϕ〉 ≈st−indǫ |ϕ′〉 if for any server-side operation D that is unbounded and can make
unbounded number of RO queries, | |P0D(|ϕ〉 ⊙K(1) ⊙K(3))| − |P0D(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(1) ⊙K(3))| | ≤ ǫ.
Fact 2. If |ϕ〉 ≈st−indǫ1 |ϕ′〉, |ϕ′〉 ≈st−indǫ2 |ϕ′′〉, there is |ϕ〉 ≈st−indǫ1+ǫ2 |ϕ′′〉.
Here we add two key pairs as auxiliary information in the definition. Since we are studying
Protocol 3 we can simply assume they are the two input key pairs K(1) and K(3).
We note that we are talking about unbounded adversary with unbounded RO queries. The
reader might be confused by wondering what is its difference from saying |ϕ〉 and |ϕ′〉 are simply
the same. The difference comes from the fact that we are using the purified notation instead of
natural notation. |ϕ〉 and |ϕ′〉 describe the state of the whole system, including the client and the
server. Intuitively this definition is equivalent to saying “the server-side of these two states are the
same” if the K(1),K(3) terms are removed.
Why do we need to add K(1) and K(3) into the auxiliary information? Because this gives us the
following property: if |ϕ〉 ≈st−indǫ |ϕ′〉, even if the client sends some messages that only depends on
K(1) and K(3), the server-side states of the final states are still the same:
Fact 3. If |ϕ〉 ≈st−indǫ1 |ϕ′〉, suppose AuxInf is a randomized algorithm that only takes K(1),
K(3) as inputs where K(1), K(3) are stored in some client-side read-only system, there is |ϕ〉⊙ <
AuxInf >≈st−indǫ1 |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >.
Now we can begin our proof of Lemma 7.4. The structure of this proof is as follows:
1. In the beginning we assume the first case in the conclusion of Lemma 7.4 is false; in other
words, the norm (or informally and intuitively, probability) of passing the protocol for the
adversary is big. And all the proofs after this step are under this assumption.
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2. We first apply the security of single-key-pair basis test on K(3), and then K(1), and get some
intermediate results. One subtle thing here is we do not always apply the lemma on the states
that really appear during the protocol execution.
3. Then we will give the construction of the server-side operation that the first case in the
conclusion of Lemma 7.4 talks about. This construction will use the intermediate results in
the previous step.
4. Then the remaining work is to prove the server-side operation constructed just now really
achieves what we need.
Proof of Lemma 7.4. Suppose
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 | (228)
Thus we need to prove the second case in the conclusion of Lemma 7.4 assuming (228).
First apply the decomposition lemma for SC-security (Lemma 6.6) (together with Fact 1) on
K(3) we know |ϕ〉 can be decomposed as |φ〉+ |χ〉 where
• | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.45C| |ϕ〉 |
• |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6+0.1C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3), and is (1, 2η)-server-side representable from
|ϕ〉. We can further get the following for |φ〉:
– |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
– 16 | |ϕ〉 | ≤ | |φ〉 | ≤ | |ϕ〉 |.
– |φ〉 is (2η/6, 2−η/6+1| |φ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(3)
Then consider the result of applying the first step of this protocol, which is BasisTest(K(3);T ),
on |φ〉. Denote:
|φi〉 := Prtl1.1∼1.i |φ〉 := BasisTestAdv1.1∼1.i(K(3); i) ◦ |φ〉 (229)
Here Prtl1.1∼1.i is an abbreviated notation for the first i rounds of the first step. In the rightmost
expression some parameters of the protocol are implicit.
Apply the security property of BasisTest(K(3);T ) (Lemma 7.3). For the first case in the
lemma’s conclusion, |Ppass |φT 〉 | ≤ 12 | |φ〉 | thus |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ |Ppass |φT 〉 |+ | |χ〉 | ≤ (1 − C2)| |ϕ〉 |,
contradiction to (228). Thus we only need to consider the second case in the conclusion of Lemma
7.3, which is
There exist an integer i ∈ [0, T ), a server-side operation U1 (which depends deterministically on
Adv1.1∼1.i where Adv1.1∼1.i is the code of the adversary in the first i rounds of the first step) with
query |U1| ≤ |Adv|+O(1) such that
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)(U1(Ppass |φi〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >))| ≤ 3T−1/4|Ppass |φi〉 | ≤ 3C| |ϕ〉 | (230)
where PS3
K(3)
is the projection on K(3) on some server-side system S3.
Recall that < AuxInf1 > is defined in the description of this lemma and has the form we need
here.
Similar to (229) define
|ϕi〉 := Prtl1.1∼1.i |ϕ〉 := BasisTest(K(3); i) ◦ |ϕ〉
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Then since | |ϕi〉 − |φi〉 | ≤ | |ϕ〉 − |φ〉 | ≤ | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.45C| |ϕ〉 | we have
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)(U1(Ppass |ϕi〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >))| ≤ 3C| |ϕ〉 |+ | |χ〉 | ≤ 5.45C| |ϕ〉 | (231)
Then after the i-th round of test on K(3) completes, Prtl1.(i+1)∼1.T is applied on Ppass |ϕi〉,
where the adversary is Adv1.(i+1)∼1.T . This maps the state to (after projected onto the passing
space) Ppass |ϕT 〉.
Then Prtl=2 is executed, which is a single round non-collapsing basis test on K
(1), and the
initial state for this step is Ppass |ϕT 〉. Since
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | > (1− C12)| |ϕ〉 | > (1− C12)|Ppass |ϕT 〉 |
• Ppass |ϕT 〉 is (2η−10, 2−η+10|Ppass |ϕT 〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) (This comes from Lemma 6.12.)
, applying Lemma 7.2 on Prtl=2 we know
There exists a server-side operation U2 (which depends deterministically on Adv=2, the code of the
adversary on the second step of the protocol) with query number |U2| ≤ |Adv|+O(1) such that
U2(Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < AuxInf2 >) = |ψ(1)0 〉+ |ψ(1)1 〉+ |χ(1)′〉 (232)
where ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, PS1
x
(1)
b
|ψ(1)b 〉 = |ψ(1)b 〉 , PS1K(1) |χ
(1)′〉 = 0, | |χ(1)′〉 | ≤ 3C3| |ϕ〉 | ≤ 1
2
C2| |ϕ〉 | (233)
where S1 is some server-side system.
Note that in (231) and (232)(233) we express the results in different ways. This is for the convenience
of later application.
Now we complete the step 1 and 2 in the “structure of this proof” given before
this proof. What we know by this time is the properties of the states in different time
steps — which are mainly (231) and (232)(233); and next, we will construct the U
that we claim to exist in the conclusion of this lemma.
Now we will design a server-side operation U which maps the state
Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf1 > ⊙ < AuxInf2 >
into a state of the form of equation (73). The operation U is defined as follows:
1. Apply Adv†=2 on the system corresponding to the server side of |ϕ′〉 and < Prtl=2 > in the
read-only buffer. Recall that Adv=2 is the adversary’s operation in the second step of the
protocol (the adversary’s operation after < Prtl=2 > is received and before r is sent back.
Note that we assume the adversary does not do any operation after r is sent out.). This maps
the server-side of the state back to the system corresponding to the server side of |ϕT 〉.
2. Suppose the server side of |ϕT 〉, < AuxInf1 >, < AuxInf2 > are separately stored in system
SϕT , SAuxInf1 , SAuxInf2. Then starting from the state coming from step 1 above, apply U2
on systems SϕT and SAuxInf2, and some extra auxiliary qubits (which are initialized to all
zeros). Recall that U2 is described in equation (232).
3. Copy the content of the system S1 (defined in (233)) that stores x
(1)
0 and x
(1)
1 (shown in
equation (232)(233)) to a separate empty register S′1. Denote this step as COPY .
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4. Apply U†2 on the system that stores the output of the second step. The output of U†2 is in
SϕT , SAuxInf2 , and some auxiliary system mentioned in step 2. (Note that these auxiliary
system is not necessarily in all zero states now).
5. Then apply Adv†1.(i+1)∼1.T on system SϕT , where Adv1.(i+1)∼1.T is the operations in Adv from
round i + 1 to round T . Note that in the real execution of the protocol the client needs to
send messages to the read-only buffer, and the adversary needs to send messages back. Here
we omit these steps and only do the server-side operation in Adv†1.(i+1)∼1.T . The server-side
of the output state is stored in systems that corresponds to the server side of |ϕi〉, and some
other systems.
6. Then apply U1 on the server side of |ϕi〉 and SAuxInf1. (Note that U1 is described in equation
(230)(231).) This operation maps the state to systems S3 (defined in (230)) and some other
systems.
7. Now the systems S′1 and S3 contain the keys x
(1) and x(3) we need. S′1 comes from the 3rd
step, and S3 comes from the 6th step.
First, we analyze the first and second steps in U . For the second step we can make use of equation
(232). But note that U2 in equation (232) is applied on Ppass |ϕT 〉, while in the second step of
U , U2 is applied on Adv†=2Ppass |ϕ′〉, we need to first find the relation between Adv†=2Ppass |ϕ′〉 and
Ppass |ϕT 〉.
In the original protocol, from Ppass |ϕT 〉 to Ppass |ϕ′〉, the following operations are executed:
the client prepares and sends < Prtl=2 > to the server, which is < BasisTest(K
(1)) >; the server
applies Adv=2; the server sends back a copy of the register that stores r; and finally a projection
on the passing space (“r is correct”) is applied. Expressing these steps with notations, we have
Ppass |ϕ′〉 = PrSendS→CAdv=2(Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 >)
where we use SendS→C to mean the server sends back the response r to the client. Then:
Adv
†
=2Ppass |ϕ′〉 = Adv†=2SendS→CPrAdv=2(Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 >) (234)
=st−ind Adv†=2PrAdv=2(Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 >) (235)
(By (228)) ≈C6||ϕ〉| Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 > (236)
Recall that the =st−ind symbols are defined just before this proof. ≈ǫ is simply Notation 2.1.
(234)(235) is because on the server side, no matter it sends a classical message to the client or not,
in the server’s viewpoint, the system is exactly the same, even if it gets some auxiliary information
that depends on the keys later.
Here the =st−ind and ≈ǫ are all describing the relations between adjacent expressions. In
summary, (234)(235), (235)(236) implies
Adv
†
=2Ppass |ϕ′〉 ≈st−indC6||ϕ〉| Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 > (237)
The next step in U is to apply U2. By (232)(237) we have
U2Adv†=2(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf2 >) ≈st−indC6||ϕ〉| |ψ
(1)
0 〉+ |ψ(1)1 〉+ |χ(1)′〉 (238)
where the symbols on the right hand side come from equation (232). Thus
(I − PS1
K(1)
)U≤2th(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >) ≤ C6| |ϕ〉 |+ | |χ(1)′〉 | ≤ 2
3
C2| |ϕ〉 |. (239)
153
where U≤2th means the first two steps in U .
Thus the task of bounding the noise on the K(1) part has completed. (which corresponds to
(78).) Note that in the 3rd step of U we COPY the keys from S1 to S′1, and this system is never
used in the operations later. Thus the system that stores K(1) is already prepared. We emphasize
we should view S′1 here as “the S1 in the description of Lemma 7.4”.
The main thing we need to prove is to prove the remaining system (other than S′1) can be
transformed to a form that contains some keys in K(3). Our method is to first analyze the form
of the state if the COPY step is not executed, then prove the normal case (where COPY step is
executed) does not differ too much from it.
If the COPY step is skipped, the remaining operation in U will be U≥4th = U1 ◦Adv†1.(i+1)∼1.T ◦
U†2 , applied on the state U2Adv†=2(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >). By (237) we know
U≥4thU2Adv†=2Ppass |ϕ′〉 ≈st−indC6||ϕ〉| U1Adv
†
1.(i+1)∼1.TPpass |ϕT 〉⊙ < Prtl=2 > (240)
Thus to understand the left hand side of (240), we can analyze the right hand side.
By an argument similar to equation (234) to (236), we have
Adv
†
1.(i+1)∼1.TPpass |ϕT 〉 ≈st−indC6||ϕ〉|Adv
†
1.(i+1)∼1.(T−1)Ppass |ϕT−1〉⊙ < Prtl=1.T > (241)
≈st−ind
C6||ϕ〉|Adv
†
1.(i+1)∼1.(T−2)Ppass |ϕT−2〉⊙ < Prtl=1.(T−1) > ⊙ < Prtl=1.T >
(242)
≈st−ind
C6||ϕ〉| · · · (243)
≈st−ind
C6||ϕ〉|Ppass |ϕi〉⊙ < Prtl1.(i+1)∼1.T > (244)
Note that ≈st−ind
C6
describes the relation between adjacent terms. In summary we have
Adv
†
1.(i+1)∼1.TPpass |ϕT 〉 ≈st−ind(T−i)·C6||ϕ〉| Ppass |ϕi〉⊙ < Prtl1.(i+1)∼1.T > (245)
where we have (T − i) · C6 ≤ 2C2.
Then we have
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U≥4th(|Right of eq (232)〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >)| (246)
=|(I − PS3
K(3)
)(|Right of eq (240)〉⊙ < AuxInf1 > ⊙ < AuxInf2 >)| (247)
(By (245)) ≤|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U1(|Right of eq (245)〉⊙ < AuxInf1 > ⊙ < AuxInf2 >)|+ 2C2| |ϕ〉 |
(248)
(By (231)) ≤5.45C| |ϕ〉 |+ 2C2| |ϕ〉 | ≤ 6C| |ϕ〉 | (249)
Define
|ϕ˜〉 = PS1K |Right of (232)〉 = |ψ(1)0 〉+ |ψ(1)1 〉
. Consider the server-side operation that computes keys in K(3) by applying U≥4th on |ϕ˜〉.
(By now the “COPY ” step is still not considered yet.) Then because the distance of |ϕ˜〉 to
|Right of eq (232)〉 is ≤ | |χ(1)′〉 | ≤ 12C2| |ϕ〉 |, substitute this into (246), by (249) we have
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U≥4th(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >)| ≤ 6.5C| |ϕ〉 | (250)
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Now with the COPY step, by Lemma 6.16 (as the condition for applying this lemma, we can prove
|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf1 > is (2η/8, 2−η/8| |ϕ˜〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) since we can prove Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ <
AuxInf > is (2η/8 + 2κ+1, 2−η/7| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1)),
| |(I − PS3
K(3)
)U≥4th(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >)| − |(I − PS3K(3))U
≥4thCOPY ◦ (|ϕ˜〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >)| |
(251)
≤2−η/30| |ϕ〉 | (252)
Using (250), and adding back |χ(1)′〉 we get
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U≥4thCOPY ◦ (|Right of eq (232)〉⊙ < AuxInf1 >)| ≤ 7C| |ϕ〉 | (253)
Thus substituting (232) it becomes
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U≥2(Ppass |ϕT 〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ 7C| |ϕ〉 | (254)
Finally using equation (237) we get
|(I − PS3
K(3)
)U(Ppass |ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >)| ≤ (7C + C6)| |ϕ〉 | (255)
This (for S3), together with (239) (for S
′
1), completes the proof.
F Proof of Lemmas in Section 8.2
This section contains the proofs for the lemmas about the padded Hadamard test in Section 8.2.
Before we prove these lemma, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma F.1. In the padded Hadamard test on keys K = {x0, x1} (see Section 3.1.5), b ∈ {0, 1}, if
|ϕ˜〉 =
∑
pad∈{0,1}l
1√
2l
|pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
client
|pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
read-only buffer
⊗ |ϕ˜pad〉 ⊗ |pad〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
environment
does not depend on (in the sense of Definition 4.9) H(pad|| · · · ) where “· · · ” is the set of all strings
of the same length as the keys in K , an adversary Advblind only queries the blinded oracle H ′ where
H(pad||xb) is blinded, (note the x1−b part is not blinded,) then
|PpassPadHadamard≥2Advblind(K) ◦ |ϕ˜〉 | ≤
1√
2
| |ϕ˜〉 |
where the superscript “≥ 2” means the first step (sampling a random pad) is already and done thus
skipped. The κout parameter within the protocol is arbitrary.
Proof. Since |ϕ˜〉 does not depend on H(pad|| · · · ) and Advblind does not query H(pad||xb),
PadHadamard≥2
Advblind
(K) ◦ |ϕ˜〉 does not depend on H(pad||xb). Suppose the server’s response for
the test is d = (d1, d2) where d2 corresponds to the last κout bits, we can expand the left hand as
follows:
|PpassPadHadamard≥2
Advblind
(K) ◦ |ϕ˜〉 | (256)
=
√
EH(pad||xb) |Pd1·x0+d2·H(pad||x0)=d1·x1+d2·H(pad||x1),d2 6=0
∑
d1d2
|d1〉 ⊗ |d2〉 ⊗ |χd1d2〉 |2 (257)
≤
√
1
2
|Pd2 6=0
∑
d1d2
|d1〉 ⊗ |d2〉 ⊗ |χd1d2〉 |2 ≤
1√
2
| |ϕ˜〉 | (258)
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Now we give the proof for the lemmas in Section 8.2.
Proof of Lemma 8.2. First we can assume Tag(K) is already stored in the read-only buffer in the
beginning of the protocol. We still denote the initial state and the post-execution state as |ϕ〉, |ϕ′〉.
By the “auxiliary information technique” proving the statement in this setting implies the original
lemma. Note that this does not fall into the cases listed in Section 6.2, but this is still true: the
adversary can simply ignore this auxiliary information.
Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists a server-side operation U with query number
|U| ≤ 2η/6 such that
|Pspan{x0,x1}U |ϕ′〉 | > 2C| |ϕ〉 | (259)
where Pspan{x0,x1} is a projection onto some server-side system S on outputting either x0 or x1.
Consider the following adversary Adv′ for PadHadamard: after it receives the pad from the
client, it first runs Adv to get a register that stores d. Now instead of measuring d, it first copies
d to some separated register, runs U on the remaining registers (which are the server and buffer
parts of |ϕ′〉), and measures to try to get one of x0 or x1, then finally measures the d register and
sends it out.
On the one hand, since the measurement on d and the operations on the remaining systems
commute, we have
|PpassAdv′(|ϕ〉 ⊙ pad)| = |PpassU |ϕ′〉 | ≥ (1− C2)| |ϕ〉 |
On the other hand, we can give an upper bound for |PpassU |ϕ′〉 | by estimating
|PpassPspan{x0,x1}U |ϕ′〉 | = |PpassPx0U |ϕ′〉+ PpassPx1U |ϕ′〉 | ≤ |PpassPx0U |ϕ′〉 |+ |PpassPx1U |ϕ′〉 |
, where we use Px0 and Px1 to denote the projection onto x0 and x1 on S (defined below (259)).
Define
p0 = |PpassPx0U |ϕ′〉 | = |PpassPx0U(PadHadamardAdv ◦ |ϕ〉)|
p1 = |PpassPx1U |ϕ′〉 | = |PpassPx1U(PadHadamardAdv ◦ |ϕ〉)|
Without loss of generality, let’s give an upper bound for p0. Assume
|Px0U |ϕ′〉 | ≥ 2−η/4| |ϕ〉 | (260)
(Otherwise we already have a very good upper bound for p0. We will merge this case in the end.)
First note that the first step of PadHadamard is to sample a random pad of length l. Denote
the state after sampling the pad as |ϕ1〉. Denote |ϕ˜〉 as the state of replacing all the queries in the
representation of |ϕ〉 by H · (I − Ppad||···). By Lemma 4.2 we can get |ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η+1||ϕ〉| |ϕ1〉 and |ϕ˜〉
does not depend on H(pad|| · · · ).
Then consider the blinded version of the padded Hadamard test, where U and Adv only query
H ′, where H(pad||x1) is blinded:
|ψ〉 = Px0U blind(PadHadamard≥2Advblind ◦ |ϕ˜〉)
Here U blind and Advblind are the blinded version of U and Adv where all the queries toH are replaced
by queries to H ′. The ≥ 2 superscript means the padding step has already completed.
Since |ϕ˜〉 is (2η , 2−η+3| |ϕ˜〉 |)-SC-secure for K and the last step is a projection on x0, by Lemma
6.20,
|ψ〉 ≈2−η/3+2||ϕ˜〉| Px0U(PadHadamard≥2Adv ◦ |ϕ˜〉) (261)
⇒ |ψ〉 ≈2−η/3+3||ϕ〉| Px0U |ϕ′〉 (262)
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Then by Lemma F.1,
|Ppass |ψ〉 | ≤ 1√
2
| |ψ〉 |
. Thus
p0 ≤ 1√
2
|Px0U |ϕ′〉 |+ 2−η/3+4| |ϕ〉 | (263)
Combining it with the case where (260) does not hold, we get
p0 ≤ 1√
2
|Px0U |ϕ′〉 |+ 2−η/4| |ϕ〉 | (264)
And similarly the inequality holds if we replace p0 and Px0 by p1 and Px1 . Combining them we
know
|PpassPspan{x0,x1}U |ϕ′〉 | ≤
1√
2
|Pspan{x0,x1}U |ϕ′〉 |+ 2−η/4+5| |ϕ〉 | (265)
Together with equation (259) we know |PpassU |ϕ′〉 | < (1 − C2)| |ϕ〉 |, which gives a contradiction.
Similarly we can prove Lemma 8.3.
Proof of Lemma 8.3. Suppose the conclusion is not true. Consider the following adversary and
client: the adversary does not measure d, but sends out the d register in quantum state directly.
The client holds d, and sends < AuxInf >, then the server runs D; then the adversary makes a
projection on S; finally the client measures d. Since the two measurements (d, and S) commute
the norm of the passing part should be the same.
Suppose p > 5C, and without loss of generality, suppose p0 < p/6. Thus p1 < 7p/6.
Use Prtl to denote the process of the client providing < AuxInf > to the server and the server
running D. We can prove the following lemma using similar argument as proof of Lemma 8.2 above
(we omit the subscript Adv for simplicity):
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, |PpassPS(Prtl ◦ PadHadamard) |ϕb〉 | (266)
≤ 1√
2
|PS(Prtl ◦ PadHadamard) |ϕb〉 |+ 2−η/4+10| |ϕ〉 | (267)
Then we have
|PpassD(|ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >)|/| |ϕ〉 | (268)
≤
√
1− (p2 − |PpassPSD(|ϕ′〉⊙ < AuxInf >)|/| |ϕ〉 |2) (269)
<
√
1− p2 + ( 1√
2
· (1
6
p+
7
6
p) + 2−η/4+11)2 < 1− C2 (270)
which is a contradiction.
G Properties of the Robust Reversible Garbled Table
In this section we give some security properties of the robust reversible garbled table. Simply
speaking, we can think about the problems in the following form: suppose the initial state is secure
for some keys with some parameters, if the client computes and sends a RobustRGT to the server,
how secure is the final state for these keys? We give detailed study for this problem in this section,
and these lemmas will be useful for the proofs in Section 8 and Appendix H.
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Organization of this section In Section G.1 we will give some basic notations and facts, and
they will be useful in the proofs later in this section. In Section G.2 we study the security for K(1)
and K
(1)
out when a RobustRGT is provided. In Section G.3 we give some security statements when
x
(1)
1 is unpredictable. In Section G.4 we give some security statements when x
(1)
0 is unpredictable.
G.1 Some Basic Notations and Facts
G.1.1 Fake keys and TAG
First, let’s formally define the notation for the fake keys and the TAG. We have already seen these
notations in the informal proof of Lemma 8.4, and now we repeat and complete the definitions:
Notation G.1. Suppose K
(1)
out, K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out are the output keys, K
(w)
out = {y(w)0 , y(w)1 } (w ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
perm and perm′ are bit-wise permutations on strings of length 2κout where κout is the output key
length. perm is called the “real permutation” and perm′ is called the “fake permutation”. Define
the notations for fake keys as follows:
The “fake keys for c = 0”, K
fake−0−(w)
out = {yfake−0−(w)b }b∈{0,1}, w ∈ {2, 3} (271)
are defined to be the key pairs of the same length with K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out that satisfy:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, perm′(yfake−0−(2)b ||yfake−0−(3)b ) = perm(y(2)b ||y(3)b ). (272)
And
The “fake keys for c = 1”, K
fake−1−(w)
out = {yfake−1−(w)b }b∈{0,1}, w ∈ {2, 3} (273)
are defined to be the key pairs of the same length with K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out that satisfy:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, perm′(yfake−1−(2)b ||yfake−1−(3)1−b ) = perm(y(2)b ||y(3)1−b) (274)
Recall the intuition behind the definition of fake keys: normally, when the server tries to de-
permute perm(y
(2)
b ||y
(3)
c+b) using the real permutation, it gets the keys in K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out. But if it tries
to de-permute them using the fake permutation, it gets the fake keys K
fake−c−(2)
out , K
fake−c−(3)
out .
Note that the letter “c” here will also be used in the same way in the proofs in this section.
Some rules for superscripts and subscripts of fake keys It might be hard to remember
and understand the superscripts and subscripts of fake keys when we meet them in the proofs later,
here we make some detailed discussion for it.
• Note that (272) actually contains two equations and thus can define four keys. This four keys
form the two fake key pairs for c = 0, w ∈ {2, 3}. (See (271))
And similar thing is true for (272). (Here c = 1.)
• Notice that (272)(274) do not change the subscripts: the subscripts that come from de-
permuting perm(y
(2)
b ||y(3)b′ ) is still b, b′, correspondingly.
• The value of “c” is the xor of the subscripts in the definition equation. (Note that if we view
the definition equation as two equations for w = 2 and w = 3, we should first fix w then
compute the xor of the subscripts.)
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In the proofs below we will need a special “global tag” defined as follows, as the shuffling of three
global tags:
Notation G.2. Define TAG as the random shuffling (a random permutation in S3) of Tag(K
(2)
out),
Tag(K
fake−0−(2)
out ), Tag(K
fake−1−(2)
out ).
G.1.2 New notation: ≈Adv∈Aǫ , and its variants
Then let’s generalize the notation ≈ to contain a set of adversaries as the superscript.
Notation G.3. |ϕ〉 ≈Adv∈Aǫ |ϕ′〉 if for all Adv ∈ A, the “distinguishing norm”, which is defined as
| |P0Adv |ϕ1〉 | − |P0Adv |ϕ2〉 | | (275)
, is at most ǫ.
And we write |ϕ〉 ≈no queryǫ |ϕ′〉 if A is the set of adversaries that make 0 random oracle queries.
And we write |ϕ〉 ≈st-indǫ |ϕ′〉 if A is the set of unbounded adversaries that can make unbounded
number of random oracle queries. (Note that this notation appeared temporarily in the proof of
Lemma 7.4 but it has different meaning there.)
These notations will be useful in the proofs later in this section.
G.1.3 Basic combinatoric facts
The following facts can be proved by basic combinatoric and probability calculation, and will be
useful later.
Fact 4. The following statement is true when κout is bigger than some constant:
Suppose IndexSet1, IndexSet2 are two sets of size κout which are subsets of [2κout]. perm, perm
′
are sampled independently randomly on the bit-wise permutation on strings of length 2κout. De-
note IndexSet as the sets of elements that are originally in IndexSet1 but mapped to IndexSet2
by perm′−1 ◦ perm. Then with probability > 1 − 2−κout/10, the number of elements in IndexSet
satisfies |IndexSet| > 110κout.
Fact 5. Consider the following game: the client samples K = {x0, x1} and K ′ = {x′0, x′1} ran-
domly, which are both pairs of different keys of length κout. The client samples perm randomly
from the bit-wise permutations on strings of length 2κout (but does not reveal it). Then it pro-
vides perm(x0||x′0) and perm(x1||x′1) to the challenger, and the challenger tries to guess either
perm(x0||x′1) or perm(x1||x′0).
The probability that the challenger can win the game above is at most 2−κout/10.
Fact 6. In the same setting with Fact 5, the challenger tries to guess x0. Then the probability that
the challenger can win the game above is at most 2−κout/10.
Fact 7. Consider the following game: the client samples K = {x0, x1} and K ′ = {x′0, x′1} randomly,
which are both pairs of different keys of length κout, and gives it to the server. The client samples
perm randomly from the bit-wise permutations on strings of length 2κout (but does not reveal it).
The server tries to guess the first half of perm(xb1 ||xb2) where b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1} can be arbitrary.
The probability that the challenger can win the game above is at most 2−κout/10.
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G.2 SC-security of K(1), K
(1)
out when a RobustRGT is provided
The following lemma says giving a robust reversible garbled table to the adversary (and even many
other related information) does not affect the SC-security for K(1) too much. What’s more, K
(1)
out
has similar security.
Lemma G.1. The following statement is true when the security parameter η is bigger than some
constant:
Suppose the input key sets are {K(1),K(3)} where each K(w) is a pair of different keys. The
initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed in Section 3.1)
satisfies the following conditions:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3).
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η
As in the protocol, the client samples Kout = {K(1)out,K(2)out,K(3)out} where each K(w)out is a pair of
different keys with key length κout, samples K
(2) which is a pair of different keys that has the same
length as K(3), and samples perm from the bit-wise permutation on strings of length 2κout, then
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (276)
⊙ perm⊙K(3) ⊙K(2)out ⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(1))⊙ Tag(K(1)out) (277)
is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) and is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1)out.
Proof. Since K(2), K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out, perm are all sampled freshly randomly we know |ϕ〉⊙K(2)⊙K(2)out⊙
K
(3)
out ⊙ perm is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3).
When (K(2), K(3), K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out, perm) are given to the server as auxiliary information, the
RobustRGT can be seen as giving some reversible garbled tables (with extra paddings) on K(1).
(Recall the definition of RobustRGT in Section 8.1.) Thus apply Lemma 6.11 completes the proof.
(Or more formally, if this lemma is not true, we can make use of the adversary to break the result
in Lemma 6.11. We just need to compute the corresponding pt1, p
t
2, p
t
3 in Lemma 6.11 based on
K(2), K(3), K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out and perm.)
Similarly when the auxiliary information is perm′ and fake keys, similar statement also holds:
Lemma G.2. Under the same conditions of Lemma G.1, and the client samples Kout, K
(2), perm
similarly, and samples another permutation perm′ independently randomly from the bit-wise per-
mutation on strings of length 2κout, then ∀c ∈ {0, 1},
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (278)
⊙ perm′ ⊙K(3) ⊙Kfake−c−(2)out ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(1))⊙ Tag(K(1)out) (279)
is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) and is (2η/6, 2−η/6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1)out.
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The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma G.1: first we know |ϕ〉⊙K(2)⊙K(2)out⊙K(3)out⊙perm⊙
perm′ is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(1) given K(3), then we notice that Kfake−c−(2)out ,Kfake−c−(3)out
can be computed from these auxiliary information. Then the remaining proof is similar.
Lemma G.1 and G.2 discuss the SC-security of K(1) and K
(1)
out. These are relatively easier to
understand. The following subsections care about the security for keys in the other two wires of
the output keys.
G.3 Security effect of RobustRGT when the adversary only knows x
(1)
0 , and x
(1)
1
is unpredictable
The following lemmas consider the case where x
(1)
1 is unpredictable.
G.3.1 The usual case (not the “fake keys” case)
What if the adversary can only know x
(1)
0 and one key in K
(3) (while x
(1)
1 and the other key in K
(3)
are both unpredictable)? As discussed in Section 8.4.3, in this case intuitively it cannot get both
keys in K
(3)
out, even if K
(2)
out is given. Formalizing this intuition gives us the following lemma.
Lemma G.3. The following statement is true when the security parameter η is bigger than some
constant:
Suppose the input key sets are {K(1),K(3)}, K(w) = {x(w)0 , x(w)1 }(w ∈ {1, 3}) which are both
a pair of different keys, the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as
discussed in Section 3.1), a bit c ∈ {0, 1} satisfy:
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)1 given x(1)0 and K(3).
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c given x(3)c and K(1). 13 ≥ C ≥ 2−
√
η.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η
The client samples Kout = {K(1)out,K(2)out,K(3)out} where each K(w)out is a pair of different keys with
key length κout, samples K
(2) which is a pair of different keys with the same key length as K(3),
and samples perm from the bit-wise permutations on strings of length 2κout, then the following
conclusion holds:
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) ⊙ perm (280)
is (2η/36, 3C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for y(3)1−c given K(2)out and y(3)c .
Proof of Lemma G.3. For this proof, we can apply Lemma 6.22 and 6.23.
First by the auxiliary-information technique we can assume x
(1)
0 , x
(3)
c are already stored in the
read-only buffer. Then (by the same reason as the proof of Lemma G.1) we know |ϕ〉⊙x(1)0 ⊙x(3)c ⊙
K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K(2)out ⊙ y(3)c is (2η, C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c. And the remaining term in (280)
is the RobustRGT .
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Define RobustRGT hyb as the “hybrid” garbled table where we replace all the rows encrypted
under x
(1)
1 and y
(1)
1 by random strings of the same length. By Lemma 6.22 there is
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT ⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K(2)out ⊙ y(3)c (281)
≈|Adv|≤2η/6
2−η/6||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT hyb ⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K
(2)
out ⊙ y(3)c (282)
Further replace the rows in RobustRGT hyb that encrypt or are encrypted under x
(3)
1−c by random
strings of the same length, and denote the result as RobustRGT hyb2. By Lemma 6.23 we have
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT hyb ⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K(2)out ⊙ y(3)c (283)
≈|Adv|≤2η/62.95C||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT hyb2 ⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K
(2)
out ⊙ y(3)c (284)
Finally note that in RobustRGT hyb2 there is no information about y
(3)
1−c. This completes the proof.
G.3.2 The “fake keys” case
And we also have the following lemma, which talks about the unpredictability of the “fake keys”.
Lemma G.4. Under the same conditions of Lemma G.3, the client samples the same things and
additionally samples perm′ randomly from the bit-wise permutations on strings of length 2κout, then
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (285)
⊙ perm′ ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (286)
satisfies: ∀c′ ∈ {0, 1}, it’s (2η/36, 3C| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Kfake−c′−(2)out given Kfake−0−(3)out and
K
fake−1−(3)
out .
Recall that K
fake−c−(2)
out , K
fake−c−(3)
out are defined in Notation G.1. And we expand the content
of TAG (which means, in the original TAG there is a random shuffling, but here we simply provide
these global tags without random shuffling.) This makes the argument stronger and cleaner-to-
prove.
And we note that this lemma is talking about the security of output keys at wire 2 instead of
wire 3. Thus it’s actually talking about different thing from Lemma G.3. Intuitively, it
says: if the adversary does not know x
(1)
1 , and only knows one of the keys in K
(3), even if it knows
both K
fake−0−(3)
out and K
fake−1−(3)
out , it still cannot compute both keys in K
fake−c′−(2)
out , where c
′ can
be any bit in {0, 1}.
Proof of Lemma G.4
Note that to prove Lemma G.4, it’s enough to prove one key in K
fake−c′−(2)
out is unpredictable. The
“unpredictable key” has subscript 1 + c+ c′ (modular 2). Thus the proof of Lemma G.4 is reduce
to prove:
Lemma G.5 (Lemma G.4, variant). Under the same conditions of Lemma G.3, the client samples
the same things and additionally samples perm′ randomly from the bit-wise permutations on strings
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of length 2κout, then
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (287)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙Kfake−1−(3)out (288)
⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (289)
satisfies: ∀c′ ∈ {0, 1}, it’s (2η/36, 3C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for yfake−c′−(2)1+c′+c .
The proof of G.5 is relatively long. To prove it, we make use of a hybrid method (Lemma 6.15).
To make the proof more readable, we will divide the proofs into several parts, and each part starts
with a bold font title. The proof contains Part I and Part II. Part II is mainly a hybrid method,
and it’s further divided to II.1 and II.2. II.2 further contains II.2.2.
Proof of Lemma G.5. Part I: preparation before the hybrid method
Assume x
(1)
0 , x
(3)
c , Tag(x
(1)
1 ), Tag(x
(3)
1−c) are given in the read-only buffer. This is reasonable
since by Technique 6.2 this only makes the statement stronger.
By the state decomposition lemma (Lemma 6.7, together with Fact 1) on key x
(3)
1−c, we can
decompose |ϕ〉 as |φ〉+ |χ〉 such that
• |φ〉 is (2η/6−1, 2−η/6+1| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c, and is (1, 2η−6)-server-side-representable
from |ϕ〉.
• | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.5C| |ϕ〉 |.
Thus we can derive that |φ〉 satisfies:
• 16 | |ϕ〉 | ≤ | |φ〉 | ≤ | |ϕ〉 |
• |φ〉 is (2η/2, 2η/2| |φ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)1 given K(3)
• |φ〉 is (2η/6−1, 2−η/6+4| |φ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c
• |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η−6)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Then Lemma G.5 is reduced to prove
|φ′〉 := |φ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (290)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙Kfake−1−(3)out (291)
⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (292)
is (2η/36, 2−η/36| |φ〉 |)-unpredictable for yfake−c′−(2)1−c+c′ . (293)
Suppose the adversarial server-side operation applied on |φ′〉 is D. Query number |D| ≤ 2η/36.
Then what we need to prove is
|P
y
fake−c′−(2)
1−c+c′
D |φ′〉 | ≤ 2−η/36| |φ〉 | (294)
where the projection is on some server-side system. Once we prove (294), we can add back |χ〉 and
complete the proof by triangle inequality.
Part II: the hybrid method (Lemma 6.15)
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Suppose the set of random pads used in the computation of RobustRGT is Set. Consider a
blinded random oracle H ′ where
H on inputs in Set||x(1)1 || · · · , Set||x(1)0 || · · · ||x(3)1−c, (295)
H on inputs in Set||y(1)1 || · · · , Set||y(1)0 ||perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)1−c), Set||y(1)0 ||perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1−c) (296)
Tag(y
fake−(1−c)−(2)
0 ), Tag(y
fake−c−(2)
1 ) (297)
are all blinded. The “· · · ” means the followings separately: in (295) the first one is all the possible
strings of length equal to the key length in K(2) plus the key length in K(3); the second one is all
the possible strings of length equal to the key length in K(2); in (296) it’s all the possible strings
of length 2κout.
Denote the blinded inputs as BI.
We will replace the oracle queries appeared in (294) by H ′ one-by-one. And finally prove (294).
Part II.1: replace the queries implicitly hidden in |φ〉
Recall that |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η−6)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Expand |φ〉 using the definition of representability (Definition 4.10), and replace the oracle queries
within it by queries to H ′. Denote the new state as |φ˜〉. By Lemma 4.3 we have
|φ˜〉 ≈2−η ||φ〉| |φ〉 (298)
Similarly define |φ˜′〉 as the output state when we use |φ˜〉 as the initial state in (290)-(292). Thus
to prove (294), we only need to prove
|P
y
fake−c′−(2)
1−c+c′
D |φ˜′〉 | ≤ 2−η/33| |φ˜〉 | (299)
Part II.2
Suppose the operation coming from replacing the oracle queries in D by H ′ as Dblind. To prove
(299), we are going to prove
D |φ˜′〉 ≈2−η/30||φ˜〉| Dblind |φ˜′〉 (300)
To prove (300), we can apply Lemma 6.15. We only need to prove the norm of “computing the
blinded inputs shown in (295)-(297) using a blinded oracle” is small. In other words, we want to
prove
For any server-side operation Dblind−by−time−t which only queries H ′ and the number of queries is
≤ 2η/36,
|PBIDblind−by−time−t |φ˜′〉 | ≤ 2−η/15| |φ˜〉 | (301)
Denote |φ˜′hyb〉 as the state defined as follows: based on |φ˜〉, the client provides the following messages
to the read-only buffer: the structure of the messages is the same as (290)(291)(292), but the client
replaces the terms that are encrypted under (295)(296)(297) by random strings of the same length.
In other words, it’s (where $ means random strings with the same length as the corresponding
terms in (292))
|φ˜′hyb〉 := |φ˜〉 ⊙RobustRGT hyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (302)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙Kfake−1−(3)out (303)
⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙
{
Tag(y
fake−0−(2)
0 )⊙ $⊙ $⊙ Tag(yfake−1−(2)1 ) (c = 0)
$⊙ Tag(yfake−0−(2)1 )⊙ Tag(yfake−1−(2)0 )⊙ $ (c = 1)
(304)
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where in RobustRGT hyb, the remaining rows that are not replaced by random strings are the rows
that encode the following map:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, x(1)0 x(2)b x(3)c ↔ y(1)0 perm(y(2)b ||y(3)c ) = y(1)0 perm′(yfake−(b+c)−(2)b ||yfake−(b+c)−(3)c ) (305)
so there are two rows in the forward table and two rows in the backward table. (In (305) b varies
but c is fixed.) (The equality is from the definition of Notation G.1.)
And we can observe that, since
1. All the oracle queries in |φ˜〉 have been replaced by queries to the blinded oracle;
2. In the definition of |φ˜′hyb〉 the auxiliary information does not contain anything about the the
random oracle outputs in (295)-(297), except a very small probability that the keys in K
(2)
out,
K
fake−0−(2)
out , K
fake−1−(2)
out have repetitions: this will occupy at most 2
−η | |ϕ〉 | norm.
3. All the oracle queries in Dblind−by−time−t have also been blinded.
Thus all the entries encrypted under (295)-(297) look (almost) the same as random strings (if the
adversary later does not query H, and only queries H ′.) Thus to prove (301), we only need to
prove
For any Dblind−by−time−t which only queries H ′, |PBIDblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 |
(306)
Now we will discuss by different elements in BI.
Part II.2.2: BI is hard to compute from |φ˜′hyb〉 and the blinded oracle
The proof of (306) is mostly by existing conditions or some combinatorial arguments. Before
we discuss by cases, let’s first understand the structure of the auxiliary information in |φ˜′hyb〉.
From (302)-(305) we can see what the adversary in (306) gets is only (or more formally,
(302)(303)(304) can be computed on the server side from the followings)
(Server side of) |φ˜〉 , x(1)0 , x(3)c , (307)
K(2), y
(1)
0 , perm
′,K(2)out (308)
K
fake−0−(3)
out ,K
fake−1−(3)
out (309)
y
fake−c−(2)
0 , y
fake−(1−c)−(2)
1 (310)
Note that ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, perm(y(2)b ||y
(3)
c ) = perm′(y
fake−(b+c)−(2)
b ||y
fake−(b+c)−(3)
c ), which can be com-
puted from (309)(310).
Discuss by different classes of inputs in BI.
• The unpredictability of x(1)1 in (306) comes from the condition: since (1)we know |φ˜〉 is
(2η/2−2, 2−η/2+2| |φ˜〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)1 ; (2)(308)(309)(310) are all freshly sampled ran-
domly according to some distribution, we know
|P
x
(1)
1
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/5| |φ˜〉 | (311)
(some details: we do not mean (308)(309)(310) are sampled uniformly randomly. There is
some restriction on their distribution, for example, K
fake−0−(3)
out and K
fake−1−(3)
out are highly
correlated. But here since we only care about the unpredictability of x
(1)
1 we can simplify
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(308)(309)(310) by “strengthening” the power of the adversary: we can assume the ad-
versary gets K(2), y
(1)
0 , K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out, perm, perm
′, from which it can recover everything in
(308)(309)(310), thus the adversary does not become weaker. However, they can also be
sampled on the server side thus the server does not get more ability to predict x
(1)
1 than what
it can do from (307).)
• Similarly
|P
x
(3)
1−c
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/10| |φ˜〉 | (312)
• There is nothing about y(1)1 in (307)-(310). Thus predicting y(1)1 is as hard as predicting a
random string 6= y(1)0 :
|P
y
(1)
1
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/5| |φ˜〉 | (313)
• And we can use a combinatorial argument to prove, ∀c′ ∈ {0, 1},
|P
y
fake−c′−(2)
1−c+c′
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/11| |φ˜〉 | (314)
or, in other words,
|P
y
fake−c−(2)
1
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/11| |φ˜〉 | (315)
|P
y
fake−(1−c)−(2)
0
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/11| |φ˜〉 | (316)
Let’s first write some intuition here since the subscripts and superscripts of the output keys
are already complicated.
Intuitions for understanding the subscripts and superscripts of the output
keys in (315)(316) and (310)
First note that the keys we consider in (315)(316) and (310) form a division ofK
fake−0−(2)
out
and K
fake−1−(2)
out . To understand them clearly, first recall how the “fake keys” are com-
puted: first K
(2)
out, K
(3)
out, perm, perm
′ are sampled, then the fake keys can be computed
from them. As what we did in the “unpredictability of x
(1)
1 ” part, we give the adversary
some extra information and prove that the adversary still cannot achieve the tasks in
(315)(316). This can simplify our thinking process.
The “extra information” the client will reveal to the server is perm. And perm′ is already
in the auxiliary information. (This is slightly different from the “unpredictability of x
(1)
1 ”
part, where we also reveal all the output keys; we could not reveal so much here.) We
will analyze what the server can learn from (309)(310) and perm, perm′ by taking the
bit-wise viewpoint on K
(w)
out , w ∈ {2, 3}.
perm′−1◦perm : [2κout]→ [2κout] form a mapping from the bits of output keys to the bits
of fake keys. Naturally, use “(2)” to denote [κout] and use “(3)” to denote [κout+1, 2κout].
Define Bit(w)→(w′) as the set of bit indexes that is an element of “(w)”, but is mapped
to “(w′)” by perm′−1 ◦ perm. (Thus
Bit(w)→(2) ∪Bit(w)→(3) =
{
[κout] (w = 2)
[κout + 1, 2κout] (w = 3)
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.) Then the following is true:
If the adversary knows (1)perm′−1 ◦ perm, (2)the description of K(2)out, (3) the values of
K
(3)
out on bit indexes Bit(3)→(2), (4) the values of y
(3)
c ∈ K(3)out on bit indexes Bit(3)→(3), it
can recover everything in (310) deterministically.
And we can see, the server does not know the bit values of y
(3)
1−c ∈ K(3)out on bit indexes
Bit(3)→(3)! In other words, even if the adversary knows (308)(309)(310), it still does
not know the bit values of y
(3)
1−c ∈ K(3)out on bit indexes Bit(3)→(3), which will imply the
unpredictability of y
fake−c−(2)
1 and y
fake−(1−c)−(2)
0 . (Some more details: notice that
– The bit values of y
fake−c−(2)
1 correspond to the bit values of y
(2)
1 ∈ K(2)out on bit
indexes Bit(2)→(3) and the bit values of y
(3)
1−c ∈ K(3)out on bit indexes Bit(3)→(3);
– The bit values of y
fake−(1−c)−(2)
0 correspond to the bit values of y
(2)
0 ∈ K(2)out on bit
indexes Bit(2)→(3) and the bit values of y
(3)
1−c ∈ K(3)out on bit indexes Bit(3)→(3);
where for the K
(3)
out part both use the bits of y
(3)
1−c.)
Now we complete the intuition part and can return to the formal proof. Note that perm, perm′
are sampled independently randomly, define a set Bit(3)→(2) to be the set of index in [κout +
1, 2κout] that perm
′−1 ◦ perm maps it to [κout], by Fact 4 with probability > (1 − 2−η/10),
|Bit(3)→(2)| > 110κout. Thus computing y
fake−c′−(2)
1−c+c′ is at least as hard as predicting a random
choice on bits with indexes in Bit(3)→(2). (With the exception of one string.) Thus
|P
y
fake−c−(3)
1
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/11| |φ˜〉 | (317)
|P
y
fake−(1−c)−(3)
0
Dblind−by−time−t |φ˜′hyb〉 | ≤ 2−η/11| |φ˜〉 | (318)
Thus (306) is true.
Thus we complete the proof of (301). Thus we complete the proof of (300). Apply (301) again
on t = |D|, together with (300), we complete the proof of (299).
Thus we complete the whole proof.
G.4 When the Adversary Knows x
(1)
1 , and x
(1)
0 is Unpredictable
The following lemma studies the case where the state is unpredictable for x
(1)
0 but the adversary
can know x
(1)
1 . This makes this lemma different from the previous lemma and this lemma will be
crucial for the proof of Lemma 8.4 for the w = 2 case.
G.4.1 Statement
Lemma G.6. The following lemma is true when η below is bigger than some constant:
Suppose the input key sets are {K(1),K(3)}, K(w) = {x(w)0 , x(w)1 }(w ∈ {1, 3}) are pairs of differ-
ent keys, the input state |ϕ〉 (where the randomness are purified by the environment, as discussed
in Section 3.1), some bit c ∈ {0, 1} satisfy:
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• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)0 given x(1)1 and K(3).
• |ϕ〉 is (2η , C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c given x(3)c and K(1). 13 > C > 2−
√
η.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤
2η.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + 2η), κout > l + η
The client samples
• Kout = {K(1)out,K(2)out,K(3)out} where each one is a pair of different keys with key length κout;
• K(2), which is a pair of different keys with key length the same as K(3);
• perm is sampled on the bit-wise permutations of strings of length 2κout;
• perm′ is sampled as the “fake permutation” independently randomly on the bit-wise permuta-
tions of strings of length 2κout
then (meanings of notations are given below)
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (319)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (320)
≈Adv∈A3C||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGTHyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (321)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ $⊙ $ (322)
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (323)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (324)
≈Adv∈A3C||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGTHyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (325)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙
{
$⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ $ (c = 0)
$⊙ $⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (c = 1)
(326)
where
• Kfake−c−(w)out are defined as in Notation G.1.
• $ denotes random strings with the same length as the corresponding terms. (Compare (326)
with (324), and (322) with (320).)
• RobustRGTHyb is defined as follows. Compared to RobustRGT , replace all the rows other
than the x
(1)
1 ||x(2)b ||x
(3)
c ↔ y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)b ||y
(3)
b+c), b ∈ {0, 1} rows with random strings of the
same length. Thus only two rows in the forward table and two rows in the backward table
remain the same. (c is fixed, and “two” comes from different b ∈ {0, 1}.)
And the notation ≈Adv∈Aǫ is defined in Notation G.3, where A represents the set of adversaries
whose attack can be divided into two phases, as follows:
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1. In the first phase, it only operates on the server and read-only buffer part of |ϕ〉, garbled
tables (either RobustRGT or RobustRGTHyb), and K(2). (In other words, it only operates
on (319)(321)(323)(325).) And it makes at most 2η/40 queries to H in this phase.
2. In the second phase, it operates on all the systems stored in the server and buffer system,
including the last five terms shown in the expressions above (we mean (320)(322)(324)(326)).
However, it only queries H ′ which is a new blinded oracle of H where · · · ||K(1)out|| · · · part
are blinded. The prefix padding has length l and the suffix padding has length 2κout. The
adversary makes at most 2η/40 queries to H ′ in this phase.
G.4.2 Proof of (319)(320)(321)(322)
Let’s first prove (319)(320)(321)(322) and the other one is similar.
Proof of (319)(320)(321)(322). Similar to the proof of Lemma G.4, we make the proof more read-
able by dividing it into several phases.
Part I: preparation before the hybrid method
First by Technique 6.2 we can assume x
(1)
1 , x
(3)
c , Tag(x
(1)
0 ), Tag(x
(3)
1−c) are given to the adversary
(stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer), and this is reasonable since it will only make
the adversary more powerful, thus prove the statement under this assumption implies the original
statement.
Decompose |ϕ〉 as |φ〉 + |χ〉 by applying Lemma 6.8 (together with Fact 1) for x(3)1−c. Then
similar to the arguments in the proof of Lemma G.4, | |χ〉 | ≤ 2.5C| |ϕ〉 | and |φ〉 satisfies:
• 16 | |ϕ〉 | ≤ | |φ〉 | ≤ | |ϕ〉 |
• |φ〉 is (1, 2η/2)-server-side-representable from |ϕ〉.
• |φ〉 is (2η/2, 2−η/2+3| |φ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)0 given K(3).
• |φ〉 is (2η/12−1, 2−η/12+3| |φ〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c.
• |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η−6)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Then proving (320)(322) is reduced to prove
|φ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (327)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (328)
≈Adv∈A
2−η/40||φ〉| |φ〉 ⊙RobustRGTHyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (329)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ $⊙ $ (330)
Once we can prove this, using the fact that |φ〉 ≈2.5C||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 completes the proof.
Part II: hybrid method
Define Set as the set of random pads used in the computation of RobustRGT .
Consider a blinded oracle H˜ (we use this notation to distinguish it from H ′ defined in the
statement) of H where
Set||x(1)0 || · · · , Set||x(1)1 || · · · ||x(3)1−c, (331)
Set||y(1)0 || · · · , Set||y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)1−c), Set||y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)c ), (332)
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Tag(K
fake−0−(2)
out ), Tag(K
fake−1−(2)
out ) (333)
are all blinded. The “· · · ” means the followings separately: in (331) the first one is all the possible
strings of length equal to the key length in K(2) plus the key length in K(3); the second one is all
the possible strings of length equal to the key length in K(2); in (332) it’s all the possible strings
of length 2κout.
Define BI as the set of inputs in (331)(332)(333).
We will replace the oracle queries in (327)(328)(329)(330) by H˜ one by one.
1. Recall that |φ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2η−6)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Expand |φ〉 using the definition of the representability (Definition 4.10) and replace the oracle
queries to H by queries to H˜, and denote the resulting state as |φ˜〉. By Lemma 4.3
|φ˜〉 ≈2−η ||φ〉| |φ〉
Thus proving (327)(328)(329)(330) is further reduced to prove
|φ˜〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (334)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (335)
≈Adv∈A
2−η/39||φ˜〉| |φ˜〉 ⊙RobustRGT
Hyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (336)
⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ $⊙ $ (337)
2. For Adv ∈ A, recall that Adv can be divided into Adv1 and Adv2. In this step we will only
consider the Adv1 part.
Define ˜Adv1 as the adversary that replaces all the queries to H by queries to H˜. Our goal is
to make use of Lemma 6.15 to prove
Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 ≈2−η/37||φ˜〉| ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 (338)
Recall that BI as the set of inputs in (331)(332)(333). Thus by Lemma 6.15 we only need to
prove
|PBI ˜Advt1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/18| |φ˜〉 | (339)
where ˜Adv
t
1 is defined to be the operation in
˜Adv1 before the time of making the t-th queries.
Since (1) |φ˜〉 does not depend on the RO outputs of H on (331)(332)(333); (2) all the queries
by time t to (331)(332)(333) of H have already been blinded, we know
|PBI ˜Advt1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 | ≈2−η/5||φ˜〉| |PBI ˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | (340)
and we need to prove
the right side of (340) is ≤ 2−η/15| |φ˜〉 | (341)
To understand ˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 more clearly, recall that the adversary in this
phase only operates on the information in (336), and what the adversary gets from it can be
computed from the followings and random coins:
(Server side of) |φ˜〉 , x(1)1 , x(3)c , (342)
K(2), y
(1)
1 (343)
perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)c ), perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1+c) (344)
Then the entries in BI are unpredictable if the adversary only queries H˜, for the following
reasons:
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• We know |φ˜〉 is (2η/2, 2−η/2+6| |φ˜〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)0 and (2η/12−1, 2−η/12+6| |φ˜〉 |)-
unpredictable for x
(3)
1−c. And the output keys, permutation and K
(2) in (343)(344) are
all sampled randomly (thus can be simulated on the server side), we know
|P
x
(1)
0
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/2+10| |φ˜〉 | (345)
|P
x
(3)
1−c
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/12+10| |φ˜〉 | (346)
• There is nothing about y(1)0 in (336). Thus predicting y(1)0 is as hard as predicting a
random string (that is not equal to y
(1)
1 ):
|P
y
(1)
0
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/5| |φ˜〉 | (347)
• We can also prove
|P
perm(y
(2)
0 ||y
(3)
1+c)
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (348)
This is from a combinatoric argument. Applying Fact 5 completes the proof. (Intu-
itively, we can understand it as follows: Because (344) looks (almost) the same as two
independently sampled strings. Thus for the adversary, computing perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)1−c) is
as difficult as the following task: the client samples a random subset of size κout from
[2κout], and swap the corresponding bits in (344); the adversary predicting the results.
Intuitively the success probability is very small.)
By similar reason
|P
perm(y
(2)
1 ||y
(3)
c )
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (349)
• For the unpredictability of the “fake keys”, by Fact 7 we know
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, c′ ∈ {0, 1}, |P
y
fake−c′−(2)
b
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (350)
Thus we complete the proof of (341). Thus (339) is true. Thus (338) is true.
3. For the Adv2 part:
Note that in the queries in the Adv2 part, the oracle queries are done on H
′, where the queries
to · · · ||K(1)out|| · · · have already been blinded. What we are going to do in this step is to replace
the queries to H ′ by H˜ ′, defined as follows:
For each query on some input:
(a) If the input falls into the blinded inputs of H ′, return the values in H ′.
(b) If not, and if the input falls into the blinded inputs of H˜, return the output values in H˜.
(c) Otherwise, return the output from H.
Note that H˜ ′ can be understood as the result of blinding · · · ||K(1)out|| · · · part on H˜.
Denote the blinded version (where all the queries have been replaced by queries to H˜ ′) of the
adversary in this phase as ˜Adv2, our goal is to prove:
Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 ≈2−η/37||φ˜〉| ˜Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 (351)
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Denote ˜Adv
t
2 as the operation in
˜Adv2 by the time just before making the t-th query. Denote
the blinded entries in (331)(333) as BIsub. Then this is reduced to prove:
|PBIsub ˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/18| |φ˜〉 | (352)
(Note that this is how the “blinded part” helps: the entries corresponding to (332) have al-
ready been blinded and the only difference of H ′ and H˜ ′ is on the entries shown in (331)(333).)
Since (1) |φ˜〉 does not depend on the RO outputs of H on (331)(332)(333); (2) all the queries
by time t to (331)(332)(333) of H have already been blinded, we know
|PBIsub ˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 | ≈2−η/5||φ˜〉| |PBIsub ˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 |
(353)
and what we are going to prove is
The right side of (353) is ≤ 2−η/15| |φ˜〉 |. (354)
Notice that, the adversary knows in | equation (336)(337) 〉 is (or more formally, what the
adversary gets can be computed from the followings and random coins):
(Server side of) |φ˜〉 , x(1)1 , x(3)c (355)
K(2), y
(1)
1 , perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)c ), perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1+c) (356)
perm,K
(3)
out (357)
Tag(K
(2)
out) (358)
which are simplified to
(Server side of) |φ˜〉 , x(1)1 , x(3)c (359)
K(2), y
(1)
1 ,K
(2)
out,K
(3)
out (360)
perm (361)
Then the entries in BIsub are unpredictable if the adversary only queries H
′, for the following
reasons:
• Similar to the reason before, |φ˜〉 is (2η/2, 2−η/2+6| |φ˜〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)0 and
(2η/12−1, 2−η/12+6| |φ˜〉 |)-unpredictable for x(3)1−c from the conditions. Additionally assume
K
(1)
out is given as auxiliary information. On the one hand, the blinded oracle can be
simulated using H and these auxiliary information. On the other hand, K
(1)
out, together
with (360)(361), are sampled randomly. Thus
|P
x
(1)
0
˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/2+10| |φ˜〉 | (362)
|P
x
(3)
1−c
˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/12+10| |φ˜〉 | (363)
• Since the adversary’s state does not contain any information about perm′, nor any fake
keys, predicting the keys in K
fake−c−(2)
out is as hard as winning the game in Fact 7. Thus:
∀b, c′ ∈ {0, 1}2, |P
y
fake−c′−(2)
b
˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (364)
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Thus we complete the proof of (354). Thus we prove (352). Thus we prove (351).
4. In summary we have
Adv2Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 (365)
≈2−η/37||φ˜〉|Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 (366)
≈2−η/37||φ˜〉| ˜Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 (367)
By (341)(354) we also get
Adv2Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 (368)
≈2−η/37||φ˜〉|Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 (369)
≈2−η/37||φ˜〉| ˜Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 (370)
And we have
˜Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (334)(335) 〉 ≈st−ind0 ˜Adv2 ˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337)〉 (371)
thus we complete the hybrid method and complete the proof of (334)(335)(336)(337).
Thus we prove (327)(328)(329)(330). Thus adding back |χ〉 we get (320)(322).
G.4.3 Proof of (323)(324)(325)(326)
The proof of (323)(324)(325)(326) is similar to the proof of (319)(320)(321)(322). We will skip the
steps that are the same and describe their differences.
Proof of (323)(324)(325)(326). The Part I is the same as the proof of (319)(320)(321)(322). In
this step we decompose the state by applying the decomposition lemma for x
(3)
1−c and reduce the
original statement to prove:
|φ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (372)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out )
(373)
≈Adv∈A
2−η/40||φ〉| |φ〉 ⊙RobustRGTHyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (374)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙
{
$⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ $ (c = 0)
$⊙ $⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (c = 1)
(375)
Then in Part II the blinded oracle H˜ is defined to be the oracle where the followings are blinded:
Set||x(1)0 || · · · , Set||x(1)1 || · · · ||x(3)1−c, (376)
Set||y(1)0 || · · · , Set||y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)0 ||y(3)1−c), Set||y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)c ), (377)
Tag(K
(2)
out), Tag(K
fake−(1−c)−(2)
out ) (378)
Notice that the only difference is on the third row above.
Now the hybrid method starts.
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1. The first step is the same, and the problem is reduced to
|φ˜〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (379)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out)⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out )
(380)
≈Adv∈A
2−η/40||φ˜〉| |φ˜〉 ⊙RobustRGT
Hyb(K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) (381)
⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙
{
$⊙ Tag(Kfake−0−(2)out )⊙ $ (c = 0)
$⊙ $⊙ Tag(Kfake−1−(2)out ) (c = 1)
(382)
2. We replace the oracle queries in Adv1 by queries to H˜.
Similarly we can verify x
(1)
0 , x
(3)
1−c are unpredictable with the same parameters. And the
same holds for y
(1)
0 , perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)1−c), perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)c ) and yfake−(1−c)−(2)b . And we need to
additionally prove
|P
y
(2)
b
˜Adv
t
1 | equation (381)(382) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (383)
which is true by Fact 6.
3. Then we replace the oracle queries in Adv2 by queries to H˜
′, which is defined as shown in
the “proof of (319)(320)(321)(322)”. We notice the auxiliary information in (381)(382) can
be computed from the followings and random coins:
(Server side of) |φ˜〉 , x(1)1 , x(3)c (384)
K(2), y
(1)
1 , perm(y
(2)
0 ||y(3)c ), perm(y(2)1 ||y(3)1+c) (385)
perm′ (386)
And we need to (additionally) prove the unpredictability of the keys in K
(2)
out. Formally, we
need to prove
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, |P
y
(2)
b
˜Adv
t
2
˜Adv1 | equation (336)(337) 〉 | ≤ 2−η/14| |φ˜〉 | (387)
This is from Fact 6.
4. By the same argument as the “proof of (319)(320)(321)(322)” completes the proof.
G.4.4 Corollaries of Lemma G.6
This lemma leads to the following two corollaries, which are useful in our main proof. Recall that
TAG is defined in Notation G.2.
Corollary 3. Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as
discussed in Section 3.1), pad length l, output length κout, key sets {K(1),K(3)}, bit c ∈ {0, 1}
satisfy the same conditions given in Lemma G.6. The client samples K(2) and Kout, perm, perm
′
similarly. Then define
|ϕ′〉 := |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) ⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ TAG
when the adversary Adv ∈ A is as defined in Lemma G.6, for any key k ∈ Kfake−(1−c)−(2)out ,
|PkAdv |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 4C| |ϕ〉 |.
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Proof. Otherwise (324)(326) will become distinguishable since the adversary can compute the keys
in K
fake−(1−c)−(2)
out and check them with the Tag(K
fake−(1−c)−(2)
out ).
Corollary 4. Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 (the randomness are purified by the environment, as
discussed in Section 3.1), pad length l, key sets K,Kout satisfy the same conditions given in Lemma
G.6. Adv ∈ A as defined in Lemma G.6. Then
|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) ⊙ perm⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG (388)
≈Adv∈A6C||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (K ↔ Kout, perm;PadLen = l)⊙K(2) ⊙ perm′ ⊙K
fake−c−(3)
out ⊙ TAG
(389)
Proof. Applying Lemma G.6 for both sides, and replace the garbled table with RobustRGT hyb and
replace TAG with (correspondingly) Shuffle(K
(2)
out, $, $) and Shuffle(K
fake−c−(2)
out , $, $), where
Shuffle is a random shuffling on three elements, $ is a random string. This replacement leads to
(in total) 6C| |ϕ〉 | error and finally two sides become perfectly indistinguishable.
Note that if the random shufflings in TAG in (388)(389) are removed, this statement is not
true. And this will be important when we use this corollary.
H Proof of the w = 2 case of Lemma 8.4
Now we give the proof for Lemma 8.4 for the w = 2 case.
The structure of this proof is as follows: the main body is divided into four steps, step 0 to step
3. During the proof we raise a lemma (Lemma H.1) and we put the proof of this lemma in the end
of this proof, as “step 4”. Thus there are five steps in total.
To prove this lemma, we need to use the lemmas in the previous section.
The proof is given below.
Proof. Step 0: Preparation
Similar to the proof of the w = 3 case, we assume
|Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≥ (1−C2)| |ϕ〉 | (390)
, otherwise the statement is already true.
Suppose there exists a server-side operation U with query number |U| ≤ 2η/B such that
|P
y
(2)
0 ||y
(2)
1
U(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ Tag(K(2)out))|/| |ϕ〉 | = q (391)
where the projection is applied on some server-side system, B is a constant chosen to be big enough
to make all the arguments below work. (Explicitly, B = 100000 is enough, but it can be much
smaller. We’re a little bit lazy here and won’t try to get the minimum-possible B. What’s more,
the lemmas later also contain some constants so writing it in this form will make the form of the
statement consistent.)
And our goal is to prove q ≤ AC for some constant A.
Again, we need to make use of Lemma 8.3. Before that, we first choose a random permu-
tation perm′ on the bit-wise permutation on strings of length 2κout, and define the “fake keys”
K
fake−0−(2)
out , K
fake−0−(3)
out and K
fake−1−(2)
out ,K
fake−1−(3)
out , which have the same length as K
(2)
out and
K
(3)
out, as discussed in Notation G.1. Recall that, intuitively, if the server tries to de-permutation
from perm(y
(2)
b ||y(3)c+b) using a “fake permutation’ perm′, it gets the fake keys Kfake−c−(w)out .
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(Let’s add a note on the meaning of b, c, w here. w ∈ {2, 3} denote the index of wires. b denotes
the bit-value in the second input wire, and c denotes the bit-value in the third input wire. Note
that in the garbled table x
(1)
1 ||x(2)b ||x(3)c is mapped to y(1)1 ||perm(y(2)b ||y(3)c+b).)
Then we will replace the global tags in (391) by TAG. The motivation of this replacement is
not clear now, but it’s important for later proof, since it allows us to apply Corollary 4. Then there
exists a server-side operation U ′ with query number |U ′| ≤ |U|+O(1) such that:
|P
y
(2)
0 ||y(2)1
U ′(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | ≥ q/
√
3 (392)
This is because U ′ can just guess the correct tags in the TAG and run U above.
Step 1: make the adversary (after the protocol completes) blind on K
(1)
out
Then define a “blinded” version of U ′, let’s denote it as U blind. In this operation the RO queries
in U are replaced by the queries to the blinded oracle H ′ where H(· · · ||K(1)out|| · · · ) are blinded.
(Recall that we blind both H(· · · ||y(1)0 || · · · ) and H(· · · ||y(1)1 || · · · ). And the prefix has length l and
the suffix padding has length 2κout.) These blinded parts cover the encryption operations we use
in all the rows of the backward table, thus if we blind these two parts of the random oracle we
“forbid” the decryption of the backward table.
We define qblind as follows, which replaces the U ′ in (392) by the blinded operation:
qblind := |P
y
(2)
0 ||y
(2)
1
U blind(|ϕ′〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | (393)
Now we are going to use Lemma 8.2, Lemma 6.19 and (392) to get a bound for qblind. First by
Lemma 8.2 and (390) we know |ϕ′〉 ⊙ K(3)out ⊙ TAG is (2η/36, 2C| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for K(1)out (the
condition for applying Lemma 8.2 is from Lemma G.1). Then apply Lemma 6.19 we can relate
qblind with (392) and get:
qblind ≥ q/
√
3− 6C. (394)
Step 2: Consider the behavior when the initial state is “some branch” of |ϕ〉
As in the proof of the w = 3 case, define |ϕ′0〉 and |ϕ′1〉, the post-execution state of using |ϕb〉
(in equation (89)) as the initial state. Define qblind0 and q
blind
1 as the quotient when |ϕ′〉 in equation
(393) is substituted with |ϕ′0〉 and |ϕ′1〉:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, qblindb := |Py(2)0 ||y(2)1 U
blind(|ϕ′b〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 | (395)
Then apply Lemma 8.3 we get (the conditions for applying Lemma 8.2 is proved in Lemma
G.1. And here we only need to consider the case corresponding to (86), since for the case (85) we
already get a bound for q: q ≤ O(1)C for some constant O(1).)
qblind1 ≥ qblind/6 ≥ q/6
√
3− C (396)
From now on we need to study what the permutation gives us. Let’s first expand |ϕ′〉:
|ϕ′〉 = (PadHadamardAdv2 ◦ (Adv1(|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (perm)⊙K(2))))⊙ perm (397)
Here we split the operations of Adv on different phases of the protocol as Adv1,Adv2. And we
omit the parameters that are not important here. Further note that this characterization of the
adversary is enough: for example, we don’t need to add another symbol Adv3 in the leftmost, since
it can be “absorbed” into U .
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Step 3 Let’s first describe the overall idea of this step. Below we will consider what happens
when the permutation perm in the fifth step of the protocol is replaced by the “fake”
permutation. This technique is less intuitive but turns out to be a key technique in the proof of
this lemma. And we will see some of the unexplained step (for example, replacing Tag with TAG)
is actually the preparation for the proof below.
We define another state |φ′〉 as the post-execution state where in the fifth step of the protocol,
the client sends perm′ to the server instead of perm:
|φ′〉 := (PadHadamardAdv2 ◦ (Adv1(|ϕ〉 ⊙RobustRGT (perm)⊙K(2))))⊙ perm′ (398)
Then we define |φ′0〉 and |φ′1〉 as the output of replacing |ϕ〉 above (equation (398)) with |ϕ0〉 and
|ϕ1〉:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, |φ′b〉 := (PadHadamardAdv2 ◦(Adv1(|ϕb〉⊙RobustRGT (perm)⊙K(2))))⊙perm′ (399)
So |φ′〉 = |φ′0〉+ |φ′1〉
Then we define qblind,fake,00 , q
blind,fake,0
1 and q
blind,fake,1
0 , q
blind,fake,1
1 , where q
blind,fake,c
b stands
for the following value: in equation (395), using |φ′b〉 as the initial state, providing Kfake−c−(3)out as
the revealed keys, and the adversary is trying to compute the fake keys K
fake−c−(2)
out using U blind.
Formally speaking, they are defined as follows:
∀b ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ {0, 1}, qblind,fake,cb := |Pyfake−c−(2)0 ||yfake−c−(2)1 U
blind(|φ′b〉⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 |
(400)
We will analyze qblind,fake,cb below. Note that the b = 0 and b = 1 cases are very different here. We
can prove (either by existing lemmas or using the lemmas whose proof is postponed):
• For the b = 1 case, we relate qblind,fake,c1 with qblind1 , and get (see Lemma H.1 below):
Either qblind,fake,01 ≥ qblind1 /2− 54C or qblind,fake,11 ≥ qblind1 /2− 54C (401)
• For the b = 0 case, by Lemma G.4, we know
∀c ∈ {0, 1}, qblind,fake,c0 ≤ 3× 4C × 2 + 9C = 33C (402)
The details are as follows:
1. We further make use of |ϕb〉 ≈9C||ϕ〉| |ϕ00〉 + |ϕ01〉. Recall (399) and (400); now we can
study these two “branches” separately and combine them by the triangle inequality of
unpredictability and get the bound for the left side of (402). And for each one of these
two — without loss of generality, let’s consider |ϕ00〉 — we can define |φ′00〉 as the result
of replacing the |ϕb〉 by |ϕ00〉 in (399), and define qblind,fake,c00 as the result of replacing
the |φ′b〉 in (402) by |φ′00〉. What we need is to prove it’s at most 3 × 4C. (In the right
side of (402) “×2” and “+9C” come from this step.)
2. One issue for applying Lemma G.4 here is the “conditions on |ϕ00〉” are described relative
to the norm of |ϕ〉. (For example, we know |ϕ00〉 is (2η − 2, 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for
x
(3)
1 given K
(1), but we need to change the norm | |ϕ〉 | in this statement to | |ϕ00〉 |.) We
can handle this problem as follows:
(Case 1): If | |ϕ00〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ〉 | then we automatically have | |ϕ00〉 | ≤ C| |ϕ〉 |.
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(Case 2): Otherwise we know (1)|ϕ00〉 is (2η , 2−η+κ| |ϕ00〉 |)-unpredictable for x(1)1 given
K(3) and (2) |ϕ00〉 is (2η , (4C ||ϕ〉|||ϕ00〉|)| |ϕ00〉 |)-unpredictable for x
(3)
1 given K
(1). Then we
can apply Lemma G.4 and choose C (within Lemma G.4) to be 4C| |ϕ〉 |/| |ϕ00〉 | and get
qblind,fake,c00 ≤ 12C. Here we implicitly assume 4C| |ϕ〉 |/| |ϕ00〉 | < 13 , since otherwise we
still have qblind,fake,c00 ≤ | |ϕ00〉 |/| |ϕ〉 | ≤ 12C.
Now let’s look at (401) and (402). Note that in (401) there are two possible cases. Luckily
(402) holds for both c = 0 and c = 1. Without loss of generality, consider the c = 0 case in (401),
and correspondingly take c = 0 in (402), which are
qblind,fake,01 ≥ qblind1 /2− 54C ≥ q/12
√
3− 55C (by equation (396)) (403)
qblind,fake,00 ≤ 33C (404)
, then notice qblind,fake,00 and q
blind,fake,0
1 can also be seen as the output of running some adversary
on a post-execution state of padded Hadamard test, we can apply Lemma 8.3 again: we take
< AuxInf > in Lemma 8.3 to be RobustRGT (perm)⊙K(2) ⊙ perm′ ⊙Kfake−c−(3)out ⊙ TAG, and
the unitary in the lemma as U blind, and the conditions for applying Lemma 8.3 come from Lemma
G.2. Thus we have
Either min{qblind,fake,00 , qblind,fake,01 } ≥ qblind,fake,0/6 ≥ |qblind,fake,01 − qblind,fake,00 |/6 (405)
, or 5C ≥ qblind,fake,0 ≥ |qblind,fake,01 − qblind,fake,00 | (406)
Both cases imply q ≤ 10000C. (substitute (403)(404).) Thus we complete the proof of Lemma
8.4. The remaining work is to fill the missing step:
Step 4: Prove equation (401).
Lemma H.1 (A repetition of (401)).
Either qblind,fake,01 ≥ qblind1 /2− 54C or qblind,fake,11 ≥ qblind1 /2 − 54C
Proof of (401). Recall the definition of |ϕb1b2〉 in equation (89)(90). Recall that
|ϕ1〉 ≈9C||ϕ〉| |ϕ10〉+ |ϕ11〉 (407)
Define |ϕ′b1b2〉 as the result of replacing the inner |ϕ〉 in equation (397) with |ϕb1b2〉:
|ϕ′b1b2〉 = (PadHadamardAdv2 ◦ (Adv1(|ϕb1b2〉 ⊙RobustRGT (perm)⊙K(2))))⊙ perm (408)
Then define qblind10 , q
blind
11 as the results when |ϕ′10〉 and |ϕ′11〉 are used in equation (395):
qblind1b := |Py(2)0 ||y(2)1 U
blind(|ϕ′1b〉 ⊙K(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ〉 |
From (407), we have
Either qblind10 ≥ qblind1 /2− 5C or qblind11 ≥ qblind1 /2− 5C (409)
These two cases correspond to the two cases in the final statement.
Without loss of generality, let’s consider the qblind10 ≥ qblind1 /2 − 5C case and the other case is
similar. Now our task is to find a relation between qblind10 and q
blind,fake,0
1 .
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Then define |φ′10〉 as the result of replacing |ϕ〉 in equation (398) with |ϕ10〉, and define |φ′11〉 as
the result of replacing |ϕ〉 in equation (398) with |ϕ11〉. Then similar to equation (400), replacing
|φ′b〉 with |φ′10〉 and |φ′11〉, and only considering the c = 0 case, we define qblind,fake,010 , qblind,fake,011 as
follows:
qblind,fake,010 := |Pyfake−0−(2)0 ||yfake−0−(2)1 U
blind(|φ′10〉 ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ′〉 |
qblind,fake,011 := |Pyfake−0−(2)0 ||yfake−0−(2)1 U
blind(|φ′11〉 ⊙Kfake−0−(3)out ⊙ TAG)|/| |ϕ′〉 |
And we have (also by (407))
qblind,fake,01 ≥ |qblind,fake,010 − qblind,fake,011 | − 9C (410)
Now to give a bound for qblind,fake,01 , we only need to give a bound for q
blind,fake,0
10 and q
blind,fake,0
10 .
Now it’s time to apply the lemmas in Section G.
• For qblind,fake,010 , we apply Corollary 4. From the conditions we know |ϕ10〉 is (2η−5, 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-
unpredictable for x
(3)
1 . Thus
By Corollary 4: |qblind,fake,010 − qblind10 | ≤ 24C (411)
(Note that there is one implicit step here, as what we did in the proof of (402): we can assume
12C| |ϕ〉 | ≥ | |ϕ10〉 | ≥ 2−
√
κ| |ϕ〉 | because we can discuss the other cases separately. Then
when we apply Corollary 4, with the “C” in the corollary chosen to be 4C| |ϕ〉 |/| |ϕ10〉 |.)
Thus substitute (409):
qblind,fake,010 ≥ qblind1 /2 − 29C (412)
• For qblind,fake,011 , we apply Corollary 3. The condition is |φ11〉 is (2η−5, 4C| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable
for x
(3)
0 . Thus
By Corollary 3: qblind,fake,011 ≤ 16C (413)
(The implicit step is as above.)
These two inequalities together with (410) complete the proof.
Thus we complete the proof of Lemma 8.4 for the w = 2 case.
Let’s give a summary on the subtle part of this proof. Notice that we apply Lemma 8.3 twice,
by considering different < AuxInf >, and get (396) and (405)(406). And the security provided by
the garbled tables gives us the other two inequalities (401)(402). And the whole proof comes from
their combinations. The other parts are mostly details when we do hybrid methods on the entries
in the garbled tables.
I Proof of Lemma 11.1
In this section we give the proof of Lemma 11.1. This section is organized as follows:
1. In Section I.1 we give some lemmas that are useful in the main proof.
2. In Section I.2 we give an overview of the proof.
3. And the main proof is divided into four subsections, in Section I.3 to Section I.6.
So the reader can go to Section I.2 for an overview of the proof techniques.
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I.1 Preparation
Before we prove Lemma 11.1, first we can prove:
Lemma I.1. Under the conditions of Lemma 11.1, |ϕ〉⊙ < SecurityRefreshing > is (2η1−6, 2−η1+6| |ϕ〉 |)-
SC-secure for K(i), where < SecurityRefreshing > are the transcripts of all the messages sent by
the client during this protocol.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 6.12. First note < SecurityRefreshing >
contains the followings:
• The garbled tables sent in the first step of each round of the SecurityRefreshing protocol;
Denote it as < GTs >.
• The random pads for padded Hadamard test in the third step of each round of the SecurityRefreshing
protocol;
• The random pads in the end of the protocol.
Since in the adversary’s viewpoint, these random pads can also be sampled and simulated on the
server-side, we only need to prove
|ϕ〉⊙ < GTs > is (2η1−6, 2−η1+6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i).
Then by Technique 6.2 we can assume the “temporary output keys” Ktemp = {K(i)(j)temp }i∈[N ],j∈[J ]
are provided as the auxiliary information. Thus what we will prove is
|ϕ〉 ⊙ < GTs > ⊙Ktemp is (2η1−6, 2−η1+6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i).
By proof-by-contradiction, assume there is a server-side operation U such that the query number
|U| ≤ 2η1−6 and
|P
x
(i)
0 ||x(i)1
U(|ϕ〉⊙ < GTs > ⊙Ktemp)| > 2−η1+6| |ϕ〉 | (414)
Suppose the set of random pads used in the computation of < GTs > is Set. By Lemma 4.3 there
exists |ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |ϕ〉 that does not depend on H(Set|| · · · ) (in other words, the RO output on the
entries whose prefixes are in Set does not have influence on the state). Then
|P
x
(i)
0 ||x(i)1
U(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < GTs > ⊙Ktemp)| > 2−η1+5| |ϕ˜〉 | (415)
(And since Set,Ktemp are sampled randomly) |ϕ˜〉 ⊙Ktemp ⊙ Set is (2η1 , 2−η1+1| |ϕ˜〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)
(416)
Let’s make use of equation (415) to construct a unitary U ′ to break the SC-security shown in (416).
In more details, we will construct a server-side operation U ′ such that the query number |U ′| ≤ 2η1
and
|P
x
(i)
0 ||x(i)1
U ′(|ϕ˜〉 ⊙Ktemp ⊙ Set)| > 2−η1+1| |ϕ˜〉 | (417)
Starting from (415), note that when Ktemp is given as the auxiliary information, each term in
< GTs > can be seen as the tuple of random pads and the hash outputs in the form of (or more
formally, if the followings and the random pads are provided to the adversary instead of < GTs >,
the adversary can compute < GTs > by itself)
H(pad||x(i′)bx ||r
(j)
br
) for some pad ∈ Set, i′ ∈ [N ], j ∈ [J ], bx, br ∈ {0, 1}2 (418)
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to the adversary. (Note that symbol i has been occupied so we have to use i′ here. And note for
each i′, j, bx, br, there are two terms in this form: one for the ciphertext and one for the key tags.
See the definition of Enc in Definition 2.4.)
The remaining steps are very similar to the proof of Lemma 6.12.
Values of this form fall into the Set|| · · · part of the inputs (the suffix padding has length equal
to the length of keys in K plus the length of keys in Λ), thus the random oracle output values of
them do not affect the state |ϕ˜〉 itself. Thus there is no difference whether the outputs of H on
Set|| · · · part of the inputs are sampled before the whole protocol, or is sampled just before the
operation of U . Then what U ′ will do is to
1. Sample the “background values” for the random outputs of Set|| · · · part; and it also samples
the random values for the terms in (418), and compute the “fake version” of < GTs > from
it, denote it as < GTsfake >;
2. It constructs a “simulated oracle” H˜; The detailed construction is similar to the construction
in the proof of Lemma 6.12 in Appendix B. The only difference is in the construction of H˜,
the first step is to check whether the input has the form of pad||x(i′)b ||r(j)b′ , pad ∈ Set. This
can be achieved since Tag(K) and Tag(Λ) are stored in the read-only buffer. (By Fact 1 the
space that the Tag is not injective is very small.)
3. Suppose the operation that comes from replacing all the queries in U by queries to H˜ as
Ufake. U ′ will put < GTsfake > onto the place of < GTs > in (415), and run Ufake.
Then we have
|P
x
(i)
0 ||x(i)1
U ′(|ϕ˜〉 ⊙Ktemp ⊙ Set)| = |Px(i)0 ||x(i)1 U
fake(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < GTsfake > ⊙Ktemp ⊙ Set)| (419)
(By Fact 1 and discussions above) ≈2−η ||ϕ〉| |Px(i)0 ||x(i)1 U(|ϕ˜〉⊙ < GTs > ⊙Ktemp)| (420)
This together with (415) completes the proof.
I.2 Overview of the proof
Now let’s prove Lemma 11.1. We will split this proof into four subsections.
1. In the Section I.3 we will do a “linear decomposition” and reduce the statement into two
smaller problems, we will call them “Statement 1” and “Statement 2”. We will prove State-
ment 1 and the proof of Statement 2 is similar. We will list these two statements in Outline
5.
2. For the proof of Statement 1, we first reduce it to a security statement of a “simplified
temporary protocol”. We will give this statement in the second subsection (Section I.4).
3. Then the third subsection (Section I.5) is for the proof of this security statement of simplified
protocol. This is the most difficult part of these four steps. We will give a further overview
for this step in the beginning of Section I.5 (Section I.5.2).
4. Finally we prove Statement 2 using similar technique (since many steps can be reused the
description of the proof is much shorter). Then we combine Statement 1 and 2 via triangle
inequality and complete the proof. This is put in the last subsection.
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I.3 Part I: Break Lemma 11.1 into Statement 1 and 2 Through Linear Decom-
position
Proof of Lemma 11.1, Part I. Suppose Adv = U2κHU2κ−1H · · ·U1HU0. (We only write down the
adversary’s operations. There should be some client side “computing and sending garbled tables”
operations among these server side operations, thus this expression only has literal meaning. We
will give explanations when we use this expression.)
The first step is to use a “linear decomposition method” to decompose the adver-
sary’s operation. Define
Advt,b = U2κHU2κ−1H · · ·HUtHPx(i)b Ut−1H(I − PK(i)) · · ·U1H(I − PK(i))U0 (421)
Here a projection is done before each RO query in the first t server side queries:
• P
x
(i)
b
is the server side projection onto the · · · ||x(i)b || · · · space of the input to the random
oracle queries;
• I − PK(i) = I − Px(i)0 − Px(i)1 is a projection onto the space that excludes · · · ||x
(i)
0 || · · · and
· · · ||x(i)1 || · · · .
(The prefix padding has length l and the suffix padding has length equal to the key length in Λ.)
And (421) means, in Advt,b:
• In each of the first (t − 1) RO queries made by the adversary, the H(· · · ||x(i)0 || · · · ) and
H(· · · ||x(i)1 || · · · ) parts of the queries are “removed”;
• And for the t-th query we make a projection and only consider the query on the input
· · · ||x(i)b || · · · .
Then we have:
Adv =
2κ∑
t=1
(Advt,0 + Advt,1) + Adv0 (422)
where Adv0 = U2κH(I − PK(i))U2κ−1H(I − PK(i)) · · ·UTH(I − PK(i))UT−1 · · ·U1H(I − PK(i))U0
so in Adv0, (I − PK(i)) is applied before each query.
We note that (422) is also literal, as discussed above (421): it means when the client-side
operations and message transmission operations are inserted suitably into the description of Adv···,
then the equation holds.
We will proceed by proving the following statements one by one:
Outline 5. 1. (Statement 1): Suppose the protocol is run against adversary Advt,b. Define
|ϕ′t,b〉 = SecurityRefreshingAdvt,b(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉 (423)
Then ∀t ∈ [2κ], b ∈ {0, 1}, Ppass |ϕ′t,b〉 is (2η2/100κ, 2−η1/4+κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given
Kout −K(i)out and < AuxInf >.
2. (Statement 2) Similarly, suppose the protocol is run against adversary Adv0. Define
|ϕ′0〉 = SecurityRefreshingAdv0(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉 (424)
Then Ppass |ϕ′0〉 is (2η2/100κ, 2−η1/4| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out givenKout−K(i)out and < AuxInf >.
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3. Note that |ϕ′〉 = ∑t∈[2κ],b∈{0,1} |ϕ′t,b〉 + |ϕ′0〉. Finally we can combine the Statement 1 and 2
by the triangle inequality of SC-security and draw the conclusion that Ppass |ϕ′〉 is
(2η2/100κ, 2−η1/4+2κ+2| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout − K(i)out and < AuxInf >, thus
complete the proof of Lemma 11.1.
In the next subsection we will reduce Statement 1 to a new statement which is about the security
of a temporary protocol. And in Section I.5 we will see Statement 2 above can also be reduced to
it.
I.4 Reduce “Statement 1” to “Security of a temporary protocol TempPrtl”
Let’s first try to prove the “Statement 1” above. To prove it, we will first make use of the technique
in Section 6.6 and 6.2 to simplify the protocol and reduce it to the security of a temporary protocol.
Then in the next subsection we will prove the security of this temporary protocol and complete the
proof of Statement 1.
Proof of Statement 1, step 1: reduction. First applying Lemma I.1 we can know |ϕ〉⊙ < SecurityRefreshing >
is (2η1−6, 2−η1+6| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) given Tag(K,Λ).
Note that in Advt,b the adversary gets x
(i)
b in the middle of the attack by making a projection.
Intuitively by the SC-security proved above the adversary should be hard to compute x
(i)
1−b. To
formalize this intuition, we can apply Lemma 6.21 to switch the oracle queries to H in Advt,b to
queries to H ′ defined as follows:
H ′ is defined to be a new blinded oracle of H where H(· · · ||x(i)1−b|| · · · ) is blinded. (425)
(“· · · ” represents arbitrary strings of some length. The prefix padding has length l and the suffix
padding has length the same as the keys in Λ.)
Then define Adv′t,b as the adversary that runs the same operations, but queries H
′ instead of
H. Similar to (423), define
|ϕ′′t,b〉 = SecurityRefreshingAdv′t,b(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉 (426)
The difference of Advt,b and Adv
′
t,b starts after the adversary’s t-th query. We can prove the state
just after the adversary’s t-th query is (2η1−6, 2−η1+7| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i) by Lemma I.1. (Since
the projection can be simulated using Tag(K) assuming Tag is injective on inputs with the same
length as the keys in K, and the space that Tag is not injective on these inputs has very small
norm.) Then by Lemma 6.21 we have
|ϕ′′t,b〉 ≈2−η1/3+3||ϕ〉| |ϕ′t,b〉 (427)
(there are some implicit steps here: |ϕ′t,b〉, |ϕ′′t,b〉 are defined on real protocol, but Lemma 6.21 is
talking about a server-side operation. But we note that we can assume all the client-side messages
are already stored in the read-only buffer but this adversary uses it step-by-step. Then we can
apply Lemma 6.21 and get (427).)
Thus to prove Statement 1, we can reduce it to “Statement 3”, which is about the
SC-security of Ppass |ϕ′′t,b〉 for K(i)out, defined as follows:
(Statement 3) Suppose the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant. Suppose the initial
state |ϕ〉 satisfies the conditions listed in Lemma 11.1. For any adversary Adv′ that only queries
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H ′ (see (425)) during the protocol, and the total number of queries to H ′ is at most 2κ+2, the
post-execution state,
PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv′(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for K(i)out given Kout −K(i)out and < AuxInf >.
Note that 2−η2/100κ + 2−η1/3+O(1) < 2−η1/4. The choices of the parameters here are for the
convenience of later proofs.
Note that the operation of Adv′ only happens during the protocol, and after the protocol
completes, in the definition of SC-security, there is another implicit adversary D. (Recall that the
definition of SC-security says for any server-side operation |D| ≤ · · · there is · · · .) In the definition
of SC-security the implicit adversary still queries the original oracle H, not H ′. In other words,
we are considering the following setting: the random oracle is blinded during the protocol, but
after the protocol completes, it is not blinded anymore. And we want to prove in this setting the
adversary is still hard to output both keys in K
(i)
out.
We will further reduce Statement 3 to some other statements. During this process we will
design a “temporary protocol”, and reduce Statement 3 to the security property of this temporary
protocol. In more details, this reduction process is as follows:
1. First we reduce Statement 3 to Statement 3′ by adding auxiliary information. (See Section
6.2 for the auxiliary information technique.)
2. Then we reduce Statement 3′ to Statement 3′′ by changing the blinded oracle to another oracle
that has fewer blinded part. This does not make the adversary weaker since the adversary
can also further blind the oracle by itself. This simplifies the later proofs.
3. Finally we make use of the auxiliary information in step 1 to simplify the protocol and reduce
Statement 3′′ to the security of a temporary protocol.
Let’s start the reduction. We will use bold font to divide different steps.
First, we apply the auxiliary-information technique (Technique 6.2) to reduce State-
ment 3 to “Statement 3′”, where the adversary is given the following auxiliary information in
the beginning:
• < AuxInf >
• K
• Kout −K(i)out
• y(i)(j)b (recall it’s the keys in K
(i)(j)
temp with subscript b) for all j ∈ [J ].
• The garbled tables (sent in the step 1 of each round) encrypted under the keys in K that
are not at index i. (Thus there are J × (N − 1) garbled tables. And the tables that are not
provided are the tables encrypted under K(i) and Λ(j) for some j.) Denote it as GTnot K(i) .
(We assume the client has already sampled all the random coins needed thus all of them are well-
defined.) In other words, we need to prove,
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(Statement 3′) Suppose the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant. Suppose the initial
state |ϕ〉 satisfies the conditions listed in Lemma 11.1. For any adversary Adv′ that only queries
H ′ during the protocol, and the total number of queries to H ′ is at most 2κ+3, the post-execution
state, defined as
PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv′(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ (
|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙K ⊙ (Kout −K(i)out)⊙ {y(i)(j)b }j∈[J ] ⊙GTnot K(i)) (428)
is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for the key in K(i)out with subscript (1− b).
(In Protocol 13 we do not have a letter for the final output keys in K
(i)
out, we describe it as “the key
in K
(i)
out with subscript (1− b)”; it is actually “padi||x(i)1−b||y(i)(J)1−b ” in Protocol 13.)
(Note that in Statement 3 we are talking about SC-security where Tag(K
(i)
out) are provided as
auxiliary information; but in Statement 3′ in the definition of unpredictability only Tag(padi||x(i)1−b||y(i)(J)1−b )
is provided. The reason that we can omit them is: the other global tag (which is Tag(padi||x(i)b ||y(i)(J)b ))
can be computed on the server-side from the auxiliary information and client-side messages when
the protocol completes; thus omitting this part does not make the adversary weaker (if we relax
the query number bound on the adversary a little bit).)
Let’s talk about the motivation of adding so much auxiliary information. We note that if
some client side messages can be deterministically computed from the information in the read-only
buffer and some public randomness, these steps in the protocol can be removed (since the server
can compute it by itself and does not need the client to send it out), thus we can simplify the
protocol. This is why we add so much auxiliary information, and we will use it when we reduce
“Statement 3′′” (not 3′) to the “security of a temporary protocol”, in the step after the next step.
The next step is to strengthen Statement 3′ by reducing the blinded part of the
random oracle. Before that, let’s give some symbols for the random pads used in the garbled table
of this protocol. Notice that the garbled tables sent in the protocol have the following structure:
1. There is a garbled table for each key in K(i) and each pair of keys in Λ(j);
2. Each garbled table contains two rows;
3. And each row is an output of Enc (see Definition 2.4), which contains a ciphertext and a key
tag.
Let’s use pad
(i)(j)
bx,br ,“ct”
to denote the random pads used in the computation of the ciphertext part
of the row of garbled tables encrypted under x
(i)
bx
, r
(j)
br
; and use pad
(i)(j)
bx,br,“tg”
to denote the random
pads used in the computation of the key tag part of the row of garbled tables encrypted under x
(i)
bx
,
r
(j)
br
. So each row of the garbled table is in the form of
(pad
(i)(j)
bx,br ,“ct”
,H(pad
(i)(j)
bx,br,“ct”
||x(i)bx ||r
(j)
br
)⊕ y(i)(j)bx ), (pad
(i)(j)
bx,br ,“tg”
,H(pad
(i)(j)
bx,br,“tg”
||x(i)bx ||r
(j)
br
))
Suppose H ′′ is a freshly new random oracle where
H(pad
(i)(j)
1−b,br ,ct||x
(i)
1−b||r(j)br ),H(pad
(i)(j)
1−b,br ,tg||x
(i)
1−b||r(j)br ),∀j ∈ [J ], br ∈ {0, 1} (429)
are blinded. (Note that i, 1− b are fixed. Thus we blind 4J entries.)
Since H ′ can also be understood as the blinded oracle coming from blinding H ′′, we can
reduce Statement 3′ to Statement 3′′, defined as follows:
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(Statement 3′′) Suppose the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant. Suppose the initial
state |ϕ〉 satisfies the conditions listed in Lemma 11.1. For any adversary Adv′ that only queries
H ′′ and the total number of queries made by the adversary is at most 2κ+4, the post-execution
state, defined as
PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv′(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ (
|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙K ⊙ (Kout −K(i)out)⊙ {y(i)(j)b }j∈[J ] ⊙GTnot K(i)) (430)
is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for the key in K(i)out with subscript (1− b).
(One may get confused by the fact that pad
(i)(j)
1−b,br ,ct/tg are sampled during the protocol, but in the
security statement we assume the adversary can only query H ′′ from the beginning of the protocol.
How can we define H ′′ if these random pads are not sampled out yet? The answer is here we can
assume these pads have already sampled on the client side in the beginning, but they may not have
been given to the server. Thus H ′′ is still well-defined.)
We note that we give a lot of information to the adversary as public auxiliary information. So
what are still not known by the adversary? The following is a list, and these are what are currently
protecting the security of the output keys (we mean (132)):
• During the protocol, the adversary can only query the blinded oracle H ′′ where (429) are
blinded.
• y(i)(j)1−b , j ∈ [J ] are hidden in the protocol, and they are not given as auxiliary information.
• The keys in Λ are hidden. They can be seen as the keys that protect the security of y(i)(j)1−b ,
j ∈ [J ].
And since we already give many auxiliary information to the server in the beginning, we can simplify
the protocol (which means, reduce Statement 3′′ to the security of a simplified protocol) through
the following facts and arguments:
1. First let’s review the initial state in equation (430):
|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙K ⊙ (Kout −K(i)out)⊙ {y(i)(j)b }j∈[J ] ⊙GTnot K(i)
2. If in some steps some the client side messages can be computed from the content of read-only
buffer and public random coins, these messages can be removed from the protocol. And we
only need to slightly relax the query number bound of the adversary to allow it to compute
these information by itself, and it does not become weaker during such simplification.
3. The random shuffling of the garbled tables can be removed since the client does not store it
and the server can also shuffle the “un-shuffled garbled tables” by itself.
4. Note that i, b is already fixed, thus after we complete these simplification, we can define
pad
(j)
br,“ct/tg”
:= pad
(i)(j)
bx,br ,“ct/tg”
, y(j) := y
(i)(j)
1−b , padfixed := x
(i)
1−b
to simplify the notations.
5. We only care about the security and do not need to discuss the server’s honest behavior.
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Thus to prove Statement 3′′, we can reduce it to the security statement of the following
temporary simplified protocol, described as follows: (below we describe not only the protocol
itself but also some of the accompanied settings)
Protocol 20 (A temporary protocol TempPrtl for the proof of Lemma 11.1). This protocol is run
on key set Λ = {r(j)br }br∈{0,1},j∈[J ].
Below padfixed is stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer of the initial state.
The client samples {pad(j)br ,ct, pad
(j)
br ,tg
}j∈[J ] (br ∈ {0, 1}) from {0, 1}l. After this is completed,
H ′′ is well-defined. (padfixed := x
(i)
1−b, and see the definition around (429)).
For each j = 1, · · · J :
1. The client samples y(j) from {0, 1}κout which is different from a string stored in some fixed
place of the read-only buffer of the initial state. Then it computes
H(pad
(j)
br ,ct
||padfixed||r(j)br )⊕ y(j),H(pad
(j)
br ,tg
||padfixed||r(j)br ),∀br ∈ {0, 1} (431)
and sends them together with the random pads pad
(j)
br ,ct
, pad
(j)
br ,tg
to the server.
2. The server runs some server-side operations as the attack, and it is only allowed to query H ′′
in this phase.
3. The client and the server do a padded Hadamard test on Λ(j) with pad length l and output
length κout. As before, the server can only query H
′′.
After all these iterations are completed, the client samples pad←r {0, 1}l and sends it to the server.
The final output key is
pad||padfixed||y(1)|| · · · y(J) (432)
Note that after the protocol completes, the adversary can query H.
Now let’s introduce some notations. Define
|χ0〉 := |equation (430)〉 (433)
. The superscript “0” is to make it consistent with the notations in the following proofs. And |χ0〉
satisfies the followings (note that GTnot K(i) affects the SC-security, and applying Lemma 6.12 leads
to the first condition below):
• ∀j′ ∈ [J ], |χ0〉 is (2η2−10, 2−η2+10| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j′) given Λ− Λ(j′).
• |χ0〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2κ)-representable under H from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ 2κ. (| |χ0〉 | = | |ϕ〉 |.)
Thus the Statement 3′′ can be reduced to the “Security of TempPrtl”, as follows
(here we use TempPrtl as the notation for Protocol 20):
Claim I.2 (Security of Protocol 20). Suppose the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant.
Suppose the initial state is |χ0〉. And suppose the following conditions are satisfied (the first two
are the conditions above):
• ∀j′ ∈ [J ], |χ0〉 is (2η2−10, 2−η2+10| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j′) given Λ− Λ(j′).
• |χ0〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2κ)-representable under H from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ 2κ. (| |χ0〉 | = | |ϕ〉 |.)
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• The parameters l, κout, η2, J satisfy the conditions listed in Lemma 11.1.
Then if the protocol TempPrtl and the adversary behaves as described in Protocol 20, and during
the protocol the number of adversary’s queries to H ′′ is at most 2κ+5, then PpassTempPrtl ◦ |χ0〉
is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
Note that we do not want to define |χ0〉 using (433) but describe its properties using the
two conditions just below (433). This is to make this statement more general and later it can
be reused to prove the “Statement 2”. And we also note that we omit the Adv subscript in
“PpassTempPrtlAdv ◦ |χ0〉” since later in the proof we need to use the subscript to denote other
things.
I.5 Part III: proving the “Security of Protocol 20”
Now the Part III of the proof of Lemma 11.1 will focus on proving “Security of Protocol 20”, the
temporary simplified protocol. Let’s first prove some lemmas for preparation, and the outline for
this step is given in Section I.5.2. So the reader can go to Section I.5.2 for an overview.
I.5.1 Preparation
Before that, let’s do some preparation. Note that in Protocol 20 there is a blinded oracle H ′′, and
to handle the blinded oracle, we need to generalize some lemmas to this setting.
The main task in this subsubsection is to adapt the property of the “padded Hadamard test”
(Corollary 1) to this blinded-oracle setting.
First we generalize the Definition 4.10 to contain both the original oracle and the blinded oracle.
This is needed here: recall that there do be two oracles in Protocol 20 (H and H ′′).
Definition I.1. We say |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable under H ′′ from |ϕinit〉 if it can be written as
|ϕ〉 = ∑2α1i=1 Pi |ϕinit〉, and ∀i, in Pi the total query number to H ′′ is at most 2α2 . (Only one oracle
is queried here.)
We say |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable under both H,H ′′ from |ϕinit〉 if it can be written as
|ϕ〉 = ∑2α1i=1 Pi |ϕinit〉, and ∀i, in Pi the total query number to H and H ′′ is at most 2α2 . (The
queries can contain both oracles.)
Similar to Definition 4.10 we call them the “representation” of |ϕ〉.
And we recall Definition 6.6 for the definition of SC-security in this blinded oracle setting, and
further generalize it to cover the case where the adversary can query both oracles:
Definition I.2. Suppose K = {x0, x1}. We say a state |ϕ〉 is (2η , A)-SC-secure for K under H
and H ′′ together if for all the server-side operation D that queries H and H ′′ and the total number
of oracle queries to H and H ′′ is at most 2η, |Px0||x1D(|ϕ〉 ⊙ Tag(K))| ≤ A.
Then we can describe our adaptation of Corollary 1 in the current blinded oracle setting.
Lemma I.3. Suppose the security parameter κ is bigger than some constant. Λ is a pair of keys.
Tag(Λ) is stored in some fixed place of the read-only buffer.
Suppose H ′′ is a blinded oracle of H which comes from blinding Set, where Set is a set of entries
with size at most 2κ and element length bigger than (l+ the length of keys in Λ). (Remark: this is
just a simple way to ensure Set is not too ill-behaved and does not have overlaps with some entries
we “care about”. When we apply this lemma these two conditions are satisfied easily.)
Suppose the initial state |ϕ〉 satisfies:
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• |ϕ〉 is (2η , 2−η | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ under H ′′. η > 10κ.
• |ϕ〉 is (2α1 , 2α2)-representable under both H,H ′′ from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
α1, α2, log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) ≤ 2κ.
• l > 2(α1 + α2 + log(1/| |ϕ〉 |) + η). κout > l + η.
Then the following conclusion holds:
For any adversary Adv′ that only queries H ′′ for less than 2η/20 times, the post-execution state
|ϕ′〉 = PadHadamardAdv′(Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ |ϕ〉
one of the following two is true:
• |Ppass |ϕ′〉 | ≤ 3536 | |ϕ〉 |
• Ppass |ϕ′〉 is (2η/6, 13 | |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ under H ′′.
This statement is an analog of Corollary 1 of Lemma 8.2 under a blinded oracle. And the proof
is also similar. We just need to adapt some key steps to the current setting.
Proof. Recall the proof of Lemma 8.2. The argument by (260) remains the same. Thus what we
need to do is to give a bound for
p0 := |PpassPx0U |ϕ′〉 | = |PpassPx0U(PadHadamardAdv ◦ |ϕ〉)|
The next step is to replace |ϕ1〉 (the state after the random pad pad is sampled out, as given in
the proof of Lemma 8.2) by |ϕ˜〉:
Take the “representation” (Definition I.1) of |ϕ〉, replace H by H(I − Ppad||···) and replace H ′′ by
H ′′(I − Ppad||···), then we get |ϕ˜〉.
. The setting here is slightly different but we can still apply Lemma 4.3 since the blinded oracle
can be expressed using H and the description of the blinded part. We have |ϕ˜〉 ≈2−η+1||ϕ〉| |ϕ1〉 and
it does not depend on H(pad|| · · · ), where “· · · ” denotes arbitrary strings of length equal to the
keys in Λ.
Then we can similarly define
|ψ〉 = Px0U blind(PadHadamard≥2Advblind ◦ |ϕ˜〉) (434)
where U blind and Advblind mean, each oracle query in them is replaced by the query to the “blinded
oracle” where pad||x1 is blinded. Note that there is a difference: the blinding operation is done on
H ′′. Then we can similarly apply Lemma 6.20 and get
|ψ〉 ≈2−η/3+2||ϕ˜〉| Px0U(PadHadamard≥2Adv ◦ |ϕ˜〉) (435)
∴ |ψ〉 ≈2−η/3+3||ϕ〉| Px0U |ϕ′〉 (436)
Finally similarly we can apply Lemma F.1 on (434) and complete the proof.
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I.5.2 Overview of the proof of the security of Protocol 20
1. Notice the structure of the protocol can be seen as a loop. First, we use a technique similar
to the “multi-round decomposition method” described in Section 6.8.3. In more details, we
need to apply an argument repeatedly. We will iterate a similar argument for many rounds
to decompose the state. The argument in each round has a similar form.
Each round (for example, analysis of the j-th round of the protocol) of argument goes as
follows:
. The initial state is denoted by |χj−1〉.
We note that there is one key difference in our proof here from the technique description
in Section 6.8.3: in each round of decomposition we will use the “auxiliary-information
technique” to add the keys y(j−1) as the auxiliary information. This step is necessary
for the proofs after this “multi-round decomposition arguments”.
(a) The post-execution state is decomposed to two states |φj〉 and |χj〉. In more details, we
will first apply Lemma I.3 to analyze the protocol in this round, and do the decomposition
based on a discussion-by-cases on the post-execution state.
After this iteration-style proof completes, we reduce the “Security of Protocol 20” to a list
of statements on |φj〉 (j = 1, 2 · · · η2/κ), and |χη2/κ〉, (see (446)-(447)) where |φ···〉, |χ···〉 are
defined round-by-round during the proof. And we will see, since the norm of |χη2/κ〉 is already
exponentially small, we only need to prove the following statement on |φj〉:
∀j, PpassTempPrtl>j ◦ |φj〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
We name it as “Statement 4”
2. The proof of the “Statement 4” above can be further divided into the following steps:
(a) In Section I.5.4 we slightly simplify the “Statement 4” to “Statement 4′” as a preparation
for the further proof. “Statement 4′” is “∀j, |φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-
unpredictable for (432)”.
(b) We will first prove for each j, |φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j′)}j′>j is (2η2/20κ, 2−η2/20κ| |ϕ〉 |)-
ANY-secure for Λ(j);
(c) Then based on it, we prove the unpredictability in (432).
We describe the proof in four subsubsections. The first subsubsection (Section I.5.3) is the first
step above. Section I.5.4 is the step 2.a above, Section I.5.5 is the step 2.b above, and the Section
I.5.6 is the step 2.c above.
I.5.3 Proof of “Security of Protocol 20”, step 1: decomposition
We will organize different steps in a single round of this “iteration-style” proof using boxes: the
argument in each round can be broken into different pieces, and we put them into boxes. For the
argument outside the boxes — which is, how different pieces are connected together, we will first
describe them using the first round as an example, then describe the argument more generally.
Proof of Lemma 11.1, part III.Step 1. We use TempPrtl>i to denote the protocol starting from
round (i+ 1). The index of round counter starts at 1. Thus the security statement of Protocol 20
can be re-written as:
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PpassTempPrtl>0 |χ0〉 is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
As what we said before, we will first use the first round of the argument as an example, then
describe the argument more generally. So the statements outside the boxes use concrete indexes
(0, 1, etc) while the statements inside the boxes use letters to denote the indexes.
Recall that |χ0〉 satisfies:
Condition on |χ0〉:
∀j ∈ [J ], |χ0〉 is (2η2−10, 2−η2+10| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j) given Λ− Λ(j).
And apply Lemma 6.12 we know
|χ0〉⊙ < TempPrtl=1.1 > is (2η2−20, 2−η2+20| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(1). (437)
where < TempPrtl=1.1 > is the client side message in the first step of the first round. We take
it into consideration as the preparation of the following proofs.
Recall H ′′ is a freshly new blinded oracle (see (429)) and the paddings are sampled randomly
and can be added into the auxiliary information without affecting the SC-security, apply Lemma
6.17 (and use Fact 1 to show the “Tag is not injective on these inputs” has very small norm)
we have
|χ0〉⊙ < TempPrtl=1.1 > is (2η2−22, 2−η2+22| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(1) under H and H ′′.
(438)
But if we want to apply a statement inductively sometimes we want a statement that has
consistent form in each round; one common technique is to loosen the parameters. Here we
loosen the parameters from η2 to η2/2 here to make the statement consistent. The exact
meaning of it will be clear later.
Thus we have:
Property of |χ0〉 for Λ(1) after the relaxation:
|χ0〉⊙ < TempPrtl=1.1 > is (2η2/2, 2−η2/2| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(1) under H and H ′′. (439)
Then we need to study the behavior of the state in the next round. Denote
|ψ1〉 := PpassTempPrtl=1 |χ0〉 (440)
, the passing part of the post-execution state after the 1-st round of Protocol 20 completes when
the initial state is |χ0〉.
We can decompose |ψ1〉 into |φ1〉+ |χ1〉 as shown in the following box. Note that (1) below we
describe the decomposition for general t to make it consistent in each round of the iteration-style
proof. In the first round we can simply substitute j = 1. (2) the reader might get confused on why
there is “⊙y(j−1)” below. For j = 1 this term does not exist, but this is needed for the later round
of this iteration-style proof. (We will explain the reason for doing it later.)
State decomposition at round j, which is,
|ψj〉 (:= PpassTempPrtl=j(|χj−1〉 ⊙ y(j−1))), together with server’s ancillas, = |φj〉+ |χj〉
(441)
(Case 0) First, if | |χj−1〉 | ≤ 2−η2/10| |ϕ〉 |, take |φj〉 = 0, |χj〉 = |ψj〉 and the decomposition
is completed. Go to the summary of this box in the end (“thus for all the cases there are · · · ”).
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(Case 1) Otherwise, | |χj−1〉 | > 2−η2/10| |ϕ〉 |. Recall that in the TempPrtl=j step of the
protocol, the following operations are executed:
1. In the first step (denoted as TempPrtl=j.1) the client computes and sends two ciphertexts
(encrypted under Λ(j)) and two key tags (of Λ(j));
2. Then a padded Hadamard test on Λ(j) is executed.
Let’s first analyze the state after the first step. By “the properties of |χj−1〉” and the norm of
|χj−1〉 in the beginning of this case we know:
TempPrtl=j.1(|χj−1〉 ⊙ y(j−1)) is (2η2/2.5, 2−η2/2.5| |χj−1〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j) under H and
H ′′.
Then we can apply the property of the padded Hadamard Test. Apply Lemma I.3 and discuss
by cases:
• (Case 1.1) | |ψj〉 | ≤ 3536 | |χj−1〉 |. Then take |χj〉 = |ψj〉 and |φj〉 = 0.
• (Case 1.2) |ψj〉 is (2η2/15, 13 | |χj−1〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j) under H ′′.
Then apply the decomposition lemma for ANY-security (Lemma 6.7) and consider H ′′
as the random oracle, we can decompose |ψj〉 as |φj〉+ |χj〉 such that
1. | |χj〉 | ≤ 2.53 | |χj−1〉 |, and is (η2/2, 2η2/2)-server-side representable from |ψj〉 under
H ′′.
2. |φj〉 is (2η2/100, 2−η2/100| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j) underH ′′, and is (1, 2η2/2)-server-
side-representable from |ψj〉 under H ′′.
Thus for all the cases there are
• | |χj〉 | ≤ 3536 | |χj−1〉 | ≤ (3536 )j | |ϕ〉 |, and is (η2/2, 2η2/2)-server-side representable from |ψj〉
under H ′′.
• |φj〉 is (2η2/100, 2−η2/100| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j) under H ′′, and is (1, 2η2/2)-server-side-
representable from |ψj〉 under H ′′.
After the decomposition, we can reduce “Security of Protocol 20” to two statements:
PpassTempPrtl>1 |φ1〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432). (442)
PpassTempPrtl>1 |χ1〉 is (2η2/100κ, (2−η2/100κ − 2−η2/70κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432). (443)
For (442), we postpone it and later prove it together with other statements of the similar form.
For (443), we first apply the “auxiliary-information technique” to add some auxiliary information
to (443) and reduce (443) to the following statement:
PpassTempPrtl>1(|χ1〉 ⊙ y(1)) is (2η2/100κ, (2−η2/100κ − 2−η2/70κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
Why do we want to add the extra y(·) as auxiliary information? The reason is, as the previous cases
where we apply the “auxiliary-information technique”, adding more information to the read-only
buffer helps us analyze the server’s state. On the other hand, to analyze the behavior of the states
in the protocol TempPrtl>1, the conditions we need are only the norm of |χ1〉 and its security for
Λ(j), j ≥ 2, and its security for Λ(1) is not needed any more. Thus providing these information
does not affect the proof later.
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Note that the reason above does not hold for the |φ···〉 branch. We only add this auxiliary
information when we do this “iteration-style proof” on the |χ···〉 branch.
Then we can prove |χ1〉⊙y(1) satisfies a similar statement as “Properties of |χ0〉”. Here we write
the arguments below for general j ≥ 0. Note that we can substitute j = 1 to get the conditions for
this round.
Properties of |χj〉:
We are going to prove:
∀j′ ∈ [j + 1, J ], |χj〉 ⊙ y(j)⊙ < TempPrtl=(j+1).1 > is
(2η2−22 − j2η2/2 − j2κ+5, 2−η2+22+j log η2 | |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j′) given Λ(≥j+1) − Λ(j′) under
H and H ′′.
And we additionally have
| |χj〉 | ≤ (35
36
)j | |ϕ〉 | (444)
|χj〉 is (2α1+j log η2 , 2α2 + 2κ + j2η2)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉
under H and H ′′.
The proof is given below. Note that (444) is already proved inductively in the “state de-
composition” box. (And we further note that this box is used step-by-step in an upper-level
induction-style proof and we could not use it to get the properties of |χj〉 for all j ∈ [J ] once.
We need to repeat the argument in this box every time when j increases. If we are currently
at round j, |χj′〉 for j′ > j is not even well-defined yet.)
Proof of the properties of |χj〉. Recall how |χj〉 is constructed out.
1. |χj〉 is (η2/2, 2η2/2)-server-side-representable from |ψj〉 under H ′′;
2. |ψj〉 := PpassTempPrtl=j(|χj−1〉⊙y(j−1)), where in TempPrtl=j the client side messages
come from an algorithm on the random paddings, Λ(j), y(j) (freshly sampled in this step),
and random coins.
And the query number of the adversary in this step is at most 2κ+5.
3. And |χj−1〉 is constructed recursively.
By Lemma 6.12 and “the condition of |χ0〉” we know |χ0〉⊙ < TempPrtl=(j+1).1 > is
(2η2−22, 2−η2+22| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j′) given Λ − Λ(j′) under H and H ′′. (We implicitly
apply Lemma 6.17 to add H ′′ to the statement.) Then by Lemma 6.5 and the construction of
|χj〉 listed above we complete the proof of the property on the top of this box. Note that the
“−j2η2/2” and the j log η2 terms come from the decomposition step (step 1 above), and the
“−j2κ+5” comes from the adversary’s operation.
Then we can relax the parameter and get a statement that has consistent form for any
round t, and consistent with (439):
The property after relaxation on |χj〉 for Λ(j+1):
|χj〉 ⊙ y(j)⊙ < TempPrtl=(j+1).1 > is (2η2/2, 2−η2/2| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure for Λ(j+1) under H and H ′′.
(445)
Then similar technique can be applied again on PpassTempPrtl>1 |χ1〉, and (443) can be further
reduced to two statements.
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And we can repeat this argument round-by-round. And we can continue to apply the same
argument for η2/κ rounds (as long as j log η2 ≤ η2/2, which means we can do the “relaxation”
within the box of “properties for |χ···〉”) and construct |χ2〉, |χ3〉, |χ4〉 etc, and finally we can
reduce the proof of “Security of Protocol 20” to the following statements:
PpassTempPrtl>1 |φ1〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432). (446)
PpassTempPrtl>2 |φ2〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
· · · · · ·
PpassTempPrtl>η2/κ |φη2/κ〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
PpassTempPrtl>η2/κ |χη2/κ〉 is (2η2/100κ, (2−η2/100κ − (η2/κ)2−η2/70κ)| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
(447)
Note that (447) is already proved by the “properties on |χ···〉”:
| |χη2/κ〉 | ≤ (35
36
)−η2/κ| |χ0〉 | = (35
36
)−η2/κ| |ϕ〉 | < (2−η2/100κ − (η2/κ)2−η2/70κ)| |ϕ〉 | (448)
So the remaining problem is to study the SC-security of TempPrtl>j ◦ |φj〉. Our goal is to prove:
(Statement 4)∀j, PpassTempPrtl>j ◦ |φj〉 is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
Now we have reduced the proof of “security of Protocol 20” to the proof of Statement 4 above.
In the next subsubsection we will prove Statement 4.
I.5.4 A slight simplification of Statement 4: Statement 4′
By Lemma 6.3, to prove Statement 4, it’s enough to prove
(Statement 4′)∀j, |φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
. Note that in this statement the unpredictability is defined on the original (unblinded) oracle H.
I.5.5 Step 2b of the overview in Section I.5.2
What conditions do we have on |φj〉? From the “state decomposition” box in the previous subsub-
section we know
|φj〉 is (2η2/1000, 2−η2/1000| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j) under H ′′ (449)
To continue, let’s write down a summary for the source of state |φj〉:
|φj〉 is (1, 2η2/2)-server-side representable from |ψj〉 under H ′′ (450)
∀j′ ≤ j, |ψj′〉 := PpassTempPrtl=j′(|χj′−1〉 ⊙ y(j′−1)) (451)
where the adversary queries H ′′ for ≤ 2κ+5 queries, y(j′−1) is sampled randomly in TempPrtl=j′−1
∀j′ ≤ j, |χj′〉 is (η2/2, 2η2/2)-server-side representable from |ψj′〉 under H ′′ (452)
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where |χ0〉 is the initial state, whose properties are given in the security statement of TempPrtl.
Thus
|χ0〉 is (2α1 , 2α2 + 2κ)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉. (453)
And the goal of this subsubsection is to prove
|φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j′)}j′>j is (2η2/20κ, 2−η2/20κ| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j). (454)
What’s the difference of (449) and (454)? There are three differences:
• Whether there is additional auxiliary information < TempPrtl>j >; note that this part also
exists in “Statement 4′”;
• We add {y(j′)}j′>j, the “temporary output key” in round [j + 1, J ], into the auxiliary infor-
mation; this makes this statement stronger, and is useful for the proofs later;
• Whether the ANY-security is under H or H ′′.
Recall that H ′′ is the blinded oracle where the entries in the form of
padjbr ,ct||padfixed||r
(j)
br
, padjbr ,tg||padfixed||r
(j)
br
,∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ [J ]
are blinded, and the adversary can only query H ′′ during the protocol. However, what we
want to prove is the unpredictability under H.
To prove it, we will use a technique that is similar to the proof of Lemma 6.12.
Proof of (454). We first reduce (454) to some simpler-but-stronger statement.
First note that < TempPrtl>j > contains two parts: the client side messages of the third step
(the padded Hadamard test) in each round, and the client side messages of the first step in each
round, which contain the “ciphertexts” and the “key tags”, as shown in (431). Recall that they are
H(padj
′
br ,ct
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
)⊕ y(j′),H(padj′br ,tg||padfixed||r
(j′)
br
),∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j′ ∈ [j + 1, J ] (455)
Since {y(j′)}j′>j is also given as the auxiliary information, (454) can be further strengthened and
reduced to the following statement:
|φj〉⊙ < HOutput>j > ⊙{y(j′)}j′>j is (2η2/20κ, 2−η2/20κ| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j). (456)
where < HOutput>j > is defined to be the random oracle outputs in the form of
H(padj
′
br ,ct
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),H(padj
′
br ,tg
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j′ ∈ [j + 1, J ] (457)
which are the oracle outputs of H on the blinded part for j′ ∈ [j + 1, J ].
Then notice that y(j
′)(j′ > j) are sampled freshly randomly. Thus (456) is reduced to proving
|φj〉⊙ < HOutput>j > is (2η2/20κ, 2−η2/20κ| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j). (458)
Now the problem of proving (454) boils down to proving (458).
Corresponding to the definition of < HOutput>j >, define < HOutput<j > as the random
oracle outputs of H for j′ ∈ [1, j − 1]:
H(padj
′
br ,ct
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),H(padj
′
br ,tg
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j′ ∈ [1, j − 1] (459)
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and define < HOutput=j > as the random oracle outputs of H when j
′ = j:
H(padj
′
br ,ct
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),H(padj
′
br ,tg
||padfixed||r(j
′)
br
),∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j′ = j (460)
. We note that these “HOutput” describe the random oracle outputs of H (instead of H ′′”) on the
blinded part. And we notice that
• < HOutput<j > can be deterministically recovered from the messages stored in the read-only
buffer of |φj〉: recall that in each round of the protocol the client sends out (431), and when we
do the statement reduction every time (for each j′ ∈ [2, j]) we analyze TempPrtl=j′ |χj′−1〉,
we first add y(j
′−1) as auxiliary information, as shown in (441). Thus < HOutput<j > can
be recovered from the client-side messages and these auxiliary information.
• For < HOutput=j >, note that we already have (449), which means the adversary cannot
query the corresponding input entries with high norm.
• < HOutput>j > is the main thing that we need to deal with. Notice that the protocol does
not use the values of this part before time j.
To “switch” the oracle from H ′′ to H, we will first switch the oracle from H ′′ to “Hmid”, which the
random oracle that
1. On the entries in the form of (460), it behaves the same as H ′′.
2. Otherwise it behaves the same as H.
And the structure of the following proof is:
1. We will first prove
|φj〉⊙ < HOutput>j > is (2η2/9κ, 2−η2/9κ| |ϕ〉 |)-ANY-secure for Λ(j) under Hmid (461)
using a technique similar to the proof of Lemma 6.12;
2. Then we make use of Lemma 6.18 to complete the proof of (458).
To prove (461), by proof-by-contradiction we assume there exists a server-side operation U such
that the query number to Hmid is at most 2η2/κ and
|PΛ(j)U(|φj〉⊙ < HOutput>j >)| > 2−η2/κ| |ϕ〉 | (462)
, then assuming (462), our goal is to construct a server-side operation U ′, operated on |φj〉 such
that U ′ only queries H ′′, the number of oracle queries to H ′′ is at most 2η2/1000, and
|PΛ(j)U ′ |φj〉 | > 2−η2/1000| |ϕ〉 | (463)
Which contradicts (449).
Note that Tag(Λ) is already in the read-only buffer thus it does not need to be added into
(462)(463).
The first step is to prove the initial state (here we mean |χ0〉) is close to a state that does not
depend on H(Pads|| · · · ) (recall Definition 4.9), where Pads is a set of pads as follows:
Pads = {padj′br ,ct, pad
j′
br ,tg
: ∀br ∈ {0, 1}, j′ ∈ [1, J ]}
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From (453), the pad length l in Lemma 11.1 and Lemma 4.3 we know, define |χ˜0〉 as the result of
replacing each oracle query to H in the representation of |χ0〉 by H · (I −PPads||···), (which means,
remove the query inputs whose prefixes are contained in the Pads system), there is
|χ˜0〉 ≈2−η2 ||ϕ〉| |χ0〉 (464)
Notice that H ·(I−PPads||···) = H ′′ ·(I−PPads||···), thus we can also imagine this state is represented
(recall Definition I.1) under H ′′.
Then we view |χ˜0〉 instead of |χ0〉 as the initial state, and based on the same (450)-(452), we
can define |φ˜j′〉 , |χ˜j′〉, etc, inductively and notice that the adversary still only queries H ′′. Some of
the computation of client side messages will query H, but the adversary will not.
And what we want to do (we mean (463)) is reduced to
|PΛ(j)U ′(|φ˜j〉 ⊙ Pads)| > 2−η2/1000+2| |ϕ〉 | (465)
and the condition (we mean (462)) implies
|PΛ(j)U(|φ˜j〉⊙ < HOutput>j >)| > 2−η2/κ−2| |ϕ〉 | (466)
Let’s explain the intuition of what we are going to do. We know one key difference of (465) and
(466) is in (466) we “switch back” the oracle from H ′′ to Hmid (in other words, although |φ˜j〉 comes
from H ′′, U queries Hmid,) while in (465) everything is under H ′′. Note that the difference of Hmid
and H ′′ can be described by < HOutput>j > and < HOutput<j >, and:
• < HOutput<j > could be deterministically recovered from the read-only buffer;
• < HOutput>j > is never used (by neither party) when we represent |φ˜j〉 under H ′′.
In other words, Hmid can be simulated as follows: first sample a “fake” version of < HOutput>j >,
then make use of H ′′, < HOutputfake>j > and < HOutput<j > to simulate it. (Note that we need
to be a little bit careful in this simulation to handle the case that some keys in Λ are coincidently
the same. The probability is small and does not affect the final result.)
We note that there is one difference from this proof to the proof of Lemma 6.12: here <
HOutput>j >, together with< HOutput<j >, completely describes the differences ofH
′′ andHmid,
thus the operation only needs to sample randomness for the “fake” version of < HOutput>j >; while
in the proof of Lemma 6.12 the operation needs to sample lots of randomness as the “background
values”.
The construction details for U ′ are as follows.
1. U ′ samples
out
fake−(j′)
br ,ct
, out
fake−(j′)
br ,tg
, j′ ∈ [j + 1, J ], br ∈ {0, 1}
randomly, with length the same as the corresponding terms shown in (457). These are used
as the “< HOutputfake>j >”.
2. The “fake oracle ” Hfake is defined as follows. For each query to Hfake, suppose the input is
x, Hfake does the following:
(a) It first check whether x has the form shown in the inputs in (457)(459)(460). This can
be achieved with Tag(Λ) as long as Tag is injective on inputs with the same length as
the keys in Λ, and the space that Tag is not injective on these inputs are very small by
Fact 1.
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(b) If not, or it is in the form of the inputs shown in (460), return H ′′(x).
(c) Otherwise, if it has the form of (459), return the corresponding values from the <
HOutput<j > (recovered in the read-only buffer)
(d) Otherwise, if it has the form of (457), return out
fake−(j′)
br,ct
or out
fake−(j′)
br,tg
(correspond-
ingly).
Denote the operation where all the queries in U are replaced by Hfake as Ufake.
3. U ′ is defined as the the combination of the two steps above: it samples < HOutputfake>j >,
puts it into the system that are used to store < HOutput>j > in (466), and runs Ufake.
When the < HOutput>j > and the oracle queries in (466) are replaced by the fake versions, by the
discussion above we will have
|PΛ(j)U ′(|φ˜j〉 ⊙ Pads)| = |PΛ(j)Ufake(|φ˜j〉⊙ < HOutputfake>j > ⊙Pads))| (467)
(By discussions above and Fact 1) ≈2−η2 ||ϕ〉| |PΛ(j)U(|φ˜j〉⊙ < HOutput>j >)| (468)
Thus (465) is satisfied and we get a contradiction. Thus we complete the proof of (461).
Finally apply Lemma 6.18 we can switch the oracle from Hmid to H and the proof of (458) is
completed. Thus we complete this step ((454), the first part of the proof of Statement 4′).
I.5.6 Step 2c of the overview in Section I.5.2
Now we can proceed to the step 2c of the overview in Section I.5.2, which is the
second part of the proof of Statement 4′. We will move from the security for keys in Λ to the
unpredictability of the output keys.
The idea is intuitively as follows:
1. y(j) is encrypted under padfixed||r(j)0 and padfixed||r(j)1 . And intuitively we can reduce the
unpredictability of plaintext (here it’s y(j)) to the unpredictability of keys (ignoring padfixed,
it’s Λ(j) = {r(j)br }br∈{0,1}).
In more details, y(j) is unpredictable because it’s encrypted as follows:
(a) The four random pads pad
(j)
br ,“ct”/“tg”
, br ∈ {0, 1} are sampled randomly. (“Four” corre-
sponds to two possible choices of br and two choices for “ct”/“tg”.)
(b) During the protocol the adversary queries the blinded oracleH ′′ where pad(j)br ,“ct”/“tg”||padfixed||r
(j)
br
are blinded.
(c) And after the protocol by (454) the state is (2η2/20κ, 2−η2/20κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for
both r
(j)
0 and r
(j)
1 , by the conclusion in Section I.5.5.
2. Note that during Protocol 20, y(j) is used as a part of (432). Intuitively we can reduce the
unpredictability of (432) to the unpredictability of y(j);
Formalizing the intuition above gives us the second step of the proof of Statement 4′.
Let’s first study the unpredictability for y(j), the output key in the j-th round of TempPrtl.
The statement we will prove is
|φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > is (2η2/70κ, 2−η2/70κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for y(j) given {y(j′)}j′∈[J ],j′ 6=j .
(469)
Note that one thing we need to be careful of is: in the definition of the unpredictability we need to
add Tag(y(j)) as the auxiliary information. The proof is given below.
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Proof of (469). Since {y(j′)}j′∈[J ],j′<j is already stored in the read-only buffer, we can assume what
we want to prove is the unpredictability for y(j) given {y(j′)}j′∈[J ],j′>j.
Suppose D is a server-side operation that tries to compute y(j) in (469). Note that it only
queries H and the query number |D| ≤ 2η2/30κ. (But note that within the definition of |φj〉, which
is (450)-(453), there do be queries to H ′′.)
Let’s further define two blinded oracles.
• Denote H˜ as a blinded oracle of H where the followings are blinded:
H(pad0||padfixed||r(j)0 ),H(pad1||padfixed||r(j)1 ), Tag(y(j)) (470)
where pad0, pad1 are the abbreviation of pad
(j)
br ,“ct”
, br ∈ {0, 1}, the random pads used in the
computation of ciphertexts that encrypt y(j).
• Then define H˜ ′′ as the blinded oracle of H ′′ where Tag(y(j)) is blinded using the same output
values as H˜. (Recall that H ′′ itself is a blinded oracle; and we further blind Tag(y(j)) on it.)
Now we do the followings step by step:
1. Expand |φj〉 using (450)-(453). Then in the sense of Definition I.1:
(a) |φj〉 is (2j log η2 , j2η2)-representable from |χ0〉 under H,H ′′ (where the queries to H are
only from the computation of the client side messages);
(b) |χ0〉, as (453) says, is (2α1 , 2α2+2κ)-representable from |EV ERY THING INITIALIZED〉.
Let’s start from the representation of |χ0〉 above. Within the representation of |χ0〉, before
each query to H, do a projection onto I−Pspan(pad0||··· , pad1||··· ) (removing the queries which
have prefix in {pad0, pad1}). Denote the result state as |χ˜0〉. Define |φ˜j〉 (similar to |φj〉)
through (450)-(453), using |χ˜0〉 (instead of |χ0〉) above as the initial state. By Lemma 4.3,
|φ˜j〉 ≈2−η2/2||ϕ〉| |φj〉 (471)
2. Starting from this step, we will replace the oracle queries by queries to H˜ or H˜ ′′ step-by-step.
The replacement in this step will consider the queries within the definition of |φ˜j〉, and in the
next step we will consider the query in D. What we will do in this step is as follows:
(a) Within the “representation” of |χ˜0〉, we will replace the queries to H by queries to H˜.
In the previous step we have already “removed” the queries that contain prefixes in
{pad0, pad1}, which covers the first two in (470). If we compareH·(I−Pspan(pad0||··· , pad1||··· ))
and H˜ · (I −Pspan(pad0||··· , pad1||··· )), we still need to use the hybrid method to blind the
oracle output on Tag(y(j)).
(b) In the “representation” of |φ˜j〉 from |χ˜0〉, we will replace the queries to H ′′ by queries
to H˜ ′′. (Here client side queries to H remain the same.)
And when we replace H ′′ by H˜ ′′, we only need to blind the Tag(y(j)) part.
Since y(j) is sampled randomly, if we do this replacement step by step, we have the following
fact on the difference caused by each step of the replacement and the total number of steps
of replacement:
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• At some step of this replacement, since (1)all the queries to Tag(y(j)) by this time have
been replaced, (2) if the server only queries H˜ ′′, the client side message in the j-th
round looks the same as random strings, and on the server side, predicting y(j) is as
hard as predicting a random string of the same length. Thus we have, each step of the
replacement makes at most a difference of 2−κout/2+α1+(η2/κ)·log η2 | |ϕ〉 | on the output
state. (α1 comes from (453) and log η2 comes from (452). And notice that t < η2/κ.)
• The total number of steps in this replacement is bounded by 2α2 + 2η2/κ + 2κ+5.
Thus if we denote the final state after this step completes as | ˜˜φj〉, there is
| ˜˜φj〉 ≈2−η2/2||ϕ〉| |φ˜j〉 (472)
3. In this step we replace the oracle queries in D by queries to the blinded oracle. Suppose Dblind
is the operation coming from replacing the oracle queries in D by queries to H˜. Suppose Ds
is the operation in Dblind from the beginning to the time just before the s-th query. By
(454)(471)(472) we have
∀s, |PΛ(j)Ds(| ˜˜φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j
′)}j′>j ⊙ Tag(y(j)))| ≤2−η2/22κ| |ϕ〉 | (473)
(Details: First note that since all the queries to Tag(y(j)) has been blinded, if we replace
the Tag(y(j)) term in (473) by random strings it makes no difference. Then we can simply
replace all the queries to the blinded version of Tag(y(j)) by the original Tag(y(j)) since they
are both just random strings and there is no difference. This step replace the queries to H˜
in D by queries to a blinded oracle where only the first two terms in (470) are blinded, and
replace | ˜˜φj〉 by |φ˜j〉. Then we can apply (471) to replace |φ˜j〉 by |φj〉, which introduce a little
bit extra noise; finally we can apply (454).)
And we also have
∀s, |Py(j)Ds(| ˜˜φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j
′)}j′>j ⊙ Tag(y(j)))| ≤ 2−η2/22κ| |ϕ〉 | (474)
The reason is, after all the queries to (470) have been replaced, the ciphertexts of y(j), which
is
H(padbr ||padfixed||r(j)br )⊕ y(j)
become random strings, and predicting y(j) is as hard as predicting a freshly-new random
string.
By Lemma 6.15
D(| ˜˜φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j′)}j′>j ⊙ Tag(y(j))) (475)
≈2−η2/60κ||ϕ〉|Dblind(| ˜˜φj〉⊙ < TempPrtl>j > ⊙{y(j
′)}j′>j ⊙ Tag(y(j))) (476)
Note that (474) can also be applied on Dblind. Then summing up the error term in (471)(472)(476)
completes the proof of (469).
Now we can complete the proof of Statement 4′:
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Proof of Statement 4′. Then we need to reduce the unpredictability of (432) to the unpredictability
of y(j). We need to be a little bit careful here, since in the definition of the unpredictability of
(432), Tag( (432) ) is provided to the adversary, which does not exist in the unpredictability of
y(j).
Recall that
(432) = pad||padfixed||y(1)|| · · · ||y(j)|| · · · ||y(J)
Here pad is sampled randomly, and all the other parts (other than y(j)) have already been stored
in the read-only buffer or given as the auxiliary information, Tag( (432) ) can be viewed as a hash
value of y(j) with some paddings. Then applying Lemma 6.12 completes the proof of Statement 4′.
Then combine Statement 4 and equation (448) and apply the triangle inequality of SC-security
(Lemma 6.1), the proof of the Security of Protocol 20 is completed.
I.6 Remaining Steps
Now we combine everything and complete the proof of Lemma 11.1.
First we can complete the proof of Statement 1.
Proof of Lemma 10.1, Part III. Recall that we reduce Statement 3 to “Security of Protocol 20”.
Since “Security of Protocol 20” is proved in the last subsection, the proof of Statement 3 has been
completed.
Summing everything up by the triangle inequality of the SC-security, the 2−η1/3+3| |ϕ〉 | term (in
equation (427)) dominates (η2 is much bigger than η1). Thus we complete the proof of Statement
1.
Then we prove the “Statement 2” in Outline 5, Section I.3.
Proof of Statement 2. The Statement 2 (about Adv0) can be proved in a similar way. Let’s describe
the proof in more details. Similar to the proof in Section I.4, we can reduce “Statement 2” to the
“Statement 3′′”, as follows:
Note that one difference of “Statement 2” from “Statement 1” is both the x
(i)
0 and x
(i)
1 parts
of the queries are “removed”. Thus what the adversary can do during the attack is less than what
it can do in the setting of Statement 1, thus proving it is actually easier. To reuse the proof of
Statement 1, we strengthen the statement. We choose b ∈ {0, 1} arbitrarily and assume during
the protocol execution the adversary can actually query H ′′ defined below, where only x(i)1−b part is
blinded.
Same as the proof in Section I.4, define H ′′ as the blinded oracle where
H(pad
(i)(j)
1−b,br ,ct||x
(i)
1−b||r(j)br ),H(pad
(i)(j)
1−b,br ,tg||x
(i)
1−b||r(j)br ),∀j ∈ [1, J ], br ∈ {0, 1} (477)
are blinded. (Note that i, 1−b are fixed. Thus we blind 4J entries.) Then we can reduce “Statement
2” to the statement below by adding auxiliary information and narrowing the blinded part of the
random oracle:
(“Statement 3′′”, repeated) Suppose κ is bigger than some constant and the initial state |ϕ〉
satisfies the conditions listed in Lemma 11.1. For any adversary Adv′ that only queries H ′′ during
the protocol, and the total number of queries to H ′′ is at most 2κ+4, the post-execution state,
defined as
PpassSecurityRefreshingAdv′(K,Λ;PadLen = l, OutLen = κout) ◦ (
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|ϕ〉⊙ < AuxInf > ⊙K ⊙ (Kout −K(i)out)⊙ {y(i)(j)b }j∈[1,J ] ⊙GTnot K(i)) (478)
is (2η2/100κ, 2−η2/100κ| |ϕ〉 |)-unpredictable for (432).
And the statement can be further reduced to the “security of Protocol 20”. Thus we can use the
same “security of TempPrtl” to prove the “Statement 2”.
Finally we can put everything together and complete the third step of the Outline 5 thus
complete the whole proof.
Proof. By triangle inequality of the SC-security we can combine Statement 1 and Statement 2 to
complete the proof of Lemma 11.1. See Outline 5 for more details.
J Proof of Lemma 12.3
Proof. The idea is to expand everything. It’s a little bit similar to the proof of Lemma 6.16.
Expand the expression of the distinguishing advantage, we need to prove for any distinguisher
D run by the server with queries |D| ≤ 2κ, θ˜ = θ2π/2 + θ3π/4, there is:
|tr(P0(D(ϕ1 ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ (θ2, θ3))D†))− tr(P0D(ϕ1 ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ (θ′2, θ′3 ←r {0, 1}2))D†)|
(479)
≤2−η/9| |ϕ1〉 | (480)
Where ϕ1 := |ϕ1〉 〈ϕ1|, |ϕ1〉 = ∑i∈[κ]Pi∑b |ϕi,b〉. When we substitute it into the trace operations
above, each term above has the following form, where θ? can be replaced by θ2, θ3 or θ
′
2, θ
′
3:
tr(P0D(ϕ1 ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ θ?2,3)D†) (481)
=
∑
i
∑
j
∑
b
tr(P0D(Pi(|ϕi,b〉 〈ϕj,b|)P†j ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ θ?2,3)D†) (482)
+
∑
i
∑
j
∑
b
tr(P0D(Pi(|ϕi,b〉 〈ϕj,1−b|))P†j ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ θ?2,3)D†) (483)
We will call (482) “the first term” and (483) “the second term”. Notice that the first term is
tr(P0D(|ϕ10〉 〈ϕ10|⊙PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙(θ?2, θ?3))D†))+tr(P0D(|ϕ11〉 〈ϕ11|⊙PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙(θ?2, θ?3)D†) (484)
where
|ϕ1b〉 :=
∑
i∈[κ]
Pi |ϕi,b〉
First we can prove each of the second term is exponentially small. That’s because, for all i ∈ [κ], j ∈
[κ], b ∈ {0, 1}:
tr(P0D(Pi(|ϕi,b〉 〈ϕj,1−b|))P†j ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ θ?2,3)D†) (485)
≤|Px1−bPjDP0DPi(|ϕi,b〉 |PhaseGT (θ˜)〉 |θ?2,3〉)| (486)
Note that all the operations in Px1−bPjDP0DPi are server-side. Since |ϕi,b〉 ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜) is
(2η/8, 2−η/8| |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K = {x0, x1} (by Lemma 6.11), and PSixb |ϕi,b〉 = |ϕi,b〉, we know
|ϕi,b〉 ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜) is (2η/8, 2−η/8| |ϕ1〉 |)-unpredictable for x1−b. And we have the query number
|PjDP0DPi| ≤ 2η/8, thus we know (486) is ≤ 2−η/8| |ϕ1〉 |.
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Note that equation (483) contains 2κ2 such terms thus the norm of (483) is at most 2−η/8.5| |ϕ1〉 |.
Thus to bound the distinguishing advantage, we only need to consider the first term in the
expansion of (481), which is (484). Substitute (484) into (479), we only need to give a bound for:∑
b
| tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b |⊙PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙(θ2, θ3))D†))−tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b |⊙PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙(θ′2, θ′3)D†)|
(487)
First we know |ϕ1b〉 is (2η/2, 2−η/2| |ϕ1〉 |)-unpredictable for x1−b. Thus consider
tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b | ⊙ PhaseGT hyb(θ˜)⊙ (θ?2, θ?3))D†))
where PhaseGT hyb comes from replacing the entries in PhaseGT that are encrypted under x1−b
by random values, by Lemma 6.22 this causes at most 2−η/8| |ϕ1〉 | difference:
| tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b | ⊙ PhaseGT hyb(θ˜)⊙ (θ?2, θ?3))D†))− tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b | ⊙ PhaseGT (θ˜)⊙ (θ?2, θ?3))D†))|
(488)
≤2−η/8| |ϕ1〉 | (489)
. And when the phase garbled tables are replaced, θ and θ′ look completely the same:
tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b | ⊙ PhaseGT hyb(θ˜)⊙ (θ2, θ3))D†)) (490)
= tr(P0D(|ϕ1b〉 〈ϕ1b | ⊙ PhaseGT hyb(θ˜)⊙ (θ′2, θ′3))D†)) (491)
Summing up (488)(490) for b ∈ {0, 1} and ? ∈ {empty,′ } gives a bound for (487). Thus we complete
the proof.
K Proof of Lemma 12.1
K.1 An Overview of Proof of Lemma 12.1
Recall that an overview of this proof is also given in Section 12.4.1.
To make it easier to understand, we give a list for the meaning of different characters:
• i ∈ [κ] is the index of blocks; (recall that we divide the κ2 rounds of tests to κ blocks where
each block has κ rounds of tests.) Another viewpoint is it denotes the round count of the
induction-style reduction proof. In each round of the reduction we analyze κ rounds of basis
test. i-th blocks (i-th round of the reduction) corresponds the (i− 1)κ+1 ∼ iκ rounds of the
test in the protocol.
• t denotes the index of round within some block. t ∈ [κ].
So the t-th test in the i-th block corresponds to the ((i − 1)κ + t)-th round of test in the
original protocol.
Ideas of the proof, repeated Note that our proof of Lemma 12.1 is as follows: we reduce Lemma
12.1 to the “Statement-round-1-completed”, then reduce it to “Statement-round-2-completed”, etc,
where the statements are described in Section 12.4.1.
Note that the description above is simplified; during each round of the reduction, we need to
add an assumption on the norm of the state; and we will stop this reduction if this assumption
does not hold. In Section K.2 we will describe the reduction from “Statement-round-i-completed”
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to “Statement-round-(i+1)-completed”, where i ∈ [κ] is arbitrary. And we will describe the overall
proof in Section K.3.
In each round of this reduction, the structure of the argument is as below. We use the (i+1)-th
round of the argument as an example. (Note that i starts from 0 here, thus what we mean is the
reduction from “Statement-round-i-completed” to “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”):
1. Starting from the “Statement-round-i-completed”, we consider a fixed but arbitrary adversary
and apply Lemma 7.3 (assuming the norm of the state we consider is not too small). This
leads to two cases.
• Case 1: there exists a time t in the middle such that the state at this time can be
controlled. For this case, we will do the following two step reduction:
(a) Eliminate the test after time t in this block of test and reduce the statement to
“Statement-round-(i + 1).Case1.1”,
(b) Eliminate the test before time t in this block of test and reduce it further to
“Statement-round-(i + 1).Case1.2”;
• Case 2: the norm of passing space of the final state can be bounded. For this case the
analogous two step reduction becomes:
(a) Write down a statement that has an analogous form to the statement in Case 1, and
name it as “Statement-round-(i + 1).Case2.1”,
(b) Eliminate the test in this block and reduce the statement to “Statement-round-
(i+ 1).Case2.2”.
2. Finally we show how the statements coming out of these two cases can both be covered by
a single statement, and this statement exactly has the form of “Statement-round-(i + 1)-
completed”.
K.2 Statement Reduction: from “Statement-round-i-completed” to “Statement-
round-(i+ 1)-completed”
Let’s consider the (i + 1)-th round, 0 ≤ i ≤ κ − 1. This corresponds to the reduction from
“Statement-round-i-completed” to “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”. And we need to analyze
the block of tests with index starting from round iκ+1. (Which is the first block, or round, in the
post-elimination protocol. Here we use the corresponding index before the elimination.)
Reduction from “Statement-round-i-completed” to “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”. Now we want
to reduce the “Statement-round-i-completed” to some other statement. Recall the description of the
“Statement-round-i” in Section 12.4.1. (Substitute s = i.) Note that in the beginning “Statement-
round-0-completed” is defined to be Lemma 12.1 itself.
There are κ2 − iκ rounds of BasisTest. We can represent the post-execution state after all the
κ2 − iκ rounds of tests as
PpassBasisTestAdv(K; iκ + 1 ∼ κ2) ◦ (P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · · + Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉)) (492)
+PpassBasisTestAdv(K; iκ + 1 ∼ κ2) ◦ |φi〉 (493)
Here we use iκ+ 1 ∼ κ2 to mean these remaining basis tests correspond to the iκ + 1-th to κ2-th
rounds of tests in the original protocol (we mean the “BasisTest(K;κ2)” in Lemma 12.1.) Note
that since each round of the basis test is the same operation, it doesn’t matter whether it’s the
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iκ + 1-th to κ2-th rounds or 1st to (κ2 − iκ)-th rounds; we choose this notation because it shows
how this single-round reduction is used in the upper-level proof: recall that we need to first analyze
the first block, which corresponds to the 1 ∼ κ rounds in the tests, and this reduces Lemma
12.1 to “Statement-round-1-completed”; and we continue this process to analyze the second block,
third block, etc. And currently we are focusing on the (i + 1)-th block, which corresponds to the
iκ+ 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ rounds in the original protocol.
In other words, here the test round with index iκ+ 1 is actually the first round.
Further note that when i = 0 there is no (492); and |φ0〉 appeared in (493) is defined to be |ϕ1〉
in Lemma 12.1.
As we discussed above, consider the first block of κ rounds of tests here, which can be denoted
as BasisTest(K; iκ+1 ∼ (i+1)κ). Now we use |φi,t〉 to denote the post-execution state after time
t ∈ [0, κ] (which means, after the basis tests in round iκ+ 1 ∼ iκ+ t) when the protocol is applied
on |φi〉:
|φi,t〉 = BasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+t(K; iκ+ 1 ∼ iκ+ t) ◦ |φi〉
Here we use AdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+t to denote the code of the adversary between round iκ+ 1 ∼ iκ+ t.
We can apply Lemma 7.3. Let’s first give the conditions for applying this lemma. From
“Statement-round-i-completed” (see Section 12.4.1) we can prove the followings on |φi〉:
SC-security of |φi〉 for K
From “Statement-round-i-completed” we know |φi〉 is (1, i2κ+2)-server-side-representable from
|φ0〉⊙ < AuxInf1∼i1 > ⊙ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ iκ) > ⊙ < TAG1∼i > (494)
And we know |φ0〉 is (2η , 2−η| |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K. By Lemma 6.11 we know
|φi〉 is (2η/12, 2−η/12| |ϕ1〉 |)-SC-secure for K. (495)
Which implies, (loosen the parameters to make the statement consistent in each round),
Either | |φi〉 | < 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 |, or |φi〉 is (2η/20, 2−η/20| |φi〉 |)-SC-secure for K. (496)
thus we get, if
| |φi〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 | (497)
, there is (by applying Lemma 7.3)
• (Case 1): There exists ti+1 ∈ [0, κ − 1], a server-side operation Ui+1 with query number
≤ 2κ+ iκ+20 (whose form might depend on the code of Adv on the (iκ+ ti+1+1)-th round)
such that
|(I − PSi+1K )Ui+1(Ppass |φi,ti+1〉⊙ < AuxInf i+11 >)| ≤
1
10
| |φi〉 | (498)
Si+1 is a server-side system, (499)
the algorithm of AuxInf i+11 is the same as the < AuxInf > in Lemma 7.3, but run on
freshly new random coins.
• (Case 2):
|Ppass |φi,κ〉 | ≤ 1
2
| |φi〉 | (500)
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Discuss by cases. In both cases the reductions contain two steps. The “first step” of these reductions
are to “remove the tests after the time ti+1”, while the “second step” of these reductions are to
“remove the tests by the time ti+1”. (The meaning of these descriptions will become clear later.)
• Case 1: The first step is to remove the BasisTest from round iκ + ti+1 + 1 to (i + 1)κ.
The idea is to replace the real protocol by auxiliary information that contain the client-side
messages (and some other things) in the protocol, and prove that this does not make the
adversary weaker. Define
< AuxInf i+1> >=< BasisTest(K; (iκ+ ti+1+1) ∼ (i+1)κ) > ⊙ < TAGi+1(iκ+ti+1+1)∼(i+1)κ >
(501)
, where
– < BasisTest(K; (iκ + ti+1 + 1) ∼ (i + 1)κ) > is the client side messages from round
(iκ + ti+1 + 1) ∼ (i+ 1)κ.
– < TAGi+1(iκ+ti+1+1)∼(i+1)κ > contains all the Tag(r
t′), t′ ∈ [iκ + ti+1 + 1, (i + 1)κ] where
rt
′
denotes the output key used in the computation of the t′-th round of the BasisTest
protocol. (See protocols in Section 7.3, where we use the same symbol r to denote the
output keys.)
(The subscript “>” in (501) means “> ti+1”. Later we will see similar notations with subscript
≤.)
Now an adversary can simulate the execution of BasisTest from round iκ+ ti+1+1 to round
(i+1)κ with < AuxInf i+1> >. Note that it can also simulate Ppass with TAG
(i+1)
(iκ+ti+1+1)∼(i+1)κ,
as long as Tag is injective on inputs with that length (by Fact 1 the norm that it’s not injective
is very small). This implies that, if an adversary can get some distinguishing advantage
(defined as equation (183)) in the original statement, where
– the tests from round (iκ+ ti+1 + 1) to (i+ 1)κ are really executed;
– the number of RO queries by the adversary is at most 2κ + iκ
there exists an adversary which can distinguish with at least the same advantage minus a
very small value (which is the norm that Tag is not injective on inputs with length κout),
where
– the tests from round iκ+ti+1+1 to round (i+1)κ are not executed, but < AuxInf
i+1
> >
is provided instead;
– the number of RO queries by the adversary is at most 2κ+iκ+(κ−ti+1), where (κ−ti+1)
is for simulating Ppass.
Thus to prove the “statement-round-i-completed”, for Case 1, we only need to
prove the similar statement:
Statement-round-(i+ 1).Case1.1
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the
following conclusion holds”), with one difference: the right side of (183) is replaced by
(2−κ − i2−2η − 2−4η)| |ϕ1〉 |.
The conditions have the following differences:
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– The initial state is
Ppass |φi,ti+1〉⊙ < AuxInf i+11 > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1> > (502)
=Ppass(BasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 (K; iκ+ 1 ∼ iκ+ ti+1)◦ (503)
P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · · + Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉) (504)
)⊙ < AuxInf i+11 > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1> > (505)
+ Ppass(BasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 (K; iκ+ 1 ∼ iκ+ ti+1) ◦ |φ
i〉 (506)
)⊙ < AuxInf i+11 > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1> > (507)
where
∗ AdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 is the code of the adversary from round iκ + 1 ∼ iκ + ti+1
of the basis test part, which has query number at most 2κ + iκ.
∗ P1, · · · Pi, |ψ10〉 , |ψ11〉 , · · · |ψi0〉 , |ψi1〉,|φi〉 satisfy the conditions listed in the
“statement-round-i-completed”;
∗ < AuxInf i+11 >,< AuxInf i+1> > are defined in (498)(501).
Note that the (506) is actually Ppass |φi,ti+1〉 and it satisfies (498).
– The protocol is as follows: in the BasisTest step, the tests are executed for κ2 −
(i+1)κ rounds. The parameters of the protocol (pad length, output key length) are
the same.
– The adversary is Adv′, and it satisfies |Adv′| ≤ 2κ + (i+ 1)κ
The second step is: we can do something to “flatten” the
PpassBasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 (K; iκ + 1 ∼ iκ+ ti+1) (508)
in (503)(506). This will lead us to a further different statement.
Define
< AuxInf i+1≤ >=< BasisTest(K; (iκ+ 1) ∼ iκ+ ti+1) > ⊙ < TAGi+1iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 > (509)
where < TAGi+1κ+1∼κ+ti+1 > contains all the Tag(r
t) where rt denotes the output keys used
in the computation of BasisTest(K; (iκ+ 1) ∼ iκ+ ti+1).
Then if the server holds < AuxInf i+1≤ >, it can simulate the protocol execution, the ad-
versary’s operation and Ppass in (508) and get a “simulated Ppass |φi,ti+1〉”. This simulation
works as follows: the adversary goes through each step of the protocol in (508), and:
– It can run the code contained in AdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 itself;
– It already gets all the client-side messages from the < AuxInf i+1≤ >, and does not need
to wait for the client to send the message;
– And it can simulate the projection onto the passing space with the global tags of the
output keys, as long as Tag is injective on inputs with length κout; (by Fact 1 the norm
that this is not true is very small.)
– Finally for the “sending messages to the client” step, it simply initializes some empty
qubits and stores the response in it.
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Denote the server’s operation in this simulation as Pi+1. Note the query number of Pi+1 is
upper bounded by 2κ+0.1. We will use Pi+1 to replace (508) in (503)(506). The reason that
the adversary does not become weaker is as follows: let’s think about what is the difference of
this “simulated Ppass |φi,ti+1〉” from the real Ppass |φi,ti+1〉. The difference is when the server
needs to reply, whether it writes on the client side empty register or it writes on some empty
qubits on its own. Thus these two states are actually the same one if we ignore the position
of this part of system! And in the simulated case the server holds more system than the real
case. Thus replacing the initial state in this way does not make the adversary weaker.
We also notice that an inequality similar to (498) still holds for this “simulated state”:
|(I − PSi+1K )Ui+1(Pi+1(|φi〉⊙ < AuxInf i+1≤ >)⊙ < AuxInf i+11 >)| ≤
1
10
| |φi〉 | (510)
Thus to prove the “Statement-round-(i+1).Case1.1”, we can prove the following statement:
Statement-round-(i+ 1).Case1.2
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the
following conclusion holds”), with one difference: the right side of (183) is replaced by
(2−κ − i2−2η − 2 · 2−4η)| |ϕ1〉 |
The conditions have the following differences:
– The initial state has the following form:
Pi+1((P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · ·+ Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉) + |φi〉)⊙ < AuxInf i+1 >) (511)
=Pi+1((P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · ·+ Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉))⊙ < AuxInf i+1 >) (512)
+ Pi+1(|φi〉⊙ < AuxInf i+1 >) (513)
where
Pi+1 is a fixed server-side operation (with projection) with query number ≤ 2κ+0.1,
P1, · · · Pi, |ψ1b 〉 , · · · |ψib〉, |φi〉 satisfy the conditions in
“statement-round-i-completed”,
< AuxInf i+1 >:=< AuxInf i+11 > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1> > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1≤ >, (514)
(see (498)(501)(509)),
and there exists a fixed server-side operation Ui+1 with query number ≤ 2κ+0.1, a
server-side system Si+1, define
|χi+1〉 := (I − PSi+1K )Ui+1 | equation (513) 〉 (515)
there is
| |χi+1〉 | ≤ 1
10
| |φi〉 |
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– The protocol is as follows: in the BasisTest step, the basis tests on K are executed
for κ2 − (i + 1)κ rounds. The parameters of the protocol (pad length, output key
length) are the same.
– The adversary is Adv′, and it satisfies |Adv′| ≤ 2κ + (i+ 1)κ.
Now define
|φi+1〉 := U†i+1 |χi+1〉 = U†i+1(I − PSi+1K )Ui+1Pi+1(|φi〉⊙ < AuxInf i+1 >) (516)
Note that we have
| equation (513) 〉 = U†i+1(|ψi+10 〉+ |ψi+11 〉) + |φi+1〉 (517)
where ∀b ∈ {0, 1}, |ψi+1b 〉 := P
Si+1
xb Ui+1 | equation (513) 〉 (518)
We will use (517) when we further reduce this statement to “Statement-round-(i+1)-completed”.
• Case 2 (500): In this case, we can reduce “Statement-round-i-completed” to a new statement
as follows. The analog of the first step of Case 1 can be skipped, but we still write down a
similar statement for consistency.
Statement-round-(i+ 1).Case2.1
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the
following conclusion holds”), but the conditions have the following differences:
– The initial state is
PpassBasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼(i+1)κ(K; iκ + 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) ◦ ( (519)
P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · ·+ Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉)) (520)
+PpassBasisTestAdvBT :iκ+1∼(i+1)κ(K; iκ + 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) ◦ |φi〉 (521)
where
∗ AdvBT :iκ+1∼iκ+ti+1 is the code of the adversary from round iκ + 1 ∼ iκ + ti+1
of the basis test part, which has query number at most 2κ + iκ.
∗ P1 · · · Pi, |ψ10〉 , |ψ11〉 · · · |ψi0〉 , |ψi1〉, |φi〉 satisfy the conditions in “Statement-round-
i-completed”.
– the BasisTest is executed for κ2 − (i+ 1)κ rounds; the parameters of the protocol
are the same.
– The adversary Adv′ is slightly more powerful than the original adversary: |Adv′| ≤
2κ + (i+ 1)κ.
Then we do similar thing as the step 2 in Case 1. We reduce the statement-round-(i +
1).Case2.1 further to the following statement:
Statement-round-(i+ 1).Case2.2
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the
following conclusion holds”), with one difference: the right side of (183) is replaced by
(2−κ − i2−2η − 2−4η)| |ϕ1〉 |.
The conditions have the following differences:
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– The initial state can be written as
Pi+1( (P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + · · · + Pi(|ψi0〉+ |ψi1〉))+ (522)
|φi〉) ⊙ < BasisTest(K; iκ+ 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) > ⊙ < TAGi+1 >) (523)
where
∗ P1 · · · Pi, |ψ1b 〉 · · · |ψib〉, |φi〉 satisfy the conditions in
“Statement-round-i-completed”.
∗ The query number of Pi+1 is at most 2κ+0.1.
∗ < TAGi+1 > contains all the Tag(rt) where rt is the output key used in the
t-th round of the tests in BasisTest(K; iκ+ 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ).
– And the following is satisfied: |Pi+1 |equation (523)〉 | ≤ 12 | |φi〉 |.
– the BasisTest is executed for κ2 − (i+ 1)κ rounds; the parameters of the protocol
are the same.
– The adversary Adv′ is slightly more powerful than the original adversary: |Adv′| ≤
2κ + (i+ 1)κ.
Let’s define some symbols that match (518)(516): just choose
|ψi+10 〉 = |ψi+11 〉 = 0, |φi+1〉 = Pi+1 |equation (523)〉 (524)
To summarize, the third step is to combine these two cases: we can reduce both “Statement-
round-(i + 1).Case1.2” and “Statement-round-(i + 1).Case2.2” to a new statement (which is the
same for both cases). This new statement is called “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”.
And we note that the symbols in this statement may have different meanings as
the symbols in the previous statement, and we will explain the difference after giving
the statement:
Statement-round-(i+ 1)-completed
The conclusion is the same as Lemma 12.1 (we mean the statement below “then the follow-
ing conclusion holds”), with one difference: the right side of (183) is replaced by (2−κ − (i +
1)2−2η)| |ϕ1〉 |.
The conditions have the following differences:
• The initial state is in the form of
P1(|ψ10〉+ |ψ11〉) + P2(|ψ20〉+ |ψ21〉) + · · ·+ Pi+1(|ψi+10 〉+ |ψi+11 〉) + |φi+1〉 (525)
where
– | |φi+1〉 | ≤ (12)i+1| |ϕ1〉 |
– P1, P2, · · · Pi+1 are all server-side operations with query number ≤ (i+ 1)2κ+3.
– ∀b ∈ {0, 1},∀i′ ∈ [1, i + 1], PSi′xb |ψi
′
b 〉 = |ψi
′
b 〉, where Si′ is some server-side system.
– ∀b ∈ {0, 1},∀i′ ∈ [1, i + 1], |ψi′b 〉 is (1, i′2κ+2)-server-side-representable from
|φ0〉⊙ < AuxInf1∼i+11 > ⊙ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) > ⊙ < TAG1∼i+1 >
(526)
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where
∗ < AuxInf1∼i+11 >=< AuxInf11 > ⊙ < AuxInf21 > ⊙ · · · ⊙ < AuxInf i+11 >
∗ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ (i + 1)κ) > contains the client side messages from round
1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ of the tests.
∗ < TAG1∼i+1 > are the set of Tag(rt) where rt is the output key used in the
t-th round of < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) >.
– |φi〉 is (1, i2κ+2)-server-side-representable from (526).
• The protocol is as follows: in the BasisTest step, the basis tests are executed for κ2 −
(i+ 1)κ rounds. The parameters of the protocol (pad length, output key length) are the
same.
• The adversary is Adv, and it satisfies the query number |Adv| ≤ 2κ + (i+ 1)κ.
The reduction that we do in this step is as follows:
• Simplify the notation: First notice that in (514) the notation can be simplified as follows:
< AuxInf i+1> > ⊙ < AuxInf i+1≤ >=< BasisTest(K; iκ+ 1 ∼ (i+ 1)κ) > ⊙ < TAGi+1 >
Thus in the final statement we can combine the auxiliary information in the form of the left
hand side above and use the notation in the right hand side.
• Merge the “auxiliary information”: the auxiliary information in “Statement-round-(i+1).Case2.2”
is a subset of the auxiliary information in “Statement-round-(i+1).Case1.2”. (See (514) and
(523).) In the final statement we simply consider (514). The reason for it is, in the Case 2, by
Technique 6.2 adding more auxiliary information does not make the adversary weaker. Thus
merging the “auxiliary information” will not make the statement weaker.
• Change the symbol for the server-side operators: We note that P1, · · · Pi+1 in (525) should
not be understood as the same things as the operations with the same symbols in “Statement-
round-i-completed”, or “Statement-round-(i+1)-Case1.2”, or “Statement-round-(i+1)-Case2.2”.
Instead:
– In Case 1, P1, · · · Pi here should be understood as Pi+1P1, · · · Pi+1Pi in (512) and Pi+1
here is U†i+1 in (517).
– In Case 2 it can be understood as the operations in (522)(523).
Note that in “Statement-round-(i+1)-completed” there is no restriction on the form of these
server-side operations, thus this statement can cover both cases.
• Change the meaning of the states: Note that |ψi′b 〉 in the “Statement-round-(i+1)-completed”
have different meaning from the intermediate statements in the two cases and the previ-
ous rounds. The difference is it contains extra auxiliary information. Note that we add
< AuxInf i+11 > ⊙ < BasisTest(K; iκ + 1 ∼ (i + 1)κ) > ⊙ < TAGi+1 > as the auxiliary
information in this step. And when we describe the form of the state, this auxiliary informa-
tion should be appended into all the “basis states” shown in (492). Even if the symbol is the
same, the “basis state” in the “Statement-round-(i+1)” contains more auxiliary information.
And we note that |ψi+10 〉 , |ψi+11 〉 come from (518)(524).
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• We still use Adv (instead of Adv′ or Adv′′) to denote the adversary.
• We loosen some parameters to make the statement looks simpler.
Thus we complete the reduction in this round.
K.3 Overall Reduction
Finally we put the argument in Section K.2 to a bigger picture and prove Lemma 12.1. Recall
Section 12.4 for the “Statement-round-i-completed” used in this induction-style reduction.
Proof of Lemma 12.1. In the last section we show how to reduce “Statement-round-i-completed”
to “Statement-round-(i + 1)-completed”. And the form of the initial statement is Lemma 12.1.
Intuitively we can just repeat this reduction process. However, note that in each round of this
reduction there is an implicit assumption: | |φi〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 |, which is assumed in (497) as a
condition of this reduction. If this condition is not satisfied at some step, we need to stop this
“statement reduction” process.
Thus the overall reduction process is done as follows. Note that here we also give an explicit
explanation on how we deal with the quantifier on the adversary.
1. We want to prove Lemma 12.1. We only need to prove the conclusion in Lemma 12.1 for a
specific but arbitrarily-chosen adversary Adv.
2. To prove it, we can turn to prove “Statement-round-1-completed”. Note that in this new
statement there is a ∀ quantifier before the adversary in it; and it certainly covers the case
where the adversary is Adv that we consider in the last step.
3. To prove “Statement-round-1-completed”, we only need to prove the conclusion for a specific
but arbitrarily-chosen adversary Adv. (We use the same notation since Adv in the step above
is already useless here.) Then we consider whether | |φ1〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 | is satisfied. If not,
stop. Otherwise, reduce it to “Statement-round-2-completed”.
4. Similarly consider whether | |φ2〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 | is satisfied. If not, stop. Otherwise, reduce it
to “Statement-round-3-completed”.
5. · · · · · ·
This argument can be repeated as long as | |φi〉 | ≥ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 | and i ∈ [κ] hold. Then when this
repetition of reduction stops, (suppose it stops at round s,) no matter it stops because which one
is violated, we always have | |φs〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 |. Then the final state has the form we want, except
an exponential small additional term, and we can apply Lemma 12.3. The conditions for applying
Lemma 12.3 hold because:
• The state form in “statement-round-s-completed” is the same as the requirement in Lemma
12.3. And | |φs〉 | ≤ 2−κ| |ϕ1〉 |.
• As we say in the “statement-round-s-completed”, |ψib〉 is (1, κ2κ+3)-server-side representable
from
|φ0〉⊙ < AuxInf1∼s1 > ⊙ < BasisTest(K; 1 ∼ sκ) > ⊙ < TAG1∼s > (527)
Since (527) is (2η/7, 2−η/7| |ϕ〉 |)-SC-secure forK (by Lemma 6.11), we know |ψib〉 is (2η/7.5, 2−η/7| |ϕ〉 |)-
SC-secure for K.
Thus applying Lemma 12.3 we complete the proof.
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L An Index of Very Common Notations and Definitions
• Read-only buffer: a system that stores the client side transcript and auxiliary information.
See Definition 3.3.
• Natural notation, purified notation: the former is for the correctness and the later is for the
security proof, except some explicit stated cases. See Section 3.1. Note that in this paper the
purified notation and the natural notation are sometimes mixed together.
• < · · · >: the output of some algorithms, usually used to describe client-side messages, tran-
scripts of protocols or auxiliary information.
• ⊙: The client sends some messages or auxiliary information to the read-only buffer. See
Definition 3.5.
• Gadget(K): the “gadget” corresponding to key set K. See Notation 4.1.
• SC-secure, ANY-secure, unpredictability: See Definition 4.5, 6.2, 6.3.
• Query number |Adv|: number of queries to H (or sometimes other oracles, for some explicitly
stated cases.) in the code of Adv. See Definition 3.11.
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